Summary of the results of the research project:

"Muslims in Germany: Integration, barriers to integration, religion and attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law, and politically/religiously motivated violence"

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1. Introduction

In the following, the aims, methodology and selected key results of a research project sponsored by the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) are briefly described.

The central aim of this project is to gain insight into experience of and attitudes towards integration as well as religious attitudes and forms of religious orientation among Muslims living in Germany. The project also aims to provide information about attitudes of Muslims in Germany towards democracy, the rule of law and forms of politically/religiously motivated violence. Based on these findings, the project also intends to assess the extent of and underlying reasons for attitudes among Muslims in Germany which range from indifference to democracy to support for politically/religiously motivated violence.

Thus the project also entails an empirical analysis of sets of attitudes which may lead to sympathy for Islamist-extremist organizations and activities. Awareness about the extent of such sympathies, in which social groups they tend to be found and relevant factors influencing the development of such problematic attitudes is extremely important for planning and designing targeted prevention measures. With this in mind, this study is intended to help identify the relevant risk groups and analyse possible influences.

Neither the extent of different religious orientations among Muslims in Germany nor their role in establishing political-ideological radicalism has yet been adequately explained in empirical terms. Drawing on current research on violence and conflict and in the field of migration sociology, this study has identified the personal experience of social exclusion in the form of victimization and discrimination and a subjective feeling of general marginalization of Muslims at national and international level (as a kind of representative victimization), in addition to religious attitudes and patterns of religious orientation, as potential influences. Further, the study analysed indicators of linguistic and social integration as well as measures of attitudes on integration, assimilation and segregation in order to examine the relevant connections.

Although some recent international studies, in particular in the UK and US, have addressed some of these issues, their findings do not necessarily apply to the situation in Germany, for example due to significant differences between the social situation, origins and composition of the Muslim populations in these countries and between national migration-specific issues. In Germany, this topic has not yet been the subject of differentiated quantitative analyses using a larger data sample, a situation that has been criticized by numerous authors in recent years. In order for policymakers to address problems of radicalization, including home-grown terrorism, which recent events have made ever more urgent, scientific findings are crucial.

Existing German studies which look at religion and violence in a Muslim context or the phenomenon of fundamentalism and Islamism contain a number of limitations and thus leave many questions unresolved. For example, a great deal of research in the field of Islamic studies has been published on these topics in recent years, but most of this work deals with socio-historical issues and religious studies, or with the underlying economic and political factors in (re-) Islamification and Islamism at national and international level. However, research in the field of Islamic studies has produced no empirical studies offering a quantitative assessment of

potential risks in Germany or empirical analyses of the social and individual backgrounds based on primary data allowing for general conclusions.

There are a number of qualitative studies of Germany, but these are necessarily restricted to rather small samples and therefore provide only a very limited basis for generalization, in particular a quantitative assessment of phenomena and risk groups and the related causes and influences. In Germany, the few larger-scale quantitative surveys in this field have either not dealt with attitudes on political violence, democracy and the rule of law among Muslims living in Germany, or have been limited to specific groups, such as Turkish youths. Some larger quantitative studies have focused at length on integration issues and the importance of religion and religious attitudes among Muslims of Turkish origin in Germany, though without going into greater depth on issues of importance for radicalization, such as attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law, or politically/religiously motivated violence.

As far as Muslims' attitudes towards political violence or terrorist activity have been addressed in recent studies, such as Gallup opinion polls conducted in Germany (Berlin) and many other countries, only very general indicators have been used. In many cases, analysis is limited to the ascriptive characteristic of religious affiliation, which however fails to account for differences – which are extremely important, as our findings show – within the large population of Muslims in Germany.

Such research overlooks differences in religious attitudes, in particular what we see as a key difference between less religious or more secular attitudes on the one hand and Islamic traditionalism, religious orthodoxy, fundamentalism and finally Islamist extremism on the other. But from a scientific perspective, an analysis which systematically takes into account the heterogeneity of the Muslim population in Germany, with regard to its attitudes to religion, integration and the receiving society at least as an option in the study design is urgently required for several reasons: first, to avoid assigning blame to the entire population and the risk of socially undesirable reinforcement of general, negative stereotypes. Second, such differentiation is needed to identify more precisely defined target groups and adequate starting-points for preventive measures.

The present study is intended to help close the gaps described in German research in this area. We have attempted in various ways to address the need to account for differences within the Muslim population. First, we have used methodological triangulation, i.e. by combining different survey methods and access channels, each of which has different strengths and weaknesses. Such triangulation allows for precise additions and methodological differentiations, as well as relativization and mutual examination. Further, highly differentiated, multi-dimensional indicators were used when measuring the constructs relevant here. In addition to the usual descriptive methods, modern techniques of multivariate classification and forecasting were used for the analyses, making it possible to identify and contrast divergent sub-groups.

For clarification, it should be noted at the outset that the present study does not belong to the field of Islamic or religious studies. It does not deal with traditions or the social history of Islam, nor is it a political scientific analysis of Islam or Muslim countries and communities, nor does it address the impact or interpretation of Islamic texts. It does not focus on religious teachings or any political systems based on them. Instead, it is an empirical, sociological description and

analysis of a religion as it is subjectively experienced and practised by individual Muslims living in Germany. This is viewed within the context of phenomena and problems related to migration, and possible connections with individual attitudes towards the state, law and society in Germany are explored.

2. The study methodology and design

The overall project is made up of five studies. For the first, preparatory study, six group discussions were conducted with a total of 48 persons of the Muslim faith. These were followed by further preliminary tests of survey instruments in several smaller availability samples. This part of the research project served to explore the field and to develop and refine the survey instruments.

The main part of the study is made up of three related, standardized surveys of representative samples and a qualitative examination segment with intensive interviews. The surveys were conducted in four major German cities (Hamburg, Berlin, Cologne and Augsburg) between May 2005 and November 2006.

Table 1:   *Overview of the studies and samples making up the main part of the study*

	Samples	of which *Muslims*	of which *non-Muslims with an immigrant background*	of which *native non-Muslims*
Standardized telephone surveys of the adult resident Muslim population	Random sample selected from EMA and telephone directories, in 4 cities: N=970	970	0	0
Standardized written surveys of 9th- and 10th-year school pupils	Random sample of school classes in 3 cities: N=2,683	500	630	1,553
Standardized postal surveys of university-level students	Random sample of students in 4 cities: N=1,227	195	1,032	0
Qualitative intensive interviews with adult male Muslims belonging to Islamic organizations	Respondent-driven sampling (iterative approximation of representativity) in Hamburg: N=60	60	0	0

The core component is the standardized telephone surveys of a representative sample of the adult resident Muslim population in the four cities mentioned above. This sample was generated from a combination of random samples of addresses from the records of the residence registration offices on the one hand, and random samples from the local telephone directories combined with telephone screening for religious affiliation on the other. This part of the study involved 970 Muslims of various nationalities practising various forms of Islam. The majority of these were Sunni Muslims of Turkish background, as expected in view of what is known about the foreign population residing in Germany and about migration processes. Of those surveyed, 99.1% had an immigrant background; nearly 40% of all respondents had acquired

German citizenship. About one-quarter belonged to the second or later generation to live in Germany.

Further, standardized surveys of representative random samples were conducted of 9th- and 10th-year school pupils and of university-level students. Telephone surveys of population samples would not have reached enough respondents from these age groups for analyses to provide conclusive results. These studies used the option of surveying non-Muslims as a basis for comparison in order to determine the extent to which certain results are specifically Muslim or may be similar for other immigrant or native groups.

The surveys of school pupils were conducted at school in written form by trained staff; 2,683 pupils responded, of which 500 identified themselves as Muslim. This part of the study drew on three of the four cities used for the telephone surveys (Berlin was not included due to difficulties with field access). The distribution of the Muslim youths' various countries of origin and the type of Islam largely correspond to the proportions found in the population samples: 70% were of Turkish background and over half were Sunni Muslims. Another 630 young people with an immigrant background were surveyed who were not Muslim. About half of these non-Muslims of immigrant background had lived in Germany since birth, whereas significantly more of the young Muslims, about three-quarters, had lived in Germany since birth. Another 1,553 respondents were native, non-Muslim youth with no immigrant background.

The surveys of university-level students were conducted by mail using a random sample of students with immigrant backgrounds drawn from student offices at higher-education institutions. This part of the study received responses from 195 Muslim students from different countries practising different forms of Islam. This sample displays a somewhat greater diversity of national origin: 56% of the Muslims were of Turkish origin and nearly one-third were from Arab countries or Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan. Another 1,032 respondents were students with an immigrant background who did not consider themselves Muslim. Of the Muslim students, more than 40% had been born in Germany; of the non-Muslims, only 10% had been born in Germany. One-fifth of the Muslim students resided in Germany only for their studies, while slightly more of the non-Muslims, or nearly 30%, did so.

The written surveys of school pupils and university-level students used contained the same questions used for the telephone surveys of the general Muslim population, but in some cases, the surveys of pupils and students used more differentiated answer formats not suitable for telephone interviews. Further, the written surveys included a series of special questions that it was not possible to ask during telephone surveys due to time constraints.

A qualitative component was incorporated into the study in order to provide more precise insights into the possible dynamics and roots of attitudes as well as specific interpretations of the experiences of Muslims in Germany. This part of the study aimed to reach in particular those persons living in or with personal experience of Muslim immigrant communities, persons which standardized surveys have difficulty reaching. Intensive interviews with 60 adult male Muslims active in mosque or cultural organizations were conducted following a certain outline. The sample was generated via respondent-driven sampling: A set of initial contacts refers their contacts, who in turn refer theirs, and so on; participants are selected randomly and asked for an interview. In this way, it was possible to reach an approximate representative sample of

Muslims with ties to Islamic organizations within the larger Hamburg area. The participants displayed a broad range of nationalities: slightly less than half came from Turkey; about one-third came from Arab countries, and about one-sixth from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan or Pakistan.

3. Key findings

In the following, key findings, especially of the descriptive analyses, on selected central topics will be presented. As a rule, results of the standardized surveys of the general Muslim population will be presented first, supplemented by comparison with results of the analyses of the two samples of young people. Results of the qualitative interviews will also be discussed as relevant. Due to space constraints, results of the extensive, multivariate analyses carried out in this project can be dealt with here only briefly and in outline; please see the full research report for detailed findings, especially those of multivariate classification and forecasting models.

3.1 Socio-linguistic integration and attitudes towards integration

The integration of immigrants in Germany may be described in various dimensions. Along with responses indicating subjective identification and feelings of attachment to the receiving society, this study also measured the extent of actual relationships and contacts with native Germans and frequency of German language use in everyday situations in order to estimate the level of individual, practical social and linguistic integration attained.

In the sample of the general Muslim population, 86.9% of respondents described feeling "very comfortable" or "rather comfortable" in Germany; only 9% felt rather uncomfortable in Germany. This corresponds to the responses of those who took part in the qualitative interviews, the large majority of whom are happy living in Germany, which almost all regard as their chosen home.

When it comes to subjective feelings of belonging, attachment and identification with Germany as receiving country, however, the picture changes significantly: Only 12.2% stated that they felt more or mostly German. About one-third (31.4%) felt a sense of attachment both to Germany and to their country of origin, and another 56.4% felt more or exclusively attached to their country of origin. The older respondents were when they arrived in Germany, the more attachment they felt to their country of origin.

The frequency of contacts and number of relationships with members of the receiving society were taken as indicators of practical integration in everyday life. Respondents were asked how many German friends they had and how often they had been invited to German homes in the past year; 10.1% stated that they had no German friends and 36.2% had only a few. Thus this aspect of integration was hardly developed amng nearly half of the respondents. Invitations to German homes were even less frequent; about one-third of respondents had not been invited at all in the past year and another 22.4% had rarely been invited. Overall, then, nearly half of the Muslims surveyed had little actual contact with Germans in everyday life.

Information about language use with friends and about media use was gathered as a measure of linguistic integration. In the general Muslim population sample, 12.1% stated that they "never" spoke German with their friends and 26.3% said that they "rarely" did so; 36.2% of respondents said they mostly or almost always spoke German, while one-quarter (25.5%) said they spoke

German about as often as their native language. Regarding media use, about one-third said they "mostly" (20.8%) or "exclusively" (10.9%) watched television programmes broadcast in a language other than German. Another third (30.8%) watched about the same amount of television broadcast in German and in a language other than German, and 37.5% watched mostly or only German-language broadcasts. The distribution is similar for print media: 41.2% read mostly or only German newspapers and magazines; about one-quarter (26.5%) read German and foreign-language print media equally as often, and 32.1% read print media mostly or only in a language other than German.

Based on these six questions, a scale of "practical socio-linguistic integration" was drawn up with values ranging from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high). Dividing respondents into four groups by level of socio-linguistic integration (values under 2: low; values from 2 to less than 3: moderate; values from 3 to less than 4: well integrated; values over 4: very well integrated), about one-fifth of the general Muslim population sample demonstrated a low level of socio-linguistic integration, more than one-third (37.6%) demonstrated a moderate level, and 43% were well or very well integrated in socio-linguistic terms.

By comparison, the proportion of university-level students who were well and very well integrated in socio-linguistic terms was significantly higher (78.9%), as could be expected given their high level of education and the fact that language skills are usually a prerequisite for university admission. Students also had more frequent contact with native Germans. Fewer school pupils ended up in the groups with very low and very high levels of socio-linguistic integration than in the general Muslim population sample, but significant deficits are obvious for more than 40% of these young people. Above all, identification with Germany is significantly lower among young people (only 5.1% feel more closely attached to Germany).


Figure 1:   *Quality of practical socio-linguistic integration among pupils, students and general Muslim population (% of each sample population)*

Comparisons between Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants in the pupil and student samples showed a significantly lower degree of practical socio-linguistic integration among Muslims. In general, the younger immigrants are when they arrive in Germany, the better their socio-linguistic integration. In the case of young second- or later-generation immigrants (i.e. those born in Germany), however, significantly more Muslim youths demonstrate low levels of socio-linguistic integration than non-Muslim youths. This is a considerable deficit which is also reflected in other, more objective indicators of social participation. For example, education levels attained by the parents of Muslim youths are significantly lower than those of both native German and non-Muslim immigrant youths. The same applies to the education levels of the young people themselves. Here too, one can find considerable disadvantages for young Muslims which point to corresponding shortcomings with regard to integration and equal opportunity.

Along with questions about attainment of linguistic and social integration, respondents' attitudes towards integration were also analysed. Here the aim was to identify possible differences in willingness to integrate and different attitudes towards integration.

In this regard, it became clear from the qualitative interviews that many participants found it hard to balance demands to conform to the customs, mores and expectations of the receiving country on the one hand and their interest in maintaining their own cultural identity and keeping up the cultural traditions of their home country on the other, and that individual respondents dealt with this issue in very different ways. The intensive interviews were remarkable for the interviewees' almost unanimous rejection of complete adaptation to the culture of the receiving country Germany. Interviewees repeatedly used the term "assimilation" to describe the kind of adaptation they believed the receiving society expected of them under the misnomer "integration". Many of them therefore viewed integration policy with suspicion, as it seemed to be missing the element of recognition for cultural autonomy.

Responses among general Muslim population sample confirmed the high subjective importance of retaining cultural autonomy and uniqueness. Almost three-quarters (71.6%) were clearly of the opinion that immigrants in Germany should preserve their culture. There was less agreement with the statement that immigrants in Germany should adapt their behaviour to the German culture (45.4%).

Table 2:   *Integration-related attitudes among the general Muslim population*

	disagree entirely	tend to disagree	tend to agree	agree entirely
Foreigners in Germany should retain their own culture.	1.6%	4.0%	22.8%	71.6%
Immigrants who come to Germany should adapt their behaviour to the German culture.	7.9%	9.5%	37.2%	45.4%
Foreigners in Germany who wish to maintain their own culture should keep to themselves.	61.6%	20.7%	8.6%	9.1%
Different ethnic groups should live apart from each other to avoid problems.	76.4%	14.6%	4.9%	4.1%

Overall, attitudes strongly in favour of maintaining the cultural traditions of the country of origin and rejecting separatist efforts predominated. Only a minority – though a significant one – approved of withdrawing into ethnically distinct "parallel societies".

Using multivariate analysis, it is possible to identify three distinct patterns of attitudes towards integration.

> This was achieved using cluster analysis, a multivariate, explorative type of data analysis for the iterative optimization of classification of persons. Respondents are grouped according to the similarity of their answers, so that each group is as homogeneous (smallest possible differences within a group) and as different from the other groups as possible.

The pattern found most often among the general Muslim population sample can be described as "integration/adaptation" (56.7%). Respondents in this group are characterized by high levels of support both for retaining cultural identity and for adapting behaviour to the receiving country (the first two questions) as well as clear rejection of all attempts at segregation, as thematized in the last two questions.

About one-quarter of respondents (27.5%) display a pattern that can be described as "tending towards segregation": Here, a high level of support for retaining the culture of the home country and for adapting behaviour is coupled with less but still majority support for ethnic segregation for the purpose of cultural preservation. This group is also less opposed than the other groups to ethnic segregation as a way of avoiding inter-ethnic conflicts.

The smallest number of respondents from the general Muslim population sample, 15.8%, display an attitude pattern that can be described as "demanding acceptance". Respondents in this group place the highest value of all three groups on retaining their own culture, while strongly rejecting behavioural adaptation. This attitude can therefore be described as demanding acceptance for their cultural difference. These persons do not want to retreat into separate areas; they do not want to adapt to the receiving society, instead demanding that it respect their differences. This group also displays the lowest levels of identification with Germany, and the frequency of contact with native Germans is significantly lower in the case of segregationist tendencies and demands for acceptance.


Figure 2:   *Distribution of integration-related attitude patterns among Muslim pupils, students and general population (% of each pattern within the three sample populations)*

In terms of development psychology, it is understandable that more than half of the Muslim pupils display this third pattern of demanding acceptance. The challenges associated with balancing different, sometimes conflicting cultural identities and expectations hit young immigrants especially hard when they are at the stage of seeking orientation and developing their individual and social identity. At this stage, their need for acceptance as a member of a different culture without being marginalized appears particularly strong. One-fifth of this group shows tendencies towards segregation, although it should be stressed that these are tendencies within a pattern. About half of this group, i.e. about 11% of the sample, shows extremely high levels of approval for segregation.

In the sample of pupils, young, non-Muslim immigrants demonstrated significantly higher levels of willingness to adapt their behaviour to the culture of the receiving country than did their Muslim counterparts.

In evaluating these different aspects of integration and segregation, it was remarkable that native German, non-Muslim youths displayed significantly higher tendencies towards segregation and exclusion than did immigrant youths. At 31.3%, the proportion of those agreeing with the statement that foreigners who wish to maintain their culture should keep to themselves was highest by far among the German pupils. The same was true of ethnic segregation in order to prevent conflict, favoured by 17% of the German young people. So both Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants find themselves in considerable conflict with their peers when it comes to exclusion and segregation.

3.2 Experiences of victimization and marginalization

One of the most prominent features of the qualitative surveys was the tendency of respondents to describe Muslims as victims of exclusion and injustice. On the one hand, they stressed that the freedom of religious expression in Germany was very positive; on the other hand, all the respondents reported incidents in which persons regarded as foreigners – regardless of their actual citizenship – were treated with disrespect, humiliated or discriminated against. Few reported serious incidents in the form of physical attacks, and those who did were usually describing the experience of others. But all respondents constantly sounded the theme of victimization and marginalization of Muslims in Germany and their exclusion from the majority society.

Based on the group discussions, it was decided to distinguish in the standardized surveys between personal experience of discrimination and victimization on the one hand and perceived discrimination and marginalization of Muslims in general, in Germany and elsewhere in the world, on the other hand. To assess personal experiences of discrimination and victimization, respondents were asked seven questions about experiences of differing intensities and how often they had occurred within the previous twelve months.

The questions covered experiences of everyday discrimination, ranging from those that could be characterized as annoyances to more serious insults and discrimination on the part of government agencies, to property damage and physical attacks. The questions refer only to incidents which respondents experienced as having been motivated by their (perceived) foreignness.

The responses to these seven questions were converted into a five-level indicator of individual experiences of discrimination and victimization based on the intensity and frequency of such experiences.

Table 3:　　　*Individual experiences of discrimination and victimization as a foreigner reported by the general Muslim population sample*

	never	once	2 - 5 times	6 - 10 times	more than 10 times
How often in the past year did someone look at you strangely for being a foreigner?	47.7%	6.9%	18.8%	5.0%	21.6%
How often in the past year were you as a foreigner treated rudely when shopping?	65.4%	7.1%	16.9%	4.1%	6.5%
How often in the past year did someone make insulting remarks to you as a foreigner, e.g. "Go back where you came from"?	69.3%	8.6%	14.0%	2.9%	5.2%
How often in the past year did other people purposely insult or verbally attack you as a foreigner?	76.0%	8.0%	10.3%	2.0%	3.6%
How often in the past year did you as a foreigner face discrimination from government agencies, such as the police or foreigners authority?	79.8%	7.6%	8.8%	2.0%	1.9%
How often in the past year was your property purposely damaged because you are a foreigner (e.g. windows broken)?	91.7%	3.1%	4.1%	0.6%	0.5%
How often in the past year were you as a foreigner purposely beaten, kicked or otherwise physically attacked?	97.1%	1.9%	0.9%	0.1%	0.0%

Note: Categorized by intensity and frequency　　　non-victim　　　minor　　　moderate　　　serious　　　very serious

Among the general Muslim population sample, only one-third of respondents reported that they had not experienced any victimization or discrimination of any kind in the past twelve months. One-fifth reported minor personal experiences of discrimination (rude treatment, impolite looks or being insulted once). Nearly half reported experiencing moderate victimization or beyond; one-fifth of the entire sample reported moderate experiences of victimization, which include a high frequency of rude treatment or insults and infrequent discrimination by government agencies.

Figure 3:   *Individual experiences of discrimination and victimization as a foreigner reported by Muslim pupils, students and the general Muslim population (% of each sample population)*

Among the general Muslim population sample, 22% reported serious and very serious experiences of victimization, which include repeated incidents of discrimination by government agencies and, in the most serious form, property damage and physical attacks.

The two samples of younger people, pupils and students, show significantly higher rates of discrimination and victimization, which is not surprising in view of their ages and higher frequency of contacts. Although serious and very serious incidents of personal victimization are rather infrequent here as well, though still widely distributed, with slightly less than one-third of pupils and slight more than one-third of students reporting such experiences. Non-Muslim immigrant pupils report similar experiences, but the prevalence of victimization experiences is significantly higher among Muslims than among other immigrant groups. The same is true of students. Thus Muslims appear to be especially affected by exclusion and xenophobia, which is in line with findings in the present study and others concerning the extent of Islamophobic attitudes among the population.

This study also looked at representative experiences of victimization in the form of perceived antipathy to and discrimination against Muslims. With regard to Germany, the responses confirmed that the large majority felt that Muslims were able to practise their religion freely here. At the same time, more than one-third to nearly one-half of respondents in the three sample populations felt that Germans did not like Muslims and that Muslims faced discrimination in Germany. Thus the theme of collective marginalization at national level is very widespread throughout the three sample groups responding to the standardized surveys and among the participants in the qualitative study.

Table 4:　*Perceived collective marginalization of Muslims: Responses clearly agreeing, in % of each sample population*

	Pupils	Students	General Muslim population
National			
Germans do not like Muslims.	35.9%	43.2%	45.0%
Muslim children are discriminated against in Germany.	35.6%	45.6%	51.8%
Muslims are able to practise their religion freely in Germany.	66.9%	63.5%	84.0%
International			
I am concerned about the oppression of Muslims in the Palestinian territories.	48.0%	50.6%	85.6%
I think it is terrible that the US is able to make war on Muslim countries without facing sanctions.	85.8%	81.4%	91.0%
It makes me angry that Muslims are the first to be suspected after every terrorist attack.	84.9%	83.1%	88.4%

Both the qualitative interviews and the group discussions stressed the major relevance of the West's (represented above all by the US) perceived handling of the Middle East conflict and the emotional significance of watching military interventions in Muslim countries. Participants viewed the "West" at global level as presuming to intervene in the affairs of Muslim countries and/or to the detriment of Muslims, resulting in enormous damage and suffering among the civil population. Muslims' sense of being threatened and under attack everywhere in the world and of being under general suspicion as the sole or main perpetrators of terrorist attacks played a major role in the qualitative interviews and was also borne out by the standardized surveys. More than 80% of respondents in every sample felt that the US was making war on Muslims and that all Muslims were suspected of being terrorists. A large majority is also very concerned about the situation of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Thus it is possible to assume that a large proportion of study participants will report a high degree of representative experiences of marginalization and discrimination with regard to the situation of Muslims in Germany and that the overwhelming majority of study respondents will report such experiences with regard to the global situation.

3.3 Religious feeling and patterns of orientation

Numerous studies have shown that strong ties to religion are found significantly more often among Muslims in Germany than among other religious groups. This result was confirmed by the surveys conducted as part of this study. For example, in the sample of the overall Muslim population, 87.3% of respondents described themselves as devout or very devout. Among the school pupils, 86.5% of the Muslims said that they were devout or very devout; the figure for Muslim students was only slightly lower at 76.7%. However, this is not always reflected by corresponding levels of individual (prayer) and collective (mosque visits) religious practice: In the overall Muslim population sample, only 31.4% visit a religious centre/mosque one or more times daily (pupils: 16.3%; students: 36.5%) and only 28.5% do so once a week or more (pupils: 28.9%; students: 17.4%).

A four-level indicator of religious devotion was developed based on the responses concerning belief and individual and collective religious practice.

This composite indicator corresponds largely to the way most studies of Muslim religiosity have operationalized individual religious devotion.

According to this indicator, more than half of the general Muslim population sample can be described as religious (39.4%) or very religious (16.6%). Among the sample of pupils, nearly two-thirds fall into this category; among Muslim students, the figure is 54.6%. By comparison, only half as many immigrant pupils who are members of other religions (predominantly Christians) (10.1%), and only 3.4% of native German youths who belong to a religion can be considered very religious. The results for students are similar: 14.4% of the Muslim students are very religious, while only 9.3% of non-Muslim students with an immigrant background are. Further, among Muslims, the lower their levels of education, the more religious they tend to be. The opposite is true among Christian pupils.


Figure 4:   Religiosity among pupils, students and the overall Muslim population (% of each category within the sample populations)

With reference to studies in the field of sociology and psychology of religion, further attitudes linked to religion were examined which are suitable for differentiating between different kinds of religious orientation. These include the central role of religion in individuals' daily lives (operationalized here as the importance of religion in everyday life and the degree to which daily decisions are based on religion), which was assessed using a separate scale. Another scale described as "orthodoxy" thematizes the value assigned to religious mores and beliefs, also those including transcendental aspects, and the priority of rules derived from or tied to these mores and beliefs. This included the frequency of alcohol and pork consumption (not presented in tabular form) as well as compliance with dietary rules and fasting, belief in the promise of a heavenly paradise and in the Koran as the revealed word of God.

Elements of fundamentalist orientations were measured separately. Such elements are characterized by a return to the roots, the "true" teachings in their original form. Members who do not follow these teachings literally are not regarded as true believers. Another important element is the conviction of possessing a special, exclusive religious truth not shared by other

religions or belief systems. Respondents were therefore asked whether Muslims who do not follow the teachings literally are "not real Muslims" and about their attitudes towards historical invariability in the sense of rejecting modernization and adjustment of religion to the changed situation in the modern world. Further, respondents were asked about their attitudes towards the duty to win converts to Islam (missionary activity), the prohibition against converting Muslims (rejection of negative religious freedom) and the statement that non-Muslims are rejected by God (cursed).

These aspects of fundamentalist orientation should be distinguished in the analysis from extreme ideologies of inequality in the form of valuing one's own group defined in religious terms more highly and not valuing other – religious or social – lifestyles. These dimensions of elevating Islam (as the one true religion and answer to all problems) and devaluing others (the moral inferiority of Christianity and decadence of the West) were dealt with in two separate scales.

Table 5:   Distribution of responses on sub-dimensions of religion-related attitudes in the general Muslim population sample

	not at all important	less important	more important	very important
Central role				
How important is your religion for you personally in daily life?	6.1%	12.0%	32.0%	49.9%
	disagree entirely	*tend to disagree*	*tend to agree*	*agree entirely*
I am directed by my faith when making all my decisions in daily life.	16.9%	16.0%	27.0%	40.1%
Orthodoxy				
I find it important to follow the rules on fasting exactly.	13.5%	9.0%	15.9%	61.9%
I am careful to eat only halal meat.	23.4%	12.0%	16.7%	47.9%
If I am a good Muslim, I will go to paradise.	19.8%	11.7%	18.1%	50.5%
I believe that the Koran is the revealed word of God.	6.6%	4.5%	9.4%	79.6%
Fundamentalist orientation				
Whoever does not follow the Koran's rules literally is not a true Muslim.	45.7%	22.5%	11.3%	20.5%
I believe it is important for the teachings of Islam to be adapted to the conditions of the modern world (values reversed for scale).	11.8%	8.6%	25.4%	54.1%
People who modernize Islam destroy the true teachings.	38.8%	17.8%	17.8%	25.5%
I believe that every good Muslim is obligated to convert unbelievers to Islam.	36.2%	16.5%	21.0%	26.3%
Persuading Muslims to change their religion should be forbidden.	58.7%	11.5%	7.2%	22.7%
Non-Muslims are cursed by Allah.	69.7%	14.7%	7.2%	8.4%
Elevated value of own group				
Islam is the only true religion.	22.5%	11.9%	12.2%	53.4%
Only Islam is able to solve the problems of our time.	34.9%	20.1%	19.1%	25.9%
Over the long term, Islam will be victorious world-wide.	27.6%	21.8%	23.4%	27.2%
Devaluation of others				
In Germany it is obvious that Christianity is not able to uphold morals.	24.9%	19.3%	23.9%	32.0%
The sexual morality of Western societies is completely corrupt.	14.7%	14.4%	25.8%	45.2%

Multivariate classification was used to check whether typical combinations between religious devotion and attitudes in the five other dimensions could be identified. In this way, four distinct patterns of religious orientation were found within the overall Muslim population sample that were also repeated in the sample groups of pupils and students.

The first group can be described as "not very religious". This group has the lowest mean values in all the sub-scales, less than the median in each case. For these Muslims, religion is not

central; they reject orthodoxy and fundamentalist orientations and do not elevate the value of their own group as a whole while devaluing others. This group accounts for 17.5% of the sample of the overall Muslim population.

Two other groups show significantly higher levels of religious devotion and centrality of religion above the absolute median. One of these groups, which can be described as "orthodox", accounts for 21.9% of the overall Muslim population sample. In this group, the dimensions of religiosity, centrality and orthodoxy are all strongly marked, whereas fundamentalist attitudes such as blanket endorsement/condemnation lie below the median.


Figure 5:   Mean values of various aspects of religious attitudes in the four identified patterns of religious orientation within the overall Muslim population sample

Clearly distinct from this group is a third group of persons which can be described as "fundamentalist", accounting for 39.6% of the overall Muslim population sample. This group shows the highest rates of religiosity and centrality of religion, and orthodox attitudes also find the highest approval here. Characteristic for this group, and what clearly sets it apart from the others, is the relatively high level of fundamentalist attitudes, although there is some variance within the group. Only 14.4% of this group demonstrates extremely fundamentalist orientations (amounting to 6.1% of the entire sample), thus it would be inaccurate to call those in this group "fundamentalists". At the same time, persons in this group agree most strongly with elevating the value of the own group (60.2% of this group at the extreme) and devaluing others (51.3% of this group at the extreme).

A fourth group, accounting for 21% of the overall Muslim population sample, demonstrates obvious ambivalence. The level of religious devotion tends to be below the median, and compared to those with orthodox or fundamentalist orientations, fewer in this group regard religion as central: slightly over half. But these responses are combined with a high level of

orthodoxy; at the same time, most of the people in this group reject fundamental orientations, and only a few place a higher value on the own group (only 5.8% at the extreme). Unlike the orthodox group, this group shows a clear tendency to devalue others (33.8% at the extreme). This combination of a low level of religious devotion and a high level of orthodoxy may be interpreted as evidence of a sense of Muslim identity based less on inner religious conviction than on outward show: insistence on rules, religious traditions that have become empty rituals, and a clear separation from Western society that is felt to be amoral. This group is therefore described as "traditional, conservative".

These results indicate major internal differences within religious orientations which would not be apparent from indicators of religious devotion alone, much less from the simple fact of being a Muslim. For example, extremely high levels of religious devotion (16.6% of the overall sample) can be found in three of the four patterns of religious orientation, although to varying degrees (fundamentalist orientation: 33.7%; orthodox: 13.0%; traditionalists: 4.7%) and with different focuses and connotations.

Further multivariate tests showed that the sub-groups of the less religious and those with a fundamentalist orientation can be reliably identified, while the two groups in between, the orthodox and the traditionalists, are somewhat indistinct at the edges. However, the results confirm that this breakdown into four sub-groups most closely reflects the actual situation.

In order to directly compare the distribution of these orientation patterns within the three sample groups, the pupils and students were categorized using the grouping algorithm defined on the basis of the overall Muslim population sample.

*Figure 6:* *Distribution of patterns of religious orientation among pupils, students and the overall Muslim population (% of each sample)*

The proportion of pupils that were not very religious is much smaller than in the overall Muslim population sample, while the proportion of those with a fundamentalist orientation is somewhat higher. The largest proportion of students, slightly more than one-third, belongs to the "not very

religious" group. They are the least likely to demonstrate fundamentalist orientations, although at slightly less than one-third, this is not a negligible quantity.

There are also obvious parallels between the patterns of religious orientation and indicators of practical integration and attitudes towards integration. For example, significantly more of those persons with a fundamentalist orientation also display low levels of socio-linguistic integration. The orthodox and fundamentalist groups also demonstrate a somewhat higher tendency towards segregation. In both of these groups, the majority indicated a willingness to integrate and adapt, but this willingness was not reflected at the level of practical socio-linguistic integration. This could indicate that, in the integration process, these two groups in particular have trouble finding openness and acceptance within the receiving society. In any case, the qualitative surveys point in this direction, repeatedly referring to experiences of rejection, lack of understanding and fear on the part of native Germans confronted with strongly held Islamic/religious attitudes.

3.4 Attitudes towards democracy and the rule of law

The research project was aimed among other things at analysing intolerant, anti-democratic attitudes linked to religion. One goal was to estimate the occurrence of Islamist attitudes or their precursors. These should not be confused with fundamentalist religious orientations. Islamist attitudes typically turn the religious into a political matter. Islamism is characterized by rejecting the basic principles of democracy and the rule of law by appealing to the will of God as revealed in the Koran. This includes advocating sharia law as based on religion, provided by God and thus sufficiently legitimized. Islamists thus oppose basic democratic principles such as the sovereignty of the people, the democratic legitimation of political power, the right to form an opposition, the freedom not to belong to any religion, the freedom of expression and basic rights of equality. Islamists believe that government authority is derived from God and His will and thus does not require human legitimation. Instead, religious authorities decide how the individual rules must be written in order to conform to God's will.

At the level of attitudes, Islamism can be described as a conglomeration of faith-based indifference to and rejection of democracy coupled with authoritarian tendencies of intolerance and an ideology of inequality.

In order to capture the relevant attitudes in quantitative terms, attitudes towards democracy and the rule of law were surveyed separately from the questions about patterns of religious orientation. Four of the questions relate to basic constitutional rights: freedom of expression and assembly, protection for minorities, the right to strike, and freedom of the press. Two questions deal with global anti-democratic attitudes ("democracy leads to crime" and "religion is more important than democracy"). Drawing on the tradition of research into authoritarianism, questions were asked about attitudes towards the death penalty and towards physical punishment as practised under Islamic law (sharia), in the country of origin and in Germany.

Table 6:　　*Attitudes towards democracy and the rule of law among the overall Muslim population: Distribution of responses to individual items*

	disagree entirely	tend to disagree	tend to agree	agree entirely
Every citizen should have the right to demonstrate in public on behalf of his beliefs.	5.2%	5.5%	20.1%	69.2%
Minorities should also have the right to express their opinion freely.	2.3%	2.0%	16.6%	79.0%
Strikes and demonstrations threaten public order and should be banned.	61.6%	18.2%	9.4%	10.8%
The government should supervise newspapers and television in order to preserve morals and order.	24.5%	10.0%	22.7%	42.8%
Following the commandments of my religion is more important to me than democracy.	32.7%	20.6%	19.2%	27.5%
The large number of criminals in this country shows what democracy leads to.	30.4%	21.1%	23.2%	25.2%
The government should have the right to punish serious crimes with the death penalty.	54.2%	12.2%	13.4%	20.2%
I think it would be good if in my country of origin, certain crimes were subject to physical punishment, as in Islamic law.	82.2%	6.8%	5.9%	5.1%
I think it would be good if in Germany, certain crimes were subject to physical punishment, as in Islamic law.	83.9%	6.7%	4.5%	4.9%

Although few respondents disagree with freedoms and minority rights, nearly one-fifth favours banning strikes and demonstrations to ensure public order. Nearly half agrees with the statement that religion is more important than democracy and associates democracy with disorder in the form of crime. A large proportion (65.3%) is in favour of government control over the press in order to preserve morals and order; one-third is in favour of the death penalty for serious crimes, and about 10% agree with physical punishment as in sharia law.

Here too, multivariate classification reveals distinctly different patterns of response to these nine questions. For example, about 12% of the overall Muslim population sample display a configuration in which all but a minority support basic freedoms, as referred to in the first two questions, while otherwise combining a critical attitude towards democracy, primacy of religion over democracy, and support for government control of the press, the death penalty, and physical punishment with reference to sharia law. Among the pupils surveyed, about 17% fell into this group; among the students, it was the smallest group, with less than 6%. A second group, made up only of students, accounted for nearly one-quarter of respondents who viewed basic freedoms as well as strikes and demonstrations positively, favoured the death penalty only to a limited degree, but tended to agree with the primacy of religion over democracy, with press censorship on moral grounds, and with sharia law.

A three-level categoric indicator was developed to identify outlying groups based on their responses to these nine questions.

Responses to the individual questions were dichotomized and the number of responses favouring anti-democratic and authoritarian attitudes were added up, with possible scores ranging from 0 to 9. Persons with scores of 0 or 1 were defined as not/not very anti-democratic. Scores higher than 1 and less than 5 were defined as moderately anti-democratic, and scores of 5 and over were defined as very anti-democratic.

Figure 7:   Distribution of the three-level indicator of anti-democratic attitudes among Muslim pupils, students and the general Muslim population (% of each sample population)

The distribution of anti-democratic attitudes differs greatly between three sample groups. As expected, the sample of students had the highest percentage of respondents that were not or not very anti-democratic. By contrast, the percentages of respondents that were very anti-democratic did not differ very much between the three samples, with the highest percentage among school pupils and the lowest among students.

In the general Muslim population sample, the tendency towards anti-democratic attitudes was negatively correlated with education levels and socio-linguistic integration. In particular, the language of media used correlates to anti-democratic attitudes: The greater the use of media in a language other than German, the greater the frequency of very anti-democratic attitudes.

There is also a correlation with the patterns of religious orientation: Among those with fundamentalist orientations in the overall Muslim population sample, the percentage of very anti-democratic attitudes is significantly higher, at 16.1%. Although this means that a substantial minority of fundamentalist-oriented Muslims displays highly anti-democratic attitudes, the majority of this group does not. Respondents with very anti-democratic attitudes can also be found among the other patterns of religious orientation, though to a much smaller extent: 8.1% of those with orthodox orientations, 5.4% of the traditionalists and 3.3% of those who are not very religious.

Islamist attitudes are characterized by the combination of very anti-democratic attitudes (primacy of religion over democratic principles, support for faith-based rules) with significantly elevated value for their own group and devaluation of those with other beliefs. The group of persons displaying this combination was taken as an indicator of the potential for attitudes sympathetic to Islamism.

This combination was found among 5.4% of the general Muslim population sample. These attitudes are found only among those with fundamentalist (12%) and traditionalist (2%) orientations, though much less frequently among the latter. Among the orthodox and those described as not very religious, no one displayed attitudes defined in this way as sympathetic to Islamism.

Among the sample of school pupils, 6.4% displayed attitudes sympathetic to Islamism. Also in this sample, this percentage was significantly higher among those of fundamentalist orientation (11.8% as compared to 4.8% of traditionalists and 1.6% of those with an orthodox orientation). Attitudes sympathetic to Islamism were found least often within the student sample (5.6%); there they occur exclusively among those of fundamentalist orientation (16.7%).

3.5   Attitudes towards politically/religiously motivated violence

The representative standardized surveys also asked participants about their attitudes towards politically/religiously motivated forms of violence and large-scale terrorist acts.

Four statements dealt with the evaluation and legitimation of violence motivated by religion. The first statement concerns the legitimacy of armed defence against attacks on Islam, thus measuring the acceptance of violence for defensive purposes; the second refers to the legitimacy of using violence offensively, in order to spread Islam. The third statement concerns the respondent's personal willingness to use violence on behalf of the Muslim community; the fourth formulates the notion of a reward (based on the Koran) for martyrdom in the cause of Islam. In this way, the statement measures not the respondent's personal view of such behaviour, but rather his/her acceptance of the religiously based interpretation that such violence is rewarded with the promise of paradise.

Table 7:   *Attitudes towards armed conflict and physical force motivated by religion (% of those agreeing within the three samples)*

	Pupils	Students	General Muslim population
The threat to Islam posed by Western society means that Muslims are justified in using violence to defend themselves.	33.6%	15.3%	38.4%
Violence is justified if it serves to spread and uphold Islam.	21.4%	2.1%	5.5%
I am willing to use physical force against unbelievers in order to serve the Muslim community.	24.0%	2.6%	7.6%
Muslims who die in the armed struggle for their faith go to heaven.	49.3%	17.0%	44.3%

Students showed the lowest levels of agreement with these statements. In all three samples, most respondents agreed with the statements about the promise of paradise and about using violence to defend Islam against Western society. Among school pupils, it is remarkable that more than one-fifth support the offensive use of violence and are personally willing to use force on behalf of the Muslim community.

The respondents were also shown statements condemning terrorist acts, killings and suicide attacks in the context of Islam. Rejection of these negative statements indicated acceptance for massive violence of this kind.

Table 8:   *Attitudes towards terrorist violence in the context of Islam (% of those disagreeing with the following statements)*

	Pupils	*Students*	*General Muslim population*
Suicide attacks are cowardly and damage the cause of Islam.	11.6%	9.4%	8.7%
Terrorist acts in the name of Allah are very sinful and insulting to God.	5.7%	5.2%	7.4%
Anyone who encourages or instructs young Muslims to commit suicide attacks is a godless criminal.	7.5%	5.7%	9.4%
No Muslim has the right to kill others in the name of Allah.	7.8%	7.3%	6.1%

The overwhelming majority agrees with these statements and rejects such forms of mass violence. On average, however, about 10% of respondents did not regard suicide attacks negatively as formulated in the statement. And a minority of 5% to 7% did not share the view that terrorist acts were sinful.

To create a general indicator, the numbers of those agreeing with the first set of four statements and disagreeing with the second set of four statements were added together. Persons with a score of 0 were coded as not acknowledging any legitimacy for politically/religiously motivated violence. Those with scores of 1 or 2 were defined as granting a low level of legitimacy, those with scores of 3 a moderate level, and those with scores of 4 or more as a high level of legitimacy for violence.

Figure 8:   *Attitudes towards politically/religiously motivated violence: % of differing levels of legitimacy given to violence within the three sample groups*

Comparing the three sample groups, the largest percentage of pupils (11.1%) views these forms of politically/religiously motivated violence as highly legitimate; among the general Muslim population, only about half as many (5.9%) share this attitude. This percentage for the general Muslim population roughly corresponds to result of the latest Gallup survey in Berlin using different indicators. Among students, the figure is less than half as many (2.1%).

3.6 Estimating the quantitative distribution of risk groups

In the following, the distribution of risk potential is illustrated in terms of set theory by showing where very anti-democratic attitudes overlap with high levels of legitimacy for politically/religiously motivated violence and their distribution across the different patterns of religious orientation. The distribution of highly religious respondents across the different patterns of religious orientation is also represented.

Total problem group: 13.9%
(95% confidence interval: 11.9%-16.4%)

<u>*Sub-groups*</u>

Highly anti-democratic: *9.9%*

High legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence:5.9%

Sympathetic to Islamism: *5.4%*

<u>*Combinations:*</u>

Highly anti-democratic and high legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence: 1.9%

Sympathetic to Islamism and high legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence: 1.1%

Figure 9:   Patterns of religious orientation, highly religious attitudes, highly anti-democratic attitudes, attitudes sympathetic to Islamism, high legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence in the general Muslim population sample (size of area reflects number of cases)

Within the sample of the general Muslim population, 13.9% of respondents expressed highly anti-democratic attitudes and/or a high level of legitimacy for politically/religiously motivated violence. Setting a confidence interval of 95% and taking the sample size into account, the estimated prevalence of such attitudes in the resident Muslim population thus lies between 11.9% and 16.4%.

The largest proportion of this pattern of attitudes can be found among those of fundamentalist orientation, where it constitutes a qualified minority of 20.1% (8.7% of traditionalists; 14.8% of orthodox; 4.9% of those not very religious). Roughly one-quarter of this risk group, defined as those with highly anti-democratic attitudes and/or granting a high level of legitimacy to politically/religiously motivated violence, is also highly religious; among the highly religious, such attitudes are found among slightly more than one-fifth (22.5%) of respondents. Thus the majority of highly religious respondents is neither anti-democratic nor views violence as legitimate.

In the sample of school pupils, the risk group defined as respondents with highly anti-democratic attitudes and/or regarding violence as highly legitimate is slightly larger (19.4%) than in the general Muslim population sample. This risk group was the smallest for the sample of students, at 10.8%.

In addition to the indicators gathered for the sample of the general Muslim population, indicators of religious intolerance were also surveyed for the samples of pupils and students.

> Muslim pupils and students showed significantly higher percentages of highly anti-Semitic attitudes than their non-Muslim peers. If non-Muslims' negative stereotypes of Muslims are also taken into account, however, then overall levels of stereotypes and intolerance no longer differ significantly between Muslims (anti-Semitic and anti-Christian stereotypes) and non-Muslims (anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic stereotypes).

The samples of pupils and students thus reveal a larger syndrome of attitudes legitimizing violence, anti-democratic attitudes, and marked religious intolerance (anti-Semitic and anti-Christian stereotypes).

Total problem group: 29.2%
(95% confidence interval: 25.4%-33.3%)

Sub-groups

Highly anti-democratic:	*11.6%*
High legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence:	*10.8%*
Anti-Semitic/anti-Christian	*15.4%*
Sympathetic to Islamism:	*6.4%*

Combinations:

Highly anti-democratic and high legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence: 3.2%

Sympathetic to Islamism and high legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence: 1.6%

Figure 10:   Patterns of religious orientation, highly religious attitudes, highly anti-democratic attitudes, attitudes sympathetic to Islamism, high legitimacy of politically/religiously motivated violence, anti-Christian stereotypes and anti-Semitism in the sample of school pupils (size of area reflects number of cases)

Including strongly anti-Semitic and anti-Christian stereotypes (the latter are an isolated phenomenon and thus a clear exception), the defined problem group accounted for 29.2%, or nearly one-third, of the sample of school pupils. In the student sample (not represented here), the defined problem group amounted to 16.4% of respondents when anti-Semitic and anti-Christian stereotypes (10.2%) were included.

3.7 Underlying and influencing factors

For the three samples, multivariate models were used to identify factors contributing to the attitude configurations described in the previous sections. Given the development of faith-related, anti-democratic attitudes, analyses of the general Muslim population sample suggest that instead of a single configuration of responsible influences, in each of the three sample groups, different factors significantly increase the likelihood of such problematic attitudes.

In a first group consisting of better-educated Muslims with little personal experience of discrimination, the perception of collective discrimination against Muslims in Germany combines with a fundamentalist pattern of religious orientation to result in such faith-related, anti-democratic attitudes. Here the effect of a group experience of victimization is the most likely explanation. This model applies best to slightly less than one-third of the critical group.

In a second, distinct group consisting of Muslims with rather poor educational opportunities, the significant personal experience of discrimination in Germany is combined with fundamentalist orientations to lead to a higher probability of faith-related, anti-democratic attitudes. Here, social exclusion and experience of victimization are the most likely factors underlying these attitudes. This group accounts for about half of the critical group.

These two groups are characterized by a sense of exclusion from the receiving society, whether based on the perception of a collective exclusion of Muslims or on personal experience. By contrast, a third group comprising about one-fifth of the critical group displays a traditionalist pattern of religious orientation combined with rejection of the receiving society and limited willingness to adapt, despite the absence of personal experience of discrimination and of perceived collective marginalization. This group can best be described as engaging in voluntary segregation or choosing to withdraw into itself.

In view of these results, it would be inaccurate to explain the potential for radicalization with regard to attitudes towards democracy and the rule of law solely as the result of social exclusion, or to view primarily religious orientations as the deciding factor. Nor is the success or failure of social integration alone decisive for everyone, although it is very important for a certain sub-group.

Problematic attitude constellations that may be associated with a potential for radicalization can be found among a sub-group of Muslims despite their high levels of education and thus improved opportunities for participation. The explanation lies rather in the perception of group victimization, of collective marginalization of Muslims in Germany. The second sub-group describes experiences of being disappointed by the receiving society. In principle, these Muslims are integration-oriented and willing to adapt; in this case, the potential for radicalization arises out of limited opportunities for participation due to low levels of education combined with personal experience of discrimination and social exclusion. By contrast, the third sub-group has withdrawn into a traditional ethnic milieu. For such persons, inner religious conviction does not play the central role; they tend instead to insist on outward rituals, which also tend to distance them from the receiving society, and ultimately exclude themselves. Such attitudes may be associated in some cases with radicalization tendencies.

In the sample of school pupils too, it was possible to identify sub-groups in which various influencing factors are at work with regard to anti-democratic attitudes and religious intolerance.

For about half of the pupils displaying extreme anti-democratic attitudes and/or religious intolerance, these can be explained in terms of marginalization theory with reference to poor educational opportunities, personal experience of discrimination and the perception of collective marginalization of Muslims; here, the type of religious orientation has no substantive additional influence. For the other half of pupils displaying such attitudes who have not experienced significant disadvantages in the form of limited educational opportunity, other factors are at work. Here, patterns of religious orientation, in particular traditionalist and fundamentalist orientations, play a much stronger role. In combination with the perception of collective marginalization at national level, they increase the risk of belonging to the critical group of those displaying highly anti-democratic attitudes and/or religious intolerance.

If one also takes into account attitudes justifying politically/religiously motivated violence, which most pupils reject, then young men are disproportionately represented within the critical group, in line with expectations. Although approval for violence in general, not only politically/religiously motivated violence, is conducive to such attitudes, it does not account for them entirely. This constellation of anti-democratic attitudes, religious intolerance and justification of violence is found much more frequently among those with a fundamentalist religious orientation. But there is significant internal variance within the group of those with a fundamentalist orientation, as there is for the groups with other religious orientations. The multivariate analyses indicate that the additional factors are in some cases very similar to those familiar from the research on right-wing extremism, propensity to violence and xenophobia. The most important of these are deficits in education and in practical, socio-linguistic integration within the receiving society as well as the experience of victimization and discrimination as a foreigner in this society. Thus there are a number of places in which factors point to circumstances in the German receiving society.

Results for the sub-group of students, who tend to be better educated and better integrated in terms of language skills, are also revealing. Here, multivariate analyses show that factors significantly increasing the likelihood of being in the risk group include residence in Germany only during university-level studies, the perception of collective marginalization of Muslims on a global scale and a fundamentalist religious orientation, as well as being male (higher rates among men). Nationality, area of study, personal experience of discrimination in Germany and perceived collective discrimination against Muslims in Germany have no additional impact in this regard.

Thus the factors involved in creating a risk group among young, educated Muslims are somewhat different from those for the other sample populations. Apart from a religious orientation which includes strong contempt for the West and an undifferentiated, high regard for Islam, the most important factors here are an intense focus on the situation of Muslims in the world and the subjective perception that they are oppressed and discriminated against. Thus political assessments and a heightened perception of societal circumstances (i.e. representative experiences of victimization) combined with fundamentalist attitudes above all provide the background for processes of radicalization. It should be noted that only a minority of the student sample, though a considerable one (about one-third of those with a fundamentalist orientation) was found to have a potential for radicalization at the attitude level. For this reason, with this subgroup as with the others, equating fundamentalist orientations or even strong religious

devotion (as found in the other patterns of religious orientation) with potential threat not only does not reflect the real situation but also increases the risk of contributing to precisely those phenomena that one is trying to prevent.

3.8 Experiences of respondents with a Muslim immigrant background and paradigmatic biographical trajectories of Islamic radicalization

The qualitative interviews were conducted exclusively with persons who are strongly rooted in Islam. What stands out here is the great importance of descriptions of victimization and exclusion of Muslims. Although almost all the interviewees reported being able to practise their religion freely in Germany, a country they thought very highly of precisely because of this religious freedom, they also described being constantly regarded as a threat, especially since 11 September 2001, and watched as potential bombers. They describe an atmosphere of surveillance and suspicion with a direct impact on their daily lives.

Generation- and age-related differences of orientation and attitudes towards relations with the majority German society can be identified. Older people more often display attitudes which can be described as tending to turn away in resignation from the receiving society and retreat to the warm and protective environment of the immigrant community and mosque associations, whereas younger people more often strive as self-confident Muslims to become recognized members of the receiving society. This attitude is also marked by a rejection of assimilation, the term interviewees use to describe what they believe the receiving society expects of them. They want to preserve their own culture and seek acceptance of their differences.

Interviewees regard Muslim organizations and their role with ambivalence. On the one hand, they describe Muslim organizations primarily as a place of retreat, subcultures with little connection to the receiving society. This stands in contrast to the interests of the younger generations: Although they also consider Muslim organizations to be important, they would like them to play a larger role in linking their members to the receiving society. These attitudes are no longer satisfied with preserving a subculture.

The younger generation in particular expresses in this way its orientation towards the German receiving society which it also regards as its own and in which it seeks its own position and recognition as Muslims. But this orientation is partly counteracted and disturbed by reactions from the receiving society.

Religious orientation also differs along generational lines. On the one hand, attitudes ranging from strongly fundamentalist to sympathetic to Islamism can be found among the younger adults. On the other hand, there is a small group with an individualized orientation towards Islam which is no longer primarily defined by relations to authority figures. This separate pattern was not revealed by the standardized surveys, where it is probably part of the orthodoxy pattern; it is characterized by strong religious faith and an emphasis on transcendence in combination with great flexibility concerning rules and religious sources and texts.

Also apparent among the younger adults is the search for orientation as a Muslim in an environment lacking general understanding of Islam and perceived as lacking respect and consideration for Islam. Those with a flexible, individualized religious orientation face the difficulty of being in the minority among Muslims and of asserting their own positions in

confrontation with a Western culture felt to be less developed, libertarian and arbitrary with regard to value orientations. This requires a great degree of independence and the ability to deal with conflict and tolerate ambiguity.

By contrast, orthodox or traditional religious orientations tend to predominate among the older interviewees, where one finds hardly any examples of sympathy for Islamism or of independently formed, individualized attitudes towards religion and the modern world.

With regard to Islamist extremism, interviewees agreed that such phenomena exist around them. When asked about the possible background for such extremism, a large proportion repeatedly referred to global circumstances such as oppression and discrimination faced by Muslims in the Middle East. Their descriptions of these circumstances are often highly emotional, expressing the especially sensitive nature of this topic for the Muslims interviewed.

Many are of the view that the less people know about Islam due to the lack of religious instruction, the easier it is to agitate on behalf of Islamist violence. Interestingly, the interviewees in leading positions demonstrated obvious willingness, based on their sense of identity as members of German society, to actively encourage Muslims' affirmation of basic rights, freedoms and democratic structures and to prevent violent extremism.

The analysis of paradigmatic trajectories as illustrated in four case histories offered an especially revealing look at the development of extremist attitudes and Islamist sympathies. The case histories are those of young adults of Lebanese, Pakistani and Turkish origin, all of whom are naturalized German citizens. The case histories fall into two categories: Two of the young adults were raised without a strong emphasis on religion; as Muslims living in the diaspora, they began in adolescence to search for identity, orientation and meaning. During this phase, they experienced a kind of religious awakening and broke radically with their previous attitudes and beliefs. Guided by charismatic role models in mosques offering rigid and unambiguous rules, they devoted themselves to an intense study of Islam. From then on, they developed attitudes based on sharia and the vision of an Islamic society and characterized by rigidity within the Muslim reference group, an insistence on true Islam and an orientation on authority.

In the second category, the other two case histories do not contain experiences of religious awakening. One case history deals with a man in his early 30s with a very traditional lifestyle who distances himself from Western society, which he finds decadent and morally corrupt. Within the Muslim community, he works to promote orthodoxy. While he wishes to continue living within the German majority society, he wants this society to accept his lifestyle. He makes no apparent attempt to adapt, instead demonstrating segregationist tendencies by calling for areas in Germany where Muslims can live according to Islamic law. He does not approve of political/religious violence but seems to believe that Muslims should be subject to special rules that in turn entail serious restrictions of other people's basic rights, in this case the rights of wives and daughters. The second case history in this category also does not contain an "awakening" but instead is an example of steady progress towards radical Islam accompanied by growing social isolation. In this case, a well-educated student chose to reject the rather Kemalist, secular orientation of his parents, who viewed his gradual embrace of Islam with suspicion and doubt. He distanced himself from some basic principles of democracy and developed a vision of an Islamic state and legal system. Personal experience of victimization or

social exclusion as an immigrant played no role in this case, nor is there any evidence of failed integration in terms of language, education or social contacts. The subject is a young university graduate with good career prospects who sees himself as a Muslim in the diaspora, thus clearly distinguishing himself from his parents, who seem to him with regard to religion lacking in credibility, too tied to the West and "watered down". Most relevant for this young man is a perceived collective marginalization of Muslims, who he describes as being oppressed by the West. Although he himself does not advocate using political violence, he does argue that while terrorist acts have the disadvantage of having created a climate of spying and surveillance, on the positive side, they have made Islam an important public issue. Further, this young man does not wish to withdraw from German society, but rather to play an active role in shaping it. To do so, he is developing ideas about establishing a young, Muslim political avant-garde in Germany. In his view, the young generation of Muslims must take over the reins and – unlike the older generation, which he describes as conformist or lethargic – take action in Germany on behalf of Islam.

These qualitative findings on individual trajectories underscore the results of the standardized surveys indicating that different sets of conditions can lead to extremism. The experience of "awakening" described here also agrees with the findings and case histories of other qualitative research projects. This experience consists of processes in which persons torn between two or more cultures and at an especially vulnerable stage in their search for identity find a representative of a rigid ideology who seems able to provide them with clear answers and social stability.

Although they represent a minority within the Muslim immigrant milieu from which respondents were sought, these four case histories illustrate how important the search for values and orientation can be in the confusing interface between two cultures. There are obviously a few people for whom the majority society does not offer any credible or convincing answers. If they come across personally persuasive representatives of Islam who can give them clear rules, answer their questions and thus offer orientation at a vulnerable time in their lives, this can indeed lead to biographical reorientations which may prepare the way for religious extremism.

4. Concluding remarks

Confirming the results of current research on this topic, all components of this study were consistent in demonstrating the extremely high importance of religion for Muslims living in Germany. The overwhelming majority has strong religious ties, much stronger than those of non-Muslim natives, as the survey of pupils showed. But these ties take various forms; it proved useful to distinguish between orthodoxy, traditionalism, fundamentalism and less religious attitudes.

Fundamentalist orientations, comprising strong ties to religion, great relevance of religion for daily life, and strong emphasis on religious rules and rituals, frequently occur in combination with a tendency to exclude Muslims who do not adhere to these attitudes and to have a high opinion of Islam and a low opinion of cultures rooted in Christianity. But this should by no means be equated with the potential for anti-democratic attitudes, intolerance or sympathies for Islamism. It proved useful to analyse religious devotion and patterns of religious orientation

separately from attitudes towards democracy, the rule of law and politically/religiously motivated violence.

The results of the three standardized surveys show that a statistically relevant minority of Muslims in Germany displays anti-democratic attitudes and attitudes characterized by Islam-based ideologies of inequality, forms of religious intolerance and prejudice and the justification of politically/religiously motivated violence. This minority, which is at risk for various kinds of radicalization, is significantly larger among young people than in the overall Muslim population including the older generation.

These attitudes show many similarities to what has often been described as "ideologies of inequality" among German young people and which can be associated with intolerance, xenophobia or right-wing extremism. The sets of conditions in which these attitudes appeared among the Muslims in the study also showed certain parallels: limited opportunities to participate in society, low levels of education, perceived threat – in sum, the search for simple solutions in a complicated world, the need for unambiguous standards and rules which resort to the crutch of hostile stereotyping.

On the other hand, the points of reference are also specific. Problems of social and linguistic integration associated with immigration, immigrants' personal experiences of exclusion, perceived marginalization linked to religion – among Muslims in Germany and elsewhere in the world – play a special role here, as does the justification of violence on religious grounds.

However, this does not mean that strong religious faith or strict adherence to religious teachings is the sole or deciding factor. Although the authoritarian tendencies and ideologies of inequality described above were found more often among those with strong religious convictions, including the sub-group of fundamentalist Muslims, these were still in the minority. Failing to take this into account, i.e. ignoring the heterogeneity within the different groups of religious orientation among Muslims, runs the risk of encouraging those perceptions of collective marginalization; for example, placing all Muslims under general suspicion would lead to subjective perceptions of exclusion, which this study has found to play a key role in encouraging radicalization tendencies.

Looking at the overall results of the multivariate analyses, one of the central findings is that for different, definable sub-groups, different sets of conditions are conducive to potential radicalization. Apart from the specific predictors identified in detail for the sample populations, generally speaking it is possible to distinguish at least two different groups: those with low levels of education at the margins of society, and those who are exploring different systems of cultural reference in search of their own identity and are extremely sensitive to injustice and perceived marginalization of the group they identify with.

Developing targeted preventive measures will therefore necessarily entail taking into account the different sets of conditions and risk factors which apply to the different sub-groups. The highest risks are apparently to be found among young people. In this context, it is certainly true that language skills are an important prerequisite for integration, but this applies only to part of the group. It is also true that better educational opportunities and the resulting opportunities to participate in German society are also very important, but this too does not apply to the entire target group, albeit to a large part of it. A significant proportion of Muslims with the attitudes

identified here as problematic speaks German fluently. Part of the risk group consists of people with a good education, high intellectual potential and favourable opportunities for participation. For them, it is more important to ask about values. Further, representative experiences of victimization, i.e. the perception of unjust treatment of Muslims in Germany and elsewhere, are highly relevant.

The study results also indicate the importance of measures targeted not at Muslims but at Germans. Anti-Muslim prejudice and physical attacks on Muslims play a major role in Muslim perceptions of the receiving society and for Muslims' ability to identify with this society. In this regard, widespread negative stereotypes of Muslims, opposition to Muslims' desire to preserve their own culture, and the resulting demand that Muslims should withdraw into their own ethno-cultural ghettoes constitute a serious problem.

Even when it seems self-evident, it must be emphasized that integration is a two-way street. Promoting dialogue among equals and everyday interaction as a means to mutual understanding and acceptance are absolutely essential. For many Muslims in Germany, in addition to opportunities to participate in society, support from their religion, their search for meaning and community and above all values are likely to play a central role in this dialogue.

Based on the findings from the standardized surveys and above all from the intensive interviews, one may conclude that in order to be productive, such dialogue requires representatives of the receiving society who do not reject Islam out of hand but instead regard Muslims truly as equals while respecting their differences. This process requires dialogue partners who are fully aware of their fundamental values and are thus at once firmly grounded, strong and open-minded.

Regarding special measures targeted at specific groups showing latent potential for radicalization, our experience in this field leads us to believe that non-Muslim individuals and institutions will probably have only limited access and success. Muslims themselves will therefore need to be involved in providing programmes to prevent conflict escalation and further radicalization among this critical group. Thus it will likely be impossible to implement further measures in this area without the cooperation of Muslim individuals and institutions. In our discussions and interviews, we found evidence of willingness to cooperate in this way.

In assessing the present results, the following methodological limitations should be noted: In the sample of the overall Muslim population, older persons were slightly underrepresented, as is often the case in such studies. Given the higher incidence of anti-democratic attitudes and propensity to violence among younger people, this may have resulted in slightly higher rates of such attitudes and propensity among the overall Muslim population sample. However, the results presented here closely reflect those of similar studies, for example concerning the extremely high importance of religion among Muslims in Germany. So one may assume that the different patterns of religious orientation described here for the first time largely reflect the overall circumstances, especially since the same general results were found using three different random samples. The qualitative results also largely agreed with the findings from the standardized surveys.

Further, it should be noted that the samples were taken from four large metropolitan areas. Although it may be assumed that a larger proportion of Muslims live in such urban areas,

because the present study did not consider rural areas, its findings do not automatically apply to all Muslims living in Germany. From a sociological perspective, it would in any case be desirable to have more precise information on the number, national origin and social status of Muslims in Germany; unfortunately, we did not have access to such information for the present research project.

Finally, it should be noted that criminological and sociological studies have suggested the special relevance of local conditions at the level of city districts and neighbourhoods for integration issues and intercultural understanding. The present study was unable to take these into account in a theoretically desirable way. Future research in this area is certainly needed for careful evaluation and conceptual development, also with a view to promoting dialogue and understanding and thereby preventing different forms of extremism.