The Social Psychology of Hatred

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Abstract

Hatred has not typically been a topic of research in the field of social psychology, although several components which embody hatred have been studied extensively in this field. Social psychologists have traditionally considered prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination and intergroup aggression to be highly important and socially relevant topics for research, and thousands of studies by social psychologists have examined these and other issues related to hatred. There are three primary approaches social psychologists have utilized in studying prejudice and intergroup aggression. The first approach may be thought of as a general model of social influence in which a variety of situational factors have been found to increase, or decrease, laboratory subjects' proclivity to engage in stereotyping or aggressive behavior. Particular types of situations may promote hatred, such as when individuals in mobs behave in ways they ordinarily would not. The second approach might be termed an interpersonal attitude approach, in the sense that individuals are measured in the degree to which they hold attitudes corresponding to authoritarianism and social dominance, which in turn relate to social hostility and prejudice. This approach, popular in the 1950s and 1960s, fell out of favor during the past quarter century, and is currently experiencing a revival of interest by researchers. The third approach focuses on social cognition or the way in which humans perceive the social world in a biased manner due to limits on the brain's information processing capacity. The social cognition approach in turn gave rise to social categorization theory and social identity theory, both of which describe important aspects of intergroup processes that explain outgroup derogation and discrimination. Each of these three approaches describes aspects of what we may commonly think of as hatred.

Social psychologists have traditionally considered issues such as prejudice, ethnocentrism, intergroup hostility and aggressive behavior to be important topics of study in which theoretically based laboratory research could potentially help resolve serious problems humans encounter in their lives. Prejudice, ethnocentrism, intergroup hostility and aggressive behavior are cer-

49

tainly aspects of what we think of as "hatred," though little research in this branch of psychology has focused specifically on hate. The concept of hate would be extremely difficult to operationalize and test under the scientifically controlled conditions preferred by social psychologists. Yet there is a vast literature developed by social psychologists that describes several aspects of what we call hatred. Social psychologists have frequently considered laboratory research an adjunct to illustrating issues that are deserving of social change. For example, Kenneth and Mamie Clark (1947) demonstrated with dolls the impact of racism on toy preferences of young children, showing that African-American children preferred white dolls over black dolls and considered white dolls to be superior. These laboratory findings were cited by Supreme Court chief justice Earl Warren in the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954.

There have been at least three major independent approaches used by social psychologists to investigate prejudice and intergroup hostility. In the *social influence* perspective, exemplified by the experiments of Stanley Milgram, researchers explore how the presence of others can change the way an individual thinks and behaves. While not specifically focusing on intergroup hostility or hatred, the social influence approach has been useful in explaining the behavior of individuals in groups or individuals given requests by important authority figures. Such classic social psychological theories as diffusion of responsibility (Latané and Darley 1968), deindividuation (Watson 1973), and obedience to authority (Milgram 1965) have been demonstrated to be linked to interpersonal aggression, particularly in crowd situations (Milgram and Toch 1968; Mullen 1986) or when important authority figures endorse violence and hatred (Staub 1989; Waller 2002). Additionally, social learning theory (Bandura 1973), where aggressive behavior becomes more likely after an individual observes "justified" aggression being modeled by another person (e.g., Berkowitz 1965), can be thought of as falling in this social influence branch of social psychology. The second approach, which I refer to as the *social-political attitudes* perspective, is best known for the research conducted by Theodor Adorno and his colleagues (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford 1950), published in a volume titled *The Authoritarian Personality*. Voluminous research on this topic was conducted in the quarter century after Adorno et al.'s influential publication, yet the topic of authoritarianism fell out of favor in the last quarter of the twentieth century. In recent years there has been a renewed interest in authoritarianism and its relationship to interpersonal aggression and intergroup hostility, largely because of the work of Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996), who revised and updated the theoretical construct of authoritarianism as well as the scale used to measure it. A complementary social-political outlook known as social dominance orientation has been identified by Sidanius and Pratto (1999), wherein some individuals approve of social stratification and group-based power differentials. Recently, the constructs of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have been used in a model to explain nationalism and outgroup prejudice (Duckitt, Wagner, Du

Plessis, and Birum 2002). Altemeyer (2004) has identified a small cross-section who score high on both authoritarianism and social dominance, exhibiting the worst qualities of both. According to Altemeyer, these individuals are highly prejudiced and ethnocentric, as well as highly driven to dominate others, and they gravitate toward leadership positions. The third approach is known widely as the *social cognition* perspective. This approach grew from observations that the human mind is an imperfect information processing tool that frequently utilizes shortcuts in order to quickly and efficiently categorize information from our social worlds and draw conclusions from what we perceive. These short-cuts, or mental heuristics, allow for faster processing of information, but they also make us susceptible to a wide array of poor judgments. The social cognition perspective in turn gave rise to social categorization theory and social iden-tity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), which originated in the observation that merely placing individuals in random groups was sufficient to elicit ingroup preference. Recent research in this area has demonstrated that although ingroup bias occurs easily, outgroup hostility occurs under specific conditions of status differential in terms of group stability, legitimacy, and permeability (Bet-tencourt, Dorr, Charlton, and Hume 2001). Today, social categorization and social identity theory are largely independent of mainstream social cognition research, but they continue to share their origins in imperfect social percep-tions, so I will group them together here. This is a grouping not all would agree with, but I believe their similarities are more than sufficient.

These three perspectives do not encompass all social psychological approaches to studying aggressive behavior, discrimination or prejudice, but they have been highly successful research programs, each operating indepen-dently and approaching these issues from a unique perspective. Social psychol-ogists have developed research programs to explain how we think about and perceive the world around us, how we determine what our attitudes are, how we determine our emotions, and how we understand others, as well as many other issues. A number of these research paradigms can also be used to help explain certain elements of aggressive behavior, dislike of others, or even hatred. Not all of these research programs will be described here.

I. Social influence

The early years of social psychology were marked by the formulation of grand theories that explained much of social behavior (Rosnow 1987). This early research often focused on group-based influence on the behavior of indi-viduals. Some classic theories of social psychology focused on such important issues as the construction of social norms (Sherif 1937), conformity (Asch 1951), obedience to authority (Milgram 1965), the power of social roles (Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, and Jaffe 1974), and bystander intervention and apa-thy (Latané and Darley 1968). Several of these theories were developed specifi-cally as explanations for aggressive behavior or intergroup conflict.

Muzafer Sherif, an early leader of social psychology, was born in 1906 in Turkey. When Sherif was 13 years old Greek soldiers invaded the Turkish village where he lived and proceeded to murder adult males villagers. The man next to Sherif was bayoneted to death, but Sherif was allowed to live because of his youth (Trotter 1985). As a result of this tragic event Sherif devoted his life to exploring the causes of international aggression and how it could be reduced. In a now classic study, Sherif (1937) placed subjects in a darkened room and asked them to estimate how far a dot of light moved across a screen. In fact the pinpoint of light was stationary. Under conditions such as these, an optical illusion known as the autokinetic effect makes it seem as if the light travels. Subjects were thus placed in a situation in which *reality was ambiguous* and in which they were asked to provide information about something that was indeterminate. Results showed that when subjects completed the task in groups, they frequently demonstrated the emergence of a social norm in terms of their belief about the movement of the light: After several trials the subjects would tend to conform and each subject in the group would provide a similar estimate. In other words, in this situation in which reality was ambiguous, subjects looked to each other for information about what was happening and developed a socially constructed reality regarding their belief about how far the dot of light was moving. Sherif believed that slogans and propaganda produce a similar mental process on a national or cultural level through the creation of cultural assumptions or interpretations of reality regarding international politics and relations with nations considered to be enemies. Chomsky (1989) has argued that in democratic societies, political and economic pressures on news organizations and the mass media result in cultural social constructions that tend to reflect a dominant world view, to the exclusion of alternatives. In Nazi Germany, propaganda and control of the media likely helped limit the potential resistance of non-Jewish German citizens to the Nazi genocidal agenda by presenting a unified anti-Semitic world view (Staub 1989). Presenting an alternative viewpoint is important for resistance to the dominant view for the very simple reason that it provides people with different ways to interpret the same situations. During the Nazi occupation of France the citizens of Le Chambon (who were Huguenots and thus "outsiders" in a sense in French society) saved several thousand Jews by adopting them into their families and hiding them from the Nazis who would transport them to Germany. Notably, the public statements by village Pastor Andre Trocme and by the village doctor appeared to persuade members of the Vichy police and even a German officer to help the villagers in their efforts (Staub 1989).

Solomon Asch (1951, 1956) also demonstrated group conformity, but rather than utilizing ambiguous stimuli as Sherif had done, Asch chose to make reality as obvious as possible in his conformity experiments. Asch arranged an experimental setting in which the subject was provided with a designated time to arrive at the laboratory. When he arrived (all Asch's subjects in this experiment were males) he found that the experiment had already begun. In fact,

Asch arranged this on purpose. The experimental room had in it a long table at which a number of young men were seated, all facing in the same direction. These individuals were all confederates who pretended to be subjects but were actually working for Asch, while the one true subject was told to arrive late as a ploy to get him seated in the last chair at the table. Once the real subject was seated the experiment began, and all the men at the table were asked to observe a line that had been printed on a poster board. They were then asked to observe three comparison lines of differing lengths and make a judgment about which comparison line matched the original line. The task was designed to be extremely easy, and anyone with reasonable vision would be able to determine the correct answer. After making a choice, each person at the table was required to say out loud which line he thought was correct. In this way the real subject was placed in a position in which he knew the answers of the rest of the group, and they would know his. The first two trials went smoothly and all confederates picked the correct comparison line. However, as the experiment progressed, all the confederates began making the same wrong comparisons. The true subject was faced with a dilemma: Should he bravely go against the group and declare the correct answer (which was obvious)? Or should he play it safe and go along with the majority? Across 12 trials 76% of subjects went along with the group and gave an obviously incorrect response at least once (approximately one-third of the subjects could be considered frequent conformers by giving many incorrect answers). When asked to provide their answers by means of a secret ballot, subjects gave correct answers, demonstrating that they in fact knew the responses. When one confederate in the group went against the majority and gave the correct answer, the real subject (apparently emboldened by the rebellious confederate) also gave the correct answer more frequently. Asch believed these results indicated that people do not blindly follow crowds, but rather rationally weigh the amount of disapproval they expect to face. They conform when their anxiety (about looking foolish in front of others) becomes too great (Blass 2004). Norms do not by themselves persuade people to believe what they do is right, but norms may create deep tension in those who rebel against them.

Social norms, as Asch demonstrated, influence behavior powerfully and can be seen, for example, in the code of silence followed by police officers, who identify so strongly with their units that they refuse to bear witness against other officers' transgressions (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). Asch's subjects felt distress at the thought of disapproval from total strangers. Members of groups who share a strong common identity likely feel tremendous pressure to conform to accepted norms, even when conforming means violating their inner beliefs and attitudes. Cults frequently use this approach in order to obtain outward conformity among their recruits as a requisite stepping-stone toward the goal of true persuasion. Zimbardo and Anderson (1993) argue that "mind control" is not an issue of force (i.e., norms) because it is possible to pressure people to say or do things they don't believe, but it is not possible to force them

to *believe* what they know to be false (fictional themes such as the Manchurian Candidate notwithstanding). True persuasion as practiced by cults relies on a combination of the Asch-type of normative influence to accomplish behavioral conformity and the Sherif-type of informational influence to change inner beliefs, resulting in the conversion experience. Normative pressure may temporarily change behavior, but to change inner beliefs it takes the soft touch of informational influence (Zimbardo and Anderson 1993). Cults typically use a combination of outward pressure to obtain behavioral conformity from recruits, combined with restriction of outside information (in the form of television, radio, books, telephones) and intense and repeated exposure to the world view of the cult (Singer 2003). It should be noted that converts to cults frequently find that membership satisfies important self-esteem needs in their lives; thus they should be thought of not as passive recipients of "mind control," but rather as active participants in the process (see, e.g., Bromley and Richardson 1983; Richardson 1999). Similar processes almost certainly play an important role in white supremacy groups catering to disaffected youths with free music, beer, and racist ideology (see, e.g., Blee 2002; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile 1997). Asch's point was that those who stand out often find the experience to be anxiety-provoking and will frequently express attitudes consistent with those of the group in order to reduce this pressure. This type of behavioral conformity essentially opens the path for actual persuasion to occur. True persuasion or indoctrination comes later, after repeated exposure to persuasive communications, the creation of a social consensus, testimonials from trusted friends or authority figures, and perhaps half a dozen other persuasion techniques too detailed to describe here (Cialdini 2001; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1996; Pratkanis and Aronson 1992).

In August 1961 social psychologist Stanley Milgram began work on what is perhaps the most well-known, and some would say notorious, series of experiments in all of psychology (Blass 2004). In 1955 Milgram was a graduate student and a research assistant to Solomon Asch and aided in Asch's conformity experiment described above. As a junior professor at Yale, Milgram sought to find a way to replicate and extend Asch's conformity research. Whereas Asch was interested in the power of the individual to resist the pressure to conform, Milgram was interested in whether individuals would comply with requests from authority figures that violated their ethical standards. Milgram's idea came directly from the trial of Adolf Eichmann, who as a high-ranking Nazi officer was given responsibility for all Jews in Germany and was given control of the system of transportation that was used in the deportation of Jews both from occupied areas to work camps and to concentration camps. Eichmann was involved not only in the transporting of prisoners, but also in the development and administration of the various apparatuses of extermination used by the Nazis. It was Eichmann who ensured that the quotas of the death camps were regularly met. At the end of World War II Eichmann escaped Germany and fled to Argentina, where he was captured by Israeli secret police on

May 2, 1960 (Wistrich 1997). His trial was an international media event and Milgram made explicit references to Eichmann's statements (that he had been following orders) when he designed his obedience experiments (Blass 2004).

In order to examine how far ordinary people would go in following the orders of an authority figure, Milgram invited ordinary people from the community to participate in an experiment involving a learner, whose task was to memorize various word combinations, and a teacher, who was to administer painful electric shocks when the learner gave wrong answers. The experiment was rigged so that subjects always were placed in the role of teacher and a mild-mannered middle-aged man (working for Milgram) always was placed in the role of learner. Subjects saw the learner strapped into a chair with electrical conductors taped to his arms in order to heighten the realism of the deception. In fact, no shocks were ever given to the learner. Very soon after the experiment began the learner would begin making errors, and the teacher (i.e., the true experimental subject) would be required to give electric shocks of increasing intensity by flipping switches on a highly realistic-appearing sham shock-box designed by Milgram. The learner, seated behind a partition in another room, would make verbal protests of increasing intensity as the intensity of the "shocks" grew. In fact, the learner's screams and protests were tape recordings played in response to specific levels of shock triggered by the teacher. If at any point the teacher refused to continue, another actor pretending to be the experimenter (actually a local high school biology teacher) would say various phrases to the effect that the experiment required that he or she continue to administer shocks to the learner. If the teacher became concerned about the learner's health, the experimenter would say that he would take full responsibility and that the teacher should continue with the experiment (Blass 2004).

Milgram conducted a number of variations on this theme, altering the distance between the teacher and learner, the perceived level of authority of the experimenter, the proximity of the experimenter to the teacher, and so forth. In the primary obedience condition described above, 65% of subjects were fully compliant with the demands of the experimenter, administering the maximum amount of shock (450 volts) to an unwilling and possibly unconscious victim (Milgram 1963). In another version of the experiment subjects were required to press the hand of the learner to a shock plate, thus placing them in direct proximity to their victims. Even in this intimate setting, 30% of subjects gave the maximum amount of shock to their victims. In a letter to a colleague describing this variation, Milgram expressed his concern: "It was a very disturbing sight since the victim resists strenuously and emits cries of agony" (quoted in Blass 2004, 96). Milgram observed that subjects appeared highly conflicted about complying with requests to provide high-level shocks to the learner. Subjects were observed to sweat, tremble, bite their lips, groan, and burst out in laughter at inappropriate times (Milgram 1965). Some were even described by Milgram as falling into uncontrollable fits or seizures. Toward the end of the series of obedience experiments Milgram filmed 14 subjects in one variation specifically

for use in the documentary film titled *Obedience*, which is now a standard teaching tool in introductory psychology classes. The responses demonstrated by subjects in that film are candid, since they did not know they were being filmed (Blass 2004). Only those subjects who gave permission after the experiment were shown in the documentary. Adolf Eichmann was executed May 31, 1962, four days after Milgram completed his experiments (Blass 2004).

Milgram believed his experiments raised serious questions about the type of hatred and violence exhibited by the Nazis. If these experimental results are to be believed, Milgram argued, then it is possible even in a democratic society to find citizens who will obey authority figures and comply with orders to commit immoral acts. Milgram (1965) concluded that human nature alone cannot be counted on to protect us from harm at the behest of malevolent authority figures. Examples of such malevolent authority figures abound, and they are not restricted to government officials. A cult leader, the head of a gang, or a religious leader would be expected to be able to obtain great levels of obedience, perhaps in proportion to the level of devotion or fanaticism exhibited by his or her followers. This certainly would be an explanation for the behavior of the followers of cult leader Jim Jones, who ordered the assassination of Congressman Jim Ryan (who was visiting the People's Temple in Guyana) and then commanded his followers to commit mass suicide. Many of Jones's followers refused to drink the cyanide-laced Kool-Aid prepared for them; these rebellious followers were shot to death by more devoted members (Chidester 2003). Obedience to authority has played a role in murder in a number of religious groups, including Mormons (Sasse and Widder 1991), Hare Krishna (Hubner and Gruson 1988), Branch Davidians (Robbins and Post 1997) and Aum Shinrikyo (Juergensmeyer 2000), to name a few. Obedience to authority figures among followers of the multitudinous reactionary Islamic religious factions likely figures largely in the current worldwide wave of terrorism (Juergensmeyer 2000; Post 2004). Paranoia among members of such groups, feelings of being trapped, a history of persecution, a sense of divine providence, psychological dependence of members on the group, and the belief that self-sacrifice benefits the collective good of their group will likely increase followers' willingness to comply when leaders ask for murderous actions (Juergensmeyer 2000; Post 2004; Robbins and Post 1997).

Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, and Jaffe (1974), in what has come to be known as the Stanford prison experiment, placed an advertisement in a newspaper to recruit subjects for an extended study of the effects of prison life. Over 70 people answered the notice and were given extensive psychological tests to determine their eligibility for participating in the study. After eliminating those with mental illness or a history of crime or drug abuse, Zimbardo and his colleagues had a sample of 24 college students who were randomly assigned to be prisoners or guards in what was intended to be a two-week role-playing experiment of prison conditions. Subjects quickly adopted their new roles. Those assigned as prisoners became docile, compliant and depressed, while guards

took on an air of authority and some became willing to mete out punishments to their prisoners. Concerns about the brutality of the guards and the mental well-being of the prisoners caused the cessation of the experiment after six days. Some guards were respectful of prisoners, but others sought to humiliate them. Several guards attempted in extreme ways to degrade and dehumanize prisoners by using threats, insults, and deindividuating comments, and by forcing prisoners to stand at attention for hours, do push-ups and jumping jacks, and clean toilet bowls with their bare hands (Zimbardo et al. 1974). Guards even forced prisoners to engage in simulated acts of sodomy (Zimbardo 2004a). Prisoners responded by becoming withdrawn, depressed, and submissive. Zimbardo, in explaining the brutality of the guards, observed a downward spiral in which the silence of the respectful guards reinforced the behavior of the brutal guards. Zimbardo reasoned that the brutal guards were exploring the boundaries of acceptable normative behavior and took the silence of the respectful guards as a sign of approval for the punishments they were devising. (Zimbardo had never provided guards a set of rules for how to interact with prisoners.)

Such a pattern may be at the root of such events as the beating of motorist Rodney King by four Los Angeles police officers: Many officers were present at the scene, yet none told the four arresting officers that they were going too far in their use of force. The Los Angeles police inhabited a social environment that might have contributed to the level of aggression used against King. Chief of Police Daryl Gates had a lengthy history of angering the public in Los Angeles by repeatedly making racially insensitive remarks (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993). While on patrol the officers involved in the beating communicated with each other from their squad cars using a computer messaging system; examination of the transcripts of these messages reveals that these officers used derogatory ethnic labels such as "gorillas in the mist" to refer to African-Americans (Mydans 1991). These officers worked in a social setting where they were primed to expect to need to use force (Skolnick and Fyfe 1993) and their superiors joined them in using derogatory ethnic labels; finally, the use of excessive force may have been approved tacitly by other officers through their silent presence at the beating. In an editorial in the *Boston Globe*, Zimbardo (2004a) draws a parallel between the Stanford prison experiment and the behavior of guards at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Guards in Iraq operated under conditions of secrecy, with no rules regarding permissible or forbidden behavior, no clear chain of command, and encouragement for breaking the will of their captives. Certainly some guards were respectful of their prisoners' rights and humanity, but their unwillingness or inability to voice their opposition to the cruelty of other guards helped create a situation that encouraged the worst behavior in others. Zimbardo and his colleagues (1974) were unable to predict from psychological tests which guards would become brutal, and he attributes this to the various situational forces that encourage otherwise good people to

perform acts of brutality in prison settings as well as other places (Zimbardo 2004b).

Another important theory from the social influence perspective for understanding hatred and violence is that of bystander apathy. Forty years ago, in the summer of 1964, Catherine "Kitty" Genovese was attacked by a stranger as she returned home from work around 1 a.m.; she was stabbed as she fled from her parked car to her apartment in a residential area of Queens, New York. In the resulting melee her screams alerted her neighbors that something was amiss, and at least one man opened his window to yell at the attacker to "let that girl alone!" (Gansberg 1965, 37). Mosley, the man convicted of the crime, reported that the noise created by the neighbors did nothing to deter him because, he said, he was convinced they would do nothing. And indeed nothing was done. Mosley fled the scene briefly. Ms. Genovese, having already been stabbed several times, struggled to the vestibule of her apartment house and collapsed, but Mosley returned 15 minutes later and attacked again, this time killing her. Newspapers picked up the story when a police captain told a reporter that 38 witnesses either saw or heard the attack and none offered to help or even call the police (Rosenthal 1999; Sexton 1995). In an investigation of the witnesses, one reported that she had tried to call police but was "gasping for breath and unable to talk into the telephone" (Gansberg 1965, 37). Another witness reported that her husband wanted to call police but she told him not to, saying "there must have been 30 calls already" (Gansberg 1965, 37), and they proceeded to watch the attack for 20 minutes. The characterization by the media of these witnesses as uncaring and indifferent city dwellers opened a heated national debate regarding the alleged deleterious effects of urban life on the human psyche and our willingness to help those in need. Social psychologists immediately became interested and sought to investigate the phenomenon in the laboratory, and their results quickly made headlines ("One Witness Better than 38" 1966).

Rather than ask what was wrong with New Yorkers, social psychologists Bibb Latané and John Darley sought to create an experiment that would reveal the situational forces behind the behavior of these witnesses (Latané 1987). Latané and Darley (1968) created a simulated emergency in the laboratory by staging a situation in which subjects believed they were talking with other students isolated in separate rooms over an intercom (in fact, the words were scripted and the voices played from a tape recorder at appropriate moments; subjects were run through the experiment one at a time and each heard the same scenario from the intercom). After a few minutes of staged conversation over the intercom system, the subject heard one of the other students fall down and lapse into an epileptic seizure. The researchers would then watch to see if the subject attempted to get help. Their results replicated what had happened in the Genovese case: The greater the number of other students supposedly listening in on their own intercoms, the smaller the likelihood that the real subject would try to obtain help. Latané and Darley called this phenomenon *diffusion of*

responsibility, theorizing that the greater the number of people witnessing an emergency, the less responsible any single individual will feel for helping. These results match closely the experience of the witness to the Genovese murder who persuaded her husband not to call police because she was certain many others had already called.

Latané and Darley (1970) continued in this line of research with another experiment, in which students were seated at a table in a room waiting for the experiment to begin when smoke began pouring into the room from a vent. Some of the students were confederates who were instructed to keep sitting as if nothing unusual were happening. Results indicated that when more students sat and acted as if nothing were happening, the real subject was less likely to seek help. Latané and Darley reasoned that the real subjects looked at the impassive people around them and decided that because no one else appeared to believe there was an emergency, everything must be all right. The researchers labeled this tendency *pluralistic ignorance*: When trying to decide whether an emergency is actually happening, people will often look to each other for information, and if other people are behaving as if nothing is happening, then they may conclude that nothing is out of the ordinary. Bystander apathy can thus be the result of either or both of these two processes:

1) Bystanders who in fact recognize that an emergency exists may not help because they believe others will.

2) Bystanders who are unsure whether an emergency exists may look to others and, seeing their passivity, conclude that there is no emergency.

Staub (1989) argues that bystander apathy, in the form of diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance, is an important factor in the genesis of mass violence and genocide. When crowds of onlookers did nothing to stop Nazi thugs from beating Jews in the streets of Germany, it both made the behavior seem normal to the onlookers and allowed the thugs to feel as if they could do what they wished with impunity. People in groups feel less responsible, which explains why those in large groups are less likely to help and also why people in large groups can commit acts thinking that there will be no repercussions.

Being a member of a large crowd also produces a state of deindividuation, in which the individual is less likely to attend to his or her inner values. Alcohol, wearing uniforms or masks, nighttime, and being a member of a large crowd all help produce a psychological state of deindividuation (Duval and Wicklund 1972; Mullen, Migdal, and Rozell 2003; Watson 1973), whereas placing an individual in front of a mirror helps produce a state of self-focused attention in which inner attitudes and values will become more pronounced (Scheier and Carver 1983; Deiner, Fraser, Beaman, and Kelem 1976). Watson (1973) found in a cross-cultural survey of tribal societies that warriors who wore masks or painted their faces were more likely to kill, maim, or torture their enemies than were those who did not. Silke (2003) examined 500 violent

attacks in Northern Ireland and found that 206 were carried out by offenders wearing masks, and that the wearing of masks was associated with greater levels of violence and/or vandalism. Deiner, Fraser, Beaman and Kelem (1976), in a study carried out at numerous residences on Halloween, found that anonymous trick-or-treaters took more candy than they should (a note placed above the bowl asked them to take just one piece) and that placing a mirror in front of an unattended candy bowl reduced the amount of candy taken. Analyzing the ratio of victims to offenders in photographs taken at 60 lynchings, Brian Mullen (1986) found a greater level of atrocity committed by offenders when larger crowds were involved. Mullen reasoned that as crowd size increases lynchers become more deindividuated and less attentive to self-regulatory cues. (Surprisingly, numerous photographs exist of lynchings [see, e.g., Allen, Als, Lewis, and Litwack 2003]).

Being in a deindividuated state does not reliably produce a willingness to follow the crowd, but rather appears to make individuals more sensitive to cultural or group-based norms that may be present. For example, Johnson and Downing (1979) dressed subjects either in Ku Klux Klan-type outfits (white hoods and overalls) or in nurse uniforms and placed them in a situation in which they were required to give electric shocks to a victim. Those wearing KKK outfits gave greater intensity shocks, but those dressed as nurses did not. The nurse uniform produces a deindividuated state, as uniforms tend to do, but this type of outfit is associated with a norm of caring, which apparently influenced the subjects. This indicates that deindividuation alone is not sufficient to cause a mob to commit violence, although if members of the crowd begin to behave violently it may foster the creation of a norm that others will follow if they also believe that violence will achieve a desired goal for the group. Milgram and Toch (1968) argued that riots occur not as a contagion effect wherein people blindly follow the violent crowd, but rather because members of the crowd share concerns about past injustices to which they are giving voice. Postmes and Spears (1998), in a meta-analysis of deindividuation research, found that deindividuation does not produce behavior antinormative to society in a general sense (which is what deindividuation theorists had previously believed was the case). Postmes and Spears found rather strong evidence that deindividuation leads to an increase in behavior that is normative to the specific situation. Under deindividuating circumstances individuals become more responsive to immediate social norms, as illustrated by Johnson and Downing's (1979) study using KKK uniforms.

When diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic ignorance, and deindividuation are considered together, they offer a compelling explanation for collective violence. An example of a temporary group norm resulting in collective violence occurred at the annual Puerto Rican day parade in New York City in June 2000. Normally an exuberant but peaceful event that moves down Fifth Avenue and ends inside Central Park, the parade that year was marred when dozens of men began dousing women with water, tearing at their clothes, and groping

them. Over 53 women were "groped, stripped, or otherwise abused" (Newman 2000, B.3), some had all of their clothes torn off while a crowd of bystanders stood and watched, and many victims were later found by police cowering on the ground or under carts in fear that they would be gang-raped (Chivers and Flynn 2000; Rashbaum and Chivers 2000). Newspaper reports reconstructed the timeline of the 35-minute event through eyewitness accounts and video-taped recordings. It was a hot, sunny day, and one man carrying a large bag of ice poured cold water on a woman whom he did not know. Photographs show she reacted positively to this, which apparently encouraged other men nearby to do the same (Barstow and Chivers 2000). As some men began grabbing at strangers' clothing, there were no authority figures to tell them to stop (the police were strangely absent from this section of Central Park and did not respond to repeated requests to move to the scene of the melee) and no male bystanders told the offenders to stop. (The offenders apparently did not listen to their victims' protestations or take them seriously.) In this way a temporary norm was established for the males in the crowd, informing them through example that it was acceptable to rip the clothes off of women. In spite of the size of the crowd, several eyewitnesses (both females and males) left the scene to locate police officers to report the ongoing crimes. Mysteriously, although reports were given to a number of police officers, none of them left their posts on Fifth Avenue to venture into the park to investigate. Is it possible these officers suffered from diffusion of responsibility due to the size of the parade and the fact that hundreds of police were watching it? Videotapes were later used by the police to locate the men involved in the attacks; most had no arrest records or histories of violence, and several described feeling swept up in the tide of events and unable to stop (Chivers 2000; Rashbaum 2000; Rashbaum and Chivers 2000).

II. Social-political attitudes: Authoritarianism and social dominance

The concept of the authoritarian personality can be traced more or less directly to research inspired by the Nazi rise to power in the early 1930s (Stone, Lederer, and Christie 1993). What would eventually become a project for iden-tifying the qualities of a "prefascist" personality structure began as an attempt to explain European workers' political preference for capitalism over socialism after World War I (Samelson 1993). One of these researchers was Wilhelm Reich, a member of Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic circle who was politically active. An avowed Marxist, Reich sought to "provide health care as well as political and sexual enlightenment to the workers of Vienna" (Samelson 1993, 24). In the *Mass Psychology of Fascism*, originally published in Germany in 1933, Reich outlined what amounted to a parallel interpretation of Freud's Oedipal complex in which he hypothesized that "the tie to the authoritarian family is established by means of sexual inhibition; that it is the original bio-

logical tie of the child to the mother and also of the mother to the child that forms the barricade to sexual reality and leads to an indissoluble sexual fixation and to an incapacity to enter into other relations" (Reich 1970, 56). Reich believed that repressive child-rearing, as practiced in Germany at the time, caused children to be sexually inhibited during puberty, a time when Reich felt sexual exploration was natural and healthy. Failure to cross this hurdle in puberty would cause a Freudian-style neurosis to develop, the outcome of which was excessive nationalism in the adult and hostility to outsiders. Reich's open criticism of Freudian theory led to his being thrown out of Freud's circle, and his criticism of prominent Nazis led to his being forced out of Germany (Christie 1991).

Reich's book describing authoritarianism in psychoanalytic terms would have been read in Europe, but not in America because it was not translated until after the war. American psychologists at the time appear to have been completely unaware of these ideas (Christie 1991). However, this line of research continued from other directions. Erich Fromm fled from Germany to New York before the war, and in his 1941 book *Escape from Freedom* he offered a more traditional psychoanalytic explanation for authoritarianism. Fromm argued that true personal freedom is difficult to maintain because of the tension associated with the responsibility it entails, and that puritanical and punishing child-rearing practices prevent people from being able to cope with true freedom, thus causing them to yearn for submission to authority figures. European psychoanalysts were quite interested in pursuing this idea of an authoritarian personality as an explanation for the tragedy of the Nazi rise to power. American psychologists, on the other hand, were more likely to look for mental illness among the Nazis as an explanation for their behavior, and there was a public perception that a "mad Nazi" thesis would be supported (Waller 2002). During the Nuremberg trials in 1945 American psychologists and psychiatrists administered Rorschach inkblot tests to Nazi prisoners, but several attempts to interpret their responses failed to yield any overt signs of serious pathology. At the same time, interviews with rank-and-file prisoners of war caused some Allied psychologists to suspect that German soldiers were unusually submissive and had poorly integrated personalities. (Of course, this could have been a result of having been captured.) There was a sense that something was different about German soldiers, even if they did not exhibit greater levels of psychopathology (Waller 2002).

Building on Fromm's (1941) thesis that harsh parenting creates submissive yet hostile adults, a team of researchers located in Berkeley, California embarked on a project (with a small grant from the American Jewish Committee) to create a scale measuring the "pre-fascist" personality structure (which they called the California F-scale). In 1950 Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford published the results of their investigation in a volume titled *The Authoritarian Personality* (TAP). Although TAP had not been subjected to scientific scrutiny it was warmly received, perhaps because it allowed for a

relatively fast and clear assessment of prejudice and narrow-mindedness by asking questions which were seemingly unrelated to anti-Semitism or other undesirable attitudes (Christie 1991, 1993). Psychologists used the scale extensively; Meloen (1993) found 2,341 publications on authoritarianism and dogmatism between 1950 and 1989.

By the 1980s there was a sharp decrease in research on authoritarianism. There were several reasons for this. First, the theory was embedded in psychoanalytic concepts wherein prejudice (and aggression in general) was the result of either displacement or projection. In Freud's model, anger at unacceptable (strong) targets must be displaced toward safer (weaker) targets. Also, unacceptable impulses directed toward parents would be suppressed, only to emerge later as aggression projected toward scapegoated outgroups. As psychologists built other, more parsimonious theories of aggression and prejudice, the theoretical underpinnings of authoritarianism began to seem dated (Taylor and Moghaddam 1994), and scientific research did not support the psychoanalytic approach to authoritarianism (Duckitt 1989, 1992, 2003). A second criticism focused on the psychometric properties of the F-scale itself. All the items on the scale were forward-coded so that anyone who was agreeable in his or her responses would score high. Research methodologists had by this time recognized that there is serious risk of biased results whenever items on a scale are all coded in the same direction (Christie 1991). An additional psychometric problem was that the F-scale seemed to be measuring a number of factors that were not related to the hypothesized construct of authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981). This called into question all results obtained using the F-scale since, because it was uncertain whether the scale actually measured what it was supposed to. These problems, combined with the rise of the social-cognitive model to studying prejudice, resulted in a dramatic decline in interest in research on authoritarianism.

University of Manitoba psychologist Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988, 1996) reconceptualized, revised and resuscitated the authoritarianism construct by creating a scale with good psychometric properties that measures what he called right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). Through extensive tinkering and testing with the RWA scale, Altemeyer identified three of Adorno et al.'s (1950) original nine components that worked well together: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Unlike the F-scale, Altemeyer's RWA scale is balanced with items both forward and reverse coded and has high reliability ratings. Those who score high on the RWA scale tend to be submissive to authority figures (they don't like to take charge), they are punitive toward those who are unconventional and those who are members of minority groups, and they are more conventional in their attitudes and behavior regarding such issues as sex, religion, and social customs. The existence of a reliable and valid measure of authoritarianism has rekindled interest in the topic, and recent years have seen advances in research relating authoritarianism to prejudice and discrimination.

A few of Altemeyer's many research findings will help illustrate the authoritarian style. To begin with, authoritarians are more obedient to authority. Regarding submission to authority, Elms and Milgram (1966) found that obedient subjects scored higher on the California F-scale, and in 1973 Altemeyer ran a replication of Milgram's obedience study and similarly found that following orders to give electric shocks was correlated with high RWA scores. In 1990 Altemeyer showed students the film of Milgram's experiments, *Obedience*, and asked them to assign responsibility to the players in the drama. Authoritarians were less likely to hold the experimenter responsible and more likely to blame the teacher (i.e., the subject) (Altemeyer 1996). Authoritarians are more accepting of illegal acts by government officials such as wire-taps and searches without warrants, and in one survey many authoritarians indicated that they believed Nixon was innocent of any wrongdoing (Altemeyer 1981). Authoritarian aggression may sound contradictory to the submission aspect of the construct but, as Altemeyer (1981) demonstrated, authoritarians are more punitive in mock jury experiments, giving out longer sentences and getting more personal satisfaction from punishing offenders. They are particularly punitive when asked to punish unconventional people such as hippies or vagrants, and they are more lenient to offenders who are "establishment" types such as businessmen or police officers. The hostility shown by authoritarians appears to be directed primarily toward those who are members of outgroups, that is to say non-mainstream or unconventional. They are more ethnocentric and prejudiced, showing greater antipathy toward members of most ethnic groups to which they do not belong (Altemeyer 1988, 1996). They are also anti-homosexual: Despite being generally in favor of law and order, they tend not to condemn gay-bashing (Altemeyer 1996). Altemeyer (1996) also found that authoritarians are generally anti-feminist, scoring high on a variety of scales measuring rape myth acceptance, acceptance of interpersonal violence toward women, likelihood of forcing sex, and so forth. Authoritarians are also more conventional: They endorse traditional sex roles, are more sexually and politically conservative, and are more religious.

Authoritarianism is a strong predictor of prejudice, but it is not the only predictor. In more recent years Jim Sidanius and Felicia Pratto (1999) have identified a complementary social-political style they call social dominance orientation. Social dominance theory (SDT) begins with the observation that all cultures have within them group-based social hierarchies in which dominant groups hold a greater share of wealth, power, and status, which Sidanius and Pratto refer to as positive social value. True, some cultures are more egalitarian than others, and SDT is rooted in the observation that arbitrary social hierarchies tend to be more pronounced in those societies that have greater levels of economic surplus. Put in another way, as societies achieve the means to produce economic surplus, they also devise hierarchies to justify unequal sharing of positive social value. Social dominance theory rests on three primary assumptions. First, arbitrary social hierarchies inevitably develop in the pres-

ence of economic surplus. Second, most forms of intergroup conflict (e.g., racism, sexism, nationalism) are natural outgrowths of our attempts to create social hierarchies. Finally, SDT views the history of social hierarchy as one in which there is a give-and-take between hierarchy-enhancing forces that promote inequity, and hierarchy-attenuating forces that seek to reduce inequity.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) refers to the degree to which an individual endorses the myths that legitimize social hierarchy, or the extent to which an individual desires and supports social hierarchy. Desire or support for social hierarchy may manifest because the individual is already at the upper strata of society and wishes to justify that position, or because the individual aspires to attain such a position. Social hierarchy may be supported ideologically by individuals within a society, but it is also the product of public and private institutions within a society. Legitimizing myths are seen by Sidanius and Pratto (1999) as the central element bridging the sociological and psychological aspects of their theory because legitimizing myths serve to justify social hierarchy while orienting the social perceptions of people within society. Racism, sexism, classism, nationalism, and negative stereotypes are examples of legitimizing myths that justify unequal distribution of wealth, power, and status. These in turn promote "behavioral asymmetry" or group-based differences in the behavior repertoire for individuals at different levels of the power continuum. Social dominance orientation thus refers to the degree to which an individual endorses the various myths that legitimize social hierarchy. This orientation is both the cause and the product of social hierarchy. Those who score high on the SDO scale tend to think of the world in terms of a competitive jungle in which the strongest succeed to reach the top, a world in which group-based power imbalance is seen as a failure of group members and not as a result of institutional factors. Not surprisingly, those high in SDO tend to oppose social welfare programs, but they also oppose civil rights policies and rights for gays and lesbians. Sidanius and Pratto (1999) have repeatedly found strong links between SDO and political conservatism, although SDO has only a small correlation with authoritarianism (Altemeyer 2004; Duckitt 2003).

Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, and Birum (2002) constructed and tested a structural model in which right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation were related to a variety of world views (such as "dangerous world" and "competitive world") and then measured in terms of how well RWA and SDO predicted prejudice and nationalism. Results indicated that social conformity and seeing the world as a dangerous place were associated with high levels of authoritarianism, which in turn was strongly related to both prejudice and nationalism. Interestingly, a second and relatively independent path emerged in which being tough-minded was strongly associated with thinking of the world as a competitive jungle, which in turn gave rise to social dominance, and SDO in turn was strongly related to both prejudice and nationalism. In this study authoritarianism and social dominance clearly operate independently of each other, perhaps in response to different types of encounters that give rise to

different world views (i.e., seeing the world as dangerous versus seeing the world as highly competitive), but both RWA and SDO make substantial contributions to both prejudice and nationalism. These are two pathways to prejudice: In the first, seeing the world as a dangerous place increases authoritarianism (and vice versa). These individuals desire greater social cohesion and conventionalism, and thus come to be suspicious of outgroups. On the other hand, viewing the world as a competitive jungle increases social dominance (and vice versa). These individuals view various social hierarchies as legitimate and seek to enhance themselves and their group at the expense of others (Duckitt 2003). These are two very different motivations for prejudice, which explains the nonsignificant relationship between RWA and SDO in Duckitt et al.'s (2002) model.

Combining these two lines of research, Altemeyer (2004) set out to locate people who scored high on both authoritarianism and social dominance. Ordinarily, authoritarians are *submissive* to authority figures, while social dominators seek to dominate others, so it was unclear how "double highs" would behave. Altemeyer has typically defined scoring high on his RWA scale by using a quartile-split in which the upper 25% of subjects are considered authoritarian (Altemeyer 1996). Creating a cross-section of the upper 25% of scores on the RWA scale with the upper 25% of scores on the SDO scale gave Altemeyer (2004) a group of "double highs," which would be roughly 5-10% of the total sample. (It's fairly rare to find a person who is an authoritarian-social dominator, but it happens.) Social dominators want to dominate; authoritarians want to submit. Social dominators are not terribly religious, are not dogmatic, are self-centered, and know they are prejudiced. Authoritarians are very religious, are highly dogmatic, are fearful, and often do not realize they are prejudiced (Altemeyer 2004). Both align themselves with conservative political parties. What would "double highs" look like? Altemeyer found, essentially, that those who are authoritarian-social dominators have the most negative characteristics of each group.

Authoritarian-social dominators were found to have higher ethnocentrism scores than did high-SDOs or high-RWAs (Altemeyer 2004). This was true of both college students and their parents. The same was true of their hostility toward homosexuals, women, and French Canadians (Altemeyer's subjects were Canadian college students and their parents). In terms of drive for dominance, "double highs" share the typical SDO's wish to dominate, but they do not share the typical RWA's wish to submit. In terms of religiousness, "double highs" were somewhat more religious than the typical SDO, who has a take-it-or-leave it attitude, but not as much zeal as is usually seen among authoritarians, who attend church almost every week. Finally, using the Exploitive Manipulative Amoral Dishonesty scale, "double highs" were rated as just as exploitive as the typical SDO, significantly higher than the typical RWA. Authoritarian-social dominators have enough religious zeal to be considered one of the ingroup for regular authoritarians, who are looking for a leader to

submit to. Authoritarian-social dominators have the drive to dominate, and like regular social dominators they are willing to lie, cheat, and steal to do it. They are thus well-positioned to take charge of conservative religious groups or antifeminist, antiabortion, anti-gun-control groups (Altemeyer 2004).

III.   Social Cognition

The social-cognitive approach seeks to describe how the mind manages social information. The mind attempts to operate as efficiently as possible, as it should, considering the massive amount of perceptual information it encounters from minute to minute, not to mention the complex decision-making behind all social interactions. In order to facilitate the collection and evaluation of this massive flow of information, the mind has developed two channels to learning. First, the hippocampal learning/memory system operates very quickly and enables us to form relatively transient perceptions of stimulus events. Patients with damage isolated to the hippocampus make more errors when attempting to identify words and faces encountered only seconds or minutes earlier (Schacter 2001). Second, the neocortical learning/memory system consists of general knowledge built up over time, it is highly resistant to change, and it provides a sort of foundation which we rely on to provide us with a stable conception of the world we live in (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000; McClelland, McNaughton, and O'Reilly 1995). When you encounter a particular type of stimulus event, the hippocampal system allows you to make immediate perceptions of the event and you may draw on information from the neocortical system to help you decide what it means. If you encounter a particular type of event often enough it may become part of your neocortical-based general knowledge system, in which case it would be resistant to change (Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000).

It would be overwhelming if we had to consciously analyze every piece of sensory data, decide what it is, and then decide what to do about it. If our minds operated this way we would be lucky to ever get past breakfast. Instead, very often we rely on a sort of automatic processing of information in which the things we encounter (including other people) are quickly categorized and compared with exemplars we have in our neocortical memory system. These exemplars are called schemas (Markus 1977); they are essentially templates created out of past experiences that provide us with information about what to expect from that category of stimulus we are encountering. This type of automaticity in social perception gives us a tremendous advantage, allowing us to move quickly and efficiently through our social environments without paying too much attention to what we are doing (Bargh 1996; Macrae and Bodenhausen 2000). Schemas also allow us to make inferences about unspecified or unknown aspects of stimuli or situations (Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Hugenberg 2003). This system permits sufficient flexibility to allow us to adjust to novel situations when needed, while also allowing us to often drive on

autopilot through our social worlds. One major problem which results is that the mind is not a perfect device for analyzing information. From this perspective stereotypes are errors in evaluation of social information, and they are difficult to change precisely because the neocortical system is resistant to quick alterations. Once a stereotype belief is embedded in a person's world view, there are a variety of cognitive errors which make it persistent and highly resistant to inconsistent information.

Errors in judgment sometimes occur simply on the basis of schema activation. One particularly dramatic example of how a schema can distort our perceptions occurred in Montana when two hunters shot at what they believed to be a brown bear. They had been out all day and were very tired, it was starting to turn dark, and they saw a shape moving in the distance. After they fired they moved in to examine their kill. When they got closer they saw that the "bear" had in fact been a tent with a man and a woman inside who had been making love. The woman was killed by one of the shots (Loftus and Ketchum 1991). In this case the men were not operating out of any form of prejudice. Their fatigue and the poor lighting undoubtedly allowed their minds to automatically process the visual information they encountered rather than to effortfully process the information and then actively decide whether the target was a legitimate one.

Police officers frequently face similar situations, not with bears, but with ambiguous social situations in which they must make snap judgments about whether a suspect is armed. Unfortunately, it is in precisely this type of situation, in which fast processing of information is required, that mistakes are more apt to occur because the mind depends more on automatic or schema-based processing of information. This may be what happened when four New York City police officers shot and killed Amadou Diallo, a 22-year-old West African immigrant who was attempting to reach for his wallet when the officers opened fire and shot him 41 times. Naturally, we cannot know the mental processes of these officers, but it is known that the shooting happened at night, that the officers had been searching all night for pedestrians carrying illegal handguns, and that Diallo was in a semi-enclosed place which limited their visibility of him. These officers apparently had primed themselves by their search for handguns. Of course, they should have been more cautious in their approach so that they would have had time to be more deliberative in their thinking. But what would have happened if Diallo had been White? Would the officers have taken more time to process the information instead of concluding he was reaching for a gun?

This question was explored by Correll, Park, Wittenbrink, and Judd (2002), who created a simulation in which White subjects viewed photographs of Whites or African-Americans who were holding either handguns or innocent items such as wallets, cell phones, or sodas. Subjects were also asked to press a button to "shoot" those suspects who held guns. Results across four experimental conditions indicated that when faced by an unarmed suspect, subjects were more likely to shoot at African-Americans than at Whites. Also, subjects shot

unarmed African-Americans more quickly than they did unarmed Whites, indicating a different deliberative response when facing White suspects. Shooter bias was more pronounced among subjects who believed African-Americans to be dangerous (illustrating the effect of a schema). However, prejudice failed to predict shooter bias. Simply believing that African-Americans are dangerous was sufficient to lead subjects to interpret an ambiguous stimulus as a gun, and this effect did not require subjects to dislike African-Americans. The researchers also administered Altemeyer's (1988) right-wing authoritarianism scale, but RWA was found to be unrelated to shooter bias (though high-RWAs were again found to be more prejudiced). In this simulation, overt prejudice did not alter shooter bias, but knowledge of the schema of dangerous African-Americans did.

The availability heuristic, identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) explains why people tend to overestimate certain classes of events. When a memory for a certain type of event is easy to bring to mind, we tend to overestimate the prevalence of that type of event. It is easier to remember a dramatic plane crash than it is a car crash, so people often overestimate the risk of death in planes and underestimate the risk of death in cars. This also explains why people who watch news programs and read newspapers tend to overestimate local crime rates: They learn of more examples of crime than do people who do not watch the news, and thus find it easier to recall examples of crime events and subsequently overestimate their own level of risk (Glassner 1999; Lowry, Nio, and Lietner 2003; Romer, Jamieson, and Aday 2003). Researchers studying the content of local television news crime coverage in Pittsburgh (Klein and Naccarato 2003), Chicago (Linton and LeBailly 1998), Los Angeles (Dixon and Linz 2000), and Philadelphia (Romer, Jamieson, and deCoteau 1998) have found that local television news reporting is biased in overrepresenting African-Americans as perpetrators of crime and Whites as victims. Interestingly, this is not true of national level network news (Dixon, Azocar, and Casas 2003), perhaps because African-Americans accused of crimes are usually shown on national news only if they are already famous (e.g., O.J. Simpson, Michael Jackson, Kobe Bryant). Nor was this bias in reporting found in the Orlando, Florida local news coverage (Chiricos and Eschholz 2002), raising the prospect that cultural stereotypes operate more in some localities than others. Local news coverage showing African-Americans in a predominantly negative light, usually as criminals, may foster the schema of African-Americans as dangerous, which, through the availability heuristic, leads to overestimates of risk of victimization by African-Americans. Furthermore, Dixon and Linz (2002) found that African-Americans and Latinos standing trial for crimes were more likely to be subjected to potentially prejudicial discussions of their cases in the local media, raising concerns about damaging pretrial publicity and bias among jurors.

It is important to note that none of what has been described thus far regarding schemas and the availability heuristic was predicated on overt

racism. When we consider prejudiced individuals encountering biased reporting on local television news, we can see that there are additional social-cognitive issues at work. When people evaluate information from their social worlds they tend to accept without much hesitation that which supports what they already believe, a finding termed confirmation bias (Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Nickerson 1998). They essentially say to themselves that this new piece of information simply confirms what they already knew to be true, so they don't feel the need to be critical of it. A prejudiced individual, encountering biased television news reporting, is likely to have his or her prejudicial beliefs confirmed. A corollary of this is disconfirmation bias (Edwards and Smith 1996), the act of trying to disconfirm information which doesn't fit with what we believe. Edwards and Smith (1996) found that subjects spent more time deliberating over arguments that didn't fit with what they believed. People essentially think more carefully about the new information as they find ways to discount or discredit it. When we consider some of the preposterous themes advanced by conspiracy theorists (Berlet and Lyons 2000; Harrington 1996) it is clear that those who believe these stories must be accepting them relatively uncritically because they are in some way consistent with beliefs they already hold. In line with this, Goertzel (1994) found that people who believe in one conspiracy theory tend to believe in others as well.

Confirmation and disconfirmation bias can alter our interpretations of social interactions. A classic example of this was provided by Darley and Gross (1983), who told laboratory subjects that they would view a film of a girl named Hannah. Some subjects were told that Hannah came from an impoverished background, while others were told that Hannah came from a relatively wealthy family. All subjects in the experiment viewed the same film of the girl engaging in several tasks, which subjects were asked to evaluate. The subjects who believed the girl came from a wealthy family rated her performance on the tasks significantly higher, demonstrating that the information about Hannah that was given to the subjects served to activate schemas that in turn altered the subjects' evaluations of her. Subjects appeared to attend to schema-consistent information and ignored that which was schema-inconsistent. Darley and Gross reasoned that subjects used the information given them prior to the film to form a hypothesis about what to expect (schema activation) and consequently attended to information that confirmed their hypothesis. Similarly, Murray (1996) found that subjects evaluated the performance of a Black child lower than that of a White child, even though the performances were identical. This effect occurs in memory as well, leading people to recall more accurately information that is consistent with their schemas. Cohen (1981) asked subjects to view a videotape of a woman who was described as either a waitress or a librarian, though in both cases the videotape was the same. Subjects were then asked to recall as much as they could about what they had seen. Cohen found that subjects who were told the woman was a waitress tended to recall information consistent with that schema (e.g., a bowling ball), while those who were

told she was a librarian recalled other information consistent with that schema (e.g., drinking wine). The confirmation and disconfirmation biases clearly help explain why stereotypes are persistent and resistant to change.

At times our inaccurate beliefs about people may cause them to literally change their behavior to conform with what we believe. Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968) gave all grade-school children at a school a bogus intelligence test and then randomly assigned them to be "bloomers" or ordinary learners. The experimenters notified the teachers at the school which students were "bloomers" and told them they could expect these children to perform much better in the near future. In fact, the "bloomers" were not different; they had been randomly selected. By the end of the school year the performance of the bloomers had improved substantially, and their scores on a real IQ test had gone up. There were several reasons for this: Teachers called on bloomers more often, gave them more extensive feedback in class, and in other ways gave these children a greater share of their attention. This pioneering research on the effects of expectancy inspired hundreds of similar experiments, and the effects have been found to be frequently replicated and substantial in magnitude (Rosenthal 1994). Efforts to demonstrate the effects of negative expectancies are limited, due to obvious ethical concerns. It would be highly unethical to deceive teachers into believing that some children were intellectually stunted, although such erroneous beliefs certainly are held quite often as a result of racist and sexist prejudices. While it is difficult to perform such experiments with children, negative expectancy effects have been demonstrated in the form of the negative placebo effect, what we now call the *nocebo*. More than 20 laboratory studies have demonstrated that negative expectations about health are sufficient to produce reports of physical symptoms by subjects under laboratory conditions (Harrington 1999). By way of analogy, we might assume that negative expectations caused by racist stereotyping would similarly have dramatic effects on academic performance in the form of self-fulfilling prophecies, which then would sadly confirm the racists' stereotypes.

There are numerous other examples of cognitive biases in processing information (Bodenhausen, Macrae, and Hugenberg 2003; Jones 1997; Nickerson 1998), but the ones described here are among the most useful when considering stereotypes and racism. Any psychological discussion of beliefs related to prejudice, stereotyping, or hatred ought to take into account how these cognitive errors function. Errors of social cognition occur among all people, yet not everyone develops stereotyped beliefs. Taking the time to rationally consider evidence from our social environments is often sufficient to avoid the most common cognitive errors.

Social identity theory grew out of the social-cognitive tradition from an attempt to explain perceptual distortions that accompany categorizations of social groups (Huddy 2003). What sets social identity apart from most social-cognition research is the motivational drive for positive self-evaluation that

underlies the process (Huddy 2003; Oakes 2002; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social competition was one of the primary approaches to the study of prejudice used by social psychologists of the 1950s. Sherif and Sherif (1953) described what they called realistic conflict theory, which was rooted in the assumption that competition for scarce resources increases intergroup hostility. Based on observations made of children competing for prizes at summer camps, Sherif and Sherif found that competitive tasks increased social distance and hostility between groups, whereas cooperative tasks reduced hostility and encouraged friendships between groups. Children in these summer-camp groups had created formidable group identities before they were even exposed to each other, and these identities became more pronounced after competition began. In response to realistic conflict theory, Henri Tajfel sought to find the minimal conditions under which members of groups would exhibit ingroup preference and outgroup hostility (Oakes 2002). Tajfel and Turner (1979) did this by creating stripped-down social groups with the minimum requirements for group categorization (arbitrary assignment of subjects to one or the other of two groups) and adding components to observe their impact on ingroup identification and outgroup hostility (Oakes 2002). Similar to social cognition researchers, who were observing categorization processes used by individuals to make sense of their social worlds, Tajfel and Turner found that individuals appear to be primed to categorize themselves in order to make meaningful social comparisons that would reflect on their own identities. Tajfel's surprising and famous (Huddy 2001) finding was that schoolboys placed in meaningless, non-interacting groups showed favoritism toward their group at the expense of a different group, even when they were aware that the groups were totally arbitrary.

Tajfel and Turner (1979) referred to their experimental manipulation as the "minimal group situation" because they had stripped the groups of all meaning. In the typical minimal group experiment, subjects would be asked to estimate the number of dots projected on a screen, or whether they preferred a painting by Klee or one by Kandinsky, or they were simply assigned to groups based on the flip of a coin (Tajfel 1982; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, and Flament 1971; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Regardless, assignment to one group or the other was random and devoid of any real meaning for the subjects. Subjects in these experiments were then asked to distribute points, which were worth small amounts of real money, to members of the groups. Subjects preferred to assign points to members of their own group rather than to members of the other group, even though they had no meaningful connections with their own group members. In a similar way, these researchers were able to achieve a variety of forms of ingroup preference. These results have become well-known for the implication that simply randomly assigning people to one group or another is enough to provoke hostility or discrimination between them. The question Tajfel and Turner sought to answer was why subjects should find any meaning in the categories imposed by researchers (Oakes 2002). Contrary to the common interpretation of these results, Tajfel and Turner did not believe that mere

categorization was sufficient to instill discrimination between groups (Oakes 2002). Turner wrote: "Social categorization per se. . .is not sufficient for ingroup favoritism" (1978, 138). Preference for the ingroup isn't simply a matter of flipping a coin and assigning people to one group or another. In order to achieve these results, subjects must internalize or *identify* with the group. The reason subjects in the minimal group situation preferred to assign points to members of their own group was that there was nothing else that was meaningful in the social situation that they could focus on. Mere categorization did not produce group behavior unless and until the categorization was internalized by the subject (Oakes 2002).

Tajfel and Turner (1979) believed that sociological categorizations, such as ethnicity and gender, would not gain significance for an individual unless they became internalized. Moreover, social identity theory presents a fluid model in which the individual may internalize differing sociological categories from moment to moment in response to social situations. A particular social setting may make one type of social category distinctive, whereas a different social setting would focus attention on a second category, and so forth. This fluidity does not negate the possibility of a relatively stable social identity, but from this perspective there are many social identities that an individual may internalize, and different types of social encounters will bring different identities to the surface at any moment. Social identity theory is interactionist in perspective and describes how people create meaningful self-identities through the categorization process (Oakes 2002).

Internalization of a group identity does not automatically cause individuals to become hostile toward outgroup members, though it may happen under particular conditions. A great deal of research has focused on the conditions under which group social identity is important for outgroup hostility and derogation. Groups may be defined along a number of dimensions, such as stability (whether the status of the group can be changed), legitimacy (the perceived legitimacy of status hierarchy relative to other groups), and permeability (the ability of group members to switch groups), and these variables will be important in increasing or decreasing ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility (Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, and Hume 2001; Tajfel and Turner 1979). If permeability is high, a member of a low status group may simply leave and join a more successful group, thereby avoiding the need for outgroup hostility; but if group permeability is low, then an alternative strategy would be to emphasize positive aspects of the ingroup or negative aspects of the higher status outgroup. If differences between groups are seen as illegitimate, the result may be an increase in tension and hostility between groups. White supremacy groups, for example, may view group differences as impermeable and, if they compare themselves with more successful ethnic minority groups, they may see status differences as illegitimate. Social identity theory predicts that when group status differences are seen as unstable and illegitimate, low-status groups should favor competitive strategies and ingroup bias. When status differences are seen

as stable and legitimate, high-status groups may have no reason for added out-group hostility, though they may consider outgroup members to be lower in ability.

Bettencourt and her colleagues (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of all research examining the conditions under which groups practice ingroup favoritism. The resulting analysis included 145 independent samples with 278 high-status versus low-status comparisons. Overall, high-status groups displayed greater ingroup bias than did low-status groups as measured by both status-relevant and status-irrelevant dimensions, and they evaluated outgroups more negatively. Low-status groups evaluated their ingroups more positively, perhaps in an attempt to compensate for their lower position in the social hierarchy, but they did not display negative evaluations of higher-status outgroups. Low-status groups appeared to recognize the relative merits of both groups, but high-status groups appeared to recognize only those aspects which were relevant to their own success. High-status groups identified more with their ingroups compared with low-status groups when status differences were seen as legitimate and when group boundaries were impermeable. When status differences were viewed as illegitimate, low-status groups appeared to value status-irrelevant dimensions, perhaps in an effort to improve their group standing. Overall, results of the meta-analysis indicated that intergroup conflict is most "likely when the status structure is perceived as illegitimate and unstable (i.e., insecure) and group boundaries are impermeable. Under these circumstances intergroup attitudes among both high- and low-status groups may be particularly biased" (Bettencourt et al. 2001, 539).

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Research in social psychology is highly relevant to the study of hatred, particularly in regard to those aspects of hatred that are related to overt aggressive acts committed by groups of offenders, socio-political attitudes and styles of interaction, stereotype formation and perseverance, and intergroup hostility. "Hatred" per se has not been a focus of research in social psychology, but aspects of what we call hate have been studied extensively by researchers in different branches of social psychology. While diffusion of responsibility may seem on the surface to be unrelated to hatred, when viewed in the appropriate socio-political context it becomes apparent that diffusion of responsibility may contribute to the expression of hatred, murder, and genocide. Similarly, information processing errors are fairly common in everyday life and are often benign in nature, but they all too frequently contribute to hatred through the creation and maintenance of stereotypes. The literature reviewed here indicates a number of pathways leading to hatred. What becomes clear from this body of research is that not all who engage in hateful behavior will see it as such (some will see their hostility toward outgroups as justifiable and perfectly reasonable). Secondly, it is clear that the situation itself can elicit both the best and the worst

types of behaviors from individuals who often have a very poor understanding of the power of the situation to influence them. This is not to say that individuals are helpless in the face of group pressure, but they may be unaware on a conscious level of the pressures that encourage them to act as they do. Do these actions still constitute hate? Consider the Puerto Rican Day parade described earlier. Young men were swept up in events that ultimately harmed over 50 women. It is doubtful that all the offenders harbored hatred toward women, yet the situation elicited from them behaviors that can be seen as hateful. This example points out the importance of examining not just the personality of the offender, but also the type of situation in which the offense occurred.

The tradition in social psychology of laboratory-based empirical research may not appeal to all who seek to study hatred, prejudice, and discrimination, yet the empirical approach outlined here has been very successful at generating and testing theories related to hatred. Theories such as deindividuation, diffusion of responsibility, and conformity help explain how groups become aggressive. Authoritarianism and social dominance theories help us understand the individual differences in socio-political styles that people have, as well as their implications for prejudice and nationalism. Social cognition research helps us understand how stereotypes are formed and why they persist in spite of contradictory information. Social identity theory provides insight not only into the fact that people frequently prefer their ingroup, but also into what conditions are most likely to cause intergroup hostility. Knowledge of this type of research may have important real-world ramifications for public policy, law, and education.

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