



Guidance for local authorities on community cohesion contingency planning and tension monitoring



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May 2008

Product Code: 08 REU 05249

ISBN: 978-1-8511-2941-6

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Ministerial Foreword

In June 2007, the Commission on Integration and Cohesion delivered an ambitious report to government based on in-depth consultation. Its ideas for renewed local and national collaboration point the way ahead for much of the department's work in promoting community cohesion.

The report made a number of recommendations to help build cohesion, one of which was the use of area profiling and mapping to help identify tensions and develop solutions.

Like the Commission, the Government's approach to cohesion is that it is something which people themselves generate. One of the many ways they can do this is by developing the ability to analyse information in a way that both helps us to understand threats to community and reduce the likelihood of conflicts occurring.

It is therefore essential we begin to develop the skills within our communities to recognise, name, manage and resolve conflicts that may arise in the process of community change in order we move towards cohesive communities.

This guide seeks to help those at the sharp end of delivering cohesion to use information collated in a way that helps identify when conflict is likely, and then develop the capacity to create the basket of skills, networks and tools required to prevent it.

Community cohesion is not a one off exercise, is something we all need to keep working at. Having this tension early warning system ensures we remain better informed and therefore better able to deal with those challenges that lay ahead. By recognising tensions early we can deal with them and move forward with confidence in developing areas where we all have a shared future.



Parmjit Dhanda MP
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State

Section 1

Introduction and background

Background

1. **Community Cohesion is what must happen in all communities to enable different groups of people to get on well together.**
2. **A key contributor to community cohesion is integration which is what must happen to enable new residents and existing residents to adjust to one another.**
3. Our vision of an integrated and cohesive community is based on three foundations:
 - **People from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities**
 - **People knowing their rights and responsibilities**
 - **People trusting one another and trusting local institutions to act fairly.**
4. And three key ways of living together:
 - **A shared future vision and sense of belonging**
 - **A focus on what new and existing communities have in common, alongside a recognition of the value of diversity**
 - **Strong and positive relationships between people from different backgrounds**
5. We have three national indicators for cohesion:
 - **The percentage of people who believe people from different backgrounds get on well together in their local area**
 - **The percentage of people who feel that they belong to their neighbourhood**
 - **The percentage of people who have meaningful interactions with people from different backgrounds.**

6. Events in some northern towns in 2001 showed that where there is a lack of cohesion, community tensions can result in serious disturbance with far-reaching social and economic consequences. Since 2001 central and local government and partners have done a great deal to build cohesion through addressing the underlying causes of tension between different communities. This is a long term agenda, requiring strong local leadership, multi-agency collaboration and a strategic approach. Comprehensive guidance to support local leaders and practitioners has been published by the Local Government Association (LGA), the Improvement & Development Agency (IDeA), the Home Office and others. A list of these key documents can be found at Annex B.
7. At the same time we need to recognise that community tensions can escalate into violent disorder and that short-term and possibly unpredicted factors, in this country or abroad, have the potential to trigger conflict in normally cohesive communities. These factors may include a racially or religiously motivated assault, an act of terrorism, or military conflict.
8. Arrangements for monitoring and responding to rises in community tension already occupy an important place in ongoing local community cohesion activity. The Government believes that it is vital for every local authority and its partners to consider developing a local cohesion contingency plan which sets out the roles, responsibilities and processes to be activated should local community tensions be assessed as likely to result in serious violence or disturbance and in the event of actual disorder occurring.
9. A local cohesion contingency plan should be a simple and unambiguous protocol agreed between local partners, and may well be closely based on existing arrangements for decision making on local cohesion issues. Where such arrangements do not already exist, the process of developing community cohesion contingency plans may provide a focus for revisiting or developing local multi-agency arrangements for ongoing cohesion work.
10. Every Government Office (GO) has a regional cohesion lead who can offer practical advice and guidance to local authorities. Cohesion leads also act as hubs for regional information sharing and can help to facilitate cross-boundary working between local authorities. Contact details for GO cohesion leads are attached at Annex C.

IDeA research into existing local community cohesion contingency planning

11. This guidance takes account of research carried out by the IDeA on behalf of the Home Office in 2006. The research suggested that few councils had robust arrangements in place to ensure a quick and coherent response to major incidents which threaten community cohesion. Encouragingly however, the research identified considerable enthusiasm and willingness amongst all of the local authorities reviewed to do more.
12. There is no single template for cohesion contingency planning, and to be effective, plans need to reflect local conditions and ways of working. This guidance suggests how cohesion contingency planning can operate locally, with some illustrative case studies in Section 6. Additional case studies can be found in the IDeA research.

Section 2

Purpose and content of a local community cohesion contingency plan

13. The purpose of a community cohesion contingency plan is to prevent community tensions leading to serious disturbance wherever possible, and to ensure that relationships and systems are in place which allow the local authority and its partners to act quickly and coherently to reduce, control or mitigate the impact of disturbances on cohesion if they do occur.
14. Agreed cohesion contingency arrangements should be documented and accessible to partners. They do not necessarily need to be in a stand alone document – indeed, it may be best to link the arrangements to other local resilience plans and processes.
15. To achieve its purpose, a cohesion contingency plan should identify in clear and unambiguous terms:
 - (A) **The circumstances in which the plan will be implemented**
This should identify the individual, or individuals, responsible for recommending that the plan is activated, and the person responsible for taking the decision to activate. The plan should also set out the context in which these responsibilities should be discharged, including a general indication of factors which might justify activating the plan.

Examples of factors which might justify activating the plan include:

- tension monitoring for the area identifies tensions at 'high' or 'medium and rising'
- a serious terrorist incident apparently perpetrated by individuals linked to a particular interest, faith or ethnic community, leading to a threat of widespread increased tension and/or disorder, or widespread anxiety within a local community that its members may be subject to attack*
- an incident of extreme racially or religiously aggravated violence by members of one community against another leading to the threat of retaliatory backlash*

*Incidents may occur within the local authority areas, outside it, or even abroad, and the threat may be perceived, where the perception gives rise to serious apprehension within a particular community or communities more generally.

16. The decision about when a local cohesion contingency plan should be activated is a matter for local judgment. It is not possible for this guidance to say in any detail what factors need to be present to justify activating a plan. This is partly because of the difficulty in predicting such factors (although some broad parameters are suggested above); and partly because of varying local conditions. For example, an urban area which already has well-developed arrangements for monitoring and responding to rises in community tension may be justified in applying a relatively high threshold. On the other hand a rural area which has not so far found it necessary to invest quite so heavily in ongoing cohesion work, may have to adopt a relatively low threshold, to meet the needs, for example, of a small minority community which may feel itself vulnerable to violent backlash following a serious terrorist incident. Councils and their partners may find the case studies in Section 6 (and in the IDeA report) of use when considering thresholds for triggering plans.
17. At times of heightened tension the Government will be alive to the possible need to activate central cohesion contingency plans and will be in close touch with Regional Government Offices and police forces.
18. A result of this may be that Government Offices will contact local areas to inquire about the state of local cohesion contingency arrangements and their implementation.

(B) Who, at a senior level – elected or official – is championing the plan

In many cases this will be the Chief Executive or Lead Officer.¹ This person will have responsibility for ensuring that effective cohesion contingency planning takes place. This will involve driving the development, testing and review of the plan and for ensuring that lead partners are fully engaged in this process and stand ready to participate if the plan is activated. Feedback from councils involved in the IDeA research suggests that it is important not to underestimate the level of strategic input required to lead, build and champion community cohesion. The research also identified that adopting a formal performance management approach (with clear outcomes, outputs and milestones) was a key factor for success.

¹ Guidance on the role of Leaders and Chief Executives in relation to community cohesion has been published. See *Leading Cohesive Communities: A Guide for Local Authority Leaders and Chief Executives*, IDeA and Local Government Association (and partners), 2005.

(C) The individuals representing the local agencies who will come together if the plan is activated

These representatives should come mandated to take immediate tactical decisions on behalf of their agencies. For the purposes of this guidance, the representatives are called collectively the multi-agency group. The plan may need to differentiate between a core multi-agency group, that is to say those who will be invariably summoned, and agencies who may need to be summoned, depending on the nature of the crisis.

(D) Arrangements for gathering and communicating relevant information to the multi-agency group

This will include details of further developments which may impact on community tension, and changing patterns and levels of local community tension. It may be possible to base these communication arrangements on ongoing community tension monitoring arrangements, but it should be clear to partners that these arrangements will be stepped up if circumstances are serious enough to justify activating the contingency plan.

(E) Key practical details

These should include:

- up-to-date 24/7 contact details for all individuals named in the plan as having a role or responsibility (and similar contact details for individuals able to deputise for them)
- contact details for other key partners and stakeholders (including community and faith group leaders)
- meeting arrangements (where and roughly how often)
- information about other key bodies and contacts (eg the lead local emergency planning officer and linked emergency response structures).

The plan should also record mechanisms agreed by partners for recording, sharing and analysing information.

(F) An indication of possible responses

You will of course want to be flexible in deciding how to respond to specific incidents or developments, but it may be helpful for the plan to include some examples of interventions.

Examples of the interventions you might include are:

- Dissemination of information and reassurance to vulnerable and majority communities
- Outreach to local faith community leaders to provide reassurance, and to arrange for dissemination of reassurance to the wider community, (eg in the case of Muslim communities, through Friday prayers)
- The Lead Member and Chief Executive publicly to meet with community and faith leaders
- The local authority to contact community groups to suggest public messages of solidarity
- Conflict resolution [further information available via Cohesion and Faiths Division – Communities and Local Government]
- Deployment of mediation resources – Neighbourhood Renewal Advisers or independent mediators
- Positive youth engagement which seeks to address tensions.

Section 3

Communication

19. Communication is a key element of a cohesion contingency plan. This should include communications between the agencies engaged directly or indirectly in the plan; with local communities and residents; and with formal and informal media sources. A clear, articulate and co-ordinated approach will help to tackle the exploitative messages of extremists, and counter myths, rumours and misinformation whilst reassuring and giving voice to majority and minority communities.
20. The core multi-agency group will want to have in place agreed arrangements for communicating with each other, and with members of the wider multi-agency group.
21. The types of issues involved in communicating with communities are likely to vary as the contingency plan is rolled out and as specific needs are identified, from the early broadcasting of messages of reassurance, through to formal statements of intent about the ways in which the situation will be monitored and controlled.
22. Local partners may find it useful to develop a menu of options for communicating different pieces of information to communities, so that they are able to respond quickly in a crisis situation. To do this, local authorities will want to work closely with representatives from the voluntary, community and faith sectors as well as communities themselves when developing the cohesion contingency plan to identify the most effective ways to communicate with and reassure local people.
23. Councils' ability to engage with press and media organisations to prevent sensationalist reporting which may fuel community tensions and ensure that key messages are communicated in a consistent, accurate and culturally sensitive way is crucial. The IDeA toolkit on *Building a Relationship with the Media* sets out some useful tips for working with the media on community cohesion issues. Local authorities will want to think about whether messages need only be shared with the local media, or whether there would be benefit in involving regional or national media. The role that informal media can play should not be underestimated.

Section 4

Developing, maintaining and reviewing plans

24. Cohesion contingency plans should be developed by a multi-agency partnership led by the local authority. At political management level ownership of cohesion contingency plans should rest primarily with council leaders and portfolio holders. Within the officer level structure, the Chief Executive should retain ownership to ensure that plans are effective and sustainable and are factored into business planning cycles, and that a performance management framework for developing and maintaining the plan is in place – this should include outcomes, outputs, milestones and timescales for delivery and review.
25. If they are to be effective, cohesion contingency plans should promote equality and good relations and not undermine them. In developing plans local authorities and their partners should ensure they take account of the duty to promote good relations between people from different racial groups contained within the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 and responsibilities for promoting equality.

Role of local councillors

26. Councils should work to ensure that community cohesion is understood and articulated by local ward councillors. They have key roles to play reassuring local people, gathering intelligence, monitoring and reporting on change and the potential for increased community tension, and acting as advocates and mediators when conflict arises.

Multi-agency cohesion contingency planning partnership

27. The local multi-agency partnership should comprise a range of partners including statutory agencies and the voluntary, community and faith sectors. Many of these partners will have key roles to play in the event of threatened or actual disturbances. Key local partners include representatives from the statutory sectors (eg police, housing, fire service, community safety, education and health) and representatives from the voluntary, community and faith sectors. Press and media representatives should also be included. You may also want to consider involving your government

office cohesion lead. Building trust and effective relationships between all partners and the development of strong links into and across communities is essential if plans are to be effective.

28. Local authorities may decide to convene a strategic group – concerned with managing the contingency planning process, reviewing plans and overseeing implementation – and a tactical group – comprised of staff on the ground who will be responsible for carrying out specific actions should the plan be implemented. There will of course be overlaps between the two groups.

Links with emergency planning

29. Cohesion contingency plans exist to prevent the threat of imminent cohesion-related disorder from becoming a reality and to limit the extent and impact of cohesion-related disorder when it does occur. In addition, in order to fulfil their responsibilities under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 local authorities work with local resilience partners to assess the risk of disruptive challenges and prepare to respond to the consequences. When assessing the impact of those risks actually occurring, local responders are asked to consider the implications for community cohesion and public order more generally. This work will complement the work on cohesion contingency planning by ensuring that emergency services and other key responders have the capability to cope with the generic consequences that could arise in the event of a breakdown in community cohesion.
30. It is important that there are clear and agreed lines of communication between the lead local cohesion contingency planning officer and the lead local emergency planning officer. The lead local emergency planning officer should be invited to take part in the development of the cohesion contingency plan and should have access to an up to date copy of the cohesion contingency plan. The cohesion contingency plan should include contact details for the lead emergency planning officer.
31. The establishment of strong links will be mutually beneficial for the community cohesion and emergency planning teams. There will be a strong correlation between much of the work involved in the preparation of the community cohesion contingency plan and the generic emergency planning arrangements. Emergency planning teams will have in place a strategy for community engagement, established channels for multi-agency co-operation and a process of assessment of the demographic composition of the community, the identification of vulnerable groups and the geographical distribution of communities within the local area.

32. Police forces, under the guidance of the Association of Chief Police Officers' National Community Tension Team, are well attuned to the community policing dimension of responding to threats to cohesion and will wish to work closely with local partners through the local multi-agency arrangements.

Reviewing and testing plans

33. Plans should be reviewed on a regular basis – preferably as part of the wider local authority planning cycle – and in response to events which might threaten cohesion to ensure they remain relevant and responsive to changing circumstances. Councils should also be observant of new communities and changing social profiles and the impact of this on local communities. It is up to local areas to decide the scale of the review although this should include scenario planning wherever possible. Some areas have found joint planning-for-real exercises with neighbouring authorities to be helpful, while others have carried out peer reviews to good effect.
34. Local authorities should also review their cohesion contingency plan following any situation or incident which has led to the plan being implemented. A de-brief should be held as soon as possible while events are still fresh in the minds of partners, so that the partnership can identify what worked well and what didn't, and seize the opportunity for improving the plan, strengthening relationships and improving communications where necessary.

Monitoring community tension

35. To operate successfully, the multi-agency partnership responsible for implementing the cohesion contingency plan needs to have up-to-date information about the scale and nature of local community tensions and regular tension monitoring is therefore vital. Many local areas are already undertaking community tension monitoring in support of ongoing cohesion work, and the next section of this guidance includes suggestions for carrying out this process effectively.

Section 5

Tension monitoring

Why monitor tensions?

36. Within all communities there is the potential for tensions to arise which may lead to conflict. The nature of tensions, conflicts and divisions will differ from one area to another: there may be tensions and mistrust between different ethnic or faith groups, urban and rural dwellers, new arrivals and long-term residents, or along inter-generational lines. Councils need to be able to track and monitor local trends and 'hot spots', alongside any national or international events which may threaten cohesion, and agree and implement actions to manage tensions on the basis that early intervention can make a real difference in preventing incidents of public disorder.

Who needs to be involved?

37. The most effective way to do this is through establishing a multi-agency tension monitoring group, led by an officer/s from the local authority and/or the local police force. This should include key partners from the statutory sector (eg housing, community safety, education, fire service, health, probation/youth offending team, community workers, neighbourhood wardens and police community support officers, National Asylum Support Service), and relevant representatives from the voluntary, community and faith sectors.

Relevant pieces of intelligence might include:

- quantitative data (eg police crime statistics and intelligence reports)
- qualitative community intelligence from neighbourhood wardens, community workers, casework by local councillors and feedback from local community meetings and organisations
- racially or religiously motivated offences or incidents
- details of new arrivals, refugees and asylum seekers, and Gypsy and Traveller communities in the local area
- gang and turf conflicts
- neighbour disputes
- complaints of noise nuisance
- examples of poor community/local authority relations, poor community/police relations/low levels of trust in local politicians
- surveys of community views on reassurance, cohesion and safety matters
- state of local economic activity (decline or improvement)
- financial and social investment in the area
- demand for housing and condition of the local housing stock
- plans for renewal and the sustainability of planned or actual improvements
- political extremism
- media reports.

What sort of information is relevant?

38. The group will need to share and collate details of incidents and situations likely to impact upon community tensions; as well as details of public order incidents which have a community cohesion angle.
39. Tensions can be more easily managed if action is taken as early as possible to address them and with this in mind, the group should also consider future events which have the potential to raise tensions. These might include planned local demonstrations by extremist groups, cultural events or sporting fixtures, or national and international events.

Sharing and analysing information

Tension monitoring arrangements

40. Local tension monitoring arrangements should be flexible enough to allow partners to share information efficiently on a routine basis and outside of that should the need arise. You may wish to involve your government office cohesion lead when developing your tension monitoring arrangements as s/he will be able to offer advice on effective approaches taken by councils in other parts of the region and beyond.
41. To ensure tension monitoring arrangements are as effective and robust as possible, councils and their partners will need to agree:
 - a lead officer (ideally from within the local authority or police force) to whom routine and emergency tension reports should be sent
 - who the reporting partners are
 - timescales for the submission of routine reports
 - arrangements for emergency reporting
 - how information should be presented
 - how often the group should meet in normal circumstances (with an understanding that meeting frequency will increase should the need arise)
 - the roles and responsibilities of each partner (in monitoring tensions and undertaking activity to address tensions)
 - protocols for managing and sharing tension monitoring information.

Recording information

42. Local authorities and their partners may find it useful to use a common template to record information. Key fields include:
 - the date, location and time of any incident
 - relevant details of the victim(s) and perpetrator(s). This may include estimates of the number of people involved and their age, gender, ethnicity or faith as appropriate
 - what is believed to have motivated the situation/incident
 - details of any action taken in response to the incident (in terms of managing the incident/disorder and the potential impact on cohesion)
 - whether the incident has been picked up on by the media and the angle of reporting.

43. All partners should try to avoid the use of jargon wherever possible, or at the very least, provide the multi-agency partnership with a glossary of key terms or abbreviations used.
44. The template might also provide examples of incidents to be grouped under the following headings:

Political (extremist political activity (leafletting, graffiti, meetings); elections or by-elections at which extremist candidates are standing; issues, potentially detrimental to community cohesion, which are prominent on the public agenda; local demonstrations; local political situations which are exacerbating community tensions)

Community (tensions between specific communities and incidents between specific communities)

Immigration, asylum and refugee² (eg local concerns about the effects of migration on the local area; impact of national policy on migration (eg asylum dispersal) on the local area; racist attacks motivated by anti-migrant sentiment)

Racial and religious (eg actions of racist organisations; racially and/or religiously motivated incidents and offences; concerns within communities (including faith communities) about hate crime)

Criminal (eg gang activity and anti-social behaviour)

National and international (incidents which have impacted upon or have the potential to impact upon the local community)

Other – anything which doesn't fit into the above categories

Future (significant anniversaries and planned demonstrations).

45. Partners should also specify whether the information relates to how communities are feeling ('experienced'); an event that has happened ('evidenced'); or something which might happen ('potential').
46. A copy of the tension monitoring reporting form used by Government Offices is attached at Annex A.

² Wherever known partners should be specific about the immigration status of migrants involved in incidents or situations. Where unknown, partners should avoid speculation.

Analysing information

47. Intelligence obtained through tension monitoring should be complemented by ongoing work to build a picture of community cohesion in the local area.
48. Regular meetings are a good way of allowing the tension monitoring group to discuss incidents that have occurred and use the information provided in reports to:
 - identify the overall levels of tension and likelihood of disturbances occurring,
 - agree priorities and actions to address tensions; and
 - monitor trends over time.
49. The frequency of meetings will depend upon local circumstances; once a month is a good starting point, with partners agreeing to meet more frequently should the need arise. While the primary focus is likely to be on immediate and localised threats to cohesion, meetings are also a useful opportunity for the group to carry out the kind of 'horizon scanning' activity described in paragraph 30.
50. Local authorities may find useful to use the following framework when trying to determine tension levels within their area. This has been adapted from the National Community Tensions Team assessment framework.

Local tension assessment framework

High

Area faces the highest risk and has the potential to experience disturbances in the immediate future.

- Substantial and widespread fears in the local community and from local agencies about the imminence of public disorder
- Evidence of preparations for public disorder or its consequences
- Sustained hostility between particular groups and the police
- Evidence that serious offences have been committed.

Medium

Tensions are evident in the local area, but the risk of disorder is not immediate.

- Significant number of people in the community and local agencies with fears about the potential for disorder if no action is taken
- Targeting of particular communities
- Tension indicators – such as assaults on police, racist graffiti – increase
- Expected disorder is localised geographically or within certain communities.

Local tension assessment framework (continued)**Low**

Some tensions remain, but are not immediately evident. The risk of disorder is low.

- Limited community concerns that tension will develop into disorder and that, even if it did, the impact would be minor
- Targeting of specific communities is at a low level or absent
- Information sources do not suggest that disorder will develop.

No tensions

51. The overall focus of the meetings should be on identifying proactive strategic and operational work which can mitigate against any emerging community tensions. It is imperative that tension monitoring arrangements are linked into wider local strategic partnerships such as the LSP and CDRP so that identified actions can be delivered swiftly and with the support of all key local agencies. One arrangement might be for the multi-agency group to function as a sub-group of the LSP.

The legal framework and information sharing protocols

52. Local authorities and their partners will wish to take legal advice to ensure that their local tension monitoring arrangements are lawful. Relevant pieces of legislation include:

The Data Protection Act 1998

53. The Data Protection Act 1998 sets out rules governing the processing of 'personal data'. It also provides people with the right to see personal data held about them. Personal Data is data from which a living individual can be identified, either directly from that data or in conjunction with other data which is either in or is likely to come into the possession of the data controller. The Act sets out eight principles that must, subject to certain limited exemptions, be followed when processing personal data.
54. As far as possible, the data provided under tension monitoring arrangements should not be 'personal data' ie it does not identify individuals and could not be used to identify individuals in conjunction with other information.

55. If reports do identify individuals, then Local Authorities need to ensure that they are following the eight principles of personal data:
- Processed fairly and lawfully
 - Processed only for specified, lawful and compatible purpose
 - Adequate, relevant and not excessive
 - Accurate and up to date
 - Kept for no longer than necessary
 - Processed in accordance with the rights of data subjects
 - Kept secure
 - Only transferred outside the European Economic Area if there is adequate protection.
56. The Cabinet Office and Ministry of Justice have published guidance for emergency planners entitled *Data Protection and Sharing – Guidance for Emergency Planners and Responders* (www.ukresilience.info). While this guidance is aimed at emergency planners the principles for data sharing are generic and may be of use to those responsible for cohesion contingency planning.

Freedom of Information Act 2000

57. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) came into force on 1 January 2005. The underlying principle of the FOIA is that information should be disclosed unless it is not in the public interest to do so. The FOIA defines particular circumstances in which public bodies are not necessarily obliged to disclose; these are called exemptions.
58. Any individual request for disclosure of information obtained in the course of tension monitoring would need to be considered on its merits. An assessment would need to be made at the time of how much harm would actually be done by disclosure, and weigh this against public interest arguments for disclosure.
59. There are a number of exemptions from disclosure under the FOIA which could be applicable if a local authority wished to consider refusing disclosure. You may wish to take into account the possible damage which disclosure would do by identifying areas at risk of disturbance. If the identity of an area became known sections of the media might publicise this. This could in turn create an expectation of disorder.

Monitoring political extremism

60. Local tension monitoring may take specific account of activities by members of any political group which increase community tension.
61. It is important that the gathering and use of such information complies with any legislation which might be relevant (for example the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and the Data Protection Act 1998).

Information sharing protocols

62. In addition to taking legal advice, multi-agency partnerships responsible for tension monitoring should agree protocols for sharing information. Partners involved in tension monitoring will want to know how the information they have provided has been used, and organisations responsible for delivering services to communities will want to understand the implications that an increase in tensions may have for their work.
63. At the same time however, releasing tension monitoring information has risks attached to it. If details of specific incidents found their way into the public domain they may lead to retaliatory activity and heightened fears and tensions.
64. Those responsible for collating and analysing tension monitoring information should consider passing aggregated tension reports down to partners who have contributed to the process only where an explicit agreement has been reached with them about how that information can be used. Key principles include:
 - Information passed back down the reporting 'chain' should be shared only for the purposes of the partner organisation receiving it and should not be shared further outside that organisation
 - Partner organisations with whom tension monitoring information is shared should agree with those responsible for producing the report the general purpose to which they (partner organisations) will put the information, and advise partners in advance of any specific action they intend to take in relation to a particular piece of information or the issues raised.
65. Local authorities should also consider developing a formal agreement to share information 'sideways' with neighbouring areas as tensions in one area may affect another, and effective management of tensions may require working across boundaries.

Monitoring community tensions at regional and national level

66. Every local authority has a valuable contribution to make to regional and central government work to monitor and respond to tensions and should submit a monthly tension monitoring report to their Government Office cohesion lead. Every month, GO cohesion leads collate this information to build a picture of tensions across their region and make an assessment of the overall level of risk. This information is then sent to the Cohesion and Faiths Unit in the Department for Communities and Local Government who use it to build a picture of tension levels across the country, and look for patterns and trends between areas and regions. Alongside providing this guidance at a national level we are developing a basket of measures which local areas can draw on to support their work on cohesion. We will be piloting specialist cohesion teams to support local authorities facing cohesion challenges, particularly those areas facing rapid change for example from new patterns of migration. We propose to use Communities and Local Government's Neighbourhood Renewal Advisers as the nucleus of these teams, expanding the cadre where appropriate for example to ensure they have the most relevant experience of migration and that they are able to engage the local third sector.

Section 6

Case studies

67. These case studies have been extracted from a report produced by the Improvement and Development Agency on behalf of the Home Office.

Developing cohesion contingency plans

Developing Cohesion Contingency Planning in Luton

Luton Borough Council undertook a scrutiny led review of community cohesion in 2002/03 entitled *Sticking Together: Embracing Diversity in Luton*.

The Council is now in the process of developing a community cohesion emergency protocol to establish how it, as a lead organisation, will respond in the face of a cohesion-related situation. The aim of the protocol is to put in place systems to monitor and detect any potential challenges to cohesion and to have in place comprehensive procedures for cohesion contingency planning.

The protocol aims to identify a senior officer to take responsibility for leading a response, a core multi-agency group that can be brought together quickly to decide on appropriate action and a wider network of contacts to draw on in addressing the situation. The protocol will also include a media strategy and links to wider emergency planning procedures. It is also hoped that this work will be supported by the development of community cohesion impact assessments.

Multi-agency working in Stoke

In 2001 Stoke had some small scale disturbances. These were managed through partnership working between the North Staffordshire Race Equality Council (NSREC), the council and police. The three agencies established an emergency group to manage tensions with the Chief Executive of the NSREC, Police Chief Inspector and a strategic director of the council to share information and resources. The group still meets as and when there are rising tensions and the potential for any threats to cohesion, eg prior to elections. The group feeds into a 'Strategic Group for Community Cohesion', which is a sub-group of the Local Strategic Partnership.

Alongside this, the council is working to support the voluntary and community sector as these groups are best placed to deal with tensions on the ground in a sustainable way. Many of these live locally and have knowledge of the area and good informal networks. Formal structures do not always reach this level because of issues to do with trust and ongoing accountability. Training in mediation skills and conflict resolution is being rolled out using Neighbourhood Renewal Funding and Home Office grants.

Tension monitoring

Monitoring racist incidents and community intelligence in Newcastle

Newcastle monitors racist incidents through ARCH (Agencies against Racist Crime and Harassment). This is a multi-agency forum whose purpose is to combat racist incidents in Newcastle. Racist incident reports are collected from 93 racist incident reporting centres across the city across 26 agencies. Cases can be automatically referred to support agencies immediately. The case management system co-ordinates any action taken by agencies. A software package is being implemented to analyse the data, and to identify links between incidents, hotspot areas, trends and timelines.

An Operational Support Group reviews case management and feeds back good practice guidelines and recommendations to ARCH members and Safe Newcastle (the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership). As part of a sub-group of Safe Newcastle, ARCH is helping to develop community intelligence and an enhanced problem solving response model. This will monitor tension indicators across the city.

Monitoring racial incidents in Milton Keynes

Milton Keynes set up a tension monitoring system about 18 months ago. Proformas are sent to a variety of agencies (including the local Race Equality Council) to collect data on incidents. Completion is compulsory within the council. A multi-agency meeting takes place monthly to sift the information gathered and to identify what to concentrate on and take action on. A tension risk assessment system is used to determine an overall risk level. Incidents and data are considered under the headings 'political', 'community', 'immigration', 'asylum and refugee', 'racial and religious', 'criminal', 'national and international' and 'future'.

The council also has a system for monitoring serious racial incidents which could lead to disorder. This is led by the Community Safety Partnership. A protocol has been identified for reporting potential and actual major incidents of racial violence and harassment. When a serious racial incident occurs, all of the key players are brought together. If the situation is deemed to be a major racial incident (or to have the potential), a community meeting is set up to generate an action plan.

Situations not felt to be major incidents are cross referred to an Anti-Racial Harassment Group (ARHG). A sub group of this is responsible for co-ordinating the actions of all agencies in order to reduce incidents of racial harassment and violence and increase social cohesion. The group has representatives from councils, the police, local schools and the voluntary sector.

As part of the broader approach to tension monitoring, the Milton Keynes Community Safety Partnership carries out an annual 'Fear of Crime' survey each year. Alongside the ARHG, the Partnership also commissioned some specific action research ('Street Dreams', reported in January 2006) to identify the reasons behind the increasing number of racial attacks that have been occurring amongst young people in the Bletchley area, and to find practical ways of preventing racial violence between young people in the future. The research looked at the issues from the young people's perspective.

Tension monitoring in the London Borough of Barnet

Alongside a Multi-faith Forum which Barnet has had in place since 2003, the borough also works with its partner agencies as part of a Strategic Multi-Agency Racial Harassment Group (MARHG) to prevent and reduce racial harassment and improve the way racial incidents are dealt with through effective inter-agency planning. As part of its Crimes Against People in the Community theme within the borough's Crime and Disorder and Drugs Strategy, the Safer Communities partnership has targets to increase levels of reporting of racist incidents and reduce the rate of repeat victims over three years. The MARHG works to an action plan which focuses on the priorities of the Safer Communities Strategy.

To facilitate meeting this target, racist incidents are referred to a multi-agency problem-solving group. The group aims to collate intelligence on all forms of racist and faith related crime occurring in the borough and advise the strategic group accordingly. In effect, it acts as a tension monitoring mechanism, reporting on incidents and areas of potential conflict, eg it receives intelligence from the council's graffiti team when there is any increase in racist graffiti. This is a new model of inter-agency working and the council and its key partners are confident that it will reduce the fear of crime and, more importantly, increase understanding of the nature and range of racist crime.

Tension Monitoring in Southampton

A police-chaired Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Committee (MARAC) monitors a wide range of incidents from domestic violence to race attacks. When an incident is reported to MARAC, the committee will ask for the views of a wide range of agencies which may have a brief, key intelligence or general perspective on the given incident. It is not treated as just another routine police investigation, but more of a partnership approach to address and defuse situations. MARAC has been particularly useful in preventing the escalation of conflict between two individuals which would otherwise have led to wider tensions between two communities.

The key lesson for MARAC has been to keep lines of communication open, on the basis that where resentments and issues of concern find no outlet, they can fester and express themselves in direct action on the street. This is what happened in March 2002 when there was a small riot in the city centre involving around 150 young men with bricks, baseball bats and other weapons – new Afghan asylum seekers on one side and Pakistani and Bengali youths on the other. The council did not see this coming because there were no lines of communication at the time.

Tension monitoring in Burnley

Community scanning work is led by the police and contributed to by local councils and other partner agencies. It identifies current and future issues under four headings: 'political', 'economic', 'criminal' and 'racial'. A document summarising the shared intelligence is produced each week, and there are regular 'scanning' meetings. Less formally, a Conflict Reduction Group was set up in Burnley in 2005. This informal network brings together practitioner and operational staff from the council, police, county council youth and community services, Registered Social Landlords and the community, voluntary and faith sectors to consider community level tensions, with the aim of developing proactive approaches to mediation, conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Tension monitoring in Oxford

Oxford City Council has had a Tension Risk Assessment system in place since July 2005 which is monitored by the council's Anti-Social Behaviour Co-ordinator. The system considers the impact of the following tension monitoring criteria: 'political scenarios', 'community scenarios', 'racial and religious incidents', 'criminal incidents', 'national and international incidents' and 'other' incidents.

Tension monitoring in Leicester

Leicester City Council's specific initiatives on tension monitoring have included:

- The Leicester Multi-Cultural Advisory Group, which is chaired by the Chief Executive of the local Race Equality Council and involves a wide range of statutory and community/faith-based representatives, including the editor of a prominent local newspaper. This meets monthly to discuss, mediate and monitor tensions and to identify action to prevent community conflict. This includes a proactive role in countering rumours that could divide communities. It has acted to prevent marches by extremist political groups through Leicester.
- Close liaison with the police who provide all of the incident statistics (eg racially motivated crimes) which are used along with community intelligence (eg from housing officers and schools) to monitor tensions. Using community and faith leaders, both agencies intervened to mediate, and dampen, rising tensions between one newly arrived community in the city and another minority ethnic community
- The organisation of a Young British Muslim Conference to discuss young people's views on identity, education, media, gender, racism and terrorism. This should help the council to better understand sources of community tension and ways of preventing community conflict. Research is also being conducted to identify the policy needs of Muslim communities in the city.

Middlesbrough Council

There are a number of strands to the council's tension monitoring approach:

- Mainstream community cohesion work is seen as essential in preventing tensions in the first place. A wide range of local initiatives are being supported, which also enables practitioners to see what is developing on the ground, eg an annual Mela festival is held in the town for all communities and is attended by some 20,000 people. The council is also supporting a new Council of Faiths, representing all of the major religions, including all four mosques in the town.
- A multi-agency Racist Crime and Harassment Theme Group (RCHTG) meets every six weeks to monitor information on incidents and trends, which might threaten cohesion. Linked to this, a Racial Harassment Case Group (RHCG) meets every fortnight to consider cases reported by a wide range of agencies, including the council, police, housing association, asylum support team, street wardens and Victim Support.
- Active Intelligence Mapping (AIM) meetings are held weekly in order to identify where and when any incidents occur and who is responsible. This group's primary focus is on criminal and anti-social activity in the town. This high-level, multi-agency meeting, is held to identify trouble hotspots and target resources, including policing and wardens.
- Area based Problem Solving Groups, consisting of locally based representatives from the Police, local authority and key partners have been brought together to deliver short term and medium term problem solving solutions to tackle priority issues in their area. Priorities are identified through local community consultation or via Active Intelligence Mapping or the Police Tasking and Co-ordination Groups. Other invitees are asked to join the groups to help tackle specific problems, eg a representative from Trading Standards in order to tackle the unlawful sales of alcohol or fireworks to young people.
- The council also monitors closely the activities of extremist political groups.

Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council

The local Crime & Disorder Partnership plays a particular role in identifying and responding to threats to community cohesion. An inter-agency Hate Incident Management Group (HIMG) meets weekly to assess the threat of disorder, review hate incidents and identify any additional action which is needed. It takes account of local, national and international issues which potentially impact upon community relations in Oldham. This includes an assessment of the potential impact of forthcoming issues – for example relating to particular events such as football matches, festivals or the local elections – as well as reviewing the impact of things which have already happened, such as crimes or incidents with wider implications.

The HIMG is chaired by the police and involves a variety of other organisations including Oldham Council and Oldham Race Equality Partnership. The group makes a weekly 'risk assessment', based on a five point scale. The threat assessment is a standing item at the weekly meeting of the council's leadership group.

When a threat of disorder is identified partners meet more frequently – daily if necessary – to ensure an effective and co-ordinated response.

Communication is an important part of responding to potential threats. In the aftermath of the London bombings, for example, the council worked with the Inter-Faith Forum, Race Equality Partnership and other groups to organise a public event called Standing Together. This included messages of reassurance to and from Muslim communities.

The organisation of the annual Holocaust Memorial Day Event provides an illustration of how effective planning can be used to prevent problems. In previous years the presence of extremist political activists had provoked problems at this event. Earlier this year, the council worked with Oldham Race Equality Partnership, the Jewish community and schools to provide a programme of activities which were organised in a way which prevented disruption and any resulting rise in community tensions.

Tackling tensions in relation to asylum seekers in Glasgow

The fatal stabbing of a Turkish asylum seeker by a local man in the Sighthill area of Glasgow in October 2003 highlighted how serious tensions were between some community groups. Glasgow is home to 7,000 asylum seekers who live largely side by side with the local population. Following the murder, all agencies in Glasgow have worked hard to reduce the tensions in the community. Actions have included:

- The establishment of local monitoring groups called Multi-Agency Racial Incident Monitoring Groups (MARIM). These are run by the police, with the involvement of all local partner agencies and monitor racially motivated incidents and trends.
- A team of outreach workers who visit vulnerable asylum seekers to address any concerns they may have.
- An awareness raising campaign to educate local people and reassure them that preferential treatment is not being given to asylum seekers.
- A multi-cultural North Glasgow Festival of music and dance, including an exhibition entitled, 'asylum images'.
- The Head of National Asylum Support in Scotland championing a six month 'bedding in' period before asylum seekers arrive. This prepares them for life in the community and encourages the local community to accept them, providing for gradual integration.

Actual responses to potential/actual disorder

London Borough of Camden

The council has a long history and track record of investment in projects to build community cohesion. This work also forms part of Camden's contingency planning for events and crises that could result in raised community tensions and was tested following the terrorist attacks on 7 July.

Some of the initiatives included:

- Putting the council's contingency plans into action after the London bombings, i.e. using well-established links with partner agencies to take swift action to reassure the community and minimise any tensions in the borough. This included organising a meeting of community, civic and faith leaders, chaired by the leader of the council, to share information about the attacks and the response from public services. Actions following this included a joint statement condemning the terrorist attacks and a continuing series of community events.
- Ensuring that racial harassment did not increase following the bombings. The council worked closely with the police and the Community Safety Partnership to provide reassurance and engage people on the challenges facing the community. This included extra police and street warden patrols at mosques and vulnerable premises, working with the business, voluntary and community sectors.

Responding rapidly to cohesion threats in Oldham

Early on the morning of 22nd August 2004, a 21-year-old white man from the Holts Village estate was attacked and robbed by a group of four Asian men in Glodwick as he walked home from a night out with friends in Oldham Town Centre.

The attack was widely perceived to be racially motivated, and feelings ran high in Holts. The Oldham Evening Chronicle reported on Monday 23rd August that a group of 120 youths had gathered on the estate over the weekend, and that they intended to attack Glodwick later in the week.

That evening an Asian mini cab driver received a call to a pub on the estate, where he was ambushed. Missiles were thrown at the cab which was damaged, though the driver was unharmed.

On Tuesday 24th August an increased threat of disorder over the approaching Bank Holiday weekend was recognised, based on the reported events and other intelligence information about the responses to these in different communities.

During the week an extremist political group published what they described as a "calming leaflet", and distributed this on Holts and, for a brief period until they were asked to leave, in Oldham Town Centre.

From Wednesday 25th to Friday 27th August there was a daily meeting held at the police station, which led to the development and implementation of a plan for preventing and, if necessary, responding to the threat of disorder over the forthcoming weekend.

Activity which resulted from this included:

- A briefing for partner organisations, and preparation for the possibility that organisations would need to implement their emergency plans.
- Police preparation for a potential major incident, including arrangements for support from across Greater Manchester had this been required.
- Joint press releases and media briefing focusing on restoring calm, and reporting on the progress of the investigations and the co-operation received from the community.
- Co-ordinated gathering of intelligence routed through a single force intelligence officer in the police.
- Locating a mobile police station on the Holts estate and distribution of leaflets appealing for calm.
- Delivery of personal letters to 25 people believed to be involved in organising disorder, stressing the need to prevent disorder and the potential consequences for individuals of involvement in this.

Responding rapidly to cohesion threats in Oldham (*continued*)

- A briefing for Imams and other members of the community in Glodwick, including some young people. This was held in advance of Friday prayers so that key messages about the need for calm could be circulated widely through the mosques. Ward councillors were active in briefing the community and liaising with groups such as cab drivers.
- Oldham Mosques' Council subsequently issued an appeal to the local community to give police any further information. They praised the support given to the police by the community, and emphasised the damage the attack could do to community relations in Oldham, and the need to bring the perpetrators to justice.
- Clear ups of areas where there was felt to be any potential for disorder – for example by emptying bottle banks, removal of building waste etc.
- Over the weekend two safe drop-off points were organised for taxi and private hire drivers on the Holts and Alt estate. These were attended by a police officer till 2am. This addressed a potential risk of problems in the town centre if drivers refused to take people home to these areas.

Despite a real risk of disorder, the weekend passed off peacefully. Police investigations into the assaults continued afterwards.

Reassurance

Pan-London Stakeholder Group

Pan-London partners commissioned the IDeA to undertake a scoping review of community cohesion reassurance activity, in the wake of 7th July bombings. Findings were presented at the pan-London Communities Together seminar in January 2006. The aim of the review was to identify and examine the types of reassurance activity used, gauge its effectiveness and how this was measured. In particular, the findings had to identify what worked well and what didn't; key issues and challenges arising; and support and resource needs.

There were fairly consistent definitions/understanding of reassurance activity in relation to the 7th July 2005 London bombings, however, some stakeholders did not like or own the term 'cohesion reassurance', and preferred 'community reassurance' (making activity user-focused rather than policy-focused). All partners shared a belief that reassurance objectives were to respond to perceived threat as well as real threats. The shared definition resulted in consistent and shared objectives by pan-London partners, but which were reflective of individual relationships and relationships between and within communities across London.

Pan-London Stakeholder Group (*continued*)

There was a wide variety of reassurance activity, ranging from strategic statements, to provision of service delivery, and brokering relations and joint working. As part of the review, these were plotted on a Delphi-matrix, looking at the scale/scope and depth of engagement. Similarly, the group is a collection of a wide range of partners, and reflects the ethos and the centrality Stakeholders give to cohesion as a cross-cutting, multi-sector priority. There was a high level of collective pride in the positive reassurance outcomes post 7th July bombings.

The project highlights the importance of tension monitoring, and indicates how reassurance works if operated on four levels:

- Competency of action, of self and in mobilising others, prior to, and during the crisis.
- Consistency and timeliness of message throughout and after the crisis situation.
- Visibility of leaders and resources (so the public can see and feel the difference)
- Monitoring and learning – crises can force a 're-think' and new paradigm, with tension monitoring now a normal part of what London bodies do.

Comparative investment and cost

Communities, partners and the London-wide Emergency Planning Network were cited as the main sources of support, so much of the investment was already accounted for through mainstream activity, networks and mechanisms. What the work did highlight is that there is a need for more investment and support in areas of: workforce development, capacity building and signposting to best practice for the future. The investment for undertaking the review was £8k. But it did provide a wealth of independently gathered information to partners on the range and effectiveness of their work.

Pan-London Stakeholder Group (*continued*)

Outcomes and lessons learnt

For reassurance to be delivered effectively it has to be part of corporate, mainstreamed approach, and there was a belief across the group – as evidenced by its practices under crises – that effective cohesion relies on strong community leadership. Other lessons learnt were:

What worked well	What could have been improved
Level and timeliness of information (to communities and staff)	Contact with communities could have been better co-ordinated
Partnership working	Resource availability
Listening to communities concerns	More culturally sensitive policing
Consolidating and mobilising existing resources	Measuring impact, rather than activity or throughput
Diversity of London made reassurance activity easier – highly diverse but more tolerant city	
Increased organisational transparency	

Key challenges for London partners relate to capacity building, consolidating resources, and ways of working that will enable shared systems and processes. Giving middle managers more of decision-making mandate will help embed the transformational leadership that individual public workers had shown during the crisis.

Sustaining the approach – Key factors for success

The activity of the pan-London stakeholders shows three key success factors:

- Stakeholder leadership and reassurance focused on three facets of cohesion contingency planning: the technical aspects of ‘blue light’ emergency services (ensuring safety and minimising risk), assisting the police (solving the crime); and increasing visibility (in identifying, assessing risk and reassurance) to communities.
- Reactive community leadership and reassurance relies on pro-active leadership outside of the situation of crisis or threat, and relies on trust. The threat of not being pro-active is the space that is exploited by extremists.
- Crisis forces a rethink, and innovation (but only where there is a strong foundation of effective partnership working).

The group now plans to use their learning experience and apply it to contingency planning for other challenges such as avian flu. It is gearing up to use Local Area Agreements (LAAs) as a key delivery mechanism for cross-cutting cohesion, and considering a region-wide pool, to be mobilised at time of crisis for economies of scope and scale.

London Borough of Brent

Brent held public meetings in the Town Hall following the London bombings to reassure local people. As few women attended the event, the council organised a further 'women only' meeting during the day at a local school and 60 women attended to talk to women councillors, local Muslim leaders and the police. The success of the event has led to improved reporting of incidents of racist abuse/harassment and the setting up of an Independent Advisory Group by the local police.

London Borough of Croydon

Croydon carried out a major programme of reassurance work with the police in the aftermath of the London bombings. This included meetings with community and faith leaders to encourage the reporting of any incidents and to calm any fears or anxiety about possible reprisals. The council and police worked on an hourly basis in gathering intelligence and dispelling unfounded rumours of reprisals. Police patrols were increased on request and additional surveillance cameras were put into place in strategic public places (eg places of worship). These established procedures would now be revisited in any similar situation.

Working with the media

Middlesbrough Council

The council has close links to the editor of the Evening Gazette, the main local newspaper, who also sits on the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). This helps to ensure that press and media related issues are considered in cohesion contingency planning.

Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council

Tameside holds regular meetings with local newspaper editors to gather information and stop sensationalist reporting which might otherwise start or add to rising tensions, e.g. in response to a Kick Racism out of Football campaign, an extremist political group wanted to picket a local football stadium. A local newspaper was going to print the story on its front page – an action that was likely to bring unwanted publicity to the picket and fuel rising community tensions. The intervention of the Community Cohesion Partnership prevented the story from being run and in the event no-one turned out for the picket.

Berwick-upon-Tweed Borough Council

The Berwick Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP) is working with the local press/media to vet stories involving migrant workers from eastern Europe and Portugal employed in the food processing and agricultural sectors to prevent stigmatisation.

Reviewing and testing cohesion contingency plans

Burnley Borough Council

Burnley carried out a major multi-agency cohesion contingency planning exercise in December 2004 collaboration with the police and supported by East Lancashire Together (the network set up as the East Lancashire Community Cohesion Pathfinder). 'Exercise Elton' was facilitated by Mediation Northern Ireland and was centred on the scenario of an Al Qaeda bombing taking place in England, but outside of East Lancashire, in which local people were killed and injured. The operational plan developed and refined through this exercise was implemented following the bombings of 7 July 2005. Lessons arising after this have continued to inform the agencies' cohesion plans, including the need to link to key contacts in faith communities to work together in getting messages out to local people.

Sunderland City Council

In May 2005 the city council initiated a partnership community cohesion exercise, with the objective of ensuring that the city would be prepared for the impact on the community cohesion of Sunderland of a terrorist attack elsewhere in the UK.

The exercise, funded by the Home Office, was facilitated by Mediation Northern Ireland, and involved all local strategic partners involved in promoting cohesion in Sunderland, together with representatives of central and regional Government, the media, and the IDeA. Each participant role played, and outlined actions to take as the scenario heightened, and the implications for communities were presented.

The confidential report of the exercise was received from Mediation Northern Ireland in late June. It provided a thorough account of the proceedings, including an analysis of roles and responsibilities, challenges to cohesion, strengths, gaps and shortcomings, and key concerns. It recommended that relevant strategic partners give due consideration to the findings.

Following receipt of the report of the exercise, it had been the intention of the council to produce a summary of action required. Unfortunately, on 7th July 2005, the terrorist incidents in London resulted in plans and procedures being implemented and tested for real. The community cohesion exercise held on 13th May proved to be timely. As partners had so recently discussed the city's response to a terrorist attack elsewhere in the UK, Sunderland was relatively well prepared for the events on 7th July.

As a follow-up to the 13th May exercise, a meeting of the North East Regional Media Emergency Forum had been held on Monday 21st June, in order to consider arrangements for joint statements, pre-preparation of important messages giving public information and reassurance. The city and region's communicators were therefore also fairly prepared for the real events, having given recent consideration to the key issues.

The planning for real exercise highlighted a number of important lessons that will be addressed by the partner agencies in revising their cohesion contingency plans.

Annex A

Sample Tension Monitoring Form

Please complete each column with as much detail as possible, including whether the situation/incident is 'experienced' (what communities are feeling); 'evidenced' (an event that has happened); or 'potential' (something which might happen).

Name of local authority area:

Name of person completing the report:

Organisation:

Date:

The overall community tension risk in this area is assessed as _____ [insert high / medium / low / no tensions as appropriate] based on the information contained within this report.

POLITICAL				
Date	Details of Situation/Incident (ie where, when, who (age, gender, ethnicity, faith), and what (useful to specify whether 'experienced', 'evidenced' or 'potential')).	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

COMMUNITY

Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

IMMIGRATION, ASYLUM AND REFUGEE

Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS

Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

CRIMINAL

Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL				
Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

OTHER				
Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

FUTURE				
Date	Details of Situation/Incident	Media coverage/ angle taken	Action Taken	Likely Future Impact

Annex B

Useful publications

Guidance for Leaders and Chief Executives

Leading cohesive communities: A guide for Local Authority Leaders and Chief Executives, IDeA and Local Government Association (and partners), 2005

www.lga.gov.uk/Publication.asp?lsection=0&id=SXE997-A78371F1

Guidance for practitioners

Community cohesion – an action guide: Guidance for Local Authorities, Local Government Association (and partners), 2004

www.lga.gov.uk/Publication.asp?lsection=0&id=-A7828C18

Community cohesion: SEVEN STEPS a practitioners toolkit, Home Office/Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2005

www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1502602

Measuring cohesion

Building a picture of cohesion: A guide for Local Authorities and their partners, Home Office/Local Government Association, 2003

Working with the media

I&DeA Toolkit: Building a relationship with the media

www.idea-knowledge.gov.uk/idk/core/page.do?pageId=81965

Conflict resolution

Community conflict: a resource pack, Home Office/Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2006

Community conflict: causes and action, Lemos & Crane, 2004

www.lemosandcrane.co.uk

Annex C

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ISBN: 978-1-8511-2941-6

ISBN 978-1851129416



9 781851 129416