WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
RESEARCHING HATE CRIME

BARBARA PERRY*

This paper identifies several strangely neglected areas of hate crime scholarship, including the lack of critical reflection on the usefulness of the term “hate crime” as a descriptor of bias motivated behavior. Concerning measurement issues, concepts and causes, hate groups, responses to hate crimes and comparative scholarship, there are many gaps in our knowledge that are avenues for further enquiry. In particular, we have failed to examine the specificity of the bias crime experiences of diverse victim groups. Moreover, rather than accept broad recording and research categories, there is a need to examine the range of offending, type of offender and impact upon society as a whole as well as upon different victim groups such as asylum seekers, travelers, South Asians, East Asians, Jews, African Caribbean and Nigerian peoples. While highlighting the need for research to inquire into discreet areas of victimization, agencies, social groups and other organizations must also recognize their shared objectives and combine their strengths to implement initiatives, evaluate impact and inform policy with an aim to reduce the incidence and prevalence of hate crimes.

* Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at Northern Arizona University, USA.
The main aim of this paper is to identify areas in need of further research in the area of hate crimes. In effect, this is not a litany of what we think we know; rather it is a synopsis of what we don’t know about hate crime. There are curiously neglected areas in our scholarship and research, which could be future avenues of new and expanded inquiry.

Necessarily, my analysis is Amerocentric. I work only at the fringes of European scholarship, often becoming aware of new work by accident or at conferences attended by European scholars. My first inspiration came from an invitation from the UK to present a plenary paper for a conference organized to inaugurate the Nottingham Centre for the Study and Reduction of Hate Crimes (NCSRHC). Recognizing that this paper was for the launching of the new research center, it seemed to make sense to focus on possible tasks for the scholars associated with the Center. However, my assessment of the importance of drawing attention to the gaps in the literature also become tangibly evident as I was organizing a text book “reader” on hate crime over the last year. I was frustrated by the paucity of strong scholarship to include in some sections of the book, finding that I often had to choose between not addressing an issue, or including literature that I found to be less than satisfactory.

It was also during the course of pulling the reader together that I identified some themes around which to structure my analysis of the “missing literature”. These are merely organizational tools, since there is undoubtedly overlap between them, as well as issues that don’t necessarily fit neatly into any of them. Nonetheless, the organizing themes I have chosen to emphasize are as follows:

1) definitions and measurement of hate crime

2) conceptualizations of the causes and consequences of hate crime

---

1 The paper was presented at the first NCSRHC and Solon International Hate Crimes Conference in Nottingham in
3) analysis of particular victim groups
4) hate groups
5) responses to hate crime
6) comparative scholarship

To be fair, these lapses are attributable to the relative novelty of hate crime as a recognized social problem. The literature and public discussions of hate crime are not much beyond their adolescence, having little more than two or three decades longevity. In the US, we can trace the beginning of attention to hate crime only to the early 1980s, when the civil rights, women’s rights and victims’ rights movements seemed to provide the context for an anti-hate crime movement (Jenness, 1995; Jenness and Broad, 1998). While the term has evolved to the point of entering the popular lexicon, the phenomenon it describes remains under explored. In this paper, then, I offer ways in which we might continue the scholarly initiatives begun in the 1980s.

Area 1: Defining and Measuring Hate Crime

The first issues I see warranting critical reflection may, at first blush, seem little more than a question of semantics. I am referring here to the use of the term “hate crime” itself. The phrase is fraught with dilemmas and difficulties. Laypeople as well as professionals and scholars tend to take it far too literally, often insisting that all (violent) crimes are “about hate”, or alternatively, that perpetrators don’t necessarily “hate” their victims. A letter to the editor of the Arizona Republic (April 17, 1999) illustrates the point: “All crimes are hate crimes. They say to the victim: I don’t care about your rights, your loss, your injury, your pain, your death or those who love you”. This is to oversimplify the concept through very prosaic interpretations of the concept. It is, then, unfortunate that the term hate crime, coined by Representatives Conyers, Kenally, and Briggs in their 1985 sponsorship of a hate crime statistics bill, has stuck. While it

February 2003.
has a dramatic ring to it, the phrase conjures up particular motivations and emotions. Moreover (Ray and Smith, 2001: 221), it tends to:

Individualize racist [and other forms of] violence, to present it as an act of pathological individuals. It encourages a view of racism and violence as the result of the presence of pathological individuals, rather than as embedded in institutional practices of offending communities, in locales and habitual ways of dealing with the world, and especially dealing with problematic situations.

Mason (2001: 260) affirms this critique. The term hate crime, she argues:

…encourages us to assume that the notion of hate has considerable explanatory force. In turn, the enactment of legislation against hate crime codifies this same psychological model of behavior - this causal link between hate and violence - as a legal wrong.

In contrast, as Jacobs and Potter (1998) remind us, hate crime is “not really about hate, but about bias or prejudice”. It is worth our while as scholars, activists and legal practitioners to explore more carefully the implications of the language we use to describe the particular form of violence. Howard Ehrlich, of the National Institute Against Violence and Prejudice (NIAVP), encourages us to distinguish between bias crime, bias incidents, and ethnoviolence. Whereas the first term refers to bias motivated violations of the criminal law, the latter two include, but are not limited to, criminal acts of violence, intimidation or abuse (NIAPV/Prejudice Institute, 1993: 1-2). Even the International Association of Chiefs of Police (1998: 7) acknowledge the need for common language when they exhort us to:

... develop shared definitions of hate incidents and hate crimes. Prejudicial behavior exists along a continuum including negative speech, discriminatory practices, property damage, physical assault, and murder. Legally, a hate crime is any crime enumerated in a hate crime statute in which a perpetrator is subject to an enhanced penalty if the crime was motivated by bias, as defined by the statute.
Hate incidents involve behaviors that, though motivated by bias against a victim’s race, religion, ethnic/national origin, gender, age, disability, or sexual orientation, are not criminal acts. Communities and justice agencies should develop a common language for these attitudes and behaviors so that their responses can be consistent, equitable, and effective.

It behooves us to consider the utility of each of these terms in different contexts, and for different observers - is one more or less useful for law enforcement, for social scientists, for journalists? Are these preferable to the term “hate crime”, and if so, according to what criteria? What messages do they conjure for the general public? What types of victimization, motivations or discourses do they appear to privilege? What assumptions underlie each term, and what are the implications of choosing one over the other?

A consideration of the language of hate crime also raises subsequent questions about how we define the concept. I begin with a series of American examples of bigoted violence in order to highlight the difficulties inherent in defining hate crime:

September 1565, Nassau County, Florida - Spanish troops, acting under orders from King Phillip II, massacre a settlement of French Huguenots at Ft. Caroline, mutilating the dead by cutting out their eyes. The expedition’s commander, Pedro Menendez de Aviles, rationalizes the slaughter by telling the victims in advance, “I do this not unto Frenchmen, with whom my king is at peace, but unto heretics.”

February 1643, New Amsterdam, New York - Dutch soldiers raid both Wecquaesgeek settlements, ignoring their orders to kill only men, murdering and mutilating Indians of both sexes and all ages. Officers report seeing infants dismembered and burned, with others bound to planks before being hacked and stabbed. Corpses are mutilated to such an extent that civilians initially blame hostile Indians for the massacre.
Summer 1730, Williamsburg, Virginia - Several slaves are sentenced to “severe whipping” after they hold meetings to discuss their possible freedom. Six weeks later four abolitionist spokesmen are executed, as the illicit meetings continue. Rumors of impending slave revolts in Norfolk and Princess Anne Counties result in a government order requiring all white men to carry weapons to church. In New Orleans, nine rebel slaves are arrested and tortured with burning matches for information on rumored uprisings. One prisoner confesses, whereupon eight men are broken on the wheel and one woman is hanged.

September 1841, Cincinnati Ohio - On September 1, white men armed with clubs attack a boarding house for blacks. On the 2nd, racial street fighting breaks out after white boys throw gravel at a group of black people. Two white people are stabbed in the incident. On the 3rd, a major race riot erupts. Violence continues until September 5th, with dozens reported killed and 300 black people jailed “for their own protection”.

January 1960 - Several teenage vandals are arrested in a wave of anti-Semitic incidents. Racist graffiti is scrawled on synagogues and other buildings in New York City, Philadelphia, Chicago, Boston, and at least thirteen other cities. In New York City a Protestant and an Episcopal church are defaced with stars of David and pro-Jewish slogans on January 7 in apparent retaliation for the swastika attacks.

These illustrative examples are separated by time and, most importantly, by cultural understandings and definitions. Acts of discriminatory violence and intimidation - even prior to the 1980s - were not considered distinct in any substantial way from other acts of violence. Nonetheless, these startlingly similar examples lend credence to the assertions made by many scholars that bias-motivated violence is not a new phenomenon in the United States. The same can of course be said of most nations. It is important to keep in mind that what we currently refer
to as hate crime has a long historical lineage. The contemporary dynamics of hate motivated violence have their origins in historical conditions. With respect to these processes, at least, history does repeat itself as similar patterns of motivation, sentiment and victimization recur over time. Just as immigrants in the 1890s were subject to institutional and public forms of discrimination and violence, so too were those of the 1990s; likewise, former black slaves risked the wrath of the Ku Klux Klan when they exercised their newfound rights in the antebellum period, just as their descendants risked violent reprisal for their efforts to win and exercise additional rights and freedoms in the civil rights era; and women who demanded the right to vote on the eve of the twentieth century suffered the same ridicule and harassment as those who demanded equal rights in the workplace later in the century. While the politics of difference that underlie these periods of animosity may lie latent for short periods of time, they nonetheless seem to remain on the simmer, ready to resurface whenever a new threat is perceived.

Nonetheless, there is a dramatic difference among the examples listed above. Those drawn from the eras preceding the 1980s would not have been perceived as what we now think of as hate crimes. Rather, they might in fact have been seen as a normative part of the social fabric, in so much as they represented non-punishable, perhaps even celebrated behaviors in their day. In contrast, examples drawn from more recent years might be both defined and publicly perceived in a qualitatively different light.

Recent legislation at both state and federal levels in the United States, as well as elsewhere, is a manifestation of the shifting conceptualization of bias motivated violence. Most notably the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990 (HCSA) was the first piece of federal legislation to explicitly institutionalize this new understanding. As is typical of governmental decrees, the HCSA provides a narrow legalistic definition of hate crime: “crimes that manifest evidence of prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity”.

For the most part, states which subsequently (or previously) introduced hate crime legislation
have followed suit, adopting a similar definitional. According to these definitions, the hate crime designation may only be applied where a “predicate offence”, or underlying crime is committed, as a result of bias or prejudice. This is not to say that even legal definitions are consistent. They are not. What constitutes a hate crime differs dramatically between jurisdictions. Across the United States, there are dramatic differences on how bias is defined, what classes of victims are protected, and the extent of bias motivation necessary for classification (e.g., “in whole or in part” or “primarily” motivated by bias). The matter is even more complex when one considers international differences. For example, while the U.S. emphasizes individual acts, German legislation tends to emphasize the organized hatred and violence associated with Nazi and neo-Nazi organizations, as well as “incitement to hatred”. In short, “crimes motivated by a victim’s race, ethnicity, or religion are defined at least nine different ways in seven different nations around the world” (Hamm, 1994: 174).

While narrow, legalistic definitions may be deemed necessary within the law enforcement community, it is not particularly satisfying from a social science perspective. What of equally intimidating or injurious acts - motivated by prejudice - which are nonetheless legal according to state statutes? What of the gay man in Colorado who is legally denied an apartment or job because of his sexual orientation? This is legal, but arguably still a violation of his basic human rights. Or what of the nineteenth century Native Americans, forced off the land, raped and murdered in their villages? Again, perfectly legal, but also heinous violations, and in fact part of the semi-official program of westward expansion.

Therein lies the dilemma of defining hate crime. As with “crime” in general, it is difficult to construct an exhaustive definition of the term. Crime - hate crime included - is relative. It is historically and culturally contingent. As the above examples suggest, what we take as hate crime today in the United States, in another time, in another place, may be standard operating procedure. Michalowski (1985), for example, reminds us that it is a myth that “there exists some universally consistent definition of theft and violence as criminal act”. On the contrary, both as a
category and as a social phenomenon in and of itself, hate crime is dynamic and in a state of constant movement and change, rather than static and fixed” (Bowling, 1993).

Bowling’s comments suggest yet another important consideration in defining crime. That is, crime is best understood as a process rather than an event. It does not occur in a cultural or social vacuum, nor is it “over” when the perpetrator moves on. For this reason, we must define hate crime in such a way as to give the term “life” and meaning, in other words, as a socially situated, dynamic process involving context and actors, structure and agency. Bowling (1993) continues, presenting a comprehensive catalog of the elements to be taken into account when attempting to delineate hate crime:

Conceiving of racial violence . . . as processes implies an analysis which is dynamic, includes the social relationships between all the actors involved in the process; can capture the continuity across physical violence, threat, intimidation; can capture the dynamic of repeated or systematic victimization; incorporates historical context; and takes account of the social relationships which inform definitions of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour.

While this is a heavy order for any single definition to fill, it is nonetheless possible to construct a conceptual definition which allows us to account for the predominant concerns raised by Bowling: historical and social context; relationships between actors; and relationships between communities. Seen in this context, it is apparent that our understanding of hate crime is furthered by a definition which recognizes the ways in which this particular category of violence facilitates the relative construction of identities, within a framework of specific relations of power. This allows us to acknowledge that bias motivated violence is not “abnormal” or “anomalous” in many Western cultures, but is rather a natural extension of the racism, sexism and homophobia that normally allocates privilege along racial and gender lines. As expressions of hate, such acts of intimidation necessarily “involve the assertion of selves over others
constituted as Other” (Goldberg, 1995), where the self is thought to constitute the norm.

According to such a conceptualization, hate crime is a crime like no other. Its dynamics both constitute and are constitutive of actors beyond the immediate victims and offenders. It is implicated not merely in the relationship between the direct “participants,” but also in the relationship between the different communities to which they belong. The damage involved goes far beyond physical or financial damages. It reaches into the community to create fear, hostility and suspicion. Consequently, the intent of ethnoviolence is not only to subordinate the victim, but also to subdue his or her community; to intimidate a group of people who “hold in common a single difference from the defined norm - religion, race, gender, sexual identity” (Pharr, cited in Wolfe and Copeland, 1994).

In light of this caveat, it is equally important to distinguish hate crime from its non-bias motivated counterparts. A potential starting point may be the distinction drawn by Berk, Boyd and Hamner (1992) between symbolic and actuarial crimes, and between expressive and instrumental motives. Symbolic crimes are purposefully directed toward a victim because of her/his group membership and the way in which the perpetrator perceives the group; actuarial crimes, on the other hand, use the victim’s status as a predictor of his/her practical value as a victim. In a parallel manner, expressive motives are characterized by a wish to send a message to the victim and his/her community, whereas instrumental motives seek objective ends - money, for example.

Similarly, a Harvard Law Review note (1993) suggests a subtle distinction between “rational targeting” - in which offenders “will use common sense to select victims who offer the highest benefit and lowest cost” (p. 1929) and “racist violence” - motivated by prejudice “based on the view that (the victims) do not merit treatment as equals or that they deserve blame for various societal ills” (p. 1930). Extant cases might be investigated as a means of highlighting the unique dynamics that characterize ethnoviolence as a distinct class.
One consequence of the varied and divergent definitions used to conceptualize bias motivated crime is that the confusion inevitably complicates the process of gathering data on hate crime. Berk, Boyd and Hamner (1992) astutely observe that “much of the available data on hate motivated crime rests on unclear definitions; it is difficult to know what is being counted as hate motivated and what is not”. As a result, while both academic and media reports make the claim that ethnoviolence represents a “rising tide,” the truth is we don’t know whether in fact this is the case or not (Jacobs and Potter, 1998). For the most part, existing methodologies are both too new and too flawed to give us an accurate picture of changes over time. For example, because the US hate crime data are collected in the same way as the other Uniform Crime Report (UCR) data, they are fraught with the same well documented deficiencies (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 1997). A recent analysis of the first decade of data gathering under the HCSA documents the many limitations that continue to inhibit accurate counting (McDevitt, et al., 2000). Among the problems: lack of law enforcement agency policies on investigating and recording hate crime; lack of intensive training on hate crime; and police officers’ lack of understanding of or sympathy for hate crime as an offense category.

Moreover, some scholars have argued that hate crimes are even more dramatically under-reported than other UCR offences (Berrill, 1992; Weiss, 1993). Gay victims, for example, may fear that the admission of their victimization is concomitantly an admission of their sexual orientation. Reporting an anti-gay crime to the police is tantamount to “outing” themselves - an event for which they may not be prepared. Similarly, the undocumented Mexican laborer may fear the repercussions of his or her status being revealed. Moreover, victims may well fear secondary victimization at the hands of law enforcement officials. At the very least, they may perceive that police will not take their victimization seriously. And perhaps they would be correct on both counts. It is not unheard of for police to further berate stigmatized victims, including people of color. Louima, the Haitian immigrant sodomized by New York City police officers in 1997, could attest to the extremes to which officers might be willing to go in an effort
to (re)assert dominance.

Louima’s case highlights another reason why hate crime may go unreported: distrust of law enforcement agencies, either on the basis of experiences within the United States, or for immigrants, in their country of origin. Given the hostile relationships between state authorities and minority communities, it is not surprising that victims of ethnoviolence are skeptical about the willingness of police officers to respond to their victimization. Similarly, the black South African immigrant whose early experience with state authority might have included night-time “visits” and “disappearances” is unlikely to welcome any interaction with police in Western countries. We can do much more to uncover the reasons why hate crime remains underreported as a first step toward empowering victims so that they feel free to report their victimization.

A significant qualitative shortcoming of the UCR is that it provides little more than numbers. How many incidents? How many assaults? How many offenders? How many Asian victims? It tells us nothing of the process involved. Thinking back to Bowling’s (1993) analysis, we might also ask what motivated the offender? What was the social, cultural, or historical, or even immediate context of the victimization? What is the relationship between the victims’ and offenders’ communities? What emotions prevailed? What words were exchanged? For these crucial and often subjective elements, we must look elsewhere. But where? There are, in fact, few alternatives, few other places to seek out either the documentation or analyses of the contextual factors that shape the assault.

Overall, the UCR and its counterparts in other countries provide little more starting point for any discussion of hate crime. Given the problems noted above, we are well advised to supplement these official sources of information with data available from the growing number of non-governmental bodies devoted to tracking and responding to hate crime. Generally, these agencies tend to gather information specific to one target group - the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) on anti-Semitism, or the NGLTF on anti-gay violence for example - and are thus limited
in scope.

Perhaps the most firmly entrenched anti-violence project is the Anti-Defamation League of B’Nai B’Rith. Since 1979, the ADL has been generating annual audits of anti-Semitic violence, not only in the United States but world-wide. The mandate of the ADL goes much further than does that of the FBI’s UCR program. ADL includes among its data “incidents” that may not fit the traditional definition of crime. Rather, the ADL tracks murder, assaults and arsons to be sure, but this is supplemented with attention paid to harassment, petty and serious vandalism, anti-Semitic slurs, and distributing neo-Nazi literature. Consequently, the audits are more comprehensive in scope than the UCR.

Another valuable contribution made by the ADL audits is that they provide the context and detail lacking in the UCR. Not only do they “count” ethnoviolence, but they also situate the data by providing summaries of illustrative cases. It is from these synopses that we gain valuable insight into hate crime as a process, specifically as a process which separates “us” from “them”. Here we get some sense of the motive and source of the hostility. It is these details which help us to better understand the dynamics of this phenomenon.

Second only to the ADL in consistency of reporting and longevity is the National Gay and Lesbian Foundation (NGLTF) in the US, whose data gathering task has recently been taken over by the Anti-Violence Project (AVP). This national organization for gay rights and advocacy has been preparing and issuing annual reports on anti-gay and anti-lesbian violence since 1984. Early reports (1984-1989) reflected data from participating local advocacy and victim witness services across the country. Beginning in 1990, representative US cities were selected as the focus for national tracking programs. The cities were selected on the basis of the maturity and professionalization of their victim service agencies. As of 1996, nine cities were included in the national tracking program. Additionally, these national data are frequently supplemented by the inclusion of the findings from local and regional victimization prevalence surveys. Since then,
there has been almost yearly variation in the number of cities included.

Clearly, the NGLTF reports are not exhaustive. They reflect victimization only in the cities covered by the report. Moreover, the data collected in the included cities are not accurate measures, given the consistent problem of under-reporting. Just as few victims report their victimization to police, few report even to the victim advocacy organizations in their area. Similarly, the prevalence studies are limited by their particular samples. Many surveys are distributed through gay and lesbian organizations or publications, which many closeted gays avoid. In addition, those involved in such organizations may be more active, more visible and therefore more at risk than might otherwise be the case.

In the US, there are a bare handful of other agencies tracking hate crime - for example the NAPALC (National Asian and Pacific American Legal Consortium), and the ADC (American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee). In addition there are a number of regional organizations committed to collecting hate crime data in their area or state. North Carolinians Against Racist and Religious Violence, for example, monitors media sources as a means of tracking hate crime trends. The Northwest Coalition Against Malicious Harassment also monitors and reports on bias motivated activities in their *Northwest Beacon*. Alternatively, some local and national organizations have been involved in survey research oriented around hate crime. The Prejudice Institute has been at the forefront of these initiatives, publishing reports on workplace and campus ethnoviolence, for example. Indeed, the Institute has discovered that violence in both of those settings is much more widespread than was anticipated.

We must recognize that each of these bodies brings with it unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, in an assessment of several unofficial data analysis efforts, Ilarraza and Becker (2001) conclude that “The results of our effort to identify and assess the extent and content of unofficial hate crime data suggest the presence of several important issues which must be taken into account when using “alternative data sources” as evidence of the extent and nature of hate
crime in America”. Among the limitations they identify:

- The data collected by these agencies are not objective scientific measurements of hate crime in America.
- There is relatively very little unofficial national level data collection. While there are numerous human rights organizations that monitor and collect information on the far right and its violent and non-violent activities, comparatively few agencies (we only found the four reviewed here) consolidate their efforts in an attempt to create a comprehensive picture of the extent and content of hate crimes at the national level.
- Unofficial efforts to compile hate crime data almost exclusively focus on specific organizational interest rather than on the incidence of hate crime activity in general.
- The definitions that are used by each organization to operationalize the hate crime concept include a variety of activities that are not technically defined as criminal activity, which may result in an over-inflated report of incidence of criminal activity.
- Alternative data compiled at the national level are predominantly collected in a passive and non-scientific manner. Without exception, the agencies collecting data at the national level rely on a variety of sources for their data. In some cases it is apparent that the actual victims of the hate crime activity are never even contacted by the agency for verification or clarification. Instead, in most cases, these agencies compile a variety of second hand information including media reports and police records.

One way forward is to work with the sorts of agencies noted above to conduct rigorous assessments of their data gathering efforts, and to then assist them in enhancing their internal methodologies. Beyond that, there is no single approach that I would propose as the way to proceed. On the contrary, I would concur with Bowling’s (1993) recommendation that, given the complexity of hate crime as a process, we should proceed in a multidimensional way:

Surveys could be complemented by ethnography, life history research, case
studies and other methods to research aspects of victimization and offending. The combination of methods will clearly be contingent on the nature of the research subject. Different combinations will have advantages for different forms of crime and for different moments in crime processes.

Moreover, returning to the processual understanding of hate crime noted earlier, it is apparent that, whatever the method employed, it is crucial that it “allow for the relationships between victim, offender, and statutory agents (police, courts, housing authority, etc.) to be charted; and that these relationships should be set in the context of family, ‘community’ and neighbourhood, race, class, and age divisions” (Bowling, 1993). While qualitative approaches are probably most suited to these dynamic characteristics of hate crime, I would encourage others to also develop creative quantitative approaches that seek to uncover some of these contextual cues.

With data in hand, scholars will be in a much better position to contribute to our understanding of other dimensions of hate crime. According to the IACP (1998), for example, “citizens need to know the facts about hate crimes and current responses to them, so they can more effectively prevent hate crime and deal with its impact on communities. Achieving greater accuracy in documenting hate crimes depends to a large extent on developing shared definitions and reducing barriers to comprehensive reporting.”.

Moreover, enhancing the empirical base of “facts” about hate crime will help us to fill another notable void in the literature: analyses of the causes and consequences of hate crime.

**Area 2: Causes and Consequences**

In my book (Perry 2001), I observed that the social sciences had failed us with respect to enhancing our theoretical understanding of hate crime. It is disturbing that, in a 2002 publication, Kellina Craig (2002) could still claim - quite accurately - that efforts to explain hate
crime theoretically remain rare. In part, the limitations of definition and measurement highlighted above help to explain the limited attempts thus far to theorize hate crime. In the absence of empirical information about bias motivated violence, it is difficult to construct conceptual frameworks. Without the raw materials, there is no foundation for theorizing. Additionally, the relatively recent recognition of hate crime as a social problem (Jenness and Broad, 1998) also contributes to the lack of theoretical accounts. To be sure, racially, and, religiously, and gender motivated violence has long been part of the history of all nations, yet it has not been readily acknowledged as problematic until recent decades.

It is curious that hate crime has not been an object of extensive theoretical inquiry. Conceptually, it lies at the intersection of several themes which are currently to the fore: violence, victimization, race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and difference, for example. In spite of the centrality of violence as a means of policing the relative boundaries of identity, few attempts have been made to understand theoretically the place of hate crime in the contemporary arsenal of oppression. It is not an area which has been seriously examined through a theoretical lens. Where social science, and especially criminology, touches on the experiences of marginalized populations, the emphasis has rarely been on victimization motivated by prejudice. Rather, the focus has been on the criminality and criminalization of minority groups. The goal of hate crime theory, then, is to conceptualize this particular form of violence within the psychological, cultural or political contexts that condition hostile perceptions of, and reactions to the ‘other’. In particular, it places perpetrators and their actions in context.

To date, the literature has been dominated by psychological and social-psychological accounts of hate crime; that is, the emphasis has been on individual level analyses. Such accounts “seek to understand the psychological causes that compel people to commit hate crimes. Sometimes these causes are sought in enduring psychological orientations or propensities; in other cases, hate crime is said to arise because individuals with certain kinds of beliefs and aversions find themselves in situations where these psychological attributes are brought to the fore” (Green, et
This is not to say that broader social or cultural conceptualizations are not available. In fact, Green et al. (2001) recently published an overview of hate crime literature in which they identified an additional five macro-level theories found in the hate crime literature: historical-cultural; sociological; economic; political; and synthetic accounts.

Nonetheless, the entries within each class of theories are limited. There is ample room for more - and more sophisticated - analyses if we are to fully understand and confront the problem. One option is to let broader empirical work guide our theory-making as we engage in the process of constructing grounded theory - what processes, relationships, motives, and so forth. are suggested by the empirical patterns of crime? Alternatively, we can let extant theory guide our research. Personally, I would like to see more theoretically grounded work which takes as its frame the cultural, social and political processes that underlie hate crime. Hate crime is at once part of and symptomatic of larger patterns of intergroup conflict, and especially of subordination. Racial violence, therefore, is in fact, a social practice embedded in broader patterns of oppression which systematically restrict the capacities and autonomy of its victims. For example, Young (1990) operationalizes oppression in a way that provides a very useful framework for contextualizing bias motivated violence. She articulates five inter-related “faces of oppression” by which we might characterize the experiences of common target groups: exploitation (e.g., employment segregation); marginalization (e.g., impoverishment); powerlessness (e.g., under representation in political office); cultural imperialism (e.g., demeaning stereotypes); and violence (e.g., hate crime). Together, structural exclusions and cultural imaging leave minority members vulnerable to systemic violence, and especially ethnoviolence. The former makes them vulnerable targets, the latter makes them “legitimate” targets. Moreover, violence is very likely to emerge in contexts wherein the formerly disadvantaged challenge the other bases of oppression, as when they seek to empower themselves economically or socially through rights claims. Efforts directed toward empowerment are commonly met with equally steadfast reactionary mobilizations.
This specific model suggests two directions for further theoretical work: examining the concrete connections between systematic violence and other forms of oppression; and especially testing the link between victim group mobilization, activism, and visibility on the one hand, and retaliatory victimization on the other. I have begun to apply this model to an understanding of the victimization of Native Americans in the U.S. Similar work, exploiting or building upon alternative theoretical models can and should also be undertaken.

Another related area that remains underdeveloped is the question of the consequences of hate crime. Running through much of the literature - even through court decisions on hate crime - is the assumption that such offences are qualitatively different in their effects, as compared to their non-bias motivated counterparts. For the sake of simplicity, I identify three interrelated dimensions of the impact of hate crime for individuals and collectives. Only one of these has received serious attention, and that very narrowly. The three dimensions are: impact on immediate victims; impact on other members of the victim’s group; and impact on the national community.

It is the first of these that has garnered scholarly attention. Research suggests that first and foremost among the impacts on the individual is the physical harm: bias motivated crimes are often characterized by extreme brutality (Levin & McDevitt, 1992). Violent personal crimes motivated by bias are more likely to involve extraordinary levels of violence - multiple stabbings, or multiple strikes with a hammer or tire iron, for example, often by multiple perpetrators. It is as if the offender seeks to erase or obliterate the victim’s identity. Even where bias crimes do not involve extreme violence - such as vandalism, graffiti, or verbal harassment - they nonetheless have a very distinct impact on individual victims. The empirical findings in studies of the emotional, psychological, and behavioural impact of hate crime are beginning to establish a solid pattern of more severe impact on bias crime victims, as compared to non-bias victims (see, e.g., Herek et al., 2002; McDevitt, et al., 2001). Such comparative analyses of bias- and non-bias motivated victims must be replicated to enhance the credibility of such findings.
A largely unknown aspect of the victim’s experience is the impact of victimization on his/her perceptions of the offender and his/her group. If we are to understand the collective and cumulative effects of ethnoviolence on broader intergroup relationships, it is important to first understand how victimization - even the act of offending - affects the perceptions of the individuals directly involved in the offense. This is something about which we have little if any information.

When we move beyond the experiences of the immediate victim, we enter the realm of speculation. Many scholars - myself included! - point to the “fact” that hate crimes are “message crimes” that emit a distinct warning to all members of the victim’s community: step out of line, cross invisible boundaries, and you too could be lying on the ground, beaten and bloodied (see, e.g., Iganski, 2001). Consequently, the individual fear noted above is thought to be accompanied by the collective fear of the victim’s cultural group, possibly even of other minority groups likely to be victims. Weinstein (cited by Iganski, 2001) refers to this as an *in terrorem* effect: intimidation of the group by the victimization of one or a few members of that group. Yet I know of no study that explicitly surveys large numbers of victims’ reference communities to determine the veracity of this assumption. If we are to argue for the classification of hate crime as a distinct form of victimization, it is incumbent upon us to establish the disparate impact it has on those other than the victim.

One related area that has received some scant attention has been the observation that anxiety triggered by the victimization of one’s cultural group can easily erupt into periods of retaliatory violence. In the US, Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged this writing for the majority in *Wisconsin v. Mitchell* (1993) He argued for the recognition of hate crime as a special class of offence because of the likelihood that it would, in fact, initiate yet more violence. This effect was evident in New York following the murder of a young African American man by a crowd of Italian youth in Bensonhurst in 1989, where the murder was followed by days of racial
skirmishes. A more recent example occurred in Carson City NV, in 2002, where a group of twelve American Indian males attacked two Latino males, apparently in response to an earlier assault on a Native American in which they were thought to have taken part. McDevitt et al (2001) include a retaliatory motive in their typology of hate crime offenders, based on their observation that a notable proportion of offenders reported that their offence was a response to a prior (perceived or real) offence perpetrated against them. But again, the efforts to establish this link are few, and tend to rely on anecdotal evidence.

Even if the victim’s cultural group does not directly retaliate against the hate crime perpetrators or their reference community, it is argued, hate crime may yet have deleterious effects on the relationships between communities. Cultural groups that are already distant by virtue of language differences, or differences in values or beliefs are rendered even more distant by virtue of the fear and distrust engendered by bias motivated violence. Intergroup violence and harassment further inhibit positive intergroup interaction. Again, explorations of changing intergroup dynamics in the face of bias-motivated violence will confirm - or deny - that such a relationship exists.

Alternatively, one possibility is that hate crime acts as a catalyst to positive change. That is, patterns of persistent violence, or highly publicized cases - like the 1998 Matthew Shepard or James Byrd cases - often have the unintended effect of mobilizing victim communities and their allies. Again, anecdotally, there is some evidence that this occurs. This was the case in New York City, for example, where Haitians accompanied by other Caribbeans demonstrated angrily, vocally and visibly against the racist violence represented by Abner Louima’s brutal beating at the hands of police officers in 1997. While innumerable victims had previously remained silent out of fear and intimidation, the publicity surrounding Louima’s victimization galvanized the community into action.

A decade earlier, other New York neighbourhoods witnessed similar rallies. The racially
motivated murders of Michael Griffith in Howard Beach in 1996 and Yusuf Hawkins in Bensonhurst in 1989 both resulted in flurries of organizing and demonstrating. An organization created after the first murder - New York City Civil Rights Coalition - was still available to lend its support to those involved in prosecuting the Hawkins case. Both incidents inspired widespread demonstrations condemning the racism of the perpetrators’ communities, as well as the racist culture of New York City generally. Clearly these cases stimulated rather than disabled the communities. We might choose to look more closely at such examples to determine the circumstances that ensure positive mobilization, rather than retaliation or withdrawal.

Systemic violence throws into question not only the victim’s identity, but also our national commitment to tolerance and inclusion. Speaking specifically of Native Americans, over fifty years ago, legal scholar Felix Cohen noted that mistreatment - legal or extralegal - of minorities “reflects the rise and fall of our democratic faith”. More recently, a New York state bill (Comprehensive Bias and Gang Assault Act, N.Y.S. 6220, 214 Laws of Res. Sess. sec. I (1990). proclaimed that:

> . . . bias-related crimes undermine the freedom that forms the foundation of what should be an open and tolerant society. These crimes vitiate the goodwill and understanding that is essential to the working of a pluralistic society. They are the antithesis of what this nation and state stand for. Accordingly, the legislature finds that . . . bias-related crimes should be prosecuted and punished with appropriate severity.

In other words, it is possible that the persistence of hate crime is a challenge to democratic ideals. It reveals the fissures that characterize its host societies, laying bare the bigotry that is endemic within each. As such, it may very well be the case that bias motivated violence is not just a precursor to greater intergroup tension, but is an indicator of underlying social and cultural
tensions. In this interpretation, hate crime is but one indicator that enshrined ideals of freedom and equality are illusory.

Clearly, the broader social effects of hate crime must be examined both theoretically and empirically. How can we measure the impact of hate crime on the broader public? How does it affect perceptions of the liberties held dear in democratic states? To what extent is hate crime a reflection of broader hatreds, and to what extent does it exacerbate or alleviate these? Any combination of these questions provides a valuable starting point in our efforts to test widely held assumptions about the societal impact of ethnoviolence.

**Area 3: Victims of Hate and Bias Motivated Crime**

To date, hate crime literature has tended to be very broad and non-specific in its focus. That is, little scholarship devotes attention to specific categories of victims. Extant literature has tended to discuss hate crime in generic terms, as if it was experienced in the same ways by women, by Jews, by gay men, by Latino/as, by lesbians. Even racial violence is collapsed into one broad category, as if all racial and ethnic groups experienced it in the same way. Consequently, we do not have a very clear picture of the specific dynamics and consequences that may be associated with victimization on the basis of different identity positions. The possible exceptions here are anti-gay victimization, which has been widely examined by the likes of Gregory Herek (2002) in the United States, and European work on immigrants.

Interestingly, both U.S. and U.K. data sources report high numbers of anti-white violence – although whites remain underrepresented as victims. For example, in the United States, the UCR hate crime data consistently report approximately 1,000 incidents motivated by anti-white bias – or 10% of all victimizations, and 20% of all racially motivated victimizations. These are certainly data that play into the rhetoric of extremist groups arguing for the recognition of whites as a victimized, disadvantaged group. Hate groups lead the way in bemoaning the contemporary
plight of the “angry white male” who is presumably being displaced by equally angry, even vengeful “mud-people”. It is, from this perspective, “the blacks and browns who are racist. It is the blacks and the browns who are exploiting the race issue for advantage” (Yggdrasil, online). It is the “blacks and browns” who are engaging in an “agenda to destroy the white race” (Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, online), leaving the “White people of the World . . . in a state of chaos (Hawthorn, online). A recent American Dissident Voices (online) radio program entitled “It’s Genocide” goes so far as to contend that

. . . the people of European descent of this world are the targets of a constant, consistent, systematic, sustained campaign of genocide, with the intention of humiliating, subjugating and eventually eliminating our people.

And the justice system is complicit in this since “the guilty often go unpunished or the innocent are persecuted, not on the basis of any evidence, but based upon the racial composition of the jury” (American Dissident Voices, online). This is a sentiment shared by the National Alliance’s Kevin Strom (online), who asks

How often are White people the victims of diverse juries who decide against the White accused or for the non-White accused because of a perception that we Whites have got it coming to us? . . . The lack of justice, the racial group think of hate Whitey, the non-White crime, the increase in the population of non-Whites, and the decrease and aging of the White population are all going to accelerate and reinforce each other.

Scholars have made virtually no attempt to understand the dynamics of anti-white victimization, or the dynamics of reporting by white victims. It may be that white victims are more likely to report their victimization, seeing it as an affront to the racial order. Or, in fact, it might be a form of ethnic bias – anti-Italian, or anti-Polish – that does not fit neatly into the limited Hispanic/non-Hispanic ethnic categories in the UCR. The truth is, as scholars, we have hardly acknowledged, let alone explored this apparent anomaly.
Complaints by the white supremacist movement notwithstanding, in the U.S., the limited data available suggests that African Americans are the most frequent victims of racial violence. Franz Fanon was no stranger to this reality. As an active and outspoken critic of Western racial politics, he often found himself accused of racial transgressions. Thus, he recalls (2000), “I was expected to act like a black man - or at least like a nigger. I shouted a greeting to the world and the world slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within my bounds, to go back where I belonged”. bell hooks (1995) similarly attests to the violent potential inherent in the game of racial accountability. She observes that the daily violence experienced by so many black people:

... is necessary for the maintenance of racial difference. Indeed, if black people have not learned our place as second-class citizens through educational institutions, we learn it by the daily assaults perpetuated by white offenders on our bodies and beings that we feel but rarely publicly protest or name ... Most black folks believe that if they do no conform to white dominated standards of acceptable behavior they will not survive.

There is - as many black or Asian or Native or Hispanic people know - danger in non-conformity and in challenging borders. The white gaze is upon them, judging them against their own whiteness, but also against imposed standards of behavior and demeanor. It is this normativity which most intrigues me: the extent to which the array of violent practices - verbal taunts, disparate treatment in public and private, assaults, police brutality - continue to be everyday experiences for African Americans. We might borrow from Georges-Abeyie’s (2001) conceptualization of petit apartheid, or from Russell’s (1998) analyses of micro- and macro-aggressions, for example, to further our understanding of the cumulative, ongoing nature and impact of ethnoviolence as experienced by so many ethnic and racial minority groups.

“Immigrant bashing” has also become a part of the daily reality of those who have reached new shores in search of the promised freedom and opportunity. In this context, racially motivated violence might very well be a response to the violation of concrete, geographical boundaries. Hostility toward those perceived as “foreign” is apparent in acts ranging from vandalism and
graffiti to brutal assaults worldwide. Inspired by political and media constructions of immigrants as the root of all problems, native born Americans, and native born Europeans express their opinions in hateful words and deeds.

U.S scholars can learn a great deal from Europeans, who have led the way in documenting and analyzing anti-immigrant violence. In the U.S, unfortunately, there are no concrete data on anti-immigrant violence. Violence against a Korean shop owner, for example, is classified and recorded as anti-Asian violence. However, the connection between the perpetrator’s tendency to equate ethnicity with immigrant status is apparent in the verbal assaults that often accompany physical assaults. When East Indians, or Haitians are told to “go back where you belong,” the assumption is clear: regardless of whether they are first, second or third generation, those who are “different” are perpetual foreigners who do not belong here. It is likely, therefore, that a significant proportion of the more than 500 anti-Asian and nearly 1000 anti-Hispanic hate crimes recorded by the FBI in 2000 (FBI, 2001) were motivated by anti-immigrant sentiments. Perhaps even some of the more than 3000 anti-black hate crimes were motivated by the perception that the victims were Nigerian, or Haitian, or South African, for example. However, in the absence of critical analyses of such incidents, we have little to say about anti-immigrant violence.

In spite of the fact that they have occupied this land longer than EuroAmericans, Native Americans are also frequently constructed as “alien”. History is replete with stories of the genocidal attempts to remove the American Indians from their land. However, scholarly attention to the historical and contemporary victimization of American Indians as nations has unfortunately blinded us to the corresponding victimization of American Indians as individual members of those many nations. A review of the literature on Native Americans and criminal justice, and even a similar review of the narrower literature on ethnoviolence reveals virtually no consideration of Native Americans as victims of racially motivated violence (Nielsen, 1996; 2000). Bachman’s (1992) examination of violence on Native American reservations is silent on the question of inter-group violence. Nielsen and Silverman’s (1996) anthology on Native
Americans, crime and justice likewise makes no mention of Native Americans as victims of racially motivated crime. Moreover, there is no Native American equivalent to the annual audits of anti-Semitic violence or anti-gay violence published by the Anti-Defamation League, and the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force respectively. Federal hate crime statistics provide little insight. The latest available report indicates that in 1996, there were 71 incidents in which Native Americans were victims of hate crime, representing less than 1% of all offences, and just over 1% of all those motivated by race (FBI, 1997). However, even these data must be taken with a grain of salt, since the UCR is fraught with limitations, especially with respect to underreporting. This may be particularly relevant in the case of Native Americans, thereby explaining the low rates of victimization recorded in UCR statistics.

Nearly as little is known about Latino/a victims of racially motivated crime. While this population has a staggeringly high rate of victimization in general, little effort has been made to tease out the effect of racial animus in this context. Moreover, anti-Hispanic victimization is often inseparable from anti-immigrant violence, given the elision noted previously. As is the case for Native Americans, there is no uniform collection of data on anti-Hispanic violence. A recent NCLR report offers some insights here, but even that is limited. It is a one time only report that does not systematically replicate its inquiry on an annual basis.

In contrast to anti-black and anti-Hispanic hate crime, Anti-Asian violence accounts for a relatively small proportion of all racially motivated hate crime. However, it does represent a growing proportion. Many sources suggest that it constitutes the most dramatically and rapidly growing type of racial violence (United States Commission on Civil Rights, 1992; and; NAPALC, 1996; FBI, 1997). The most comprehensive source of data on violence against Asian Americans is the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) yearly audit. The most recent audit seems to confirm what anecdotal evidence and intuitive observations have suggested: riding a wave of anti-immigrant sentiments, anti-Asian violence is consistently on the rise this decade. Asians - regardless of the longevity of their ties to the United States - are
frequent victims of violence ranging from offensive bumper stickers, to verbal harassment, to assault, to murder. As is often the case with hate crime, anti-Asian incidents disproportionately involve assaults and intimidation, i.e., violations of the person. For example, in 1995, assaults accounted for 28% of all incidents reported to the NAPALC. It is interesting to note that a substantial number of suspected offenders involved in violence against Asian Americans are African American or Hispanic. In 1995, these two groups accounted for nearly 45% of offenders (NAPALC, 1996). However, neither the dynamics of white on Asian violence, or Asian conflicts with other groups have been systematically examined. In the aftermath of the September 11, attacks, it is more important than ever to study and understand the animus that underlies anti-Asian violence. I have made an effort in this respect, with a paper on the White supremacist response to the attacks, and one on the historical antecedents to contemporary anti-Arab sentiments.

From the time European settlers landed on the shores of what is now the United States, there has been a close connection between race, ethnicity, the “immigrant experience” and religion - perhaps more so than in most countries. For many ethnic groups arriving in this new land, religion has provided the basis for continued (albeit often short-lived) solidarity and sense of community. It has often served as the glue which would reinforce group identity. At the same time, religion has been a frequent source of divisiveness between groups, where religious beliefs and practices have defined worshipers as “different”.

It is ironic that a country resettled by people seeking freedom from religious persecution has had such an extensive history of religious bigotry and violence. It is equally ironic that while the First Amendment guarantees religious freedom, some religious minorities have been met with considerable legal and extra-legal intolerance. Its remains the case, in spite of our popular mythology, that the United States is not a melting pot of religious “tolerance and harmony”. On the contrary, “all of the ancient European hatreds based on nation and religion reappeared on this side of the Atlantic. Cities became boiling cauldrons of suspicion and hatred” (Walker, 1998).
From Puritan persecutions of “heathens” and “heretics”, to contemporary acts of anti-Muslim violence, religious difference has inspired periodic waves of hostility culminating in violent rhetoric and action. However, these remarks are speculative - there is virtually no literature to confirm my analysis of the contemporary contours of religiously motivated violence. This can even be said of anti-Semitic violence which is quite likely the most frequent class of religiously motivated violence. Imagine my surprise when I was unable to locate a single scholarly piece on US anti-Semitic violence. Again, this is an area in which European scholars can provide guidance to researchers in the US (See, for example, Byford 2003).

I will note but two specific areas for exploration in the area of religiously motivated violence. The first I have noted already: anti-Semitic violence. Given the absolute absence of literature on violence against Jews in the US, the field is wide open. One specific issue of concern has emerged out of recent Anti-Defamation League annual audits. An overview of recent audits reveals an especially disturbing trend: since 1991, anti-Semitic violence has been increasingly more likely to involve personal rather than property crimes. Historically, this has been a group victimized by crimes against property, such as synagogue or cemetery desecrations. However, the tide has turned in recent years. Additionally, the decline in the number of anti-Semitic incidents beginning in 1995 has corresponded to an increase in the intensity of the violence associated with the incidents. In 1995, for example, an arson in New York City resulted in several deaths. In November of that year, the FBI fortunately foiled an attempt by the TriState Militia to bomb several ADL offices.

The second class of victimization I would like to see explored concerns anti-Muslim violence. Many Christian Americans have long been hostile to what they perceive as Islamic fundamentalism, which in turn is increasingly associated with terrorism in the American psyche. Especially in the aftermath of the September 11 2002 attacks on New York City and Washington DC, Americans have come to associate the fundamentalism of Islam with fundamentalist violence - believing they will do anything that they deem to be the “will of
Allah”. Consequently, Muslims are suspected of being foreign and domestic terrorists. Exacerbating this is the tendency to collapse all Muslims with Arabs and to see them all as painted with the same tainted brush. Stereotypes of the “crazed,” “religiously fanatical” Arab/Muslim abound.

As identifiable symbols of Islam, mosques are frequent targets of anti-Muslim activity. The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1996) reports that in 1995, at least seven mosques were burned downed or seriously vandalized. The UCR (1996) reported six cases of Destruction/Damage/Vandalism to Islamic property for the same year. As I argue elsewhere (Perry 2003, forthcoming), the history of anti-Arab sentiment and discrimination has conditioned the contemporary wave of retaliatory violence against those perceived to be Muslim, or Middle Eastern. But again, there is ample room for alternative analyses and interpretations of anti-Muslim violence. Scholars have only just begun to think about this class of victims, largely motivated by recent events.

In short, while religious minorities have been identifiable victims of personal and property crimes, they have not attracted scholarly attention. The preceding was a cursory glance at but a few such cases. We might also explore the experiences of the Amish, the Rastafarians, and other marginal groups for evidence of religious persecution. Moreover, we might productively pursue a line of inquiry that unpacks religion from race or ethnicity. In both instances noted above – anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim violence – it is not transparently clear whether violence is motivated by presumed differences in religious beliefs, or antipathy toward Jews and Muslims as distinct ethnic groups. Does the fact that much anti-Semitic violence is directed toward synagogues imply a predominantly religious motivation? Or does the fact that violence is directed at dark-skinned people – taken to be Middle Eastern – imply that such assaults are grounded in racial rather than religious bias? There are not simple distinctions to make, either practically or academically.
I turn now to other forms of bias motivated behaviors, which might nonetheless have some connections to religion to the extent that religious beliefs have often shaped other types of criminal violence, not against other religious groups, but against others who might be practicing “intolerable” behavior. One such case is violence against gay men and lesbians. In spite of the US federal Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, there still exist no systematic nationwide data on which to base such judgements. Data from the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF), New York City Gay and Lesbian Anti-violence Project and police department bias units across the country have all documented dramatic increases over the last decade and a half (Berrill, 1993; Jenness, 1995). However, it is not at all clear whether this reflects a “real” increase in such violence, or a greater willingness to report victimization.

Nonetheless, together, data from the Uniform Crime Report, from NGLTF reports, and from other regional and national victimization surveys paint a disturbing picture of widespread violence against gay men and women. Victimization surveys, for example, consistently find upwards of 60% - often as high as 80% or 90% - of subjects experiencing verbal abuse; physical abuse is as high as 30%. Moreover, rates of victimization, and the proportion of victimizations involving assaultive offences, are dramatically higher than for the general population (Berrill, 1992; Berrill, 1993).

Attacks against homosexuals tend to be among the most brutal acts of hatred. They often involve severe beatings, torture, mutilation, castration, even sexual assault. They are also very likely to result in death (Comstock, 1991; Levin and McDevitt, 1993). This feature of violence against gays may account for its emergence as a recognizable social problem, worthy of public attention. Jenness’ (1995) examination of gay and lesbian anti-violence projects seems to support this contention, in that many of the groups were initiated in response to particularly dramatic cases.

As I noted at the outset of this section, anti-gay violence has probably been the most widely examined form of ethnoviolence, both empirically and theoretically. In spite of the relative depth
of the scholarship on anti-gay violence, a significant gap does exist: violence against lesbians, specifically, has not been of great concern to researchers. In part, this may be because anti-lesbian victimization appears to be less pervasive than violence against gay men. Yet such quantitative distinctions do not excuse our failure to take seriously the sharply gendered nature of anti-gay violence.

von Schulthess’ (1992) study of anti-lesbian violence in San Francisco reveals close links between anti-woman and anti-lesbian violence. In fact, she argues that anti-lesbian violence is an extension of misogynistic sentiment generally. This confusion may, in fact, deflate the numbers of reported anti-lesbian hate crimes. Victims and law enforcement authorities alike are often unable (or unwilling) to identify assaults as anti-lesbian. They may, instead, be perceived as anti-woman. For example, Brownworth (1993: 326) quotes a lesbian victim, who makes clear the difficulty of distinguishing the motive in this context:

> Was my attack anti-lesbian? Or was it anti-woman? . . . I was raped because as a woman I’m considered rapeable, and as a lesbian I’m considered a threat. How can one separate these two things?

Lesbians and non-lesbians alike frequently report this confusion (Pharr, 1988; NGLTF, 1994). Sexual harassment - wolf whistles, and “come-ons”, for example - often escalates into lesbian baiting and, worse, violence. Thus the two are difficult to untangle.

Given the depth of cultural heterosexism, it is perhaps not surprising that there has consistently been resistance to including sexual orientation as a protected class in hate crime legislation. What is, perhaps, surprising is that similar controversy has swirled around the inclusion of gender as a protected category. There is a tragic irony in the fact that, on December 6, 1989 in Montreal, Canada, Marc Lepine lined up female engineering students against a wall, opened fire
and killed 14 while shouting his intent to “kill the feminists”. Just four months later, on April 23, 1990, the U.S. Congress signed into law the Hate Crime Statistics Act mandating the collection of data on crime motivated by prejudice on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion and sexual orientation. In light of the international publicity assigned the former, the failure of the latter to include gender is telling. Perhaps more clearly than any other case, the Lepine murders demonstrate that much violence against women is indistinguishable from other hate crimes. It, too, is intended to intimidate and control the larger class of people - women - not just the victims. This very argument provides the basis for future scholarship. There is still considerable resistance to the inclusion of gender motivated violence as a “hate crime”.

A seldom acknowledged dimension of gendered violence is found in abortion clinic violence. Abortion is an issue of control and autonomy. The denial of women’s control over their own bodies becomes an attempt to maintain their subordination to and dependence on men. This is a crucial exercise in the wake of 30 years of the women’s movement, in which the gender line was blurred, and the hegemony of masculinity questioned. Women are in the midst of constructing a feminine gender identity that undermines definitions of the natural sex order which has been so carefully crafted. Anti-abortion politics, then, are an important means of reaffirming that essentialist gender line, reasserting the sanctity of traditional gender relations of power, which places women on the “private” domestic side, and men on the “public” political side. There is still plenty of work to be done to show the extent to which abortion clinic violence is gendered, rather than directed toward the practice itself.

The increase in violence against clinics in the US between the mid-1980s and mid-1990s coincided with the increased visibility and vitriol of right wing religious anti-abortionists (Diamond, 1996; CDR, 1995; Novick, 1995). The violence seemed to reach its peak in the years 1993 and 1994, the same years in which Michael Griffin, Paul Hill and John Salvi allegedly assassinated five clinic personnel. During the same years, the Feminist Majority Foundation’s national survey of clinics found that more than 50% of all clinics in the US experienced severe
violence, including invasions, bombs and bomb threats, arson and arson threats, and chemical attacks. Since then, the violence has declined. Future research might attempt to explain this decline. What factors contributed to the weakening of the anti-abortion movement: was it the efforts of pro-choice activists; the implementation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrance (1994); enhanced law enforcement; or some combination of these and other as yet unknown factors?

Like abortion clinic violence, harassment and intimidation of people with disabilities is also intended to limit the personal and collective autonomy of the community. And, also paralleling the case of anti-abortion violence, the recognition of people with disabilities as potential victims of bias motivated violence has come very late to the social sciences. Moreover, it was not until 1996 that the category was added to the federal hate crime legislation; few states have followed suit (see Grattet and Jenness, 2001a). A bare handful of articles have explicitly addressed bias-motivated violence against persons with disability. Moreover, these have not typically been grounded in empirical investigations of such victimization. Consequently, we know very little about the extent, nature, or impact of violence against this population. This is ironic given that, in the United States, at least, people with disabilities represent one of the largest minority groups – an estimated 20% of Americans have some form of recognized disability (Grattet and Jenness, 2001: 667). Additionally, the victimization experienced by people with disabilities parallels that of other targeted communities, to the extent that such violence is

. . . produced by a whole series of ideological structures that legitimize oppressive behavior. Indeed, disabled people face a pattern of oppressive societal treatment and hatred, much as women face misogyny, gay men and lesbians face homophobia, Jews face anti-Semitism and people of color face racism (Waxman, 1991: 187).

Finally, we have not attempted to understand the specificity of violence experienced by people who occupy multiple positions of culturally defined inferiority: women with disabilities, or gay men of color. For example, Sheffield (1987) argues that the good/bad woman dichotomy that often underlies violence against women is especially problematic for women of color, who,
according to strictures of the racial hierarchy, can never achieve “goodness”. It is the
presumption of the inherent inferiority of black women that long left them vulnerable to
unpunished and unpunishable rape at the hands of white men. That black women, especially, are
uniquely vulnerable to gendered violence is implicit in Adisa’s (1997: 196) observation that:

African American women are more likely to be raped than any other woman, are
least likely to be believed, and most often watch their rapists treated with
impunity or mild punishment.

Women of color are not typically viewed as “real” victims. More so even than white women,
women of color are characterized as inviting violent assault. The latitude allowed them for
enacting femininity is even more circumscribed than that allowed white women. African
American women, for example, are “safe” only when enacting the racially prescribed gender
roles. It is this intersection of race, gender and sexuality which shapes the victimization of
black women and other women of color (Crenshaw, 1994; Collins, 1993). In other words, race
conditions the gender imagery to which women are held accountable, especially in terms of their
sexuality. While both white women and women of color are vulnerable to gendered violence,
the cultural permission for such victimization varies dramatically. White women are often
victimized because they are perceived to have crossed some boundary of appropriate feminine
behavior; women of color because they are perceived to be, “by nature”, sexually available and
provocative. In short, white men’s subordination of white women and women of color “involves
holding them accountable to normative conceptions of essential womanly nature in different
ways” (West and Fenstermaker, 1993: 168).

My perceptions here are speculative, and theoretically grounded. What is needed is explorations
that seek to either confirm or negate their validity. It is important to look both theoretically and
empirically at the cultural and structural practices that leave people vulnerable to violence on the
basis of overlapping identities.
Related to this is another area of victimization that remains underdeveloped: minority-on-minority violence. It is ironic that at the same time that policy makers, scholars and commentators point to the increasing diversity of most industrialized nations, they stubbornly persist in collapsing racial and cultural relations into a black-white binary. If we are to make sense of the current state of racial and cultural conflict, it is imperative that we broaden our understanding to recognize these countries for what they are: multicultural, multiracial and multiethnic communities, characterized by multiple and crosscutting coalitions and cleavages. The politics of difference, in other words, is also inscribed in the interethnic relations of oppressed groups. Cornel West (1994: 109) insists that:

\[\ldots\] although this particular form of xenophobia from below does not have the same institutional power of those racisms that affect their victims from above, it certainly deserves attention as a struggle within the politics of identity formation.

It is particularly important to acknowledge this in our conversations about hate crime, where minority on minority violence is not unheard of. Two especially dramatic conflicts in the United States highlight this often overlooked reality: the Crown Heights violence between black and Jewish people in 1991; and the black-Asian-Hispanic conflicts that exploded in the Los Angeles riots of 1992. While obviously revealing the long-standing tensions among and between these similarly marginalized groups, these incidences represent efforts to negotiate identity and place in the US. In these events - and others like them - the actors either created or accepted opportunities to do difference, and especially race, through violence.

The same diversity that threatens the white majority - and thus underlies hate crime - similarly causes ruptures and discomfort among oppressed groups in the US. These ruptures ultimately revolve around identity and recognition. Yet such struggles for recognition take place on different terms viz. oppressed groups, as opposed to those involving white-minority relations.
The white majority excludes or marginalizes subordinate groups. However, within the politics of interethnic minority conflicts, there emerges an opportunity to acquire or sustain recognition. The driving force here is that (Young, 1990: 60):

\[ \ldots \text{while the subject desires recognition as human, capable of activity, full of hope and possibility, she receives from the dominant culture only the judgement that she is different, marked and inferior.} \]

One way to overcome, indeed overturn, this negation is to extrapolate the “rules of the game” to the context of subordinate ethnic conflict, to mark another as “different, marked, inferior”. Only in this way can the subordinate establish some semblance of dominance, demanding of other oppressed groups that which is not forthcoming from the hegemonic majority. Punished, repressed and reprimanded for asserting their ethnic identity within view of the majority culture, members of subordinate groups can opt to engage in hate crime as an alternative resource for constructing their identities. Consequently, minority on minority violence also reeks of hierarchical conflict. Interethnic violence among and between subordinate groups “becomes a “field of possibilities” for transcending class and race discrimination”, i.e., a critical resource for doing race, in particular (Messerschmidt, 1993: 103), albeit within the master narrative of white, heterosexual, masculine hegemony. That is, minority on minority hate crime in the US is not only about Korean-African American conflict, or African American-Jewish conflict. Rather, it is about how these tensions play out in the context of relations of racial/ethnic/gender subordination.

What is needed are efforts to make sense of this intercultural violence between and among subordinate groups. The task is hampered by the paucity of literature in the area. Scholars have been slow to address the occurrence of hate crime in this context. My intent is to draw attention to the issue, and to stimulate dialogue and inquiry. We might choose to explore illustrative sets of relationships, such as prejudice and hate motivated violence in the US and Europe among and
between African Americans/Afro Caribbeans and Asians; Jews and African Americans/Afro Caribbeans; Afro Caribbeans/Nigerians; or gay men within communities of color, for example.

**Area 4: Hate Groups**

If there is one subject in the broad field of hate crime literature that has received extensive attention it is hate groups. I write here of the hate movement/hate groups, by which I mean a shorthand for an array of organizations known variously as hate groups, racialist groups, militias, separatist organizations, the patriot movement, or extremist groups. I fully recognize the distinctions between these, but nonetheless use the terms hate group or hate movement for the sake of simplicity and consistency.

While apparently responsible for a relatively small proportion of hate motivated violence, hate groups undoubtedly play a role in conditioning an environment in which bias motivated incidents can occur. It is likely that organized hate groups are responsible for little more than 10 to 15% of all hate crime (Levin and McDevitt, 1993). This is not to downplay the seriousness of their actions, especially in light of the especially brutal nature of hate group violence. Nonetheless, as Langer (1990:85) suggests:

> At the least, there appears to be a kind of multiplier effect whereby one thing leads to another and the mere existence of the movement acts as an enabling force for the open expression of racism.

And, as the Anti Defamation League (1999) has recently observed:

> The shootings in Los Angeles and Chicago and the synagogue burnings in Sacramento did not begin with a gun or a firebomb. They began with ugly, hateful words and ideas from racist, anti-Semitic groups, and from the extremist
manifestos of white-supremacist hatemongers.

Such observations are fairly common in the literature on the hate movement. I have made such claims myself. Yet, with a few dramatic exceptions (e.g. Benjamin Smith), there is little evidence to support the correlation. We assume that the presence of hate groups contributes to a climate of suspicion, distrust and bigotry, but the relationship might just be the opposite: that the latter gives rise to the former. To date, we have not truly tested the widely held suspicion that hate groups are forerunners to the hate violence of perpetrators not directly associated with the movement. I would like to see this community of scholars give more serious attention to assessing this relationship. It is very likely that hate groups are but an extreme expression of the widespread racism, sexism and homophobia that pervades North American and European cultures. These groups may lend voice, and perhaps some legitimation to sentiments held by those unaffiliated with the Klan or Skinheads, for example. The ideologies they endorse provide a framework within which others can also articulate and legitimate their own antipathies to potential minority victims. Nonetheless, we must take these theoretical assertions to the next level and seek evidence that other hatemongers or hate crime perpetrators have some awareness of the ideologies of hate.

Of course, some of those who do become aware of organized hate groups seek to learn more, even to become a part of the movement. Randy Blazak’s and Kathleen Blee’s work specifically address the process of “becoming a racist,” although with considerably different emphases. Blazak is specifically concerned with the recruitment of young, disaffected, and “anomic” youth who join violent Skinhead groups as a means of reclaiming some power. In contrast, Blee offers an intriguing examination of women who affiliate with KKK and neo-Nazi groups. The two approaches complement one another. Blee’s work answers the question implicitly raised by Blazak’s work: why would women join and remain in organizations that are, by and large, male oriented and male dominated? These scholars have begun a dialog that must be continued, helping us to understand what kinds of people are vulnerable to the siren call of the movement.
There is some indication that, in fact, very different kinds of people are answering this call than in the earliest years of the hate movement. Significantly, an increasing proportion of the hate movement’s membership seems to be characterized by non-traditional demographics, as more middle income, white collar workers become drawn to the message of salvation (Klanwatch, 1998; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 1997). The hate movement represents a beacon since (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 1997: 279):

... it is diverse in its expression, which can provide a haven for those seeking an explanation of the social conditions of white disenfranchisement along with a call to action. The “new rural ghetto” consists of formerly middle-class people who had achieved “American cultural goals” and lost it. Often forgotten, they are filled with rage as they “watch in hunger” as others eat at tables that not long ago were their own.

Moreover, slight modifications in the presentation of intolerance have made the contemporary hate movement more palatable, more acceptable to a public sensitized by a generation of discourse of equality, multi-culturalism, and diversity. In a word, hate is increasingly “mainstream”, and thus increasingly legitimate. In part this has been accomplished by toning down the rhetoric and engaging in symbolic racism. This “new racism” couches the old hostilities in abstract, ideological terms or “code words” that appear to have rational rather than emotive connotations. Further explorations of this process of “mainstreaming” are important to our ability to intervene in the recruitment process.

One corollary of the changing demographics of the hate movement is its apparent infiltration of the militia movement, which is characterized by a broader appeal, audience and membership. Recognizing a golden opportunity to extend their rhetoric of hate beyond traditional hate group membership, some leading hate activists have quickly joined ranks with the growing militia
movement. The CDR (1995:4) claims that, while militias are not exclusively made up of supremacists, “the line becomes blurred as one out of five active white supremacists have not only become involved but have become national leaders in the movement.”. Increasingly, the distinctions between the two types of organizations are becoming muted in terms of membership and ideology. Louis Beam, a long time Klansman and virulent racist, is the architect of the US militia movement’s strategy of “leaderless resistance”.

Because racism within the militias is often presented in sanitized form - as patriotism or constitutionalism - it has the face of legitimacy. The violence and intolerance are downplayed and hidden behind questions of “rights” and “rights violations”. This is what accounts for the broader appeal of the militia movement. It provides an apparently benign arena for dissatisfied citizens. Anyone from tax protesters, to racists, to bankrupt farmers, to unemployed workers can voice their hostility without necessarily being labelled as sexist, or homophobic, or racist. By crossing the line into the militia movement, hate groups are able to open themselves up to people who would otherwise resist joining a neo-Nazi or KKK organization. As Klanwatch director Joe Roy observes, “militias, common law courts and other Patriot organizations allow members to vent their anger in a manner that is more acceptable to mainstream America” (Klanwatch, 1997:17).

Beyond the dangers of increased numbers and the broader appeal of the militia movement lies the danger that inheres when you mix open-ended hostility with paramilitary activity. More so than the traditional hate groups, militias are heavily armed and trained to use the arms - as is their right according to the 2nd amendment. In a letter of warning to US Attorney General Janet Reno, Dees (1996) clearly stated his fears in this context:

We have substantial evidence that white supremacists are infiltrating the leadership of these organizations. In our view, this mixture of armed groups and those who hate is a recipe for disaster.
Similarly, Dees’ associate Danny Welch concluded in a report on the militia movement (cited in Dees, 1996) that:

. . . (I)t is a movement fuelled by religious fanaticism and racism, fully armed and willing to kill. Its members are capable of becoming Americanized versions of the kind of extremists you read about in other countries, a full-scale terrorist underground.

The empirical research on these dangerous links is scattered and fragmentary at best. It is thus an area in dire need of tangible proof.

Another source of growth for the hate movement is its tendency toward globalization in the context of the so-called Information Age. Weinberg (1998), for example, explores the extent to which hate groups around the world share motivations grounded in social, economic, and political uncertainty. Moreover, it becomes apparent from Weinberg’s analysis that such common perceptions of loss of privilege have contributed to the globalization of the movement, as hate groups communicate their parallel predicaments on the World Wide Web.

Internet communication helps to close the social and spatial distance that might otherwise thwart efforts to maintain a collective identity. Given the geographical dispersal of hate groups across the country, and across the globe, the medium of cyberspace allows members in Maine, Mississippi, London, and Oslo to engage in real time conversations, to share the ritual and imagery that bind the individuals to the collective without having to travel great distances or incur great costs. Virtual conversations and ready access to Web pages aggressively asserting the shortcomings of the Other strengthen the resolve of individual members by creating the framework for a shared sense of both peril and purpose.
Moreover, Internet communication knows no national boundaries. Consequently, it allows the hate movement to extend its collective identity internationally, thereby facilitating a potential “global racist subculture” (Back, Keith and Solomos, 1998). There is no reason to expect that processes of globalization affecting commerce, politics and demographics will not also affect the realm of identity politics played out by the hate movement (Weinberg, 1998). Weinberg (1998: 79) argues that the Internet will in fact provide the vehicle for the construction of a “common racial identity reaching across the Atlantic”. Regardless of national affiliation, Internet communication allows white people across the globe to share in the celebration of a common race. Moreover, such sites facilitate the importation of outlawed documents and rhetoric so that all can share in the discourses of hate. For example, while Germany and many other European nations have criminalized the publication and dissemination of racist propaganda, these nations have yet to establish an effective means of regulating the virtual border crossing of cyberhate. In short, the potential of the Internet for creating an enhanced sense of unity among the computer mediated community of haters is vast, and in fact, global. Again, each of the areas noted here are worthy of independent exploration: the ideological and the practical links between hate groups world wide; the utility (or constitutionality) of regulating Internet communication; and the use of the Internet to communicate between groups.

Another way to make sense of the globalization of the hate movement - beyond its “sanitized” presentation - is to consider the impact of contemporary media on recruitment and movement activities. In particular, scholars are beginning to recognize the extent to which the Internet has provided a remarkable marketing tool for the distribution of white power music specifically, and for the hate movement generally. It has been a major boon to all aspects of hate group activity, from recruitment, to strategizing, to movement globalization. Hate groups have mastered the exploitation of the Internet to communicate their ideas to countless members and potential members worldwide.
Area 5: Responding to Hate Crime

In the extant scholarship, there is little consensus as to how to respond to or prevent bias motivated crimes. Throughout the literature, authors often suggest resolutions that derive logically from their analyses. However, for the most part, these recommendations come by way of a conclusion, and are thus not fully developed. Hence, this section encourages researchers to explicitly address interventions intended to ameliorate the incidence or impact of hate crime. Initiatives might range from broad summaries of “promising practices”, to very specific programs like the victim-offender mediation. Moreover, the focus might include assessments (e.g., Jacobs, 1998) on hate crime legislation, or speculative recommendations for alternative approaches (e.g., Cogan, 1996, on social change).

Not surprisingly, the American literature, in particular, is dominated by attention to legislative and law enforcement responses. No dimension of hate crime has garnered as much scholarly attention as has its legal regulation. Nor has any area engendered so much controversy. While scholars can agree, in principle, that hate crime is grounded in bigotry (whether individual or cultural), there is no such consensus as to how, or even whether hate crime should be regulated legally. Nonetheless, as is typical in the United States, the most widespread response to hate crime has been statutory. Very little literature is available on approaches outside of the criminal justice system.

However, as many authors argue, hate crime legislation is not without serious limitations. James Jacobs (1996) is among the number of scholars critical of legislation that appears to criminalize “thought” rather than “action”. He raises the question of the constitutionality of hate crime legislation, as well as its potentially divisive impact on inter-group relations. From this perspective, the “identity politics” inherent in hate crime legislation seriously threatens First Amendment guarantees to freedom of speech, as well as equal protection provisions.
Another point of contention within the hate crime canon is the existence of inconsistencies in protected classes, as Grattet and Jenness (2001a, b) make clear. Where traditionally oppressed groups are excluded from the legislation - as is often the case with women and gay men and lesbians - the implication is that they are not worthy of the same protections afforded racial minorities. Moreover, the groups that are protected vary dramatically across jurisdictions, so that there is no shared national vision of who should be extended the protections of the law. In a similar vein, the nature of hate crime legislation in the US is itself disparate. At the federal level, hate crime may be confronted through the Hate Crime Statistics Act, the Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act, the Violence Against Women Act, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, the Church Arsons Prevention Act, or the Civil Rights Act. At the state level, some jurisdictions address bias motivated violence and intimidation, some account for institutional vandalism, and some allow for penalty enhancement for bias motivated crime. However, the states are by no means consistent in their inclusion or invocation of such criminal legislation. The law may or not have some impact on offenders - actual or potential - or on victims’ feelings of empowerment or on public consciousness. But it must not be the focus of attention. Our peculiarly American obsession with legal solutions must not blind us to other fruitful avenues toward the prevention of hate crime or the amelioration of its effects.

I would like to see hate crime scholars wield their pens in the interests of alternative responses to hate crime within and beyond the criminal justice system. As in most areas, the typical response to offenders has been punitive. We can explore, theorize, and test non-punitive measures that are likely to have more positive outcomes for the victims and offenders alike. Shenk (2001), for example, encourages us to extend the currently popular restorative justice model to the area of hate crime. She argues that:

> ... there are three principal benefits to be derived by both victims and offenders who engage in the victim-offender mediation process. First, victim-offender mediation humanizes the criminal justice process … Second, victim-offender
mediation provides an emotional release for both the victim and offender …

Third, victim-offender mediation fills many of the gaps in hate crimes legislation. By placing emphasis on the victim’s needs, victim-offender mediation will likely encourage victims to report future incidents of hate crimes … In addition, unlike hate crimes legislation, victim-offender mediation assures a reduction in recidivism.

Literature like Shenk’s that justifies consideration of non-punitive approaches must be followed up by scholarship that critically assesses the impact and effectiveness of such measures when and if they are adopted.

Under the current regime, and given the presence of hate crime legislation, an immediate question that arises is that of the role of police in invoking the relevant statutes. Numerous scholars have noted the extent to which law enforcement officers are frequent perpetrators of violence and brutality against people of color and gay men and lesbians. In addition to outright bias, many officers remain insensitive or poorly trained - either of which can contribute to inadequate enforcement of hate crime measures (see Bell, 2002). Add to that prosecutorial reluctance to proceed with hate crime charges (see Grattet and Jenness, 2001a) and the limitations of hate crime legislation are readily apparent. Consequently, it is vital that legislative initiatives be accompanied by provisions for effectively training law enforcement and prosecutors in the identification, investigation, and prosecution of hate crime (see, e.g., Wessler, 2000). However, such training must itself become a focus of investigation. The assumption seems to be that if the training is offered, that is enough. Police will be equipped to deal with hate crime. Much more assessment of such programs is needed. Just two weeks prior to the time of writing, I sat in on a day long training session offered by a well known and well respected anti-prejudice organization. I came away from the session thinking that it was no wonder police found such trainings to be a waste of time. It was very vague, with few concrete suggestions for how police might improve their investigations, or even their interactions with
victims. If it was frustrating for me, it must have been much worse for the officers. It is this sort of content based assessment that might become one avenue for exploration.

Law enforcement officers are not the only people in need of education around hate crime and the prejudices that underlie it. As a means of preventing hate crime, anti-prejudice and anti-violence projects have begun to spring up across the US, especially in elementary and secondary schools, but also in college and university settings. Federal, state and local governments continue to support such initiatives through promotional and funding activities. For example, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) sponsored the development of a Healing the Hate curriculum directed toward youthful hate crime offenders. Similarly, the US Department of Education is mandated by the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities initiative to support the development of hate crime prevention curricula, as well as training programs for teachers and administrators. Together, the OJJDP and the Department of Justice fund the National Center for Hate Crime Prevention. Working in partnership with such agencies as the ADL, the Center for Democratic Renewal, and the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Center is dedicated to interventions for youth, in particular. The Center provides training, workshops, technical support, interventions, and information for youth, practitioners and communities.

As with police training programs, there have been few if any academic assessments of such initiatives. The starting point for such evaluation research lies within the organizations and programs themselves. They must take the initiative in clearly defining expected outcomes of hate crime prevention and response efforts. Useful program evaluation relies on clear and measurable definitions of outcomes. In addition to reducing the incidence of hate crime positive outcomes could include “changes in attitudes of children or community members who participate in hate crime prevention training, improved conflict resolution skills, increased victim satisfaction, enhanced perceptions of safety and well-being, reduced recidivism rates, and positive changes in the behavior or attitudes of offenders” (IACP, 1999). It is also important to
keep in mind, however, that “in jurisdictions where the rate of hate crime reporting has been low, a desirable short-term or interim outcome may well be to increase the rate of reported hate incidents or crimes” (IACP, 1999).

The last decade of the twentieth century saw a flurry of hate crime legislation and other state activities, none of which have had an appreciable effect on the frequency or certainly the severity of hate crime. Such initiatives are insufficient responses to bias motivated violence, in that they do not touch the underlying structures that support hate crime. Abdicating responsibility for countering such violence to the state, then, will not be a sufficiently effective long term strategy. Rather, the responsibility must be shared and distributed across institutional and interactional levels. Moreover, the ultimate goal is not only to attack hate crime but to disrupt the institutional and cultural assumptions about difference which condition hate crime. To the extent that difference is socially constructed, it can also be socially reconstructed. In other words, we can strive for a just and democratic society in which the full spectrum of diversity addressed here is re-evaluated in a positive and celebratory light. To that end, then, I encourage advocacy scholarship that is grounded in the theoretical models urged previously. Such literature would stimulate thinking about creative, democratic approaches to the elimination of hate crime and of the cultural and social processes that underlie it. This is the other side of the equation: not evaluating what exists, but rather advocating for alternative approaches, which may or may not be outside the formal criminal justice system.

Valerie Jenness’ (e.g., Jenness and Broad, 1998) work on anti-violence projects reveals that widespread ethnoviolence has in fact mobilized identifiable social movements. In particular, she draws attention to the success of feminist and gay and lesbian organizations in developing “collective action frames” that have redefined hate crime as a legitimate social problem. In fact, Jenness and Broad (1998: 174) conclude that “anti-violence projects across the United States have provided and continue to provide the structural basis for the mobilization around violence and victimization”. Such bodies serve two primary roles: lobbying for the elimination of
discriminatory law and practice; and monitoring and responding to hate crime.

The social movements and organizations referred to above will continue to stimulate change for the communities for which they speak. However, it is becoming increasingly important that they recognize their shared objectives, and engage in coalition building. The victim groups addressed throughout this paper have often experienced a similarity (but not sameness) of oppression. In other words, blacks, Jews, Asians, homosexuals and others have all suffered various degrees of discrimination and victimization. Racial and ethnic communities, and gender communities alike have been marginalized and are victims of bias motivated violence. Yet rather than acknowledging this and forming coalitions, they have often resorted to conflict among themselves. While recognizing the distinct nature and impact of hate crimes upon different victim groups, expressed above, intercultural coalitions must challenge the essentialist assumptions about identity that insist on irreconcilable differences between races, between genders, between race and gender. The social change advocated by Jeanine Cogan (1996), for example, will require that we see race, class, gender and sexuality as “categories of connection” rather than as categories of opposition.

The civil rights movement, women’s movement, gay and lesbian movement, and the victim’s rights movement share a commitment to countering discrimination and its related forms of violence. The anti-violence projects which are embedded in each of these reflect not only localized social movements, but also the power of collective action that consciously crosses boundaries. Despite the different interests, perspectives, tactics and strategies, these projects nonetheless coalesce around shared experiences of violence, victimization, and other forms of discrimination. Such coalitions do not force its members to “pluck out” one part of their identities; they resist the fragmentation which otherwise alienates people from their multiple communities, and from the rich variation of their own identities.

**Area 6: Comparative Research**
A few brief words by way of conclusion: What I have offered here is by no means an exhaustive list of the possibilities for extended scholarship. It is undoubtedly skewed by my own interests, and my own agenda. However, I hope it has inspired one or two ideas. In fact, if anything useful comes out of this paper, I hope that it is collaborative scholarship that joins talents, expertise, and diversity of perspectives.

I have mentioned several times that American scholars, in particular, can learn from European analyses of bigoted violence. There is so much to be learned from the scholarship embedded in the conditions of other nations, as well as from the concrete experiences of these countries. In short, it is important to more fully comprehend both the cultural specificity and the commonalities of bigoted violence across borders. Our approach must be, at least in part, global and historical, since ethnoviolence itself is global and historical. As Mike Sutton, Director of NCSRHC and his former UK Home Office colleagues David Mann and Rachel Tuffin observed in a recent paper dealing specifically with their research into the online hate movement (Mann, Sutton and Tuffin 2003):

In order to understand the meanings for white racialists, and how their organizations and activities have evolved in recent years, it is necessary to know more about the cultural, demographic, economic and political context in each society of interest. The reasons for race hate in Britain will undoubtedly share many of the core characteristics of other countries, yet it has its own unique historical influences.

An earlier comparative analysis by Rob Witte (1994) clearly underpins this need for attendance to cultural specificity:

Every country has its specific history, circumstances, developments, and
discourses. The same holds true with respect to the racist violence itself. Countries differ with respect to (groups of) perpetrators, to groups of potential victims, and to the responses by various sections of society. Yet, in addition to differences, similarities are present too.

Comparative studies that acknowledge this sentiment will allow us to uncover the constants in hate crime, the broad constellations of conditions that make such violence likely - conditions like rapidly shifting demographics, economic downturns or uncertainty, or volatile political discourse, for example. Thus, these analyses may help us to build the theoretical accounts to which I previously referred.

Cross-cultural understanding becomes especially important in enhancing our understanding of hate groups. As I noted earlier, the hate movement has become increasingly globalized. This requires that we share information and knowledge about the activities of these groups across borders. Moreover, given the spread of the hate movement, it may be in our best interests to explore theoretically and practically the ways in which nation-states can collaborate to constrain its growth and convergence - a concentrated effort to educate the public, police and regulate the online activities of hate groups.

In practical terms, comparative scholarship may be most useful in the development of effective responses to hate crime. As Witte (1994) asserts:

One thing is clear: state responses to racist violence are an important, if not decisive factor with respect to future developments. Will the level and the scale of racist violence increase even more? Or will it decrease? Or will it be regulated in some other way? An international comparative analysis of state responses to racist violence may give a better insight in the variety and the influence of these responses to this violence. Such an analysis should include both similarities and
This, then, suggests that we seek to document anti-hate crime initiatives, and determine what types of responses are effective under what conditions. In short, nation-states can learn from both the successes and failures of other political entities.

One exciting area of comparative analysis that is in its nascent stages is the examination of the links between hate crime and the broader concept of ethnic conflict. Scholars have begun to address the parallels and linkages between seemingly disparate events like the 1998 lynching of James Byrd in Texas, and conflicts like the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks, and 1998 Colombian social cleansing. Roger MacGinty (2001) recently asked the question:

What is the difference between a prejudice-motivated assault in a city in the United States and a similar incident in a deeply divided society such as Northern Ireland or South Africa? At a micro and human level, there will be little difference for the victim. But, the context between the cases is significant and has an impact on the debate on hate crime.

What is the difference? Intuitively, we might respond that a US city assault is an individual offence, while those in Northern Ireland are political offences. Yet, in culturally divided societies, is hate crime devoid of political motive? I would ask that we seriously engage this question, and look to hate crimes for precursors of or parallels to ethno-national conflict.

I will close here with an earnest request that we take advantage of this call to make progress toward establishing cross-cultural links, and more generally, toward addressing the voids I have identified. If we are to confront this increasingly global problem as a global community, it is imperative that we commit to a shared interest in enhancing our understanding of all dimensions
of bias motivated violence.
References


*Arizona Republic*, Letter to the Editor, 17/05/99.


Criminology, 33(2): 231-250


Diamond, S. (1996), Facing the Wrath: Confronting the Right in Dangerous Times. Monroe ME:
Common Courage Press


Herek, G., Cogan, J. and Gillis, R. (2002), ‘Victim Experiences in Hate Crimes Based
on Sexual Orientation’, *Journal of Social Issues*, 58(2): 319-339


National Institute Against Prejudice and Violence/Prejudice Institute, (1993), Bias Incident Data Collection. Baltimore MD: Prejudice Institute


Perry, B. (forthcoming), Backlash Violence: Anti-Muslim/Anti-Arab Hate Crime in the


