



**German Delegation of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly
&
Gert Weisskirchen
Personal Representative of the
Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism**

Combating Antisemitism – Challenges and Successful Strategies

- EXPERT FORUM -

Berlin, 25 January 2008

Conference Documentation



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Program of the Conference

09:00 – 10:00 Service of remembrance in the German Bundestag on the occasion of Victims of National Socialism Day (video transmission to conference room)

11:00 – 11:30 Opening and greetings

Dr. Norbert Lammert

President of the German Bundestag

Dr. Angela Merkel

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Ambassador René Nyberg

Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Finland

11:30 – 13:00 Panel: **Education on the Holocaust and Antisemitism**

Speakers:

Aycan Demirel, Kreuzberg Initiative against Antisemitism (KiGA e.V.), Germany

Michał Bilewicz, Forum for Dialogue Among Nations, Poland

Alla Gerber, Holocaust Foundation, Russia

Wolf Kaiser, Memorial and Education Center Haus der Wannseekonferenz

Chair:

Ingolf Seidel, Task Force: Education on Antisemitism, Germany

13:00 – 13:30 Buffet in break-out area

13:30 – 15:15 Panel: **Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat Them**

Speakers:

Carine Bloch, Vice-President, Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (LICRA), France

Dr. Rafal Pankowski, Never Again Association, Poland

Martin Endemann, Alliance of Active Football Fans (BAFF e.V.), Germany

Dr. Gregor Rosenthal, Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance (BfDT)

Chair:

Michael Whine, President, Government and International Affairs, Community Security Trust, United Kingdom

15:15 – 16:45 Panel: **Antisemitic Tendencies in the Academic Context and Successful Strategies to Combat Them**

Speakers:

David Hirsh, University of London, founder of "Engage", United Kingdom

Prof. Dr. Lars Rensmann, MMZ Fellow, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

Dr. Yves Pallade, B’Nai Brith Europe, Germany

Irina Scherbakova, Memorial, Russia

Chair:

Prof. Gert Weisskirchen, Member of the German Bundestag, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism, Germany

16:45 – 17:00 Coffee break

17:00 – 18:45 Panel discussion: **The Role of Europe's Parliaments in Combating Antisemitism**

Speakers:

Prof. Dr. Cornelius Weiss, Member of the State Parliament of Saxony, Germany

Gitta Connemann, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany

Petra Pau, MdB, Vice-President of the German Bundestag, Germany

Hellmut Königshaus, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany

Jerzy Montag, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany

Chair:

John Mann, Member of Parliament, House of Commons, United Kingdom

18:45 – 19:15 Conclusions

Rabbi Andrew Baker, American Jewish Committee (AJC), USA

Prof. Gert Weisskirchen, Member of the German Bundestag, Germany

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1. Summary of the Conference

1.1. Opening and Greetings

The Expert Forum was opened by **Dr Norbert Lammert**, the President of the German Bundestag. He began by talking about other things that had happened on the same date. For instance, 25 January 1945 had marked the beginning of the so-called ‘evacuation’ of Stutthof Concentration Camp near Danzig, which cost more than 20,000 Jewish people their lives. Furthermore, David Ben Gurion had been appointed the first prime minister of the newly established State of Israel on 25 January 1949, and ‘The Final Solution’, the third part of the *Holocaust* miniseries, had been broadcast in Germany on 25 January 1979. This series had established the word ‘Holocaust’ as the accepted term for the genocide committed against the Jews.

This genocide had neither happened in a vacuum nor been unavoidable, but had grown over a long time and by no means in secret. The President of the German Bundestag quoted from a letter written by the composer Arnold Schönberg to Vassily Kandinsky in 1923 after Kandinsky had been accused of anti-Semitism: ‘I have finally understood what I have been forced to learn in the last year, and I will never forget it. That really I am not a German, not a European, yes I am probably hardly a human being (at least, the Europeans prefer the worst of their race to me), but that I am a Jew. I have heard that a certain Kandinsky too sees only the bad side of what is done by the Jews and only the Jewish side of the bad things they do, and at this point I give up any hope of reconciliation. It was a dream. We are two different kinds of people. Definitely!’

The President of the German Bundestag underlined that there were definitely not two different types of human being and nor should anyone ever believe as much. He recalled the ceremony in the plenary chamber and the impressive words of Lenka Reinerová, stressing that, although it might be impossible to remould humanity, occasions like the Expert Forum could help in their way to draw attention to dangers and ways of combating them.

When the Conference on Anti-Semitism had been held at Berlin in 2004, the then President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the sadly deceased Paul Spiegel, had said: ‘The question that has to be answered in Berlin is: How can we counter growing global anti-Semitism? There have been various conferences and seminars in the past. So far, they have only ever produced declarations of intent; fine speeches and declarations that gather dust. What I hope for from the Berlin conference is that the ideas focused on there will influence the day-to-day work of our governments. However, our civil societies too have to recognise that this concerns them. As a form of racism, anti-Semitism is inhuman. This is a matter for all of us and threatens the foundations of democracy.’ The President of the German Bundestag was sure that every one of those present would put their name to these words. But just signing a piece of paper would not be enough. Merely attending this Forum did not constitute a contribution to the struggle against anti-Semitism.

The German Bundestag deliberated regularly and intensively on anti-Semitism. For instance, the parliamentary groups had decided to schedule a comprehensive debate on the issue in March 2008.

The President of the German Bundestag extended a very warm welcome to all the participants and expressed his hope that the Conference would, above all, meet the expectations of those who did not even know it was taking place.

German Federal Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel referred to the service of remembrance for the victims of National Socialism held earlier in the morning, which had brought home to the participants themselves and the public what the darkest chapter in German history had been like and the consequences it had entailed. Ultimately, all that remained was the incomprehensibility of what had happened, as well as the responsibility that this past imposed on all Germans. Each generation had to ask itself anew how it could live up to this responsibility. Admittedly, people who entered political office assumed quite particular obligations, but there were also plenty of civil society initiatives that were addressing this topic outside the world of politics. The German Federal Chancellor recalled that she had recently presented awards to young people who had been involved in the Blank Patches project. They had researched almost forgotten historical traces of the book burnings and concentration camps, then produced a newspaper as a way of informing a wider public about their findings.

The Germans had to be grateful that there was once again Jewish life in Germany, as evidenced by the large number of synagogues, including the synagogue on the Rykestraße in Berlin. Furthermore, a new kind of Jewish life had arisen thanks to the Jews who had come from Russia – which also meant that the Jewish communities had been given the amazing task of integrating these members, work that had to be supported by the whole of German society. Following a service of remembrance that had looked back to the crimes committed by National Socialist Germany, it was all the more difficult to believe that anti-Semitism, xenophobia and racism were still, or once again, haunting Germany today. The fact that similar phenomena were also to be observed in other countries did not relieve Germans of their responsibility to deal with what was happening in their own country. It was true that action was being taken to respond to these developments and events – but this alone was not enough. It had to be admitted that there was no such thing as a generally valid recipe for measures to stamp out anti-Semitism, xenophobia and racism.

This required an admission that the openness of democratic societies and the developments that were accompanying globalisation were once again offering those who held extreme-right-wing and anti-Semitic ideas opportunities to spread their simplistic paradigms. At the same time, the fact that someone was most likely to be receptive to such thinking if they found themselves in a difficult social situation should never serve as an excuse. It was true that societies that were perceived to be equitable were better protected against hostility of all kinds; however, it was also undeniable that a crude, disguised anti-Semitism was also to be found among educated sections of the population.

It was an unbearable situation that there was no Jewish institution in Germany where police protection was not required, regardless whether it was a kindergarten, a school or a synagogue. Apart from this, it was worrying that, despite all the historical education and despite all that had happened, a certain inarticulacy concerning Germans' own history was to be found in broad parts of the population.

It was therefore an important task – and not just for political education – to encourage people to speak about these matters; for only patterns of thought that were no longer articulated would become fixed and possibly turn into anti-Semitism and racism. This Forum was of great significance, particularly in view of the diverse forms anti-Semitism took on, from violent anti-Semitism to the anti-Semitism of the conservative middle classes. Continuing the legacy of the OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism held at Berlin in 2004 and the Berlin Declaration, it could especially help Germans to think about what they could best do and where they could set an example, and to pursue these ideas in dialogue with participants from other countries without lapsing into mutual accusations and recriminations.

The German Federal Chancellor hoped that the participants would enjoy honest discussions in an open atmosphere, but also that their proceedings would be marked by a consciousness that the task of combating anti-Semitism was manageable. Anti-Semitism and violence were to be fundamentally condemned, and ways had to be found to convey this attitude very clearly to the younger generation through personal example. The German Federal Chancellor ended by thanking Prof. Gert Weisskirchen, Member of the German Bundestag, for his untiring work on this important topic.

Ambassador René Nyberg began by stating that it was an honour for him to be able to welcome the participants to the Forum on behalf of the Finnish Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE. The purpose of this Forum was to facilitate a committed approach to the practical implementation of the obligations that had been entered into. In this respect, young people were a major priority.

At this time, Finland was seeing a heated debate about anti-Semitism in the 1930s – which had been triggered by the rejection of a dissertation by a Jewish academic. Germany had examined its past in an exemplary fashion. The same was true of Estonia, where there was a dedicated committee that had been set up to study the events of that period. The Finnish Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE had great expectations with regard to the results the Expert Forum would produce.

Prof. Gert Weisskirchen, Member of the Bundestag, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Anti-Semitism, thanked the speakers for their encouraging words. He was sure that there would be an open-minded discussion between the participants about best practice and that a dialogue would take place about how democratic systems could be protected from anti-Semitism, which came like a thief in the night and destroyed the substance of democracy.

1.2. Panel 1: Education on the Holocaust and Anti-Semitism

The theme of this panel discussion was educational and youth work on the Holocaust and anti-Semitism in the OSCE states, as illustrated by examples of initiatives and institutions in Russia, Poland and Germany.

In a departure from the agenda, **Dr Kathrin Meyer**, Advisor on Anti-Semitism Issues at the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), presented two new publications issued by the ODIHR to the participants. To date, she said, country-specific teaching and educational materials on combating anti-Semitism and Holocaust education had been created by the ODIHR for ten countries. Dr Meyer explained that educators in the other OSCE Countries could make use of the publication *Addressing Anti-Semitism: Why and How? Guidelines for Educators*, which had been completed in December 2007 and was available on the ODIHR homepage. This publication was intended to encourage educators to take up the topic of anti-Semitism in their educational institutions, particularly if young people were causing concern with anti-Semitic statements and behaviour. In addition to this, there was the ODIHR's publication *Holocaust Memorial Days in the OSCE Region: An Overview of Good Practices*, which had appeared in January 2008. The brochure set out country-by-country what was being done to commemorate the Holocaust across the OSCE area and the contributions made by the parliaments and governments of the various countries to these remembrance activities.

Ingolf Seidel from the Education on Anti-Semitism Task Force (Germany) chaired the panel session, which he opened by talking about his impression that historical and political educational work and the projects on anti-Semitism and the Holocaust undertaken in this field were increasingly being expected to combat current anti-Semitic tendencies. However, it was necessary to ask whether this function could actually be fulfilled by educational work inside and outside schools.

Alla Gerber from the Holocaust Foundation in Russia explained that no further public debate about anti-Semitism or the Holocaust had taken place in the Soviet Union following the end of the Second World War. Instead, the Stalin period had been marked by state-sponsored anti-Semitism, which had been founded on the traditional anti-Semitism of Russian society and blamed Jewish citizens for social and economic problems. Perestroika had marked the end of state anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union and Russia in the 1980s. However, the Russian state was doing little to counter anti-Semitic tendencies in Russian society today. The courts were only prosecuting small numbers of anti-Semitic crimes. The Holocaust and anti-Semitism were still not being discussed in schools.

It should therefore not come as a surprise that anti-Semitism had been growing strongly in Russia for many years. A new anti-Semitism was becoming apparent, in particular among young people. At a time when Russia was going through a difficult phase of economic and social upheaval, Jews were increasingly being made scapegoats.

The Holocaust Foundation had been established in 1992. It was a small civil society organisation that did not receive state support and was active in many cities across Russia, doing academic and educational work on the Holocaust. Its activities ranged from the commemoration of the Holocaust, exhibitions and information work in schools and higher education institutions to the organisation of remembrance events and the erection of memorials. The Holocaust Foundation's other activities included seminars with teachers, competitions for school pupils and international exchanges for schoolchildren and students.

Michal Bilewicz from the Forum for Dialogue Among Nations in Poland explained that anti-Semitism was widespread in Polish society. Anti-Semitism had been rising since the early 1990s, although there had been no attacks since 1989. One specific feature of Polish anti-Semitism was the fact that it was directed against what was just a tiny Jewish community in Poland today. However, the proponents of Polish anti-Semitism clung to the cliché that there was a 'Jewish conspiracy' in the Polish media and the world of Polish business. In particular, this conspiracy theory regularly played a part in campaigning when parliamentary elections were held.

The Forum for Dialogue Among Nations pursued two main priorities in its youth activities, which were intended to reduce anti-Semitism among young Poles. The Forum organised international encounter programmes and one-day workshops. Evaluations showed that both approaches had a positive impact on attitudes towards Jewish fellow citizens.

Aycan Demirel from the Kreuzberg Initiative against Anti-Semitism (KIGA) spoke about this organisation, which had been founded by individuals with a background of migration and had been doing youth work on forms of anti-Semitism, such as hostility to Israel and conspiracy theories, since 2004. Even if the initiative was not active in the classic field of Holocaust education, the relevance of the Holocaust to the topics it dealt with tended to be brought out by the young people themselves, for instance during workshops on the Middle East conflict and Israel. Looking at the Holocaust could spark off processes of reflection on contemporary anti-Semitism.

As an example of negative experiences, Demirel mentioned comparisons of Israel's current policies, such as the construction of the West Bank barrier, with the policies of the National Socialists. It was also noticeable that schoolchildren displayed anti-Semitic behaviour and expressed anti-Semitic opinions when the topic of the Holocaust and National Socialism was raised.

In schools, youth workers were often confronted with an attitude of denial. Furthermore, frontal teaching was easily perceived as an attempt to exert pressure and a morally coloured method of conveying facts. This led to the accusation that too much attention was being devoted to the Shoah and the Nazi period. Young Germans, especially, wanted a line to be drawn under the past and regarded the lessons as an attempt to assign blame. At times, suspicions were expressed that there was a Jewish interest in the commemorative work that was being done. Young people from immigrant families felt National Socialism and the Holocaust had nothing to do with them. Another pattern of resistance among migrant schoolchildren was encouraged by their view of themselves as victims, which could turn into competitive victimhood when the Holocaust was being examined.

KIGA was attempting to break down these patterns of rejection through its activities, teaching young people about history and countering anti-Semitism among young people by means of educational work on National Socialism and the Holocaust.

KIGA was committed to combating this modern anti-Semitism and was developing teaching units on topics such as the Middle East conflict and Islamic anti-Semitism for intermediate and secondary general schools as part of the Federal Government's Youth for Diversity, Democracy and Tolerance programme. It had proved to be crucial for youth work with young people from backgrounds of migration that the youth workers themselves had backgrounds of migration as well.

Wolf Kaiser from the Memorial and Education Center at the House of the Wannsee Conference referred to a study carried out at the University of Frankfurt, according to which changes in attitudes could not be brought about causally by means of historical and political education work; it was necessary for the heightened expectations about the impact education could have to be lowered. However, history teaching could encourage reflection and communication about the evaluation of historical events and the behaviour of the actors involved, although it had to be accepted that the desired results would not always be achieved. The conditions in schools differed from those at a memorial site; both offered specific opportunities to help pupils form historical and political judgements, as well as throwing up certain difficulties.

The influence of adults outside the education system on the opinions formed by young people was not to be underestimated. This then threw up the question of how the history of the Holocaust could be conveyed to adults in ways that would promote self-reflection on their part and have positive effects on their attitudes and behaviour.

The House of the Wannsee Conference took the meeting of state secretaries at Großer Wannsee in 1942 as the starting point for seminars that focussed on the participation of members of the most various professional groups in planning, organising and implementing the deportation and murder of the Jews. The students studied historic documents from which it was possible to draw conclusions about the actions and attitudes of the people who had participated in these processes. In these seminars, historical learning about the Holocaust was combined with discussion and reflection about ideologies and mechanisms that could lead to organised irresponsibility and ruthlessness, as well as the feasibility of opposing such developments with methods guided by the principles of human and civil rights.

Furthermore, Mr Kaiser pointed out that the formation of judgements and opinions about the Holocaust and anti-Semitism among young people was strongly influenced by their parents, which meant it was absolutely essential for schools to promote self-reflection on the part of their pupils in order to make them aware of such influences.

There was insufficient time for any discussion of the papers.

1.3. Panel 2: Anti-Semitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat Them

At the beginning of this panel session, **Prof. Gert Weisskirchen**, Member of the Bundestag, announced that the President of the German Football Association (DFB), who had had to send his apologies on account of another commitment, had asked for his regards to be passed on to those present. Prof. Weisskirchen regretted that the President of the German Football Association had been unable to attend and stressed the significance of the topic that was being addressed by this panel discussion for the whole of society.

The papers were opened by **Dr Gregor Rosenthal** from the Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance (BfDT). Dr Rosenthal explained that the Alliance had been formed in 2000 as a result of the German Federal Government's call for an 'uprising of the upright' and was intended to function as the central contact and catalyst for civil society projects set up to oppose right-wing extremism. At the same time, the potential and the networking capabilities of the BfDT were to be put at the disposal of organisations in other areas, including football.

Rosenthal described anti-Semitic incidents in football as one of the sport's oldest problems. However, such incidents were a problem for society as a whole, and football merely brought them into focus: Football was by far the most popular sport in Germany. At the same time, therefore, football's major integrative function offered great opportunities to exploit it when initiating social change. In the last few years, the DFB, in particular, had set up a number of projects jointly with the BfDT. Simultaneously, the DFB was now willing to throw light on its own history under National Socialism.

Rosenthal described amateur football in Germany as particularly problematic. In this field, the BfDT saw a need to transfer the positive lessons about how to combat racism and anti-Semitism ('best practice models') that had been learned at schools and in workplaces to football and its clubs. Among other activities, Rosenthal highlighted the Spring Cleaning campaign developed jointly with the DFB, the purpose of which was to remove racist graffiti from football grounds. One important step that could be taken to combat anti-Semitism and racism would be a quality mark for football clubs that satisfied particular criteria with regard to democracy and tolerance.

Carine Bloch from the International League against Racism and Anti-Semitism (LICRA), France, briefly presented her organisation, which had been founded in 1927 and was dedicated to combating anti-Semitism and racism.

Football represented a central locus for action to combat racism and anti-Semitism because it brought together all social strata. In addition to this, there were hardly any other areas of society in which such a high degree of equality of opportunity had been achieved as in football. There were almost no problems in French professional football associated with racism and anti-Semitism among players, clubs and officials. In the fan scene, however, there were 'neo-Nazi networks' of a few hundred individuals who possessed a multiplier function. It was pos-

sible to identify between four and six clubs in French professional football that had considerable problems with racism at games and in the fan scene. However, fans themselves were also the victims of racist and anti-Semitic attacks at and around football matches.

LICRA had attempted to raise awareness of these problems and break down the taboos that surrounded the issue. It could now point to major successes: The beginning had been the imposition of fines on clubs associated with racist attacks. Since then, SC Bastia had even had points deducted due to the racist behaviour of its fans. LICRA was cooperating closely with all actors in the football business on this topic.

There were considerable problems in amateur football in France as well. In organised amateur football, it was important for action to be taken long before the players walked out onto the pitch. The staff of LICRA worked with players at the level of street or 'backyard' football in the suburbs. It would be desirable for campaigns against racism and anti-Semitism in football to be internationalised.

Dr Rafael Pankowski from the Never Again Association, Collegium Civitas, Poland, concentrated in his paper on aspects of football culture in Central and Eastern Europe. Football helped to mould identities. In consequence, measures to bring about social change always had to take football into consideration. Despite falling numbers of anti-Semitic incidents, the link between football and anti-Semitism was part of everyday life in Poland. After initial indifference, the growth of the 'Nazi-hooligan scene' and the infiltration of this scene by extreme-right-wing parties had prompted a gradual rethinking in Poland. For instance, a fine had been imposed on one club whose fans had held up a banner with the German phrase *Arbeit macht frei!* ('Work will set you free!' the inscription above the gates at Auschwitz) at a first-division match in Warsaw. Steps had also been taken to stop UEFA having to lift the ban on extreme-right-wing and anti-Semitic slogans at football stadiums, despite an initiative from an extreme-right-wing Polish Member of the European Parliament that would have forced the organisation to do this.

Never Again had set itself the aim of drawing fans' attention to these connections. To this end, it was keeping records of racist and anti-Semitic incidents and raising awareness among football officials by means of training courses. In the mean time, the growth of a functioning network opposed to anti-Semitism and racism was to be noted, particularly among younger football fans. Cooperation was being expanded in this field at a European level. For instance, Never Again was undertaking its first projects in Russia.

Finally, **Martin Endemann** from the Alliance of Active Football Fans (BAFF) suggested the European Championship that would be taking place in the summer of 2008 could be exploited by fans, particularly from Italy, Croatia, Poland and Germany, for racist and anti-Semitic provocations. He presented the Alliance of Active Football Fans and its work, and explained that changes had taken place in the community of fans found at football matches since the 1980s. Although the crowds at football grounds were no longer homogenous, 'that is to say male, white and latently racist', the problems of racist and anti-Semitic chanting and graffiti had certainly not gone away. Endemann quoted a study conducted at Duisburg in 2001, according to which 95 percent of visitors to football grounds stated they had heard anti-Semitic chants or slogans in the previous six months. Today, the situation in amateur football was proving to be particularly problematic. Racist incidents were now even coming to light at under-15 games.

Two problems that were particularly urgent at the moment were the attacks coming from Neo-Nazi hooligan groups and the attempts being made by the National Democratic Party of Ger-

many (NPD) to gain cultural hegemony over groups and activities associated with football. Unfortunately, since the clubs affected were afraid of damage to their image, they were not always prepared to discuss the issue. By contrast, the fan scene was showing increasing commitment to the struggle against racism and anti-Semitism on the terraces. There was self-regulation in the fan scene (e.g. the Multicoloured Terrace initiative at Leipzig). A rethinking had also taken place at the DFB. In this respect, Endemann picked out Theo Zwanziger for praise.

Anti-racist initiatives in football needed to be given much greater intellectual, material and public support, and policymakers had to provide the resources this would require. It was problematic that the stewarding services at German stadiums not infrequently recruited their staff from the neo-Nazi scene. In addition to this, referees could demonstrate civil courage by stopping a match if racist incidents occurred while it was going on, as had already happened in the Dutch Eredivisie. The police also had to take tough action if there were suspicions that attempts had been made to incite violence and hatred, just as they did when enforcing the ban on fireworks in stadiums.

The ensuing discussion touched on measures to combat anti-Semitic machinations in football. For instance, **John Mann** said that economic pressure, in particular, could be used to push football clubs into committing themselves more strongly against anti-Semitism and racism. This could include points being deducted, as well as clubs being excluded from competitions if their fans caused racist incidents. It was also necessary to think about the extent to which fans could be refused admission if they had drawn attention to themselves with anti-Semitic or racist behaviour. In this connection, Mann recalled a project in English football in which the seat numbers of fans who conducted themselves in this way were communicated to the officials responsible by SMS during the match. **Michael Link**, Member of the Bundestag, emphasised the importance of information work and mentioned as an example the proactive approach taken when publicising the Jewish roots of Tennis Borussia Berlin. **Michael Chlenov** from the Federation of Jewish Organizations (Russia) referred to the most recent anti-Semitic incidents in his country, which had taken place after the Russian national football team had been defeated in a European Cup qualifier in Israel. He described football as a replacement for traditional warfare and an opportunity to air prejudices. **Petra Sitte**, Member of the Bundestag, reported on the high degree of sensitivity about the issue of football and racism that she had encountered among the younger generation of officials and coaches at a conference in Magdeburg. Finally, Petra Sitte asked whether the situation was similar in women's football.

In his response to the discussion, **Martin Endemann** supported the demand for more economic pressure on the clubs and mentioned positive experiences in Belgium, where a sponsor had terminated its contract with a club after racist comments were made by the club chairman. In the Czech Republic, a television channel had refused to broadcast a match due to racist chanting. Unfortunately, there was no single body in Germany that recorded anti-Semitic and racist incidents in football.

Dr Rafael Pankowski felt it would be possible to change the culture at football grounds if more women went to the stadiums. He emphasised that Lithuanian basketball and Czech ice hockey, for example, were facing problems similar to those in football. **Carine Bloch** too supported the demand for more women at football grounds, as well as reiterating the significance of economic pressure on the clubs. She said the mediation work being done in fan and club circles was proving very successful and emphasised the exemplary function of star players like Thuram, who had made his position clear in a robust fashion – even before French football officials and sponsors had turned their attention to the problems of racism in football.

Dr Gregor Rosenthal stressed that halting a match if there were racist and anti-Semitic attacks had a significant media impact, while the involvement of players also made an important contribution to combating racism in football. Rosenthal referred to the possibility of incorporating provisions into club constitutions that would allow adequate action to be taken to stop racist and anti-Semitic incidents: for example, people could be banned from grounds on this basis, something that would be an important weapon in the clubs' hands.

1.4. Panel 3: Anti-Semitic Tendencies in the Academic Context and Successful Strategies to Combat Them

Various approaches to combating anti-Semitism in academic contexts were presented and discussed under the chairmanship of **Michael Whine**, the Director of the British Community Security Trust.

Michael Whine introduced the session by reviewing the history of the Arab League's boycotts against Israel and gave an overview of the current situation. All but the primary boycott had been lifted following the conferences at Madrid and Oslo. Since then, Israel had been trading with a number of Arab states.

Annual meetings of left-wing European politicians, Arab nationalists and Islamists started taking place in 2002. Since then, an international campaign had been conducted against Israel and its supporters. This was particularly well organised in Great Britain and France. However, there were also attempts to stop Israeli and Jewish speakers from appearing at universities in the United States and Canada. In Britain, some of the attempts to impose boycotts had come from the unions. The English Greens were calling for investments to be withdrawn from Israel. Whine explained that the panel session would look at various aspects of, and concepts for, action to combat anti-Semitism and oppose boycott campaigns.

The first speaker in the panel session, **David Hirsh** from the University of London, founder of the Engage World Jewish Congress, emphasised that almost all sociological studies had concluded that racism and anti-Semitism, in particular, were characteristic of members of the underclass. In Great Britain, however, anti-Semitism appeared noticeably often in academic circles and, above all, among the trade unions for university lecturers. Anti-Semitism was now to be met with at many social levels again, including the media, academia and politics, especially the Greens in England. It was also easy for what was at first sight merely criticism of the policies pursued by the State of Israel to slip into anti-Semitism. Today, anti-Semites often hid behind ostensibly honourable goals, such as upholding human rights and the like.

The dividing line between criticism of Israeli policy and anti-Semitism was fluid. This was evident from a comparison of the public reactions to Israeli human rights infringements and those committed by other states, which simultaneously strengthened anti-Israeli and even anti-Semitic forces. As far as the Middle East conflict was concerned, it could be demonstrated that the old, familiar myths were being incorporated into the criticism of Israel and the Jews. Among other things, mention could be made of the myth of the 'Jewish world conspiracy', the theory of the threat from Jewish lobbyism and the supposed connections between Jews and financial capitalism. The State of Israel and Jews were demonised and depicted as imperialist, colonialist and racist. Israel was compared to the Nazi regime and Apartheid.

These rhetorical strategies were used to express and, at the same time, disguise anti-Semitism. Hirsh emphasised that he was talking about anti-Semitism in what was called the mainstream of society. He was therefore of the opinion that anti-Semitism could not just be fought by means of repressive state and bureaucratic measures. Rather, in our democracies it was necessary to conduct political campaigns of persuasion that reached every part of society.

In his paper, **Prof. Lars Rensmann** from the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA, emphasised the academic consensus that the tendency had been for anti-Semitism to rise since 2000 and the second intifada. The OSCE's working definition of anti-Semitism was a good basis for investigation. However, there were also many hidden forms of anti-Semitism that were not covered by this definition. Anti-Semitism was represented in a general dimension as the collective discrimination of a minority. Racism too played a role in the matter.

Overall, anti-Semitism was becoming 'more socially acceptable'. There was controversy about what was driving the increase in anti-Semitism. In Germany, for example, it could be registered that anti-Semitism resulted in part from the fact that the Jews were blamed for the shameful, bad memory of the Holocaust.

There was an association between criticism of Israeli policies and the formation of anti-Semitic attitudes. In this respect, there was no avoiding the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. According to French studies, anti-Semitism was significantly more likely to occur among immigrants than among other population groups. In the German context, the NPD, in particular, had to be monitored and fought as the vanguard of the right-wing spectrum. The NPD talked very frankly about the anti-Semitism it was seeking to spread, in which it drew on the old, familiar clichés of a Jewish world conspiracy and similar ideas.

Furthermore, a radical Antizionism was beginning to emerge on the left of the political spectrum. This was associated less with political parties than left-wing groupings, which claimed that the Arabs and the Palestinians were being oppressed by the strong aggressor Israel. Animosity towards Israel and the Jews was to be noted from a broad range of political positions, particularly finding expression in the new media. Germany had failed to do enough to prohibit anti-Semitic content disseminated through the media, such as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.

Finally, some types of anti-Semitism also came from radical Christian groups, as well as minorities and certain musical cultures, such as rap music. Rensmann called for more extensive research in all these areas. As well as this, however, there was the open anti-Semitism that was peddled in the media, for example by Al-Manar and radical Islamist organisations. The myths that served as the basis for anti-Semitism had to be publicly exposed. In Germany, he favoured the preparation of an annual report on anti-Semitism by the German Federal Government, which should compile and publish facts and figures concerning anti-Semitism in German society as comprehensively as possible. This report should serve as a warning and evaluation system. With regard to the dissemination of anti-Semitism in the new media, Rensmann also urged that instruments such as state sanctions and repressive measures should be implemented more vigorously. A ban on the NPD should not be ruled out.

Dr Yves Pallade from B'Nai Brith Europe, Germany, noted that all forms of anti-Semitism were encompassed by the OSCE's working definition. He felt the existing instruments for fighting anti-Semitism should be used better and more effectively.

Yves Pallade went on to examine some examples and quotations that illustrated anti-Semitism in the middle ground of society. First, he mentioned Dr Watzal, who worked for the Federal

Agency for Civic Education and at the University of Bonn, quoting from a radio interview Dr Watzal had given. Juliane Wetzel from the Centre for Anti-Semitism Research at the Technical University of Berlin had described the quotations from Watzal as packed with typical anti-Semitic clichés. Pallade then discussed an article on the Lebanon War that had appeared in the *taz* daily newspaper. He also referred to comments by Norman Paech, a spokesman for the Left Party parliamentary group in the German Bundestag. Finally, he looked at similar examples from remarks made by Klaus Holz and Alfred Grosser. These academics attempted to trivialise the crimes of the Nazi regime by comparing them with the actions of other states, Israel in particular. Furthermore, they sometimes used Nazi jargon in their comments. The OSCE's definition was up-to-date. It just had to be applied consistently. It covered the examples and quotations he had given. In his work in the USA, he had learned one thing, which was that there could be anti-Semitism without Jews, but not without anti-Semites.

Irina Sherbakova, Memorial, Russia, referred to the dangerousness of what was known as the 'Russian national idea' for the whole world. This construct was encountered at all levels of society. The myths that had already been mentioned were being exploited in order to falsify history. A humanist idea was difficult to build up, but easy to destroy, and anti-Semitism was taking its place to a certain extent. Russia's academic elite was subject to political influence. A cadre policy was being pursued at the level of the country's schools and universities. Russia, especially, needed a moral authority, something that was, however, absent there. The shame threshold had been left far behind in Russia, and anti-Semitism was being expressed more openly. The Russian right wing had not been marginalised, but was becoming the mainstream of society. Even so, surveys had found that the Jews and Israel ranked well behind Caucasians, blacks and Gypsies as enemies of Russia. Anti-Semitism was just one part of the racist spectrum in Russia. Nevertheless, the whole racist spectrum was gaining an ever stronger grip over Russian society. Furthermore, national history was being heavily instrumentalised in Russia, and it was extremely difficult to counter this development because those who advocated it were being strengthened by the activities of nationalist movements in the Soviet Union's former satellite states, Ukraine in particular, which were pursuing similar objectives.

Finally, Ms Sherbakova emphasised that it was difficult to develop compulsory strategies for action to combat anti-Semitism. She favoured stronger networking in the form of better dialogue and an alliance of democratic forces as the first step towards the solution of the problem.

In the ensuing discussion, **Marieluise Beck**, Member of the Bundestag, Alliance 90/THE GREENS, a Member of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, stressed that she had been horrified to hear the Greens being mentioned in this context. She said that she would be passing on the remarks that had been made to the German party leadership, through whom she would be seeking clarification at the level of the European Greens. She described the precise delineation of left-wing and right-wing anti-Semitism as something that was problematic. In this respect, she criticised the lack of willingness on the part of left-wing politicians to get involved in this debate.

The historian **Dr Horst Helas** called for the whole of society to recognise the borders that now existed. He believed it was impossible to draw comparisons between two historical events or individuals and therefore advised urgently that all concerned should refrain from doing so in any form of discourse. Finally, he noted that the conservative press in Germany did not recognise the National Socialist connotations of certain words, such as *Heuschrecken* ('locusts'), which had been used in attacks on financial speculators and the press related purely to trends in the economy.

Mikhail Chlenov, Federation of Jewish Organizations, Russia, discussed the parts of the political spectrum from which anti-Semitism was coming today. In Russia, as had already become clear from the account given by Ms Sherbakova, anti-Semitism was to be classified generally as a phenomenon found on the right as part of the ‘Russian national idea’. By contrast, the academic anti-Semitism met with in Europe came mainly from the left-wing spectrum. The proponents of this anti-Semitism were sometimes linking up with Islamist movements and often disguising their ideas as criticism of the policies of the State of Israel.

Ringo Bischoff, Youth Secretary of the German United Services Union (ver.di), admitted that a number of anti-Semitic concepts and images had been taken over blindly by the trade unions. When he asked whether ver.di’s negative, critical response to the British lecturers’ union concerning its call for a boycott had had any impact on public opinion in the UK, **David Hirsh** answered that it was important to react to the union’s behaviour with international outrage in order to bring home to the union what its responsibilities were. He agreed with Rensmann that anti-Semitism was to be found across the whole political spectrum. Anti-Semitism was also camouflaged by language. However, he commented sceptically with regard to the effectiveness of bans. The biggest problem was the anti-Semitism that could not be banned.

In response to a question from **Klaus Faber**, former State Secretary for Education in Saxony-Anhalt, **Lars Rensmann** stated that international efforts would be required in order to deal with the Arab broadcaster Al-Manar. The Federal Foreign Office had a duty to act on this issue. The report on anti-Semitism he was calling for would also have to include data about media organisations of this kind. Rensmann argued once again for better use to be made of the existing legal options for state repression (in particular, Article 130 of the German Criminal Code). At the same time, he pointed to the need for a public debate about these issues.

Yves Pallade answered a question from the audience by saying that he had wanted the examples he had chosen to demonstrate that the OSCE working definition was of no practical use if it were not applied consistently. The states that had adopted the goal of combating anti-Semitism should first of all set their own houses in order. In addition to this, the struggle against anti-Semitism had to be conducted both by these states and by the political parties.

1.5. Podium Discussion: The Role of Europe’s Parliaments in Combating Anti-Semitism

The podium discussion was chaired by **John Mann, MP**, House of Commons, UK, who began by welcoming the politicians who would be taking part in the debate, then went on to talk about the situation in the UK. He explained that there was a very large group of people who were working against anti-Semitism in the UK. This was necessary because anti-Semitism was accorded less attention than racism and was therefore more dangerous. The members of this group believed in first setting their own houses in order, rather than interfering in their political opponents’ internal business. As representatives of the people, MPs felt duty bound, above all, not to permit any anti-Semitism in their own organisations. Again and again, doubts were expressed as to whether anti-Semitism could be eliminated. However, this could not be a justification for any failure to step in and oppose anti-Semitic discourses, whether this was within one’s own parliamentary party or in any other setting. In addition to this, as representatives of the people, politicians were also able to raise their voices within civil society structures, including the world of football, and advocate positions opposed to anti-Semitism. In this way, they could resist the rising wave of anti-Semitism, and he called on all the parliamentarians present to take action of this kind.

Prof. Cornelius Weiss, Member of the Saxon *Land* Parliament, reported that he had been sitting opposite the ‘backbone of anti-Semitism’ in the *Land* parliament for more than two years. He had set his experiences down on paper (cf. conference documents) and hoped for an exchange of opinions about what he had written.

Gitta Connemann, Member of the Bundestag, said she was convinced that parliaments and their members had an indispensable role to play in the struggle against anti-Semitism, but their contribution alone would not be sufficient to contain anti-Semitism in the long term. She emphasised that, although anti-Semitism was not a German invention, Auschwitz had been, which meant Germans bore a special responsibility in the struggle against anti-Semitic tendencies of any kind. Apart from this, anti-Semitism had many faces, and the efforts to combat it consequently had to be conducted in a differentiated fashion as well.

Essentially, she saw four sources for anti-Semitic forms of thought, speech and action: right-wing extremism, anti-Zionism, anti-Americanism and Islamist anti-Zionism. She recounted that she had been in Haifa together with Jerzy Montag, Member of the Bundestag, during the Lebanon crisis and that she had subsequently written down and published her experiences. Following this, a storm of abuse and insults had rained down upon her. In this connection, she referred to the warning against right-wing anti-Semitism and Moslem anti-Semitism that had been delivered by Dr h.c. Wolfgang Thierse, Member of the Bundestag, Vice-President of the German Bundestag, and emphasised that she was horrified by the increases in the numbers of anti-Semitic crimes, including acts of violence. Apart from this, it was necessary to keep in mind at all times the warning given by the late President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Paul Spiegel, who had spoken of the ‘discreet anti-Semitism’ of a small elite group. It was true that education helped in the battle against anti-Semitism, but this anti-Semitism of the educated should not be neglected.

It was indispensable for all sections of the population to be won over for the struggle against anti-Semitism and to contribute to it actively. As an example of a suitable approach, Connemann referred to the Youth for Diversity, Democracy and Tolerance programme set up by the German Federal Government; the integration of foreign citizens and migrants was just as essential to the struggle against anti-Semitism as the systematic use of repressive measures.

She had her doubts about the calls for a regular report on anti-Semitism: Firstly, Germany had a tradition of reporting very different from that in Great Britain and, secondly, reports were often discussed before empty benches. In addition to this, reports were frequently out of date by the time they were discussed. Nor did she feel a study commission would be a suitable means of promoting the struggle against anti-Semitism. Such a study commission would be very good at analysing complex evidence, but it should be remembered that outstanding non-governmental organisations had presented excellent reports on the subject in forms that would not have been possible within parliament. She also harboured scepticism about the demands being made for the NPD to be banned. In this respect, there was a danger that the failure of a renewed application for its banning would strengthen the party, so that any application for it to be banned should really only be made if the success of such an application could be guaranteed. However, what Germany was lacking was a central point of contact at the government level, an anti-Semitism commissioner.

Jerzy Montag, Member of the Bundestag, began by explaining that he was standing in for Daniel Cohn-Bendit, MEP, in this discussion. Initially, he described three aspects of the role parliaments played, or could play, in the struggle against anti-Semitism: First of all, it was particularly incumbent on parliamentarians to ensure society as a whole could agree on a discourse about where the limits of the acceptable lay. It was necessary to steer a pragmatic

course between the position of Voltaire, who had said, ‘I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it,’ and that of a militant democracy. Secondly, the Framework Decision on Combating Racism and Xenophobia had omitted anti-Semitism, which should have been included as a third evil to be fought. Moreover, the German presidency had allowed the UK to cite its legal traditions as grounds on which to block the introduction of penalties for anti-Semitism. Thirdly, for these reasons, the central significance of the struggle against anti-Semitism had to be made absolutely clear in the current discussion. In this context, it ought to be kept in mind that there were no permanent forums or institutionalised discussion threads concerned with the topic of ‘combating anti-Semitism’.

He was in agreement with Ms Connemann that the best solution had still not been found. However, Prof. Weisskirchen, Ms Connemann and he himself had called for a hearing on anti-Semitism that was to be held in the German Bundestag. Finally, he wanted to make the point that tackling anti-Semitism was a task for the whole of society, but parliament had to make sure that it was actually tackled and provide the resources required as well.

Petra Pau, Member of the Bundestag, Vice-President of the German Bundestag, first expressed her sympathy with the British position that anyone involved in the struggle against anti-Semitism had to start by setting their own house in order. Only once this had been done could wider, concerted action be taken. She continued by touching on the various sources of, and motivations for, anti-Semitism and emphasised that right-wing extremism and anti-Semitism posed a danger to society and democracy. This was why the struggle against anti-Semitism was a task for parliament as a whole. Until now, however, the German Bundestag had merely responded with *ad hoc* measures. For the most part, the parliamentary groups left the daily business of combating anti-Semitism to specialists. What was lacking was a clear overview. In this respect, Pau cited the German Federal Government’s answer to an interpellation tabled by the Left Party parliamentary group, from which it was evident that Jewish cemeteries were being desecrated every week and that these crimes were still not even being recorded as ‘anti-Semitic’ because the motivation that lay behind them was being disregarded. However, the analysis had to be clear if effective counterstrategies were to be developed. Another grave error was that just one of the German Federal Government’s ministries had been put in charge of fighting racism and anti-Semitism. In order to remedy the situation, The Left Party had formed an interdisciplinary working group. A hearing on the topic would also be important. After all, it was to be noted that there were plenty of strategies for combating anti-Semitism – but if the analyses that had been reached were incorrect, it was to be assumed that these strategies too would be at least incomplete.

Pau ended by calling for regular reporting on anti-Semitism, an observatory and a commissioner for democracy and tolerance, who could be based at the Federal Chancellery, for example. The goal of these measures should be for various strategies to be discussed and implemented on a cross-party basis, specialist expertise bundled and civil society mobilised. With regard to the drafting of a concept for memorial sites, on which the German Federal Government and the Bundestag were working, she saw the danger that this concept might equate memorial sites for victims of the Nazis with sites for victims of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED). In this respect, it should be emphasised that the crimes that had been committed between 1933 and 1945 should on no account be played down.

Hellmut Königshaus, Member of the Bundestag, underlined that there were no essential differences of opinion between the parliamentary groups in the German Bundestag about the struggle against anti-Semitism. At most, differences of opinion in this field made themselves felt when it came to the assessment of the various instruments available for the struggle against anti-Semitism. Like the preceding speaker, he was also of the opinion that the crimes

of the Holocaust were not comparable with other crimes, including those of the SED regime. It was not sufficient to concentrate on the naïve thugs in the struggle against the NPD; rather, the intellectual originators of radical right-wing ideas had to be targeted as well and attacked more vigorously. In addition to this, it was generally important that, as a key target group, the rising generations should be involved. Finally, he was concerned to draw attention to an important condition of any struggle against anti-Semitism: At a time of globalisation, it was hardly possible any longer for an individual state to halt the flood of media products with extreme-right-wing content, for instance those available over the Internet. The same was also true in relation to the import of Nazi publications from countries where there were no punishments for the production and dissemination of such materials. The struggle against anti-Semitism therefore had to be an international task.

Irina Sherbakova emphasised how cheering it was that people in Germany and at the German Bundestag were bothered about the struggle against anti-Semitism. In the Duma, by contrast, an agenda item on ‘anti-Semitism’ would not provoke much interest. Apart from this, there was the problem that civil society in Russia was totally indifferent to the topic. **Klaus Faber** remarked that he could not see why the dissemination of anti-Semitic ideas and the production and distribution of materials with anti-Semitic content were not punished – in contrast to the production and distribution of, for instance, bomb-building instructions or the like. It was by no means bureaucratic to put in place sanctions against these activities under criminal law. Apart from this, it was important for all parliaments to do more than just discuss anti-Semitism when anti-Semitic incidents had occurred and so react to them after the event. He also felt it was unsatisfactory that the debate about shutting down Al-Manar had been going on for such a long time, but there was still no progress to be seen on this issue. The same could be said of the ban on Hezbollah. Finally, mention had to be made of the still overdue ban on the NPD. In this connection, he wanted to ask Ms Connemann whether the fear that a regular report on anti-Semitism in Germany would not enjoy a great deal of attention was not ultimately rooted in a recognition that it would not lead to any such concrete measures. However, he suggested that an anti-Semitism commissioner of the kind she was calling for pre-supposed reporting along these lines.

Dr Manfred Wittmeier from the Hesse Youth Circle, a regional umbrella organisation for youth groups, commented that the Forum was a good example of an exchange of experience and welcomed the initiative to organise such an event, in whatever concrete form, at the German Bundestag. Furthermore, a national observatory should be established, as had already happened at the European level. It was to be welcomed that many parliamentarians were getting involved in the struggle against anti-Semitism in federal politics; however, the question was how it would be possible to gain any leverage over the *Land* parliaments. It was not enough to leave the struggle against anti-Semitism to the ministries responsible in each *Land*, those with jurisdiction over youth policy, for instance. Finally, Dr Wittmeier praised the Youth for Diversity, Democracy and Tolerance programme – which had also been mentioned previously by Ms Connemann.

Prof. Cornelius Weiss, MdL, noted there were certain differences of perception with regard to the struggle against anti-Semitism. And yet there was no disputing the analysis: Anti-Semitism was being expressed ever more often in acts of violence, and the willingness to vote NPD was increasing, particularly among younger citizens under the age of 30. Prof. Weiss expressed his concern that this could result in the party obtaining a structural majority. The range of repressive instruments available therefore had to be applied resolutely, while it was necessary to acknowledge the significance of education policy in combating anti-Semitism. Not only that, it had to be taken into account that sufficient financial resources needed to be deployed, for instance to support Jewish cultural associations and so promote the integration

of new members of the Jewish communities from Eastern Europe. Finally, it was imperative to consider whether democracy could not be adjusted to the requirements of modern society by extending it with additional plebiscitary elements.

Gitta Connemann, Member of the Bundestag, responded to Klaus Faber's arguments by pointing out that, even if reports – of which, incidentally, there were already more than ten – were produced every year, this would not increase the likelihood of major debates being held to discuss them. In addition to this, she lamented the fact that Germany's two public broadcasting corporations had not covered the Forum; an event on such a topic should not be left to the specialist channels. The struggle against anti-Semitism could not be conducted without collaboration from the media. In particular, it would not be possible to mobilise civil society without their support.

Jerzy Montag, Member of the Bundestag, emphasised that the struggle against anti-Semitism should not be subsumed into the concept of 'fighting right-wing extremism and xenophobia' – as in the language of the EU and the European Treaties. Rather, it was necessary to clearly highlight the singularity of anti-Semitism. With regard to the implementation of measures in criminal law, there had already been a practically endless debate about this issue. He therefore wanted to merely point out that even defining 'anti-Semitism' as a criminal offence was extremely difficult because the principle of precise formulation had to be respected when it came to the norms of criminal law. From the events in Saxony, Montag continued, he drew the conclusion that the democratic parties should not withdraw from grassroots politics or rural areas. As a positive counter-example, he mentioned Bavaria, where the NPD had found just 18 persons who were prepared to sign up as supporters in Nuremberg.

Petra Pau, Member of the Bundestag, attacked the attempts that were undertaken to make the number of the right-wing-radical acts of violence look lower by means of statistical tricks, particularly in the run up to *Land* parliament elections. It might well be that a regular report would only serve as a crutch for arriving at a comprehensive and transparent analysis of the situation, but such an aid still had to be used. Nor should such a report just contain facts and figures: it had to comment on the situation with regard to anti-Semitism in qualitative terms. Reporting of this kind could also inform and mobilise civil society. Furthermore, she shared the criticism of the lack of coverage given to the morning's event in the plenary chamber by the publicly funded media.

Hellmut Königshaus, Member of the Bundestag, too opposed the idea of making 'anti-Semitism' a crime. As for an observatory, something he did support, he wanted to comment that it had to be possible for the German Federation and the *Länder* to cooperate across departmental and administrative boundaries. He therefore proposed that this body should be established under the auspices of a conference of the *Länder*. Although he believed a report on anti-Semitism would be expedient, he felt it was more important to make it clear that anti-Semitism and the efforts to deal with it were 'big issues'. In consequence, such a report also had to be the subject of a recorded vote in the German Bundestag. As far as the criticism of his meeting with the Palestinian Minister for Refugee Affairs, Atef Adwan, was concerned, he wished to clarify that Mr Adwan was not a member of Hamas and that he had met the Minister in his own capacity as a Member of the German Bundestag who, as his parliamentary group's spokesman on the Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development, was also responsible for the use of taxpayers' money. He rejected the accusation of anti-Semitism in this connection.

John Mann, House of Commons, UK, who was chairing the session, briefly summarised the roles played by parliaments in combating anti-Semitism in the various states that had been discussed. The British report, as he stressed, contained 35 recommendations on action to combat anti-Semitism, which had been supported by the different parliamentary parties there. The report would be raised with the Duma, subject to the consent of the Russian President. The matter would also be raised with Lithuania. John Mann emphasised that the levels of information and consensus in the German Bundestag were particularly high and finally called on other countries to follow the British and German examples.

1.6. Closing Speeches

Rabbi Andrew Baker, American Jewish Committee, reported that he had met Ignatz Bubis in Bonn 15 years earlier. At that time, he had driven with Bubis in a bullet-proof car accompanied by a police vehicle, and Bubis had told him that the protection was ‘for the others’. Back then, Bonn had seen heated discussions about the move to Berlin, partly due to the symbolism of such a move and the City of Berlin itself. The question had ultimately been whether Germany could cope with Berlin as its capital. Rabbi Baker mentioned the glass cupola of the Reichstag Building and the fact that the building’s flags had been flown at half-mast to mark the event that morning. This stood for a development that would have been unthinkable in earlier times. Berlin was becoming highly significant in the struggle against anti-Semitism.

Even if doubts were to be heard from the ambassadors to the OSCE in Vienna as to whether conferences ever got anything done, this Forum had in fact demonstrated that the parties involved knew how important words were. It had become evident that anti-Semitism was a shared feature of very different, in some cases totally unconnected, social groups. It had also become evident that all concerned had a duty to remain mindful of the Holocaust’s significance for the present day. Over the last few years, at any rate, it had been good to see that people still knew what was at stake.

The inquiry John Mann had chaired in Great Britain had been extraordinarily important. It had also been good that, when he visited Washington, the French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, had said anti-Semitism was not just an attack on the Jews, but also on the whole of France. Anti-Semitism was one of the core problems that had to be dealt with by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the new Member States of the EU. In Lithuania, for instance, journalists had been afraid to report on the injustices suffered by Jews there during the Nazi period due to the anti-Semitic mood in Lithuanian society. For this reason, not least, it was important that all three Baltic states had set up historical commissions ten years earlier. Even today, there was still a need to research what had happened in the period after the War. Concerted action was necessary in this respect.

Prof. **Gert Weisskirchen**, Member of the Bundestag, emphasised that the battle against anti-Semitism was not being fought just to protect Jews, but in the interests of all people. It was necessary to ensure that nothing happened to destroy everything that had been built up in Germany after 1945 in terms of democracy and universal human rights, including the achievement that – to adapt Hannah Arendt – every individual had a right to rights, regardless where they came from and who they were.

The parliamentary inquiry in the UK had been a very good instrument, and a suitable approach had to be found in Germany too. To help find such an approach, a hearing was scheduled to take place at the German Bundestag in March. This hearing should also allow conclusions to be drawn concerning the work of the German government. At the same time, it had to

be made quite plain that the specific kind of instrument was less crucial than how that instrument could be used to further the struggle against anti-Semitism.

Civil society would certainly have a key role to play in all these measures. For even if there were a broad consensus among the political class about combating anti-Semitism, that consensus would need deep foundations in civil society if it were to have any impact. The roots had to be developed and grow or be strengthened where they had withered.

Apart from this, Prof. Weisskirchen was delighted that it had proved possible for a conference on action to combat anti-Semitism to be held in Romania in October. Finally, he wished to comment that an analysis of the narratives prevalent in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in particular their narratives about the creation of national identity, which conspicuously incorporated and exploited elements from the past, indicated that the threat from anti-Semitism was growing stronger.

2. Panel: Education on the Holocaust and Antisemitism

2.1. *Introduction to the Panel on Education on the Holocaust and Antisemitism*

Ingolf Seidel

A discussion of education on the Holocaust and antisemitism in a joint panel raises various problems and issues which I would like to outline, albeit with the requisite brevity, in this introduction.

First and foremost, it is essential, in my view, to clarify the topic, and the expectations raised by this type of education work. Can education on the Holocaust from an historical and political perspective be effective against current manifestations of antisemitism and both inform and "immunize" the target group, whoever that may be? This raises questions about the opportunities for and limits to pedagogical intervention in general, but it also calls into question whether a focus on National Socialism and the Holocaust can and should serve as the basis for ethical education

An historical and political approach can present the various trends in the historical development of antisemitism in Europe, put them in context and show how Jewish and non-Jewish experience is shaped by Christians' anti-Jewish sentiment and antisemitism. In adopting this approach, however, Jewish history should not be reduced to the Shoah – the Holocaust – and nor should it be presented solely as a history of persecution and victimhood, for it is important not to reinforce stereotypical perceptions of the Jews.

Historical education on National Socialism, the Holocaust and other National Socialist mass crimes should be an essential part of education and learning and therefore part of the curricula. But just how useful is it to assess the knowledge gained – which inevitably raises ethical and moral issues – on the basis of grades in school? That really is debatable.

In general, it would seem advisable to curb society's often very high expectations of historical and political education and, indeed, of a pedagogical approach in general. The problems which this raises for some education specialists were recently summed up neatly by Robert Sigel from the Bavarian Regional Centre for Political Education in an interview with *Focus* magazine:

"Education specialists, especially those who show a particularly high level of commitment, often demand too much of themselves when it comes to this issue. They have immensely high expectations of themselves: they want to convey the facts, but at the same time, they have an ethical aspiration as well – they want to educate their students towards tolerance and prevent the emergence of ultra-right attitudes and antisemitism. And they pack everything into this one topic. It's too much..."¹.

Neither shock tactics – a focus on atrocities as a way of convincing students – nor a conventional "stand and deliver" teaching style, nor indeed morally charged expectations of young people will heighten their abilities to empathise or change their perspectives – both of which are pillars of modern educational thinking.

Instead, a key expectation of those who are working as educators and creative artists in this field is that they should look first at their own relationships with history and remembrance

¹ http://www.focus.de/schule/schule/unterricht/interview_aid_229997.html (accessed on 14.01.08, only available in German).

and at their own family and social traditions. The majority of people working in education today have acquired their knowledge of National Socialism and the Holocaust second-hand – not least due to the generation gap. For education specialists in particular, the key question is how to deal consciously with their own relationships with this past, with national narratives and family history, and how strongly this awareness of the past flows into their education work.

A further question which arises in relation to current educational concepts to deal with history and with present-day manifestations of antisemitism is how to respond to the increasingly multiethnic composition of their youthful clientele. The highly diverse narratives in students' family history offer a chance to enrich the education process and should be regarded, first and foremost, as an opportunity and not as a problem. As one example, let me cite the approach used at the education centre in the former "House of the Wannsee Conference", which works with the life stories of persecuted Turkish people and publishes its brochures for visitors in Turkish and Arabic as well. Problematical statements in the "globalised classroom" or the idiosyncrasies resulting from the coexistence of sometimes competing communities of remembrance of course cannot be ignored in the educational context. The challenge facing teachers is to counter manipulation and false information while, at the same time, remaining mindful of the origins of these competing cultures of remembrance and victimhood and being able to categorise them appropriately. The task of historical and political education is to move beyond one's own national history and to convey an awareness of complex historical processes from various perspectives.

Methods of "learning through research", which fosters the independence and autonomy of students, as well as biographical work, art-based approaches and creating connections with the real-life experiences of students are all ways of responding to the interest in Holocaust history which undoubtedly exists.

A further approach which must take its place alongside historical and political education is the separate issue of contemporary antisemitism and how this should be dealt with appropriately. Just as antisemitism as a concept cannot be subsumed in the term "racism" or restricted to the racist and historical dimension, an educational approach which aims to combat antisemitism must not be treated solely as a subsection of antiracist education.

Over recent years, teachers have reported difficulties in organizing discussions with Holocaust survivors who are Jewish, as students are increasingly refusing to participate. What's more, the term "you Jew" – used as a deliberate pejorative – appears to have become part of the standard vocabulary of school students. It is the students who are not antisemitic, in particular, who confirm the accuracy of teachers' empirical observations here.

The increasing prevalence of antisemitic statements and acts of violence cannot be attributed solely to young people with extreme-right sympathies or to related events in mainstream society. Stereotypical and simplistic attitudes are found in many different population groups, and antisemitism varies according to national narratives and specific social conditions. Antisemitic attitudes are found among young people from families with a migration background from Muslim countries, and these attitudes fluctuate between latency and overt aggression. The trigger is generally the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and perceptions of it, together with a lack of knowledge about the complex situation and history of the region. Whether this perception of the conflict is a symbol of failed or, rather, successful integration into German mainstream society is a moot point. It is not uncommon for this problematical perception of the Middle East conflict to go hand in hand with adherence to conspiracy theories and personalization of abstract political processes by young people.

Young migrants' real-life experiences of discrimination cannot be used as an excuse for teachers to play down antisemitic statements in the classroom. Authoritarian ideologies –

whether ultra-rightist viewpoints expressed by native-born Germans or Islamist and nationalistic opinions from young migrants – must be rigorously dealt with in the educational process, like any other form of antisemitism. This does not negate the need to acknowledge experiences of discrimination and provide space for them to be recounted.

Regardless of findings on the increase in antisemitic world views, an approach to political education is required which addresses and analyses the various forms of antisemitism as they are practised. Coordinated methodological approaches and strategies are required for the various contexts and target groups.

Education on current forms of antisemitism, although still a fairly new field, has nonetheless given rise to various, sometimes very ambitious, projects. Strategies which aim to show how antisemitism can be addressed as an issue in school or in the non-school education sector already exist and can be regarded as models of European best practice; they include, for example, the new teaching materials from the ODIHR/OSCE, which were developed by the Anne Frank House, the Centre for Research on Antisemitism and the Fritz Bauer Institute.

Independently of this, the expectations of pedagogical interventions are generally high. But any expectation that education projects can address overt structures of prejudice and take on a fire-fighting role within our social policy is bound to be disappointed.

The aim of this education work is to move beyond the straightforward process of imparting knowledge and into the sphere of moral values. To this end, an educational process which is based on dialogue between teachers and students is of utmost importance. A more "instructional" approach to teaching, on the other hand, will inevitably arouse or even create resistance. Through a mixture of imparting knowledge, boosting empathy, focussing on methods which foster a shift in perspective, and developing an understanding of plural identities in the target group, education can have a preventive effect.

To the best of my knowledge, a network such as the *Task Force Education on Antisemitism* – which is managed and coordinated by the American Jewish Committee, with various agencies involved in political education subjecting the outcomes of their work to peer evaluation and sharing information about current developments in the field of antisemitism and education – only exists within a national framework in Germany. At international level, the *Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research* involves experts from public bodies, research institutes and private organizations from 24 countries. Naturally, it would be desirable to develop this type of cooperation further. It would also be desirable to expand the current education services in the field of historical education and contemporary antisemitism. To this end, more funding and support for this work at memorial sites, research institutes and in civil society initiatives, without any red tape, are essential.

2.2. *History as a Problem in Antisemitism-Reducing Educational Projects: Experience of Forum for Dialogue among Nations*

Michał Bilewicz²

The problem of antisemitism in Poland was well discussed in many publications and reports. Some of the most important insights in the nature of Polish antisemitism stress the role of the wide-spread belief in Jewish conspiracy that becomes most salient before the parliamentary elections – as it is being used as a mean of political propaganda (Kofta, 2005). Other researchers stress the role of other important phenomena, as the feelings of guilt and repressed memory of a bystander (Steinlauf, 1997) or victimhood competition between Poles and Jews (Krzeminski, 1993). Such biased memories, deeply rooted in the national representations of the Holocaust and the Polish-Jewish history in general, are probably shaping attitudes of the older generations of Poles towards Jews.

However, until recently there were no attempts to face the problem of antisemitism among Polish youth. Young people do not seem to be influenced by the representations of the past, historical memories or direct experience of contact with Jews. On the other side – among young generations of football fans, subculture members etc., the most extreme forms of antisemitism could be observed (Kornak, 2007). At the same time – numerous Polish youngsters try to combat antisemitism in their everyday life activities (Radzik, 2007; Kornak, 2007).

Since its beginning Forum for Dialogue among Nations organized educational activities, aiming in combating antisemitism among Polish youth. Its actions were concentrated on increasing the opportunities of contact between young Poles and Jews (by organizing exchanges and student meetings), as well as on direct antisemitism-reducing workshops in Polish high-schools. This paper focuses on the effectiveness of student meetings and antisemitism reducing workshops performed in Polish schools.

1. Polish-Jewish youth meetings

During the last decade, increasing Polish-Jewish contacts have been established. With the opening of Polish borders, Jewish youth from Israel, USA, Canada and other countries have begun visiting places related to the Holocaust— such as ghettos, and concentration and death camps. During these visits, some of the Jewish groups have met with young Poles. For most young Poles and Jews, such encounters are a unique opportunity to interact with members of a group about which they feel they know well from historical narratives (Steinlauf, 1997) but with whom they have little personal experience.

Since 1998 every year Forum for Dialogue among Nations organizes Polish-Jewish meetings during March of the Living. The March of the Living is an international educational program that brings Jewish teenagers from all over the world to Poland on Holocaust Memorial Day to march from Auschwitz to Birkenau, the largest concentration camp complex built during World War II, and then continue to Israel to observe Israel Memorial Day and Israel Independence Day. While in Poland, Jewish teens also visit Warsaw, Krakow and Lublin. More than few groups of Jewish students (American, Canadian and Australian) during their stay in Warsaw and Krakow take part in encounter program with Polish students (from high schools in these cities).

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The encounter program consisted of a 2-hour meeting in schools (around 100-200 students participated in each meeting). However, the encounters were organized in small 10-people groups (5 Polish students, 5 Jewish students), as only such groups are proved to be effective in psychological process (Bradford, Gibb & Benne, 1964).

In 2004-2006 we decided to evaluate this meeting program in order to study its educational effectiveness in combating antisemitism and indicate problems that may occur during such actions. The overall effectiveness of these programs proved to be significant: Polish students after participation in the encounter program had much more positive attitudes towards Jews, and they felt that that Jews are more similar to them (Bilewicz, 2006; Bilewicz, 2007). At the same time there was no direct effect of contact in reduction of belief in Jewish conspiracy – for those students who believe in such anti-Semitic conspiracy theories such contact had no effect. It seems that they sub-typed Jews whom they met as an exception from the ‘overall Jewish conspiracy’.

However, when we compared students who talked with their Jewish friends about present-day issues and historical issues, we found out that only meetings about present-day issues were successful in antisemitism reduction. When Polish students talked with young Jews about the history, they didn’t change attitudes towards Jews and they didn’t perceive Jews as more similar to them. On the contrary, they perceived Jews as being anti-Polish, and this elevated anxiety during the encounter.

Thus, the history of Polish-Jewish relations may constrain opportunities of antisemitism reducing contacts in today’s Poland.

2. Antisemitism reducing workshops

Since 1998 Forum for Dialogue among Nations has been organizing 1-day workshops for high-school students in several Polish cities and towns. Numerous scenarios and curricula were created during these years, and all of them were performed and tested in class-room setting by prepared young trainers. The scenarios were prepared under supervision of our experts, a group of scholars from Warsaw University (sociologists, historians, pedagogues and psychologists). The main aim of these workshops was the reduction of antisemitism among Polish high school students.

In 2007 Forum decided to evaluate the workshops in Polish high-schools. The main aim of this was to study the effectiveness of certain interventions in (1.) increasing positive attitudes towards Jews, (2.) eliciting responsibility for past negative actions of Poles towards Jews, (3.) increasing involvement in Polish-Jewish dialogue.

All 4 workshops were based on social-psychological theories of prejudice reduction: *Anti-Semitic graffiti* workshop was based on perspective-taking theory (students took perspective of American Jewish senior coming back to his Polish hometown and facing anti-Semitic signs on the walls), *What is and what should never be* workshop was based on counterfactual thinking theory (students were constructing alternative versions of history and explaining behaviour that could lead to rescue of Jews in Poland), *The Poles and the Jews during the Holocaust* workshop was based on collective guilt theory (students were faced with information about Polish misbehaviour towards Jews during WWII), and *Israel’s critique* workshop was based on new antisemitism theory (students were pointing similarities between Nazi caricatures and modern anti-Israel propaganda, and they tried distinguish anti-Semitic speeches among other critical voices about Israel).

The quantitative evaluation of these interventions showed that the workshop about anti-Semitic graffiti in Poland led to more positive perception of Jews; workshop about counter-

factual thinking about Polish-Jewish history led to increased responsibility for Polish crimes towards Jews, and to greater involvement in Polish-Jewish dialogue, but at the same time it worsened attitudes towards Jews; workshop about Polish-Jewish relations during the Holocaust did not change attitudes at all; and workshop about new antisemitism led paradoxically to greater perceived responsibility for Polish history (Bilewicz & Wójcik, 2008).

It should be stressed that – like in the case of encounter program (Bilewicz, 2007) – workshops reflecting on historical issues built psychological walls between young Poles and Jews. Confronting the negative Polish-Jewish history led students to the perception of Jews as less similar to themselves and to more negative attitudes towards them. Also the issues related to Israel led to controversies, resulting with more negative attitude towards Jews. In comparison to these ‘historical’ and ‘political’ issues, a workshop about everyday antisemitism observable on the walls of Polish cities (*Anti-Semitic graffiti*) led to more positive perceptions of Jews, but it didn’t lead to any collective guilt or responsibility for historical misdeeds. When all workshops are taken as a whole – they had significantly positive impact on involvement in Polish-Jewish dialogue. This seems as good prognosis for future antisemitism reduction.

3. Conclusion

In all educational efforts organized by Forum for Dialogue among Nations, the history becomes an important obstacle. The workshops in Polish schools are most effective in antisemitism reduction only if they do not touch historical issues (esp. World War II and the Holocaust). The same could be applied to Polish-Jewish youth meetings – they tend to fail when students step into the fertile ground of Polish-Jewish history. The main reason for that is lack of proper historical education in Polish high-schools. Students are taught idealised narrative of their own history, and this makes them closed for any attempts of presenting them different perspectives of their nations history (in our case – the Jewish perspective). Such idealised version of Polish history becomes an obstacle in future Polish-Jewish contacts, and inhibits positive consequences of such contact. That is why enormous efforts have to be made in order to prepare Polish students to any activities related to Holocaust or Polish-Jewish history. Without proper historical education and proper historical curricula, any efforts to face antisemitism could have only limited effectiveness.

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2.3. Educational Work on the Topic of the Holocaust and Antisemitism Wolf Kaiser³

The frequently expressed expectation that history lessons on the Holocaust would make students immune to antisemitism or could even reduce existing antisemitic prejudices, has not been fulfilled. Nevertheless it is not by chance that the title of this panel mentions antisemitism and Holocaust together as educational topics. The Holocaust would not have happened without the long tradition of anti-Jewish hostility and its radicalization and development into racist antisemitism. Although we would have enough good reasons for opposing antisemitism even without the unprecedented catastrophe of the genocide of the European Jews, it was undoubtedly the Holocaust which discredited anti-Jewish ideology. For many of those who are dedicated to fighting antisemitism, the horror caused by this mass crime was the starting point. Indeed, those who have anti-Jewish prejudices or even an anti-Jewish attitude cannot ignore the Holocaust. Those who make anti-Jewish remarks today are usually anxious to distance themselves at least from the racist antisemitism of the Nazis. Today, there are, paradoxically, forms of antisemitism which evolved as reactions to the Holocaust and perception of it: the secondary antisemitism of those who accuse the Jews of systematically exploiting the Germans' feelings of guilt, and the denial or relativization of the murder of the European Jews – a terrible insult to survivors and to the memory of those murdered. These new forms of antisemitism must also be taken into account when we discuss how to combat antisemitism.

Obviously, sound knowledge about the Holocaust is necessary, although not sufficient, to strengthen willingness to confront antisemitism and prevent revisionism. It helps to understand why commemoration of the victims, prosecution of perpetrators, compensation for survivors, and ongoing research on Holocaust history were and still are important tasks, especially for European countries. And the way in which knowledge about the Holocaust is communicated and absorbed is also of importance. Problematic forms of Holocaust education - e.g. speaking about the victims only in the dehumanizing language of the perpetrators - can promote anti-Jewish prejudices and attitudes rather than reduce them, against the intentions of the educator.

These preliminary remarks are not intended to deny the fact that there are challenges in the fight against antisemitism for which awareness of the Holocaust plays only an insignificant role, or indeed no role at all. If we want to clarify, for instance, the difference between legitimate criticism of Israeli politics and antisemitic remarks concerning the Middle East conflict, we need different knowledge. Nevertheless even in this case Holocaust awareness can be relevant: anybody who has studied the Holocaust in depth will be more than hesitant to accept the frequently expressed opinion that the Israelis are doing to the Palestinians today what the Nazis did to the Jews.

Since I work at an institute which does not deal primarily with current antisemitism, but with Holocaust education, I shall speak about the challenges we are confronted with in our work, without referring each time explicitly to antisemitism.

1. From Concealment to Histotainment

For decades, critical remarks concerning the way the Holocaust was dealt with in Germany were directed against concealment of the crimes. This was called the second guilt of the Germans. Indeed, the demand to draw a line under the history of the Nazi period, already voiced

³ Gedenk- und Bildungsstätte Haus der Wannsee-Konferenz

in 1947, can still be heard today. The wish to achieve "normality" through forgetting is widespread. Therefore it is still an important educational task to explain why it is important to study the Holocaust in depth. However, it cannot be said anymore that the Holocaust is kept under wraps in the German public arena. On the contrary, it is present to such an extent, particularly in the media, that Martin Walser felt he should reject the "permanent presentation of our shame". Yet, unlike Walser, I do not think that the presence of the topic in the media is problematic because it means "instrumentalization of our shame for contemporary purposes", but because we find – aside of valuable feature films and documentaries – programmes in the media which contribute to the trivialization of the Holocaust. In "histotainment" programmes, historical footage and interviews with survivors and other eyewitnesses are used to create emotional effects. For reinforcement, often dramatic scenes using actors are added, in which directors present their own views on actions of persons involved in historic events. In sentimental feature films, the Holocaust is used to give a trivial plot the impression of some historical weight.

The trivializing use of the Holocaust not only produces inaccurate and distorted images of the historical events, it also gives the recipients the feeling that they already know everything about the Holocaust which is worthwhile knowing. The assertion: "We have heard this many times; we know all this", is certainly the most frequent expression of resistance to be heard from German young people when the teacher announces lessons about the Holocaust. As educators we should not react to these phenomena by blaming the media in general or suggesting to the students that they should rather read a good book than watch TV. Holocaust fatigue (for which the media are undoubtedly not solely responsible) should be discussed in the context of the attitude towards the Holocaust in society as a whole. This can be done in diverse ways: historically by studying how awareness of the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes developed in the aftermath of the war, in zones of occupation, in both German states and since 1990; in media studies by examining the so-called documentaries and feature films and analyzing the intended effects, the patterns of portrayal, the omissions and the emphasis on certain aspects; in political science by exploring the political intentions, functions, and consequences of works thematizing the Holocaust.

Education through history lessons?

Educational work on antisemitism and the Holocaust does not only aim at imparting knowledge. It also intends to communicate values, develop human attitudes and strengthen powers of judgement. Lawrence Kohlberg has shown that the ability to make judgements about moral questions is generated through moral conflicts and disagreements about problems⁴. Could and should we stage such conflicts for educational reasons in order to create conditions for moral education? In our society today there is a considerable pressure for conformity where National Socialism and its crimes are concerned. In the political sphere, the publicly demonstrated consensus that National Socialism has to be rejected unambiguously and forcefully is absolutely necessary. Maintaining the pressure for conformity is desirable in this respect. It would be an illusion to believe that the whole population would reach a post-conventional stage of moral judgement. In education, however, pressure for conformity is a very problematic factor. In institutions like schools with their system of rewards and sanctions it will be efficacious even if the individual educator is very open to divergent opinions. Where pressure for conformity is effective, it does not promote moral development, but temporary good conduct through condi-

⁴ Cf. Lawrence Kohlberg / Elliot Turiel: *Moralische Entwicklung und Moralerziehung*. In: *Sozialisation und Moral. Neuere Ansätze zur moralischen Entwicklung und Erziehung*. Ed. by Gerhard Portele. Weinheim 1979, pp. 13 - 80; Lawrence Kohlberg: *Die Psychologie der Moralentwicklung*. Ed. by Wolfgang Althof, Frankfurt a. M. 1996.

tioning. As soon as the balance of power changes, even if this happens only in the immediate surroundings, the side which is now in a position of power will benefit from this trained adaptability.

Research done by scholars at the University of Frankfurt concerning the "paradoxes of moral-educational communication in the classroom" has shown that "educational communication cannot directly cause changes of attitudes"⁵. The authors concluded that exaggerated expectations concerning education should be reduced. At the same time they underlined that ethical principles could be reflected on in history lessons about the Holocaust, principles which are, or should be, the basic norms of human co-existence. If we follow this argument, history teachers should not understand Holocaust education as mere conveyance of knowledge combined with undisputed value judgements (as tended to be the case in schools, according to an as yet unpublished piece of research). Nor should all opinions, even those which are based on ignorance or morally unacceptable attitudes, be accepted without comment (as often happens in informal education according to the survey). Instead, educators should strengthen reflection on and communication about historical developments and events and the behaviour of the people involved, whilst accepting that there is no guarantee of achieving the desired results.

According to the authors of the Frankfurt study, the task and achievement of history lessons consists of "training the already established way of dealing with history by making it habitual, finding appropriate language, and internalizing expectations, but also through reflection and critical analysis, thus confirming the consensus reached in public communication, embedding it in society and updating it". School and lessons "only reproduce – for better and for worse – what already has been achieved in the adult society"⁶. Experts on the didactics of history meanwhile, stress that history lessons fail to achieve their goals if they do not foster the ability of the learner to form his or her own historical opinion, but merely encourage the reproduction of conventional interpretations, particularly if it is the version dominant in the media which is communicated, rather than the most enlightened one⁷. While Bodo von Borries argues that the war of destruction and the Holocaust are unsuitable topics for training the ability to make judgements on historical events⁸, Gerhard Henke-Bockschatz believes that these topics too can be used to train a reflective and self-reflective way of dealing with history if teachers and learners avoid premature moral judgements and have sufficient methodological competences⁹.

No matter how we assess the opportunities for young people to form their own, carefully considerate opinions about the Holocaust - it is certainly true that the influence of adults outside educational institutions on the opinion of young people can hardly be overestimated. The family or the circle of acquaintances, but also media (newspapers, TV, or feature films) can exert such influence.

3. Adult Education

⁵ [Meseth, Wolfgang](#) ; [Proske, Matthias](#) ; [Radtke, Frank-Olaf](#): Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Geschichtsunterricht. Erste empirische Befunde und theoretische Schlussfolgerungen. In: [Meseth, Wolfgang](#) ; [Proske, Matthias](#) ; [Radtke, Frank-Olaf](#) (editors) : Schule und Nationalsozialismus. Anspruch und Grenzen des Geschichtsunterrichts. Frankfurt am Main/New York 2004, p. 142.

⁶ p. 143.

⁷ Cf. Bodo von Borries: Moralische Aneignung und emotionale Identifikation im Geschichtsunterricht . Empirische Befunde und theoretische Erwägungen. In: Schule und Nationalsozialismus, p. 292.

⁸ Cf. p. 294.

⁹ Cf. Gerhard Henke-Bockschatz: Der „Holocaust“ als Thema im Geschichtsunterricht. Kritische Anmerkungen. In: Schule und Nationalsozialismus, pp. 298-322, especially pp. 299 and 320.

This implies an additional challenge for those who do not only teach young people, but also adults: How can we teach the history of the Holocaust to adults in a way which encourages self-reflection – possibly influencing their views and behaviour in a positive way? In this case, it is even less realistic to exert influence directly through education. It would rightly be conceived as arrogant. Since its inauguration, the House of the Wannsee has taken a different track.

Using the central event in the House's history, the meeting of state secretaries at the Great Wannsee – known as the Wannsee Conference - as a starting point, the central topic of the seminars it organises is the participation of members of diverse vocational groups in the planning, organization and implementation of the deportation and murder of the Jews. Those employed in diverse branches of the civil service (in the widest sense of the term) study historical documents providing information about the actions and attitudes of those who were involved in the Holocaust on the perpetrators' side. Excerpts from vocational journals as well as legal ordinances, administrative orders and instructions, forms etc. are used for this purpose. In addition, reports, letters, and personal memories are analyzed. The administrative documents often have a greater relevance to the participants of the seminars than to a historian who is not familiar with their profession, because they know the structures and the instruments from their every day administrative practice. This gives them a motivating sense of achievement. But sometimes they are shocked to realize the extent to which their own procedures are formally similar to those which were applied to organise the persecution of the Jews.

This is particularly true for those professions which have developed a very specific language and way of thinking. Lawyers, for example not only have their own professional terminology like other professions, too. Their procedures and argumentation developed very specifically over a long period of time and can be recognized even in the perverted judiciary of the Nazi regime. The trainee lawyers who come to seminar days at the House of the Wannsee Conference realize that their professional tools were used to legitimize blatant injustice. Time and again discussions arise as to how they can find a position which would enable them to oppose the perversion of law into an instrument of inhumanity organized by the state.

In general, these seminars for diverse vocational groups aim at combining historical learning about the Holocaust with discussions and reflection on ideologies and mechanisms which can lead to organized irresponsibility and lack of conscience and about possibilities to counter such developments with behaviour based on respect for human and civil rights. There is no guarantee that every individual who has participated in a seminar week will really be influenced by such reflections about historical experiences in concrete conflict situations. Yet, the importance of the fact that historical learning can encourage reflection about political and ethical questions in many social groups should not be underestimated.

4. History of the perpetrators and the perspective of the victims

Dealing with Nazi crimes in seminars for vocational groups, an approach which is now also used by several other memorials, focuses mainly on the perpetrators. Not by chance, Holocaust studies in Germany, more than in other countries, are especially interested in the perpetrators. This can lead to realisations which are undoubtedly of general interest. If we want to understand how the Holocaust could happen, it is sensible and even necessary to analyze the ideologies and motivations of the perpetrators, the structures of their organizations and their procedures. The whole process was initiated and controlled by the perpetrators and therefore we need their files to reconstruct it. We must also use such documents in the classroom in order to allow understanding of the processes, rather than just cataloguing the facts. It is not difficult to find suitable primary source material. I take a textbook for secondary schools as an

example¹⁰. It contains five historical documents: instructions by Nazi leaders on how to behave towards Jews from 1933 and 1938, excerpts from the Nuremberg Laws and the Wannsee Protocol and a passage from the autobiographical writings of the Auschwitz commander Rudolf Höss. Thus it gives students an opportunity to examine the files and mode of operation of the perpetrators and their procedures. Nevertheless something crucial is missing in this textbook: the voice of the victims - the only element which could give us some idea of what the defamation, exclusion from society, discrimination and persecution - which ultimately developed into genocide - meant for the victims. Only if we try to take the victims' perspective, can we gain an impression of the human catastrophes caused by the Nazi crimes, but also the degree of strength and courage many victims found in order to resist and defend their human dignity as long as possible.

A direct encounter with survivors (an infrequent opportunity for German students even in the past) will hardly be possible any more in the future. We will therefore have to rely on documented testimonies even though they cannot really replace a personal discussion. Aside from diaries and testimonies in a written form, testimonies and interviews recorded using audiovisual media should be used much more often in the classroom. So far, a huge amount of valuable material has been collected, but it is seldom utilized in education. In order to use it in an appropriate way, convincing concepts must be elaborated and discussed with teachers in teacher training courses. Otherwise the video or DVD with a survivor's testimony may simply be shown instead of giving a lesson, rather than being integrated as an important element into a Holocaust syllabus.

The impression made by a recorded testimony will certainly be weaker than the impact of a personal discussion. On the other hand, using the recordings allows an analytical and critical approach. Emotional overpowering can be avoided and at the same time students can be enabled to develop empathy. Feelings of empathy towards the victims of the Holocaust are not the same as identification. Every attempt to ignore the distance which separates us from them would be both presumptuous and illusionary. But when students hear the testimonies of survivors, they can try to see what happened through their eyes, whilst being aware that they are living in completely different circumstances. A multi-perspective approach to the Holocaust in history lessons (which looks at the perpetrators and victims, as well as the role played by bystanders and the motives and behaviours of helpers, and rescuers) does not mean that we adopt a certain view without critical distance. Rather, it means reconstructing and explaining the perspectives of the historical actors.

5. The European Dimension of the Holocaust

This can only be successfully achieved if we are familiar with the historical context of the Holocaust – a greater challenge than one might initially think. In German schools, lessons on the Holocaust are often confined to the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis in Germany, at best completed with a casual glance at Auschwitz as the incarnation of the destruction of human lives. Despite these limitations, the student may have more or less sufficient historical and geographical knowledge about the background. Yet the Nazis discriminated, dispossessed, deported and murdered the Jews of almost all European countries. This European dimension is a characteristic feature of the Holocaust which differentiates it from most other genocides. German perpetrators were supported in occupied and allied countries by black-mailers and denouncers, by collaborating administrations and police officers and, to varying degrees in the different countries, also by local accomplices. Discussion of these facts - with-

¹⁰ Klaus Dieter Hein-Mooren et al.: *Buchners Kolleg Geschichte. Von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Nationalsozialismus*. 2nd edition Bamberg: C.C. Buchners Verlag, 1992, pp. 423 – 428.

out diminishing German responsibility in the least - requires sound historical knowledge. In school education this can only be conveyed through the use of examples. The attempt to cross the German borders when exploring Holocaust history should not result in only mentioning facts and figures. For many German children and young people, the story of Inge Deutschkron provided the opportunity to learn about the hardship and courage of German Jews who lived in hiding and fought for their survival. They should also learn about the fate of Polish, Lithuanian, Czech or Hungarian Jews not only through factual information, but also by studying biographies of individuals like Dawid Rubinowicz, Solly Ganor, Petr Ginz, or Tivadar Soros¹¹, to mention only a few of those who have written moving diaries or testimonies.

6. International Cooperation

For such a widening of perspective, international cooperation amongst teachers, rather than just experts would be of great value. The Council of Europe and the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) have lent support to some initial initiatives. It would be desirable for such initiatives to also be facilitated by school administrations of the German Federal States enabling and encouraging teachers to take part in international teacher training seminars. The intention of such seminars would not be to simply export didactic and methodological concepts from one country to another. This would not be a very promising approach - not only because of the different styles of teaching and learning, but also, and more importantly, because of the very different role and history of the European (and non-European) countries during World War II. To ignore the differences would even be problematic from a moral point of view. It is not by chance that different countries focus on different issues concerning the Holocaust. Let me give you an example. Challenges which hardly exist in Eastern Europe, gave rise to renewed reflections in some Western and Central European countries about the question of how to deal with the history of Nazi racism and antisemitism. Racist behaviour towards immigrants, but also anti-Jewish remarks by members of immigrant communities motivated educators to develop new concepts for an appropriate approach to antisemitism and the Holocaust in multiethnic and multicultural societies¹². These concepts are targeted not only at the majority in society, but also at immigrants. In the course of the educational discussions it became apparent that there are some experiences which can be generalized, but challenges are not the same in all societies with considerable numbers of immigrants. One important factor is where the majority of immigrants come from, because there are considerable differences from country to country as far as historical conceptions and political attitudes are concerned. Here again, we realize that it does not make sense to adopt ready-made concepts but to exchange experiences, to test suggestions and to cooperate in mastering complex challenges.

Whether such cooperation will contribute to a European conception of history – of which some people believe the Holocaust is the nucleus – can remain undecided for the time being. We are so far from homogeneity in this respect that having an argument about whether it is

¹¹ Cf. Inge Deutschkron: *Ich trug den gelben Stern*. 4th edition, Cologne 1983. The diary of Dawid Rubinowicz, translated by Derek Bowman. Blackwood, Edinburgh 1981. Solly Ganor: *Light One Candle: A Survivor's Tale from Lithuania to Jerusalem*, Kodansha International Ltd, U.S., Sep 1996. Petr Ginz: *The Diary of Petr Ginz*, edited by Chava Pressburger, with an introduction by Jonathan Safran Foer, translated from Czech by Elena Lappin, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007. Tivadar Soros: *Masquerade. Dancing Around Death in Nazi Occupied Hungary*, edited and translated by Humphrey Tomkin, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2003.

¹² For the German discussion cf. *"Erziehung nach Auschwitz" in der multikulturellen Gesellschaft. Pädagogische und soziologische Annäherungen*. Edited by B. Fechner, G. Kößler and T. Liebertz-Gross. Weinheim 2000. Elke Gryglewski: "Ich bin jetzt ein Teil von Deutschland..." - Jugendliche nichtdeutscher Herkunft und ihr Umgang mit der Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus in Gedenkstätten. In: *NS-Gewaltherrschaft. Beiträge zur historischen Forschung und juristischen Aufarbeitung*. Berlin 2005, pp. 498-508. Gordon Mitchell et al.: "Wenn wir die ganze Sache nicht machen würden, dann würde Gras darüber wachsen ...". *Deutsch-jüdische Vergangenheit in interkulturellen Schulklassen*. Frankfurt a. M. 2007

desirable or not seems pointless. It is already an accomplishment if the national conceptions of history are not used to create enemy images.

3. Panel: Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat Them

3.1. Keynote

Theo Zwanziger¹³



DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

Ladies and gentlemen,

Combating racism, xenophobia and antisemitism is a task for society as a whole – and football also has a role to play here, by looking beyond the confines of sport and helping to give our ever-changing society a human face. With this in mind, we have worked together with our *Land* associations in numerous projects over the years with the aim of tackling all forms of discrimination. Our position remains clear: the German Football Association has a long-standing commitment to supporting projects which work with fans and whose main 'goals' are to prevent violence, address extremist attitudes and educate supporters' club members on social issues.

As part of the licensing process, we require clubs to commit to working with supporters, and we also provide them with training opportunities to assist them in this process.

With the annual award of the Integration Prize and the Julius Hirsch Prize, we pay tribute to clubs and organizations which have made an outstanding contribution to tackling marginalization in the game, in the stands and in society as a whole and show that these projects can be best-practice models for other initiatives.

Together with the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, we are supporting German Sport Youth's project '*Am Ball bleiben - Fussball gegen Rassismus und Diskriminierung*'¹ ('Stay on the Ball – Football against Racism and Discrimination') which aims to develop football as a positive influence, especially among supporters.

In addition to these specific projects, football reaches out to many people in their daily lives and can thus exert great influence on social developments. It provides opportunities for personal fulfilment and recognition through sport, boosts self-esteem and offers a forum for important group experiences of dealing with winning and losing. Mutual respect and tolerance are an important part of the 'inter-play' and activities in the clubs.

The German Football Association aims to use its social position to champion the causes of freedom, tolerance and our common humanity. We resolutely oppose any moves to forget Nazism and its horrors, and are prepared for the fact that combating racist, xenophobic and antisemitic attitudes is a lengthy process.

Dr Theo Zwanziger

¹³ President of the Deutscher Fußball Bund (DFB)

3.2. *Racism, Xenophobia and Right-Wing Extremism in Spectator Behaviour and the Development of Counter Strategies*¹⁴

Gunter A. Pilz

1. Initial Situation and Aim

Xenophobia, racism and right-wing extremism in the context of football matches have been observed and debated for many years. As a result, there has been reaction on several levels. Fan projects, clubs, associations and police, but also fans themselves, have developed different strategies to take action against racist and right-wing extremist incidents or to prevent them in advance wherever possible.

The aim of the study is to analyse the most recent developments relating to xenophobia, racism and right-wing extremism in spectator behaviour and identify provisions, possibilities, and limitations of counter strategies, and then to create action recommendations on this basis. It is thus important to formulate conditions which are necessary for successful work, or, aspects which can limit the effectiveness of antiracist work. In doing this, the different action fields and perspectives of the involved parties are considered.

2. Results: Description of the Situation

In almost all national league clubs which were studied during the research period 2004 to the first half year 2005, visible and audible xenophobic and right-wing extreme behaviour in the tiers of the stadium has reduced in recent years but has not disappeared. In the individual stadium location, there has been a decline both on different levels and also in different problem situations. While it is mostly individuals or small groups in most places who involve themselves in these kinds of expressions, a whole block of several hundred to one thousand fans in some locations has involved itself in xenophobic discrimination independent of the events in the match.

Furthermore, it can be seen that problematic behaviour is not restricted to only the ultra scene or the standing area, but rather can be found in the seated area, too.

A shift in racism and right-wing extremist behaviour away from the stadium and toward the journey to and from the match was identified – this creates a public beyond the stadium, for example in public transport. Bus and train journeys during away games are also used as a place for staging racist and right-wing extremist songs.

Furthermore, a shift in racism and right-wing extremist behaviour away from the premier league and toward the lower leagues was identified. Here we can see problem situations which in some cases require urgent attention. As a cause of such a shift, the following could be named: missing fan projects and other offers which look after fans who are susceptible to problematic behaviour and attitudes; the lower public and media pressure leads to the fact that such incidents often do not become known to public; less police and club control as well as lacking club commitment and financial resources.

With regard to the national team, a decline in the visibility of right-wing extremist expressions or xenophobic presence has been seen in recent years.

However, severe racist and/or right-wing extremist behaviour is very much in trend, particularly at away games. For example, this could be seen at the games in Celje in March 2005 and in Bratislava in September 2005. These incidents are not seen by the questioned experts as a

¹⁴ Zusammenfassung aus der Studie: PILZ, G.A. u.a. Wandlungen des Zuschauerverhaltes im Profifußball. Schorndorf 2006

new phenomenon, but rather that they show a “wave pattern”: right-wing extremist and racist expressions come again and again – often also together with violence – at national team matches, especially in Eastern Europe.

The described decline in problematic behaviour in the analysed premier league clubs does not necessarily mean a decline in problematic attitude patterns. There could be a discrepancy between attitude and behaviour. Problematic attitude patterns could have become less visible – this is indicated by interviews with fans and experts. This is the case to a considerable extent for the area of right-wing extremism. The right-wing extremist scene has changed its strategy and communicates using hidden codes of right-wing extreme attitudes and a corresponding symbol system which often is only recognisable to insiders. This puts high demands on fan project workers, stewards, and fan supporters because they first have to learn this expert knowledge which is normally not available to them.

Racism is also still just as present in the premier league stadiums. It has however also taken on other, less obvious forms, besides the direct insulting of spectators which still exists (as we saw in the recent events of the 2005/2006 season). Subtle racism can be recognised in that black and also East European players are more readily criticised by fans and have to perform better than German or West European players. If black players are criticised, they are likely to be de-personalised and thus change from an individual to a black man.

Racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism are certainly perceived in the stadium and partly critically discussed. Homophobia and sexism however are much less perceptible and also less often questioned. Thus, a hierarchy of discrimination has developed – although homophobia and sexism are more prevalent in stadiums than xenophobia and right-wing extremism. Homophobic fan songs belong particularly to the standard repertoire in many football stadiums and are not questioned. At the same time, football belongs to one of the last social bastions in which homosexuality is generally a taboo. Sexist merchandising articles are very common and are considered as a “normal” part of football culture.

3. Results: Counter Strategies

As reasons for the decline in racist and right-wing extremist spectator behaviour, changes in football culture are also named in interviews besides the explicit counter strategies and the self regulation mechanisms in the fan scene. These are things such as the stronger presence and normality of black players in the teams and the “civilisation” of football through the “eventisation” which increasingly attracts the middle class into the stadiums to whom the “culture of insults” is alien.

Counter strategies can be differentiated by agent and type of strategy. Important agents are fan projects, police, clubs, associations, fan initiatives and fans. Counter strategies are available in the area of pedagogical work, campaign work, self regulation mechanisms, rules, sanctions as well as networking. There are no panaceas for work against right-wing extremism, racism and xenophobia. Continuous work with different approaches and a constructive, networking cooperation between the agents is necessary.

Since the beginning of the eighties, the associations – DFB, but also some federal state associations, too – have highlighted the problem with right-wing extremism and racism in the stadiums and tried to work against these problems on various levels. Since the end of the nineties, the DFB has gone from more singular campaigns over to the development of a comprehensive concept against racist tendencies in football stadiums and to consistent involvement of the premier league clubs. It has agreed on a 10 point plan against racism which, among other things, advises implementing an antiracism paragraph in the stadium rules and requires a clear positioning of the club against racism. The DFB participates in the FIFA and UEFA

conferences against racism and thus can promote the implementation of international resolutions against racism in the premier league.

Self regulation mechanisms in the fan scene are a considerably important aspect in the development of counter strategies. They must be sustainably supported. “Politics doesn’t belong in the stadium” is an argument of many fans to prevent racist and rightwing extremist statements. However, this argument is also often used to stop antiracist activities. Fans realise at the same time that racist and right-wing extremist behaviour brings negative headlines for the club. With fans or spectators who identify with the club, they are careful not to damage the club’s image and behave appropriately without necessarily identifying with the content of an anti-racist attitude.

It is clear that some of the fans intervene in racist and right-wing extremism with courage because they do not want to tolerate such discrimination and statements. These fans must be supported by the club and the fan project. This is also true for fan initiatives which act explicitly against racism and right-wing extremism in football.

Framework conditions and guidelines can be formulated for work against racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism so that this work is sustainably effective. With regard to the club, it is important that it positions itself clearly and early against racism and right-wing extremism in order to avoid an undertow effect in the fan scene. A club is only then credible in its commitment against xenophobia and right-wing extremism when it also deals with its own fans respectfully and democratically and continually works on the racism theme instead of only reacting whenever there is a problem which is publicised by the media.

Building blocks for the work against racism have been developed through the study based on interview analysis. They should be implemented in the daily work. Fan projects are confronted with numerous tasks with the result that anti-racist work is often pushed aside and violence prevention is favoured. The complexity of the subject and the necessary expertise regarding right-wing extremism, which is often not available in sufficient quantity, add to the difficulties.

The functioning communication between the different agents connected with the stadium is of high importance. Practical examples show how breakdowns in communication, e.g. between the club and the fan project, reduce the effectiveness of the work or even inhibit activities. The determination of responsibilities and the networking of the agents are very important in this context. It must be clear to all the agents that anti-racism has to be understood as a cross-section task and not as a compulsory programme. Especially campaign work may not be a one-off occurrence. It must be accompanied by additional measures. Campaigns are only then credible when they are part of a continuous concept. The general rule is that the social anchoring of measures increases their effectiveness. That means that measures are particularly effective when they are developed together with the fans, or at least are supported by the fans.

Furthermore, anti-racist work means opening your own institution – for example with regard to the participation of migrants.

4. Action Recommendations

The following action recommendations are suggested for the work against racism, xenophobia and right-wing extremism

- Development of an education programme „Work for Respect and Tolerance“ for the fan
- project and regularly carrying out training and workshops for fan project workers

- Training with multipliers or key figures from the fan scene through the fan project
- Regular training of stewards, security personnel, and fan supporters especially on the subject of recent developments in right-wing extremism and training on intervention action in the stadium
- Carrying out an event day for respect and tolerance against xenophobia, sexism and
- homophobia in the premier league
- Development of a travelling exhibition on the subject of “Women, Football and Sexism”
- Establishment of a share fund to support specific activities for respect and tolerance in the fan scene
- Organising an instructor on the subject of “Xenophobia and Right-Wing Extremism“ at the fan project coordination point (KOS)
- Organising a voluntary instructor/contact person for the work for respect and tolerance in the club
- Implementation of an interdisciplinary work group for respect and tolerance on the national level.

3.3. *Sport, Racism and Citizenship*

Carine Bloch¹⁵

Founded in 1927, LICRA (the International League Against Racism and Antisemitism) fights all forms of racism, antisemitism and discrimination throughout the world. Since 1998 LICRA's Sports Commission has had two main objectives: to use sport as a tool to teach young people about citizenship, respect for others and responsibility and to combat undesirable developments in professional, amateur and non-organised sport.

Respecting one's opponents, the referee and team-mates, taking responsibility on a playing field, learning to live and develop one's potential within a group (...); there is no doubting the social and pedagogical role of sport. Sport in France, moreover, does not suffer, or at least not unduly, from discrimination: whether in amateur or professional clubs or in training centres, participating in sport and/or access to sport at high level is open to all. Today it is one of the very rare fields which continues to offer young people from the most diverse geographical, social and religious backgrounds the hope that anybody can still achieve success.

But if sport can still point the way in terms of equality of opportunity, it can likewise be a place which gives expression to undesirable racist tendencies and violence.

Since it was established, LICRA's Sports Commission has denounced the racist tendencies which are corrupting sport, football in particular, at all levels. LICRA is shattering a disturbing silence and confronting a taboo subject; LICRA, some say, is talking up epiphenomena". Since research work is confined principally to the subject of violence and does not really tackle the questions at the heart of LICRA's purpose, LICRA understood that in order to mobilise people and take effective action, its first task was to demonstrate and to convince. To do so it had to be able to quantify, qualify and analyse racist phenomena and/or the use of sport as a recruitment ground. It therefore decided to keep a record of all the information it could collect on racist incidents occurring at sporting venues. In order to classify this information, it developed a special observation tool.

I. Review of racist tendencies

1. Tools for observation and analysis

A. LICRA observation tool

LICRA has designed this observation tool to record racist incidents on and around sports grounds in all sports and at all levels of practice (professional, amateur and non-organised). The information tool was tested out in 2006 and 2007 and LICRA sections trained in its use.

The purpose of the tool is to observe:

- racist incidents and the risks of infiltration (by extremists) in professional sports;
- racist abuse/violence and incitement of racial hatred, as well as the danger of those involved in amateur sport retreating into their own communities;
- the risk of young people involved in non-organised or relatively unstructured sport being recruited (by fundamentalists, sects, the extreme right...).

The tool is a platform for collecting information obtained from a variety of sources:

¹⁵ President of LICRA, head of the Sport Committee, Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémisme

- Internal sources

Information is collected at departmental and regional level by LICRA sections (60 sections spread throughout France). The recorded incidents are validated at national level by the platform administrator, who is also responsible for archiving, consolidating and processing the data recorded.

- External sources

In addition to information collected by LICRA's sections, LICRA also relies on other sources, including:

- sports clubs and supporters' associations which contact LICRA headquarters. Since the information campaign « Racisme, se taire c'est accepter » (Racism, keeping quiet is the same as accepting) in June 2006, targeted at 22,000 football clubs in the FFF (French Football Federation), these contacts have intensified as players and spectators have become more aware of LICRA's work in this field
- the media reporting on racist acts (press, radio, television, internet) : articles are rare even if the acts are increasingly well reported
- internet forums which are monitored by LICRA
- LICRA partners (FFF, Ministry of the Interior, etc.) who have their own observation tools and exchange information with LICRA

B. Survey of communes

In 2005 LICRA decided to conduct a survey among the communes with a view to establishing another source of information. The communes can be viewed as external stakeholders which cannot be accused of partiality. Moreover, elected representatives and officials in the communes are seen to be less judges in their own case in the world of sport; because they are local, they have detailed knowledge of the ground in question.

The survey of a representative panel of 589 communes was carried out over three years, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 344 communes, that is to say 58%, responded to the survey, a high response rate compared with normal replies to surveys on subjects such as racism and antisemitism. The panel is representative of the French communes as a whole, covering the country's entire territory and involving communes of all sizes in both urban and rural settings.

The information passed on by the communes to LICRA is treated strictly confidentially. The survey consists of a five-page questionnaire covering questions on three main themes: professional football/sport, amateur football/sport and non-organised football/sport.

2. Types of incident observed

The survey of the communes reveals different types of incident according to the sport and level of play. Over the 344 communes who replied, 44% have observed problems in all sports and at all levels. The communes report that 90% of the problems observed relate to football, the most played and most popular sport.

A. In professional football and sport

a. Review

Over the three years 19 of the 48 communes which have a professional football club within their territory have responded to the survey (a response rate of 40%). Only eight of the 19 communes report racist incidents within their professional football club. This figure seems low especially since LICRA itself has been contacted by victims reporting racist incidents on the part of pseudo-supporters and/or the politicisation of some stands in relation to 20 professional clubs. Between January 2005 and June 2007, for example, LICRA recorded more than 165 examples of racism in professional football in France.

Nevertheless, as the survey has gone on mindsets have changed and tongues have loosened. In 2005 one single town had the courage to tackle the question of racism in professional football. Today there are ten or so. The systematic denunciation of these incidents has paid off; the beefing up of legislation is now showing results in and around stadia. Racism in professional football is becoming less of a taboo subject, even if the commonly expressed view that “it’s a problem for others, not for us” still persists.

Over the three years of the survey ten communes, moreover, have reported observing racism in other high-level sports, all of them collective: handball, rugby, volleyball and basketball.

b. Authors and victims

Few racist incidents take place between players on the professional football pitch. In football stadia the vast majority of incidents are observed in the stands (monkey cries, Nazi salutes, racist insults, slogans, banners...), where small organised groups mainly attack rival players and fans, notably those of colour. These organisations use football as a means to spread their hateful propaganda in an attempt to recruit new members. They also think nothing of transforming a match into a political arena, as happened in the tragic match between Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) and Tel Aviv in November 2006.

DRAMA AT PSG IN A CLIMATE OF RACISM AND ANTISEMITISM

Press release 24/11/06

LICRA strongly condemns the multiple incidents of violence, racism and antisemitism which occurred yesterday during the UEFA Cup match between PSG and the Israeli club Hapoël Tel Aviv.

LICRA denounces, as it has done for a number of years, the climate of insecurity and terror (racist and anti-Semitic violence, attacks on immigrants, lynchings...) which prevails at every match at the Parc des Princes. Since the beginning of the season LICRA has noted a real hardening of racist aggression at PSG and escalating violence.

During and after the match yesterday evening hundreds of Parisian supporters shouted anti-Semitic insults such as “dirty Jew!”, “death to Jews” and “Heil Hitler”, accompanied by multiple Nazi salutes, according to several witnesses who contacted LICRA this morning. “Gangs of 10 to 15 youths, some armed with knives, gave chase to Jewish supporters once the match had ended”, they added.

LICRA calls on the authorities without delay to launch a thorough investigation into the circumstances which led to the death of a supporter after the match and saw another seriously injured. For LICRA this tragedy is further evidence of the failure of the Local Security Contract (CLS) applying to the Parc des Princes which was put in place in June 2004 and the limits of

an ambiguous policy pursued by the Parisian club for almost 20 years in the face of these intolerable developments.

Fortunately the drama of this match and the events surrounding it has also had a galvanising effect. Stricter legislation in relation to sports facilities has led to two phenomena: a reduction in the number of offences committed inside stadia and the displacement of racist phenomena from inside to the outside of stadia. Now violent and racist incidents take place on the fringes of the match: rival supporters (the famous fights), spectators and passers-by are now attacked or subjected to abuse, generally because of the colour of their skin or their religion.

B. In amateur football and sport (federal and non-organised)

148 communes (43% of the communes who took part in the survey) report that they are aware of racist acts at amateur level. The problems are different from those in professional football where racism mainly emanates from particular supporters in the stands. In amateur sport there are many more racist acts committed on the field (almost one in two). For the most part these are similar to those observed in civil society, exacerbated by the tensions of the game and/or local and parochial rivalries. The data collected from the communes in relation to amateur and non-organised sport highlight three main phenomena:

- Racism, antisemitism and homophobia

Racism and antisemitism are widespread: over the three years of the inquiry the municipalities informed LICRA of nearly 1300 racist and anti-Semitic acts. Insults are commonplace and unfortunately too rarely recorded by referees in their match reports. Acts of aggressions are becoming more and more numerous and, above all, violent.

As far as homophobia is concerned, it is becoming increasingly recognised as a major (and worrying) phenomenon in the world of football. 10% of communes admit to being aware of problems linked to a refusal of some to accept the sexual orientation of others (a significant increase over the 2% revealed in the 2005-2006 inquiry). Measures still need to be put in place.

A number of communes have also reported cases of discrimination against women. Young women, notably Muslim women, are sometimes refused access to sport as a result of cultural and family traditions. Sexism accounts for 10% of the acts committed in amateur sport.

- Retreating back into the community

The existence of community clubs is not a new phenomenon. In France, a country which attaches greater importance to integration than to assimilation, these have up to now been clubs open to all communities. Since 2000, however, LICRA has observed a trend for these clubs to refocus on their original community. This trend is a response to fear on the part of the victims of racist acts, who prefer to belong to a community club. 30% of the communes who replied to the survey confirm that they have observed such a trend. It is also clear, nevertheless, that towns and cities in general oppose the establishment of such teams which are contrary to the values of the Republic.

There is also another phenomenon: 20% of the municipalities have observed a rise in tension between urban and rural teams which reveals a fracture between the two environments. The fact that one side includes very mixed populations while on the other side minorities are underrepresented is frequently a source of conflict.

- Recruitment by fundamentalist groups

A further type of problem affects amateur and non-organised sport: the recruitment of young people by fundamentalist groups.

15% of the communes who took part in the survey report attempts by fundamentalist groups (90% of cases) or sects (10% of cases) to recruit young people. The communes report difficulties in gathering information on this phenomenon because it is hard to identify and to observe. As a result, the figures communicated in the survey seem significantly below the real situation. The enrolment process is often the same. The fundamentalists practise a form of infiltration within a group (community or other), propagating their malevolent ideas. They use sport, sometimes relying on a sporting structure, as a vehicle to transmit their message and introduce religious practices into sport.

Street football or indoor football (futsal) is the sport which is most affected by this mechanism. It also affects other sports such as body building and combat sports which are very popular in deprived areas and which provide fertile ground for this type of activism.

II. LICRA activities in France

1. Speaking out and mobilising people

A. Warning about racist tendencies amongst young people

LICRA gets involved with young people on a daily basis in order to raise their awareness about problems of racism, antisemitism and discrimination early on. This involvement takes place in primary and secondary schools, six-form colleges, and training centres run by professional clubs. In total, awareness-raising work has been carried out amongst 280,000 young people since 1999 through sport or in a sporting context.

LICRA develops instruments and organises specific events in order to work in depth with young people on issues like those of respect, citizenship and individual responsibility. It has organised, for example:

- Prevention workshops in connection with films like *Le foot pour la tolérance* ("football for tolerance"), which was produced by LICRA in 2002
- Speeches and discussions with testimony from well-known sporting figures
- Educational tournaments on the subject of citizenship with debates and activities (charters) in the context of matches

Another instrument used is a partnership agreement between LICRA and the UCPF (Union of Professional Football Clubs), which was signed in 2007. This agreement provides in particular for prevention work using an educational guide, but also the exchange of information concerning racist acts, along with an annual assessment of application of the Charter against Racism signed in 2005. The guide, published in the framework of this cooperation, allows events to be organised in the 40 training centres run by the clubs in the first and second divisions. The idea of these is to raise the awareness of young people concerning the problems of racism in general and within their own sporting field in particular.

B. Raising awareness amongst the general public

a. Organising conferences

Throughout the year, LICRA organises conferences to inform the general public about the dangers of racism and antisemitism, in order to raise awareness and mobilise people. These conferences highlight the different forms of these phenomena observed by LICRA and pro-

vide a framework for action in combating this scourge. In 2007, 55 events of this type were organised at local level by LICRA's branches in the context of sporting events.

b. Running communication campaigns

LICRA runs communication campaigns in order to mobilise the silent majority and combat the tendency to play down racist phenomena in sport.

The first information campaign was run in 2002. The slogan of the campaign was *Mettons le racisme hors-jeu! Mettons la violence hors-jeu!* ("Let's put racism out of the game! Let's put violence out of the game!").

In 2006, a large-scale operation was launched in partnership with the Ministry of Youth, Sport and Voluntary Sector and the French Football Federation. The slogan "racisme, se taire c'est accepter" ("racism: keeping quiet is accepting it") was displayed on tens of thousands of posters (accompanied by an information leaflet), encouraging witnesses or victims of racism to speak out. In the framework of this campaign, the 22,000 French football clubs were called on to take action.

In the field of professional football, LICRA initiated a campaign in 2006-2007 entitled *pseudo supporter rest chez toi* ("pseudo supporter: stay at home!"). This campaign centres on two film clips intended to be broadcast via the media or directly in sporting venues. It is also possible to view these films via www.licrafoot.com (making them accessible to as many people as possible). The Paris Saint-Germain Football Club (PSG) got involved with this campaign by showing the clips and distributing leaflets at a match in February 2007. This campaign is rounded off by an educational interview with one of the two actors, which can be used by LICRA activists in their prevention work in schools and sporting clubs. Cinemas in twenty cities in France also showed these films during the educational weeks against racism in March 2007.

2. Mobilising different stakeholders and managing partnerships

Since 2005, LICRA has observed a tangible increase in awareness amongst those active in the sporting world of the existence of racist tendencies and their consequences. Thus, LICRA is regularly consulted and organises events in partnership with these stakeholders.

A. Public Institutions

LICRA organises events in partnership with public institutions to fight against racism.

The association organises training seminars aimed at elected representatives and those working in the fields of sport and security for local and regional authorities. The aim of these training seminars is to provide instruments or advice to the participants on identifying and combating racism. In 2006 and 2007, for example, 900 elected and non-elected representatives of regional authorities took part in such seminars.

LICRA and the local authorities also organise awareness-raising projects (debates, sporting tournaments...).

And some local authorities get more deeply involved and sign agreements. The goal of these agreements is to mobilise stakeholders over the long term. These partnership agreements signed by LICRA and the various stakeholders usually provide for monitoring, awareness-raising and sanctions in response to racism. LICRA has worked, for example, with the Midi-Pyrénées public service training and career development agency, the regional and departmen-

tal authority for youth and sports in Charente-Maritime, the French forum for urban security, sports and regional development and numerous regional authorities (city of Nantes, Rhône-Alpes regional council, etc.)

B. Campaigns in cooperation with football organisations

LICRA establishes partnerships in order to organise awareness-raising and communication campaigns, as well as campaigns to promote vigilance with regard to racism and ensure sanctions for those involved.

In the field of professional football, LICRA has partnerships with:

- The UCPF (Union of Professional Football Clubs)
- Professional football clubs (HAC, Lens, PSG, Tours, Stade de Reims...)

In the field of amateur football, LICRA cooperates with:

- the FFF (French Football Federation)
- the football leagues (Rhône-Alpes, Nord Pas de Calais, etc.)
- the districts (Dordogne, ...)
- numerous amateur clubs
- fan associations ("les Doggies" in Lille, "les West Dragons" in Toulouse...)

LICRA also has links with the DTNA (the central referees' organisation), the UNFP (professional footballers' union) and UNECATEF (the national union of professional coaches and technical employees in football).

3. Legal and legislative campaigns

A. Legislative activities

a. Ministry of Sport

Since 1998, LICRA has had regular meetings with the Ministry of Sport. During the amendments to the Sports Law in 2000, LICRA's proposals were taken up, allowing anti-racist associations to act as a joint plaintiff in court cases on behalf of victims.

b. Ministry of the Interior

Since its creation in 1998, LICRA's sports committee has had regular meetings with the Ministry of the Interior, giving it an opportunity to feed in its perspectives on issues of stadium safety and the battle against racism and violence. The association had expressed its desire to see the toughening of sanctions for those responsible for racist chants or violence in stadiums. In the framework of the fight against terrorism, a law was brought into force in July 2006: this law allows associations or groups of violent and/or racist fans to be dissolved. A LICRA proposal was fed into the law: LICRA had pointed out the fact that most problematic fans were not part of associations as defined by the 1901 law.

B. Work on sporting disciplinary codes

LICRA has questioned the FFF on a number of occasions concerning its disciplinary code for racist behaviour during a match. LICRA has called on the FFF to ensure that acts of a racist nature are labelled as such and treated separately from other forms of violence, as it the case in criminal cases (where they are treated as aggravating circumstances). The provisions were amended to this end in 2006: they now provide for a 6-match suspension for players and a 5-month suspension for managers, trainers or other officials involved in using racist language.

THE KEBE AFFAIR: AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT

Press Release, 15/10/07

LICRA welcomes the decision taken today by the disciplinary committee of the LFP (Professional Football League) to subtract one point from SC Bastia's points in League 2 due to racist behaviour demonstrated by certain fans in the context of the away-match in Libourne Saint-Seurin on 14 September last year.

This sanction, for an offence which, it should be stressed, is illegal under French law, represents a cultural revolution in French professional football, due to its unique and novel nature. LICRA would like to point out, however, that strict application of FIFA's disciplinary code would require the subtraction of three points for the first racist offence, or six points or relegation for re-offenders. Nevertheless, this decision was able to achieve a small degree of clarity, following the grotesque way in which the Baros affair was dealt with, which was incomprehensible to everyone.

Finally, LICRA believes, as stated recently by Michel Platini, President of UEFA and the DNA (national association of referees), that temporary or permanent interruption of a match in cases where racism has been observed will remain a further instrument in the battle against racism in football.

C. Protection of victims

a. In the legal sphere

LICRA is regularly contacted by victims of or witnesses to racist actions in sport. The association assists them free of charge in their proceedings. It advises them in taking legal action. LICRA can also join victims as a co-plaintiff if they so desire. For example, in 2006, it joined Paris Saint-Germain football club as a co-plaintiff at the trial of supporters who had unfurled a racist banner.

b. In the field of sport

Alongside these legal proceedings, LICRA also offers its expertise to victims and sporting authorities within the framework of disciplinary commissions.

In addition, LICRA has the power to refer any racist action in and around football stadiums to the national council for ethics in football. LICRA's regional branches are also heard by the football ethics commissions at département and regional level.

III. LICRA's activities at international level

1. Rule changes and a resolution

A. Football's international governing bodies

In 2006, football's international governing bodies, FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) and UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), took action against racism by introducing measures to increase the penalties for racist behaviour on the pitch and around football stadiums. The FARE Network, of which LICRA is a member, was consulted concerning the introduction of more severe penalties in cases of racism. FIFA intends in future to impose stadium bans and deduct points in the case of racist behaviour by a player, manager, official or supporter. UEFA is planning to impose suspensions of up to five matches for players who make racist remarks.

B. The European Parliament

LICRA regularly lobbies the European Parliament on issues relating to racism in sport. For example, in 2000, the association participated in working groups of the European Commission which led to the resolution on preventing racism, xenophobia and intolerance in sport.

In March 2006, a resolution on tackling racism in European football was signed by Members of the European Parliament. This resolution was the fruit of exchanges and consultations with the FARE Network. LICRA collected more than 50 signatures from French MEPs in support of the adoption of this resolution.

2. Activities within the FARE Network

For over five years, LICRA has been working with FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe), the European network of associations against racism in football, which has a special partnership with FIFA, UEFA and the European Parliament on issues of racism. As a result, the network can make proposals at legislative and regulatory level. FARE is also involved in international competitions (World and European Cups). The Swiss branch of LICRA has created a Sports Commission; it will be involved in the FARE Network's activities during Euro 2008, which is being jointly organised by Switzerland and Austria.

A. FARE Action Week

LICRA is charged, on behalf of the FARE Network, with running the European Action Week against racism in football held in October each year, during which hundreds of projects are organised across the continent. The 8th Action Week took place in 2007 and was the framework for around fifteen projects in France and Switzerland.

B. FARE conference

Each year, the FARE Network organises an international conference which brings together the delegates of the network and experts in tackling racism in football. Following conferences in Sheffield, Vienna and Bratislava, Paris was chosen by FARE as the venue for the conference on 19 and 20 May 2007. LICRA was responsible for organising this event, of which Michel Platini, the President of UEFA, was the patron.

130 guests thus met at the headquarters of the French Football Federation (FFF) to hold discussions about this year's theme: "Football, Diversity and Equality". The conference was attended by 80 representatives of the FARE Network, as well as representatives of French and European public authorities (the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the City of Paris), representatives of football institutions (UEFA, the FFF,

the UNFP and the UNECATEF), referees' representatives, journalists, sociologists, former professional players... with the conspicuous exception of the French Football League, a notable absentee at this conference.

This European conference involved two days of reflection and exchange on how to tackle racism in football more effectively. The central issues raised included: those at the top setting an example, the lack of diversity in football's decision-making bodies in Europe, the scandal of the trafficking and exploitation of young African footballers, a real awareness of the problem of homophobia, and the harmonisation at European level of antiracism legislation and sporting rules.

Finally, in September 2007 in Vienna, FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe) made LICRA a member of its administration group, thus making the antiracism association one of the most important organisations within the network.

3. Trafficking in young African footballers

A. Current situation

More and more young African players are drawn to the major European championships, against the background of poor prospects of a future in sport in their country of origin. These young people – sometimes pushed into this by their families, who see in them hope for social and economic advancement – are often manipulated by unscrupulous local or European agents. They leave for Europe whilst still minors to take part in trials, on simple tourist visas. If they do not pass the trials, they usually find themselves abandoned in the country illegally, without papers, without money, and without access to social security benefits. Today, thousands of such young people, forgotten by all, wander across Europe, travelling from country to country. They are often unable to return to Africa with dignity, and/or they prefer to remain illegally in Europe rather than returning home and having to bear the “dishonour” of their family.

This situation was described as “alarming” by UEFA at the “Play Fair With Sport” conference in 2006. It is to be feared that the situation may deteriorate if nothing is done. Furthermore, the successful examples of a few African players such as Samuel Eto'o and Didier Drogba encourage young Africans to take this route, without having been warned about the risks.

B. Actions taken to date

In November 2006, the first International Conference on Young African Footballers was held in Enghien-les-Bains, organised by Culture Foot Solidaire in partnership with LICRA. It brought together numerous stakeholders in the world of football: institutions such as UEFA, the UCPF (Union of Professional Football Clubs), associated networks such as FARE, as well as former sports players such as Salif Keita, the first winner of the African Player of the Year award, and Aimé Jacquet, manager of the 1998 World Cup winners. This conference allowed a light to be shone on this serious problem, linked globally to North/South immigration. The FARE (Football Against Racism in Europe) conference organised by LICRA in May 2007 (see above) also offered a forum for tackling this problem.

Furthermore, LICRA's legal service, in partnership with Culture Foot Solidaire, works throughout the year to help young victims in their administrative and legal proceedings, offering them assistance and advice.

Finally, the MEPs Ivo Belet, Jean-Luc Bennahmias, Adeline Hazan, Guy Bono and Patrick Gaubert, president of LICRA, submitted a written declaration concerning the fight against the

trafficking and exploitation of children in football to the European Parliament on 28 March, with the aim of drawing the attention of sporting and political authorities to this catastrophic situation.

4. Individual activities

Examples:

LICRA worked with the FES (Friedrich Ebert Foundation) on preparations for the 2006 World Cup (work with French supporters).

It coordinated the “social cohesion” group of the Agenda 21 for Paris’ 2012 Olympic bid.

3.4. Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat them

Rafal Pankowski¹⁶

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I would like to share with you some reflections on certain aspects of football culture in Poland and in East-Central Europe at large. It seems that football is in fact a good exemplification of both the dangers and the positive potential that can be identified in contemporary popular culture. It is popular culture that constructs and moulds identities today and any serious initiative aiming at social change needs to take this factor into account.

In this context I would like to tell you about something positive that has happened in football culture in Poland in the recent years. Antisemitism is, unfortunately, still very much present in Polish football. Nevertheless, the number of antisemitic manifestations has decreased significantly, not least thanks to joint efforts of the "NEVER AGAIN" Association and the Polish Football Association. We are currently trying to replicate our example of good practice across the region of Central and Eastern Europe, working hand in hand with bodies such as Football Against Racism in Europe and UEFA.

Problems of racism, and antisemitism in particular, are part of every day life in Eastern Europe to an extent no longer encountered in many Western states. Until recently no other arena in Poland seemed to have been affected so deeply by racism and antisemitism as football grounds. An antisemitic subculture dominated the stadiums almost completely, with rival gangs routinely calling each other's clubs "Jewish." (NB. "Jewish" here is a term of abuse. It happens despite the fact that the real number of Jews in Poland today is of course very small.) Anti-racist efforts to counteract this trend were initially met with indifference or even hostility by football officials.

The media covered the issue of football hooliganism. What they rarely mentioned, however, was the successful penetration of hooligan circles by racist ideology as well as by organized neo-fascist groups. The display of Celtic crosses and other Nazi-skinhead symbols at football games had become commonplace in the 1990s.

The issue was vividly illustrated in March 2000 in Lodz, an industrial city with two big football clubs, LKS and Widzew. Antisemitic and Nazi graffiti, often combined with the clubs' symbols, was present almost everywhere on the city's walls and little action was taken until a shocked visitor, the chairman of an Israeli organisation of former Lodz inhabitants (most of them survivors of the Lodz Ghetto), wrote an open letter to the local authorities.

Alerted to the fact that the city's international reputation was at stake, the authorities, together with the local media organized a much publicized action day, to clean the offensive slogans off the walls. However, in an act of extreme defiance the same evening, neo-Nazis showed their contempt for such initiatives. They daubed "Judens raus" and symbols of the neo-fascist party, National Revival of Poland (NOP) on the home of Marek Edelman, the last surviving commander of the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto uprising and a leader of the Solidarity movement in the 1980s.

After outrage in the national media, Poland's president wrote a letter to Edelman offering him personal security guards. Edelman publicly rejected the offer, saying the government should rather look at its own policy of tolerating neo-fascist groups. He also pointed to the daily discrimination suffered by Roma people and refugees.

¹⁶ "Never Again" Association, Collegium Civitas, Poland

The NOP, involved in the attack, is the main extreme-right organization that has tried to organize football hooligans into "national-revolutionary" cadres, through leafleting and displaying its symbols at stadiums.

In this context one has to add the entire football hooligan subculture is very strongly violence-oriented. The numbers attending league games are rather small. Because of that, it became much easier for an extremist minority to win cultural (and physical) hegemony on the terraces.

The lust for violence and the frustration of young, predominantly working class, youths involved in football hooliganism, is easily channelled by extreme-right activists who provide them with a sense of purpose.

Hooligan gang leaders seem sympathetic to the cause, too. One editor of a prominent hooligan publication stated in an interview: "Fascism is not a horrible idea. I think that national socialism is a necessary and only means of purifying the ranks of some groups from gypsies, punks and negroes. From everywhere I hear, it is more and more welcome at stadiums." Such ideas are translated into popular chants heard on the terraces, such as "We will do to you what Hitler did to the Jews."

Antisemitism is not the only form of prejudice widely expressed at football grounds. The problem of racism in Polish football is increasingly affecting the black players who have joined Polish clubs since the mid-1990s.

In reaction to this, the 'Let's Kick Racism Out Of The Stadiums' campaign of the 'NEVER AGAIN' Association aims to challenge racist attitudes amongst fans and promotes anti-racism at football grounds. 'NEVER AGAIN' is a broadly-based anti-racist organization that acts in other fields, too (e.g. Music Against Racism), but it has appreciated the importance of football in contemporary culture and society.

The campaign activities include regular monitoring and reporting of incidences, production of two anti-racist magazines ('Stadion' and 'Never Again' magazine) and the organizing of an annual anti-racist football tournament.

Through cooperation with the national and international media, 'NEVER AGAIN' has raised awareness of the existence of the problem of racism and antisemitism in football. Importantly, the 'NEVER AGAIN' Association has succeeded at raising awareness of the Polish FA and club officials on the issue of symbols displayed in stadiums. An anti-racist manual has been produced jointly by 'NEVER AGAIN' and the Polish FA which provides guidance for club officials and FA game observers. Since 2003 'NEVER AGAIN' has trained officials, among others through presentations at the annual conference on stadium security organized by the Polish FA.

As a result, a large number of racist and antisemitic symbols and slogans were removed from stadiums. In some cases matches were stopped and clubs were fined for racist and antisemitic behaviour of the fans.

Those measures were welcomed by public opinion and the previously silent majority of the fans. They also met with considerable resistance from the extreme right, which involved pickets of stadiums, smear publications in the radical nationalist press and other forms of pressure. Photos and personal details of activists connected with the campaign appeared on the infamous Nazi hit list Redwatch which is still available on the Internet. When the far-right gained access to the Polish government in 2006, the pressure intensified. As late as July 2007, Sylwester Chruszcz, a Member of the European Parliament from the far-right League of Polish Families, demanded the ban on extreme-right symbols in stadiums be lifted. Similar demands were voiced by other radical nationalist groups, such as the All-Polish Youth, the National

Rebirth of Poland and the Polish National Party. In this context the intervention by UEFA President Michel Platini who personally supported “NEVER AGAIN” and the FA in their firm stand on the issue of racist symbols was important and valuable.

The activity of 'NEVER AGAIN' has been endorsed by, among others, Emanuel Olisadebe, Poland's first black international and many other prominent role models: players and public figures. Educational activities were organized at grass-roots level, including numerous local tournaments and the distribution of thousands of posters with football stars expressing their opposition to racism and antisemitism. They were received enthusiastically by the young football fans and a growing network of anti-racist football fans has appeared.

It is hoped that such anti-racist work in Polish football can be sustained and new successful projects can be inspired and supported in other Central and Eastern European countries, too.

Anti-racist initiatives in Eastern Europe are very much needed but there is often little chance for them to obtain local funding. In October 2003 it was decided that the funds received by the FARE network from the MTV Free Your Mind Award would be used to aid anti-racist football projects in this region. Subsequently, ‘NEVER AGAIN’ received support from the Stand Up Speak Up campaign fund, initiated by the famous player Thierry Henry.

This support has been used both for the enhancement of the above mentioned activities in Poland and for the promotion of anti-racism in and through football in the region. 'NEVER AGAIN' is well qualified for the task: it has highly competent activists and it has accumulated years of experience working at both the national and the international level. It has also experienced being active in a hostile environment, coming a long way from the initial refusal to acknowledge the problem of racism and antisemitism by authorities and media alike, to the gradual acceptance of the need for anti-racist measures. 'NEVER AGAIN' has established numerous contacts with anti-racist initiatives in the region, including fan groups and ethnic minorities. It serves as a contact point for the development of anti-racist football projects in Eastern Europe with a special emphasis on the former Soviet Union. In each of these countries the experiences of ‘NEVER AGAIN’ and FARE are shared in the field of combating racism in and through football to encourage local football-related anti-racist initiatives. The 'NEVER AGAIN' Association provides assistance to the other organizations in the region in terms of guidance, advice, inspiration, and material to be used in their activities. We act as consultants and experts for the national and local initiatives.

The growing number of events taking place in the region during the Football Against Racism in Europe Week of Action in October each year is an optimistic sign.

There is still much to be done, but important progress has been made and one has to state the unchallenged cultural hegemony of racism and antisemitism in many stadiums is a thing of the past. As a growing number of examples show, football can be used as a positive means to construct inclusive identity instead of being a tool of violent exclusion and hatred.

3.5. *Antisemitic Tendencies in Football and Successful Strategies to Combat them*

Gregor Rosenthal¹⁷

1. Introduction and background

Antisemitism is one of the oldest forms of discrimination in the football environment (Endemann 2002, p. 80). It reached its catastrophic peak in the first half of the 20th century with the persecution of Jewish players and the ban on traditional clubs in Germany and Austria.¹⁸ But the history of antisemitism in Germany did not end in 1945 with liberation from National Socialism. Stereotypes, prejudices and often latent but in some cases overt hostility towards Jews are still part of social reality in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Public attention has recently turned increasingly to the antisemitic tendencies that are apparent in football, as in other walks of life, and which exist despite the numerically insignificant presence and low level of active participation of Jewish players and clubs in the German game.¹⁹

Nowadays, antisemitism in German football is mainly expressed in the form of verbal abuse from opposing (non-Jewish) teams and their fans, and biased referees. For example, the *U-Bahn-Lied* ("Subway Song" – "We'll build a subway to Auschwitz") frequently features in the repertoire of songs sung at matches by various fan groups, and in some stadiums, referees are accustomed to being subjected to abuse that includes the word "Jew". The desecration of a Jewish cemetery by football fans (Endemann 2002, p. 81) and the public vilification of supposedly "Jewish clubs"²⁰ and openly Jewish footballers and teams are other expressions of the prejudices and negative attitudes which still exist towards Judaism.

Whereas public pressure and a high media presence, together with preventive and punitive measures by the clubs themselves, have been successful in clamping down on the problem in the higher divisions, the lower leagues in the amateur game are often impotent when confronted with the problem, due to their less rigorous security measures and their frequent lack of experience in dealing with antisemitic or racist incidents.

The Jewish football association Maccabi Germany [*TuS Makkabi Deutschland e.V.*] and its local clubs in the regional leagues are regularly subjected to antisemitic incidents. For example, games involving Maccabi clubs often involve antisemitic abuse from opposing fans, while goals scored by Maccabi players meet with comments like "clear off to Auschwitz!" or "your granny died in Auschwitz" from the opposing team's players. An entry in TuS Makkabi Düsseldorf's guest book, for example, says: "Haven't the Jewish moneybags sent enough German heroes to be slaughtered in the First and Second World Wars?"²¹ International conflicts, too, are increasingly being played out in matches between Jewish clubs and those with players from an Islamic migrant background. As Alon Meyer, President of Makkabi Frankfurt, told the daily broadsheet FAZ, the club's youth teams are subjected "all too often, unfor-

¹⁷ Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – Gegen Extremismus und Gewalt (BfDT)

¹⁸ For example, Julius Hirsch, one of the great pre-war players for the German national team as well as for the football clubs Karlsruher FV (1910) and Spielvereinigung Fürth (1914), was deported to Auschwitz-Birkenau in 1943 and murdered. In Austria, the National Socialists closed down the legendary SC Hakoah soccer team in Vienna and murdered its captain Max Scheuer, who had led the side to championship victory in 1925.

¹⁹ The Jewish clubs are the 24 football departments, with around 3000 members, of *Makkabi Deutschland* – the Jewish Gymnastics and Sport Association in Germany [*Jüdischer Turn- und Sportverband in Deutschland e.V.*], all of which play in the amateur leagues. In all, 25,869 clubs and 6,490,008 members are registered with the German Football Association (www.dfb.de).

²⁰ Clubs such as Eintracht Frankfurt, Bayern Munich and Stuttgarter Kickers, which had Jewish connections in the past, are often subjected to antisemitic abuse.

²¹ Entry in the Online Guestbook of TuS Makkabi Düsseldorf, 25.11.2007

tunately", to antisemitic abuse – mainly from young Muslims rather than from the extreme right.²²

Antisemitism is certainly not only encountered in football; on the contrary, it is a problem in society as a whole. But football – as a melting pot which brings together the most diverse social groups, and a mass movement with a strong social integration function – plays a major role in the socialization process, especially among young people, and therefore has a particular responsibility in this context. As a microcosm of wider society, football casts many of society's problems and ills – including racist and antisemitic tendencies – into sharp relief. Over recent years, the game has recognised this fact and has stepped up its efforts to promote tolerance and peaceful social relations and kick racism, discrimination and antisemitism out of football.

Particularly in light of the crimes committed in the name of the German people, combating antisemitism is a task for society as a whole and has the highest priority. Civil society actors from various sectors, who are committed to tackling this problem intensively, have established a number of successful strategies and practice-oriented approaches to combat antisemitic tendencies. The particular strength of the Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence (BfDT), as a key point of contact and impetus for civil society, is that it can tap into this wealth of experience for football as well. The key question here is: how can tried and trusted strategies and methods to combat antisemitism be transferred from other areas of civil society to football and its structures? Who are the key points of contact – in government structures or civil society – that the football establishment can approach to find out about strategies, practice-oriented know-how and best-practice models?

2. Antisemitism: a priority topic

The Alliance's mandate is to bring together and network civic engagement for democracy and tolerance and against extremism and violence, and to publicize the related activities. Since it was launched by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Ministry of Justice on 23 May 2000, the Alliance has supported best-practice projects by civil society organizations and initiatives that work for tolerance, openness and diversity as the hallmarks of a liberal society.

Combating extremism and antisemitism are key priorities in the Alliance's work. Through the Alliance, we support civil society engagement in these areas, firstly by collecting and publicizing best-practice projects against antisemitism – e.g. through our "Active for Democracy and Tolerance" Best Practice Competition – and recommending them to others and granting them financial awards. Secondly, we support practical civil society engagement by groups and individuals who want to tackle antisemitism at local level. For those who are not yet actively involved, we identify ways to participate through successful practice-oriented approaches which they can replicate.

Reflecting its important contribution to practical democracy-building, the Alliance last year gave greater priority to the topic of "tolerance in sport". The particular focus of this expansion of its agenda is to combat racism, xenophobia and antisemitism in football. Our approach is to offer stakeholders in the game ideas and impetus to facilitate their practical work with clubs at local level. To this end, we organize events and forums where practitioners and volunteers can exchange ideas and work together with experienced civil society actors to develop solutions to the problems in football. We also identify successful models from other areas of civil society which can be applied to football as well. The 2006 World Cup, which was hosted by

²² "Wir dürfen uns nicht einschüchtern lassen" ["We must not be intimidated"], FAZ.net, 10.09.2007

Germany, is just one positive example of how football can foster a climate of tolerance, openness and a sense of belonging.

3. Projects and cooperation relating to "tolerance in sport"

As one of our key events relating to the topic of "tolerance in sport", the Alliance joined forces with the *Koordinierungsstelle Fanprojekte* (KOS) [Fan Project Coordination Unit] and the "Stay on the Ball" ["*am Ball bleiben*"] project launched by German Sport Youth [*Deutsche Sportjugend*] and organized a nationwide conference for football clubs, called "Making the clubs strong – what we can do about discrimination and racism in football clubs" ["*Vereine stark machen - Was tun gegen Diskriminierung und Rassismus im Fußballverein?*"], which took place in Halle (Saale) in November 2007. The event attracted around 150 delegates from all over Germany. For the first time, representatives of the amateur game – from the presidents to the youth coaches, committed fans and civil society initiatives – came together to develop joint strategies for action. Various conflict management methodologies were presented to give amateur clubs a new tool in the fight against discrimination and racism, and new networks were established. The broad mix of delegates and their active contributions to the event underlined, very impressively, the importance of this topic for society as a whole. For example, five forums were held in which delegates looked at ways of dealing with abusive language and various forms of discrimination on the football pitch, and the various manifestations of right-wing extremism and its code were also explored. This spring, a manual will be produced to provide practical guidance for new supporters' initiatives, especially during the often very difficult start-up phase.

In February 2008, the Alliance will hold a national event in Hanover with various other partners. This time, the theme is "Integration – the most important challenge in Football?!" The issues to be explored by the delegates will include cultural diversity and intercultural skills, as well as inter-ethnic conflicts in football clubs. As a particular focus, the event will look at ways of transferring civil society strategies for intercultural learning to the football arena, and how football can become more open to other actors working in the field of integration.

A further example of practical democracy-building in sport is our "Team Time" project, a joint initiative between the Alliance and the German Basketball Association, which was carried out for the first time with numerous regional civil society partners in summer 2007 as part of the Street Basketball Tour in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. The aim of the project was to encourage young people to engage with each other in a spirit of tolerance and non-violence in a sporting environment. To this end, besides the sporting and musical activities available at various venues, we provided information and advice and ran "Opportunities Markets" which offered young people the chance to get involved in volunteering. There are plans to continue this combination of sport and political education later in the year, this time in a different federal state.

Well-functioning networks are a key basis for an effective, coordinated and cooperative approach to tolerance and fair play in football. Network-building supports the dialogue between all stakeholders and partners in football. However, there is also a need for greater openness towards other civil society organizations which are often confronted with the same problems, as this offers the opportunity to learn from each other and adopt a sustainable approach to dealing with violence, racism and antisemitism. In order to support this goal, the Alliance has been represented from the outset in the Expert Group "For Tolerance – Against Racism and Xenophobia" set up by the DFB Task Force. Since September 2007, this expert group has become a permanent feature of the DFB structures. The Alliance is the main governmental and civil society representative in the DFB Working Group "For Tolerance – Against Racism".

4. Dialogue and networking against antisemitism

By adopting this approach to the implementation of its agenda and through its work as the key contact point and impetus for civil society, the Alliance can act as the interface between sport, the government's activities and civic engagement for tolerance and against extremism in football. The Alliance is thus working to bring together civil society's well-established models to combat discrimination, extremism and antisemitism, and the agencies concerned, with the actors and organizations involved in football, and to do so in as practical a manner as possible. We believe – and our experience backs this up – that this exchange of experience and the synergies which it creates offer a great opportunity to devise successful new strategies to combat antisemitism in football and take existing solutions to the next level.

So which civil society models can be used in football?

- As one example, civil society groups and football clubs could work together to develop materials for referees, coaches and other club officials which identify antisemitism and racism in football and outline measures to combat them. An outstanding model here is the "Task Force: Education on Antisemitism" coordinated by the American Jewish Committee (AJC). This Task Force promotes exchange about current forms of antisemitism and develops appropriate teaching methods for schools and the non-school education sector, taking account of practical experience and conceptual approaches developed by individual network members, including groups such as the Amadeu Antonio Foundation or the "Educational Building Blocks against Antisemitism [*BildungsBausteine gegen Antisemitismus*]" project run by the Berlin-Brandenburg Education Team [*Bildungsteam Berlin-Brandenburg e.V.*] and *Tacheles reden! e.V.* The latter two associations have developed a joint education programme which explores the issue of "where does antisemitism come from, and what can be done about it?", and have produced a training manual with materials, methodologies and strategies.
- The Berlin-Kreuzberg-based Initiative against Antisemitism [*Kreuzberger Initiative gegen Antisemitismus e.V.*] – which won the Alliance's Best Practice award in 2006 – focuses on antisemitism among young Berliners with a migration background and therefore deals specifically with the growing antisemitic tendencies among Muslim communities in Berlin. Intercultural teams, comprising educators with and without a migration background, undertake outreach work with Turkish, Arab and Muslim young people. In addition, teaching modules against antisemitism, which respond to the specific needs of these target groups, are developed and trialled ("educational strategies against antisemitism in a society characterised by immigration"). The initiative had promoted Turkish-Jewish dialogue in particular and makes a major contribution to combating violence and fundamentalism. The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence (BfDT) also supports the inter-faith football tournament, the Avitall Cup, in Berlin, which aims to make the game a place for fair play between Christians, Muslims, Jews and atheists.
- Other tried and tested methods to combat antisemitic tendencies through awareness-raising and education include exploring the history of National Socialism and the murderous impacts of antisemitism during the Nazi period. Encounters with present-day Jewish life and communities in Germany are also often very important in dismantling prejudice. Two projects which won awards in the Best Practice Competition in 2007 highlight these particular aspects. The *Christliches Jugenddorfwerk Chemnitz* (CJD) in Chemnitz (Saxony), which is part of the nationwide Christian Association of

Youth Villages, has been working for many years to combat racism and antisemitism among young people. With its history workshop *DenkZeichen Erzgebirge* in Saxony, the CJD is aiming to sensitize young people to the issue of antisemitism. The history workshop has established a comprehensive local history library as a basis for research work by the young people, which culminated in the laying of eight "stumbling blocks" for Jewish victims of Nazism in front of their former homes in the town of Freiberg. The Jewish Cultural Community in Hameln-Pyrmont [*Jüdische Kultusgemeinde im Landkreis Hameln-Pyrmont e.V.*] in Lower Saxony initiated a project entitled "Together against Xenophobia and Antisemitism" which aims to facilitate contacts between children and young people and Jewish culture in the city of Hamelin. This has taken place through school visits to synagogues, followed by discussions on "Judaism and life in the Jewish community today", which have given the schoolchildren the opportunity to ask a rabbi detailed questions about the Jewish faith. This approach can be transferred to football, as TuS Plettenberg, a football club from the Sauerland in western Germany, has shown: indeed, the club was awarded the German Football Association's Julius Hirsch Prize in 2007 for its commitment. The club studied the life and fate of Julius Hirsch, a Jewish German who played for the national team, and produced various texts about him for inclusion in the "*Kicker, Kämpfer, Legenden*" ["Kickers, Fighters, Legends"] exhibition. After a friendly game between the youth teams in Berlin, TuS Makkabi Berlin took part in the Julius Hirsch Cup competition organized by TuS Plettenberg in June 2007.

5. Conclusions

In efforts to combat antisemitism, football and, indeed, other sectors of society benefit from greater openness. This enables successful strategies to be developed further on a joint basis so that alongside its own measures, football can apply practice-oriented approaches from other arenas to its own structures through networking with civil society actors.

We would like to draw on the Alliance's skills in networking and dialogue to facilitate this process pro-actively through our own role as a point of contact for football clubs, associations and supporters' groups, etc. To this end, we will continue to bring representatives of the game and experienced civil society actors from other areas together, through our own projects and events, with a view to developing joint solutions. Besides the event in Hanover on "Integration – the Challenge in Football?!" we are planning a further joint event entitled "For Tolerance – Against Right-wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Antisemitism in Football" during the second half of 2008.

We also offer to share appropriate best practice models from different civil society initiatives and activities for democracy and tolerance with football bodies, in order to give them additional impetus for practical cooperation and initiatives that can be replicated, with a view to achieving the goal of more tolerance in sport.

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4. Panel: Antisemitic Tendencies in the Academic Context and Successful Strategies to Combat Them

4.1. *Hostility to Israel and Antisemitism*

David Hirsh²³

The type of antisemitism I am addressing here is that which is expressed in the language of hostility to Israel and which is not explicitly antisemitic. It is therefore necessary to make difficult judgments about what is antisemitic and what is not. Such judgments require knowledge.

Some of this antisemitism could be caused by antisemites who have discovered an apparently legitimate way of articulating their hatred of Jews. I would expect more and more such antisemites to adopt an antiracist vocabulary, as people like David Irving and David Duke are doing.

Or it could be that the strength and the particular form of hostility to Israel are partly motivated by an unconscious hatred of Jews.

But in my view the hostility to Israel is not usually a result of an underlying antisemitism. Antisemitism often begins with a healthy sense of outrage towards Israeli human rights abuses – a hostility which I share. But it often becomes a hostility to Israel, rather than its actions or policies, and it can then become a hostility to the Jews who live there, and to the Jews around the world, who seem to support it uncritically. In any case, it is not necessary to show that somebody is a Jew-hater in order to show that what they say or do is antisemitic or has antisemitic potential.

I propose to discuss a number of ways in which hostility to Israel is often expressed either with antisemitic intensity or in antisemitic ways. I am focusing on what people do and what they say. I do not think it is necessary to speculate about their secret or unconscious motivations. Contemporary antisemites do not feel that they are antisemitic; they deny that they are antisemitic; they say that they hate antisemitism as they hate all racism. These disavowals do not diminish the antisemitic threat, they exacerbate it. Contemporary antisemitism is spread by people who think that they are doing good, exposing lies, standing up against hypocrisy and institutionalized, murderous cruelty. Today's spreaders of antisemitism have the energy and the confidence of people who think that they are doing good.

We would not go far wrong if we assumed that most contemporary antisemitism starts as hostility to Israel and that antisemitism is an effect of that hostility rather than a cause. Disproportionate hostility to Israel risks licensing and legitimizing antisemitic movements. It normalizes antisemitic ways of thinking about Jews and their place in the world.

1. Singling out Israel for unique hostility.

Israel has been responsible for a large number of human rights abuses particularly associated with the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. Such an occupation can only be sustained by a regime of fear and violence. Yet Israeli human rights abuses are far from unique. Many states occupy contested territory; many states are responsible for much greater human rights

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abuse than Israel. So the sharp focus on Israeli human rights abuses, so often combined with a silence about the abundance of much greater human rights abuses around the world, is a matter of concern.

2. Defining Israel as essentially and incurably evil

Israel commits human rights abuses but it does not commit genocide. It is often, however, portrayed as being equivalent or similar to Nazi Germany. Yet there are no concentration camps, there are no gas chambers, there are no Einsatzgruppen, there is no analogy. To compare Israel to Nazi Germany is simply to say that it is uniquely evil, and more evil than other state. It is also particularly offensive since the Jews were the victims of Nazi genocide.

Israel is often portrayed, without serious analysis, as being equivalent or similar to apartheid South Africa. When this is not an honest attempt to shed light, but it becomes instead a way of designating Israel as being uniquely worthy of boycott, then this is a cause for concern.

Israel is often portrayed as being essentially racist. For example in UN fora, campaigners have insisted on defining Zionism as a form of racism. This is a way of pathologizing Zionism, of turning the word into an epithet or evil, and of claiming that it is incurably more threatening than 'normal' nationalism or other movements for national self-determination.

Israel is often portrayed as being a keystone in a global system of imperialism. All of these ways of singling Israel out have the effect of putting Israel at the centre of what is wrong with the world. Antisemites have always thought of Jews as being central to the world's ills and they have often portrayed Jews as playing a crucial part in the system of capitalist exploitation. Now, Israel is thought of as being central, and as a crucial part of imperialist exploitation. In truth, Jews and Israel are not central to anything and a worldview which finds that they are is a cause for concern.

Campaigns to boycott Israeli academics, sportspeople, artists and musicians, to exclude Israelis from the cultural and economic life of humanity, necessarily rely on some way or other of understanding Israel to be a unique evil on the planet. Such campaigns also progress from spreading the idea that Israel is uniquely threatening to attempting to set up concrete exclusions of Israelis.

3. Mirroring elements of old antisemitic rhetoric – blood libel

It used to be said that Jews used their cunning to hunt and to murder innocent children in order to use their blood for religious ritual, often in order to consume it. This was sometimes thought of as a re-enactment of the crucifixion, of the most evil act imaginable, the killing of God. Elements of these old blood libels appear in contemporary stories about the evils of Israel more frequently than could be understood to be coincidental. Israel is often portrayed as wishing to murder Palestinians; often there is no instrumental motive but it is accused of doing so out of pure malice. It is often claimed that Israel has a policy of murdering innocent children. The death of Palestinians under the age of 18 slips, in the analysis of some anti-Zionists, into a gratuitous policy of child-murder. Images are often produced which illustrate Israelis or Jews killing and / or eating children; images are often produced which combine the elements of Palestinian blood and food; stories are often circulated about Israel spreading viruses or stealing the body parts of Palestinians or having blood on its hands. Israel is often portrayed as a state which kills simply for the sake of killing.

4. Mirroring elements of old antisemitic rhetoric - conspiracy

If Jews murder children, you can be sure that they conspire to hide the fact. Conspiracy theory is the other central libel of antisemitism. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, a forged book which claims to be a report produced by the world Jewish conspiracy, has never been out of print and is still sold world-wide as a true exposé. Jews are accused of fomenting wars and revolutions in which they themselves are not prepared to kill or to die. They are presented as owing allegiance only to each other and therefore not to the communities in which they live; not to their neighbours or their class or their nation. Contemporary versions of antisemitic conspiracy myths are produced by respectable professors, are published by respectable publishers, and are considered seriously by the respectable media. Using the apparently legitimate vocabulary of the 'Israel lobby' it is possible to articulate antisemitic conspiracy theory in such a way which is not likely to be immediately recognized as antisemitic.

Those who campaign against contemporary antisemitism are accused of 'playing the antisemitism card' or 'crying antisemitism' in order to de-legitimize criticism of Israeli human rights abuses

I have called this response *The Livingstone Formulation* after the Mayor of London, who said: 'for far too long the accusation of antisemitism has been used against anyone who is critical of the policies of the Israeli government'. The *Livingstone Formulation* has become a standard response to an accusation of antisemitism and it does two things.

Firstly, it denies that there is a distinction between the criticism and the demonization of Israel. Demonization, for example, which singles out Israel for unique loathing, or which claims that Israel is apartheid or Nazi or essentially racist, or which characterizes Israel as a child-killing state, or a state which is responsible for wars around the world, or a state which is central to global imperialism, is not the same thing as criticism of Israeli government policies.

Secondly, the *Livingstone Formulation* does not simply accuse anyone who raises the issue of contemporary antisemitism of being wrong, but it also accuses them of bad faith: 'the accusation of antisemitism *has been used* against *anyone* who is critical...' [*my italics*]. Not an honest mistake, but a secret, common plan to try to de-legitimize criticism with an instrumental use of the charge of antisemitism. Crying wolf. The *Livingstone Formulation* is both a strawman argument and a charge of 'Zionist' conspiracy. It is itself an antisemitic claim. Its regular appearance is also, in itself, evidence that antisemitic ways of thinking are becoming unexceptional in contemporary mainstream discourse.

Antisemitism which is expressed as exaggerated criticism of Israel does not routinely manifest itself as violence against Jews or as a racist exclusion of Jews. Currently, it is a political form of antisemitism. It starts in particular streams of left and liberal thought and it is moving into the mainstream where it tends to meld with other antisemitic traditions. Political antisemitism which is not as self-evident as antisemitism may lead towards more recognizable forms of anti-Jewish racism, of anti-Jewish violence, and anti-Jewish exclusion.

Right now the fight against antisemitism is, therefore, a political fight, a fight over common-sense notions, a fight over public discourse. It cannot be won simply by legislating against certain ideas or forms of words; it cannot be defeated only bureaucratically. If people want to oppose antisemitism then they must win arguments about how we understand events in the Middle East. They must persuade people of the threat of rhetoric of Jewish or Zionist conspiracy. They must learn to recognize the tropes of older antisemitisms.

We cannot aspire to persuade or educate those anti-Zionists who are already certain of their own righteousness and who already believe that anybody who is concerned about antisemitism is a dishonest defender of all that is evil in the world.

Rather, we must focus our political energy and our educational effort on those who may be persuaded by such people. They must be inoculated against antisemitism. They must understand something of the history and the nature of antisemitism. They must understand something more about Israel and Palestine than the one-dimensional and half-true narratives of Israeli aggression and Palestinian victimhood which are offered, temptingly, to those who are looking for easy ways to understand what is wrong with the world and easy ways to feel that they are doing and thinking the right thing.

But the fight against antisemitism must be an antiracist fight. It must not seek to deflect demonization onto another target; it must be as horrified by anti-Arab racism or by anti-Muslim racism as it is by antisemitism. We can only oppose antisemitism effectively if we treat it as a form of racism and if we oppose all racism consistently.

4.2. *Antisemitic Radicalism: Challenges and Policy Recommendations*

Lars Rensmann²⁴

1. Definitions and Concepts

Antisemitism has become a highly contested and politically charged subject of public debate. Today, this also resonates in the academic discussion of the subject. At the same time, empirical evidence of the resilience and rise of antisemitic attitudes and extreme right political mobilizations across the European Union is abundant. Contrary to popular views, in rigid scholarly research on antisemitism there is little controversy about the ongoing relevance and increase of antisemitism as an attitudinal pattern in Germany and Europe over the last decade. However, there is much debate about a) the dependent variable of research, i.e. what counts for ‘antisemitism’ as the subject of scrutiny that is to be explained, b) the explanatory variables, i.e. about the nature and origins of antisemitism, c) the extent and relevance of antisemitism among Muslim immigrant communities, and d) the question if there is a “new” antisemitism or simply a revival of the old.

Especially these controversial dimensions will be addressed in this brief expertise about current challenges of antisemitic radicalism by the extreme right, by extremist “anti-Zionists”, and segments among ethnic minorities. The current political challenges will then be discussed. In so doing, some resilient but problematic claims about antisemitism raised in academic and public discourse are critically examined. They themselves may nourish antisemitic perceptions of social conflicts. Finally, those observations and the summary of empirical findings will lead to a distinct set of policy recommendations.

The working definition and criteria suggested by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) [now EU Agency for Fundamental Rights] offer a useful reference point. It runs counter to the polarized political debate on “inflationary” antisemitism charges, on one hand, and the denial of antisemitic phenomena altogether, on the other. According to the EUMC, “Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred towards Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed towards Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.” (EUMC 2005) In addition, the EUMC argues, such manifestations could also target Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity. Antisemitism frequently “charges Jews with conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often used to blame Jews for ‘why things go wrong’.” Beyond Nazi racial theories, the EUMC suggests criteria that point to various forms of stereotypes and anti-Jewish violence which classify as antisemitism. They include:

- Justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology
- Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as a collective – such as the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions
- Denying the Holocaust
- Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust
- Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavour

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- Applying double standards by requiring of it a behaviour not expected by any other democratic nation
- Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis (EUMC 2005)

Criticism of Israel and Israeli policies similar to those levelled against any other country, to be sure, cannot be regarded as antisemitic. Antisemitism, in turn, is a persistent “prototype of political and social resentments” which is “difficult to change” (Benz 2004).

To understand antisemitism it is necessary to a) recognize its general dimension, hence to see it as a form of collective discrimination against Jews and anti-Jewish racism, similar to other prejudices against minorities or ‘others’, b) to recognize its specific dimensions, traditions, and functions. Modern antisemitism serves as a world explanation and conspiracy theory, i.e. it “explains” and personifies the origins of social conflicts, views Jews as all-powerful but secret “string-pullers” behind the workings of modern society, as a closed community pursuing world conspiracy, suggests Jews are driving nations and the world into war, and views Jews as lazy, decadent, greedy agents of finance capitalism, globalism, and cosmopolitanism, among other things. New forms of antisemitism also suggest that “Jews exploit the Holocaust for their material purposes” (Rensmann 2005; Rensmann/Schoeps 2008).

In addition, we should differentiate between radical, manifest and latent forms of antisemitism. Liberal-democratic societies put restrictions on overt expressions of antisemitism, by legal means and/or by the discursive scope or “zone of acquiescence” (Norris 2005: 20) that defines the boundaries of democratic legitimacy of public statements and actors. In reaction to these boundaries, hate speech often adapts to democratic conditions, uses innuendo, and becomes more coded (for example, by employing the same stereotypes but replacing the term “the Jews” by “the Zionists”, “the East Coast” or, in a Stalinist tradition, the “cosmopolites”; Cohen 2007).

2. Issues and Attitudes

Antisemitism, as a set of prejudices and a binary, simplified interpretation of the social world, often marches in step with other anti-democratic, anti-constitutional and anti-pluralistic attitudes, such as ethnic nationalism, racism, and authoritarianism (Ahlheim/Heger 2000; Niedermeyer/Stöss 2005; Rensmann 2004). It is part of an authoritarian, extreme right world-view which, by pointing to “the Jew”, “explains” the modern world, social and international conflicts, perceived threats to national identity, and globalization. Antisemitism is also an integral part of the world-view of radical Islamism, which includes authoritarianism, homophobia, misogyny, racism, and hatred for democratic pluralism and constitutionalism. In addition, antisemitism can resonate in certain variants of “anti-imperialism” and “anti-Zionism” (including those sharing a left-wing self-understanding). This includes extreme left groups that show solidarity with antisemitic, Islamist groups, based on the ethnic-nationalist conception that homogenous, “rooted” peoples (Völker) are invaded by “foreign global agents” and “Zionists”.

Beyond those world-views, we face a rise of ‘everyday antisemitism’, which finds expression in random violence and an increasingly common slanderous use of the word “Jew” in society and among German youth. According to a study by the BpB (Federal Agency for Political Education), teachers no longer manage to teach Germany’s younger generations of the horrors of the Holocaust. Instead, the word “Jew” has turned into one of the most common German curse words among students in both East and West Germany”, and history teachers addressing the Holocaust are frequently attacked as “friends of Israel” (“Jude beliebtes Schimpfwort unter Schülern,” Die Welt, 8 January 2008; Haaretz, 11 January 2008).

Empirical research also proves that the common claim that Jews were “replaced” by other minorities as a subject of societal prejudice is unfounded. From 1998 to 2003, there has been an increase from 20% to 23% of people with manifestly antisemitic attitudes in Germany. Other prejudices against Jews have also increased in recent years; in 2003, 28% of the populace believed that Jews have too much influence on world politics (1998: 21%) (Bergmann 2008).

Other issues and attitudinal patterns also need to be taken into account. They are not reflected in conventional questionnaires relating to ‘classical antisemitism’. In Germany, in particular, “secondary antisemitism” (antisemitism related to the rejection of Holocaust memory) is a relevant issue shaping negative views towards Jews. “Secondary antisemitism” refers to the stereotypical perception that Jews embody the unpleasant memory of the Holocaust and are made responsible for the remembrance of this part of German history. In 2004, 62% of Germans say that they do not want to be reminded of the crimes committed by Germans against Jews (GMF Survey 2004). This serves as a background of prejudices against Jews.

Furthermore, after controlling other factors, Kaplan/Small (2006) show in an empirical study of respondents in ten European countries (including Germany) that antisemitism consistently increases with the degree of anti-Israel attitudes. Respondents with a radical anti-Israel attitude are six times as likely to be antisemitic than respondents which do not support anti-Israel statements. „Based on this analysis, when an individual’s criticism of Israel becomes sufficiently severe, it does become reasonable to ask whether such criticism is a mask for underlying antisemitism“ (Kaplan/Small 2006: 560). Radical anti-Zionism does not only highly correlate with antisemitism but also with racism (Geissler 2002). In Germany, 28,9% somewhat agree to the statement: “If one considers Israel’s policies, I can understand if one is against Jews,” while 15,5% fully agree to the statement. 23,9% somewhat agree that “what Israel does today is, in principle, not different from what the Nazis have done to the Jews in the Third Reich”, and 27,3% fully agree to this statement (GMF Survey 2004). These statements document forms of “anti-Israel antisemitism” cutting across conventional left-right cleavages. This can be conceived as “new” antisemitism.

This set of prejudices relates with a widespread denial of antisemitism as a motivation when violence against Jews occurs. In some countries, like France, Denmark, and Belgium, strong sympathy for the Palestinians corresponds with the desire to see opposition to Israel as the causal factor of violence against Jews in Europe (in Denmark, only 10% believe that antisemitism causes violence against Jews, 65% believe that anti-Israel sentiments are the cause; Bergmann 2008).

Finally, a subject of much recent controversy has been antisemitism among immigrant communities, especially among Muslims. To be sure, there may have been empirically unfounded exaggerations of the phenomenon. However, there have been initial far-reaching claims by some publicists, suggesting that negative attitudes and even violence against Jews primarily reflect Muslim opposition against Israel’s policies, or that “a spreading Islamic antisemitism in Europe cannot be verified by studies while in the meantime antisemitic prejudices are transferred to ‘the Muslims’,” (Mark Terkessidis, taz, 3 February 2004). These claims have been challenged by empirical research. A French study shows that negative attitudes among French immigrants towards Jews are by an average of 11.6% higher than among non-immigrant French, and antisemitism also correlates with the immigrants’ attachment to Islam (Bergmann 2008). According to an empirical survey in Great Britain among Muslim immigrants, 40% say “Jews are a legitimate target in the struggle for a just order in the Middle East.” (Die Zeit, 24 April 2007) According to a recent survey, every third Muslim (on various levels of education) harbours antisemitic and anti-Christian prejudices, and antisemitism is more wide-spread among Muslim immigrants than among non-Muslim immigrants and among non-immigrant Germans (Frankfurter Rundschau, 20 December 2007; Brettfeld/Wetzels 2007).

3. Extreme Right Antisemitism

A major challenge is the increasingly radical and open antisemitic agitation and mobilization by extreme right parties, organizations, networks, and publications. Today, the major political actor in this field is the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). As the oldest extreme right party in Germany (founded in 1964), the NPD has changed its course in the 1990s under its new leader, Udo Voigt. It intensified its grassroots work and has shifted much of its organizing to the East; the headquarters are now located in Leipzig. Since the 1990s, it operates according to a “three-fold struggle for the “the brains”, power “on the streets”, and for (seats in) “the parliaments”. Benefiting from a consolidated extreme right youth culture and political movement, in recent years their three-fold long-term strategy increasingly pays off (Funke/Rensmann 2005). This includes electoral politics and public office. In regional/state elections, the NPD has received 9.2% of the vote in Saxonia in 2004 and 7.3% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania in 2006 and entered the regional parliaments in both cases. Although Holocaust denial is no longer its primary focus (as in the decade before Voigt), the NPD has become increasingly militant and further radicalized over the years. Its declared goal is the reestablishment of a German Volksgemeinschaft (folkish ethnic community), and it glorifies Nazism. Under Voigt, neo-Nazis with a criminal record have been recruited to the leadership, and the party got more movement-oriented and “national-revolutionary”. The NPD and its youth organization Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN) have affiliations with the militant “free comradeships” (“freie Kameradschaften”) and successfully mobilize youths in the East. The NPD cooperates with the “National Alliance” (US) and, under the umbrella European National Front, other antisemitic extreme right parties in the EU, like Forza Nuova (Italy), Renouveau Français (France), La Falange (Spain), Hrisi Anghi (Greece), and Nuova Dreapta (Romania).

Antisemitism is a core element of global right-wing extremism (Weitzman 2006), but particularly of its German variant (BMI 2007). The NPD’s radicalization also – and especially – applies to their open antisemitism (Scharenberg 2006:87; Rensmann 2008), which is a key element of their program and campaigns. Many commentators and scholars, however, take little notice of this so far. To be sure, agitation against immigrants (“repatriation instead of right to stay”), and overt racism and ethnic nationalism remain essential parts of NPD ideology (Scharenberg 2006: 86f). But with the NPD’s turn on the “social question” in the mid-1990s and the party’s ideological “modernization” in relation to new issues such as social welfare reform (“Hartz IV”), globalization (“globalism”), Israel, and Islamism, radical antisemitism is once again at the core of its political organizing, mobilization, and campaigning. Electoral campaigns, public statements, demonstrations and publications employ antisemitic conspiracy theories. Jews are perceived as the “string-pullers” behind the Federal Republic, liberal democracy, capitalism, multi-culturalism, globalization, and alleged “world conflicts” like the Middle East conflict. Jews are seen as the personified root cause to all of the above. In case of the NPD, these mobilizations are anchored in a world-view assuming a global Jewish conspiracy. In particular, new mobilizations in the last years have focused not only on anti-immigrant propaganda but also on nationalist anti-globalization, “anti-imperialism”, and agitation against Israel and the USA. However, like others who agitate against Jews, the NPD declares speciously that it is not antisemitic, claiming that those who “declare their solidarity with the Palestinian people...cannot be antisemitic because Arabs are Semites, too” (NPD, 9 January 2008).

In the NPD, the aforementioned new issues and topics serve as a medium for anti-Jewish hatred. Along with neo-Nazis, the NPD insinuates a „Zionist“ world conspiracy. Events, demonstrations, and local neighbourhood activities of the NPD attack „multi-national globalization“, often interpreted as Jewish “globalism”, „US imperialism“ und „Zionist terror“. Hereby the

NPD employs a nationalistic and antisemitic social justice and anti-war rhetoric and demands to „overcome the capitalist interest rate economy“ (Udo Voigt). Addressing opposition against the social welfare reforms of Schröder’s Agenda 2010, American “locusts”, and “Jewish” banks, the NPD re-phrases the “social question” in a nationalistic and antisemitic fashion.

Israel and the US are major targets of their campaigns. In solidarity with Islamists, the NPD claims to fight „For a world of free peoples – solidarity with Iraq and the Palestinians!“ (Puschnerat 2005, 69) Jürgen Schwab, NPD intellectual and member of its national leadership, proclaims that Bin Laden’s Al-Qaida and its „global partisan war“ is „obviously the adequate answer to the strategies of the One World.“ (Schwab 2002, 134) Israel is frequently portrayed as a special centre of cosmopolitanism and globalization, of „multinational finance capitalism“, „war-mongering imperialism“ with the ambition of „world domination“ (quoted in Gessler 2004: 29); on the other hand, it is portrayed as an „artificial“ state of a “non-people” oppressing the Palestinian people. This hardly coded extreme right „anti-Zionism“ is apparently open for alliances with left-wing „anti-Zionists“ and „anti-imperialists.“ The NPD paper *Deutsche Stimme*, for example, even endorses the „remarkable tradition“ of left-wing „anti-imperialism“ and supports the „overcoming of right-left-antagonisms in the aftermath of the war in Iraq“ which allegedly allows for a focus on the „common enemy“, the “apartheid state Israel” and the “Judeo-American world domination apparatus with its well functioning genocide machine!“ (Deutsche Stimme 8/2004). Accordingly, according to the NPD the conspiracy of „international Jewry“ materializes especially in Palestine (quoted in Puschnerat 2005: 70).

Behind the “aggression of Israel” the JN suspects a “strong Israel lobby of the US East Coast” (www.wernigerode.nationaler-beobachter.de, August 2006). The militaristic party even declares that “War is war and never right! No to war and oppression! Stop the Israeli and American war-mongers in the Middle East!” The most radical German anti-Semite today, the former RAF member Horst Mahler, was also temporarily active in the party. Mahler, among other things, calls for a new “final solution of the Jewish question” (Mahler, “Endlösung der Judenfrage,” www.deutsches-kolleg.org/erklaerungen/judenfrage; cf. Rensmann 2004: 253; Weitzman 2006 58) The Iranian president Ahmadinejad’s antisemitism, Holocaust denial, and anti-Israel agitation also attracts the NPD, which had organized demonstrations in his support during the World Cup in Germany 2006. As *Der Spiegel* points out, it is a myth that the NPD agitates primarily against Muslims. While attacking both immigrants and Jews, the NPD seeks to “close the ranks with Muslims who hate Israel” (*Der Spiegel*, 1/2008, p.33). According to the NPD, Jewish or „Zionist“ string-pullers conspiracies persecute and kill critics of Israel. Jürgen Möllemann “practiced German-Arab friendship and criticized Israel. This was his death sentence.“ The „Zionist string-pullers“ have, the NPD argues “reached their goal“ by “disempowering” the pro-Arab and pro-Muslim academic Udo Steinbach (NPD Hamburg: „Zionisten machen Deutsches Orient Institut platt“, www.npd-hamburg.de) To be sure, there is also a rise of new racist anti-Islam parties, but the NPD and many other extreme right groups today declare “solidarity” with Muslims and Islamists (at least with those living in foreign countries) in their “fight” against “the Jews”.

Finally, downplaying of the Holocaust remains another major agenda topic. In Saxonia, the NPD portrayed the bombs on Dresden at the end of World War II as “Holocaust by bombs“. In addition, the NPD consistently celebrates “good Jews” who allegedly disclose the “Zionist character” and the “Holocaust industry”. For example, the „Jewish David Irving“ Norman Finkelstein has been celebrated by virtually all extreme right groups. He claims that a Jewish “Holocaust industry” exploits the Holocaust and Germans for the sake of “Zionism” and material purposes. Jews are used as a reference point if they share the NPD’s resentments.

To be sure, the problem of antisemitic radicalism on the extreme right is not limited to the NPD alone. There are various other groups, organizations, and actors, including the Deutsche

Volks-Union (DVU) and its popular “German National Newspaper”, the “Society for Free Publishing” (GfFP), neo-Nazi groups and publications like the radically antisemitic National Journal, or authors like Johannes Rothkranz, who distributes the antisemitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and claims that the “Protocols” “have fully come true hundred years later”. (Document 1) Among others, there are also the fascist, anti-gay, and antisemitic conspiracy theorists from the Lyndon LaRouche cult, represented in Germany by the “Bürgerbewegung Solidarität” (“citizen movement solidarity”).

4. New Right and Populist Antisemitism

Again and again, there have also been more coded, right-wing populist mobilization attempts in post-unification Germany which utilized anti-Jewish stereotypes. In the early 1990s, a so-called “New Right” academic and publishing scene intermingled calls for a new, “self-confident” nationalism against Western/European integration with downplaying Nazism, and latent anti-Jewish prejudices. Two books, edited by Rainer Zitelmann (among others), namely “The Self-Confident Nation” and “Western Attachment”, served as an intellectual platform. In the latter, professors like Hans-Helmuth Knütter, who later on joined the ranks of the extreme right “Society for Free Publishing” (GfFP), published antisemitic fantasies about “German-hating British rabbis” blackmailing the German nation. “German-hating” in Western foreign countries, Knütter had argued beforehand, is instigated by “Jews and particularly blacks, especially in the New York area and New England, but also in Georgia.” However, the New Right faced strong public criticism by democrats, clearly lost momentum during the 1990s, and became more and more politically and academically isolated. The extreme right weekly *Junge Freiheit* (“Young Freedom”) is the only relevant surviving “New Right” forum. Another right-wing populist effort to mobilize resentments against Jews could be witnessed during the 2002 national electoral campaign by the FDP politician Jürgen Möllemann (cf. Rensmann 2004: 442ff). Möllemann accused the German-Jewish lawyer Michel Friedman and the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon of instigating antisemitism by their behaviour, thus blaming Jews for antisemitism. After the 2002 election, however, Möllemann was discredited in the FDP and eventually had to resign (and later committed suicide in 2003). None the less, Möllemann provided a political opening for those utilizing the complex Middle East conflict for anti-Jewish agitation.

5. Radical “Anti-Zionism”

According to the EUMC definition and criteria, many cases of anti-Zionism and radical anti-Israel agitation, which do not identify themselves as extreme right, can also be classified as antisemitic. While there have been “anti-Zionists” who are not antisemites, just as there have been foes of affirmative action who are not racists, more and more “the crucial question is prejudicial overlap” (Cohen 2007). While criticism of Israeli policies is not neither anti-Zionism nor antisemitism, antisemitism strongly correlates with anti-Zionism and anti-Israel sentiments, and the likelihood of antisemitism increases with the intensity of anti-Israel sentiment (Kaplan/Small 2006). “Anti-Zionism” and antisemitism had resonated in parts of the left since the late 1960s, but had been marginalized since the 1980s. However, they resurged since the “Al-Aqsa-Intifada” in 2000. To be sure, antisemitic anti-Zionism and hatred of Israel are at odds, if not in outright contradiction with other left-wing ideals, such as democratic humanism and social egalitarianism. (Cohen 2007) One of the reasons of anti-Israel sentiments among left-wing groups is a change in perception since 1967 (Kloke 2007). Since then, Arabs and Palestinians are seen as the weak and “the oppressed”, Israel, to the contrary, is seen as “the powerful” and “aggressive”. Israeli military actions, then, are often blown out of

proportion and described as “genocide”, whereas suicide bombings in civil neighbourhoods are downplayed as “acts of despair”.

The “anti-Zionist” antisemitism is based on a binary world-view (evil Zionists versus the “good people”, good “anti-imperialists”). It is sometimes indirect or coded. However, the simple act of substituting the words “the Zionists” by “the Jews” reveals the antisemitic nature of several radical anti-Israel groups which do not see themselves as “extreme right”. Today, indeed, we find various examples of antisemitic stereotypes in allegedly “left-wing” groups, websites, and publications. These stereotypes are applied to Israel as a “collective Jew”, portraying Israel, “Zionism” and “the Zionists” as agents “without scruples”, “parasitic”, “fundamentally evil”, “materialistic”, “string-pullers” behind global conspiracies, “warmongering”, “greedy”, “artificial”, “inhuman”, a “foreign power” “exploitative” the “peoples of the world”. Some of these categories, allusions, symbols, and hate speech are all too familiar to students of antisemitism and racist discrimination, and the language and imagery is, in several cases, indistinguishable from the anti-Israel agitation on the extreme right. In Thessaloniki (Greece), communist groups recently desecrated a Holocaust memorial, attaching pictures of dead Lebanese civilians, while in Italy extreme right activists from the Forza Nuova threw tomatoes at the Israeli embassy, symbolizing the “blood of the Lebanese” and proclaiming “Hezbollah, until victory”. There is also, in some cases, a convergence in the goal that “‘Israel’ must die!” (Interim)

The demonization of Israel as an “apartheid state” or as “Nazisreal” has now a long tradition in “anti-Zionist” or allegedly “pro-Palestinian” publications (with or without links to “the left”). This includes cartoons portraying Israeli politicians as revenants of Nazis, as exemplified in the portrayal of the Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, in Nazi-uniform on the website “Das Palästina Portal” (erhard-arendt.de; arendt-art.de; Document 2). While claiming not to be right-wing extremist (please “no radical right links”), the “anti-Zionist” website “Say no to Israel” (www.no2israel.de; found 18/12/2007), for example, publishes “a selection” of cartoons from the Iranian Holocaust cartoon competition. Displayed are cartoons which have, says the author of the site, “special appeal to me”. Apart from dozens of cartoons which ridicule the Holocaust and equate the Nazi genocide with Israel, some cartoons suggest that Jews rule the world, while others show Jews as ticks and vermin (Document 3).

In Germany, the daily newspaper *Junge Welt*, which has considerable influence on the extreme left, consistently shows support for a global “anti-imperialist” alliance with Iran and radical Islamist/antisemitic groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, or Muslim brotherhood (some of their historical traces leading to the collaboration of al-Husseini with Nazism; cf. Lewis 1999; Faber 2005), as well as generally for the “armed resistance” against “Zionism and imperialism”. Whoever recognizes Israel’s right to exist, editor Werner Pirker argues, also recognizes the “last colonial state” and “apartheid state” and stands “in fundamental opposition to the anti-imperialist struggle for liberation.” (*Junge Welt*, 25 April 2002). Along with the „geofascist USA“ (*Junge Welt* 2 August 2006) Israel is viewed as a “foreign body in the Arab world.” (*Junge Welt*, 22./23 July 2006)

The “Campo antiimperialista” (antiimperialista.org) also plays an important propagandistic role in this political milieu. In Germany, it also publishes “Intifada: Zeitschrift für den arabischen Widerstand”. The group fights against “the Zionists” and the “so-called state of Israel”, seeks a „world without Zionism“ and “solidarity with Hamas”, and views elections as “imperialist theater”. It glorifies terror, including lynching, against the “true terror” of “Zionist-imperialist politics”. For the group, the “destruction of Zionism and the so-called state of Israel is the only way to justice.” (quoted by DÖW, hagalil.com 2003) In addition, Campo’s “Antiimperialist Coordination” explicitly supports Holocaust deniers (Neugebauer 2003). Its sister organization, the “Revolutionary Communist League”, demands an “Arab Palestine from the river Jordan to the sea”. Many demonstrations against the “child-killer Israel” and

“Israel’s war of annihilation” are also joined by the Hezbollah and neo-Nazi Holocaust deniers.

“Anti-Zionist” agitation among “left-wing” anti-imperialists often refers to selected Jews who use antisemitic stereotypes or to antisemites who pretend to be Jews. This is a method also common in the extreme right. For example, Norman Finkelstein’s book about a global Jewish “Holocaust industry” found considerable resonance among left-wing anti-imperialists. Another striking example of the blurred boundaries of anti-Zionism and antisemitic radicalism is “Israel Shamir”, a neo-Nazi called Jöran Jermas using a Jewish name to gain attention. He published a fiercely antisemitic book full of anti-Jewish stereotypes and conspiracy theories. One of the chapters is called “ZOG”, the neo-Nazi term for “Zionist-Occupied Government”. Shamir’s book, “Galilee Flowers”, was published by a radical-left anti-imperialist press (ProMedia), other versions appeared at Horst Mahler’s neo-Nazi Deutsches Kolleg (Many of the “anti-Zionist” publications and groups do no longer pay much attention to left-right distinctions). The blatantly antisemitic book also received favourable reviews by anti-Israel publications, including those which claim to be “leftist”. The leftist weekly Freitag, known for its demonization of Israel, published a review praising Ermash/Shamir’s “forthright portrayal of Israel and its policies which many do not want to see and many disavow.” The article also claims that „Shamir’s conversion” „will never be forgiven by Jewry” (“[die Konversion] wird ihm seitens des Judentums niemals verziehen.”) (Ludwig Watzal, “Die echten und die falschen Juden,” Freitag, 3 June 2005).

6. Religious Antisemitism

Christian antisemitism remains a societal problem. Traditional Christian stereotypes of Jews as “Christ-killers” remain relevant in rural religious communities and some radical Christian groups. Christians with antisemitic dispositions may feel encouraged by the comments by German Catholic bishops in Israel who hinted to analogies between the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the situation of Palestinians today.

However, while Christian antisemitism has not disappeared, it is clearly less politically articulate and radical than many manifestations of religiously motivated antisemitism in Muslim immigrant communities (although there are exceptions to the rule). Islamic or Muslim antisemitism is documented in music and culture, especially rap songs, in political agitation, and in forms of everyday antisemitism among Muslim youths („Antisemitische Welle an Schulen: Jüdische Schüler fliehen vor Nazis und aggressiven Muslimen,” Der Spiegel, 7 December 2006). There is also a stark increase in antisemitic hate crimes by Muslims against Jews, although the number of violent hate crimes remains low. In addition, widely shared criticism of Israel among Muslim immigrants is often merging with antisemitism (Gessler 2004; Claudia Dantschke; cf. Die Zeit, 7 June 2007), so that Israel is perceived as an expression of the evil nature of “the Jews”.

The origins of that trend are multi-faceted. On one hand, Muslims – like other immigrants – suffer from various forms of exclusion. Comprehensive integration programs are still lacking, which is a reflection of the decades-long refusal to accept that Germany has turned into a multicultural immigrant society. In addition, a study conducted at the University of Michigan (Miller/Rensmann 2008) shows that immigrants, although for a long time a considerable segment of the citizenry and the electorate, utterly lack political representation, especially across continental Europe (including Germany). Furthermore, Muslims in Germany and Europe are often subject to racist discrimination and exclusion, like any other ethnic minority. Unemployment and social exclusion are particularly drastic for young Muslims and other ethnic minorities. Radical religious centres and mosques offer a sense of community and support

which many uneducated and unemployed Muslims feel lacking in society. These are societal factors that help to breed radicalism.

On the other hand, the relevance of antisemitic ideology, propaganda, and agency in Muslim communities have been ignored or underestimated for too long. The “import” of antisemitic radicalism through international media and the media (for example Ahmed Rami’s antisemitic “radioislam.org”, etc.; cf Weitzman 2006: 65, or Hezbollah’s satellite TV station al-Manar), provides an underestimated challenge. Al-Manar, which televises the antisemitic “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and justifies arbitrary killing of Jews, can still be received via satellite in Germany. Such media prove to have a considerable impact on the framing of issues and antisemitic world-views among immigrants. Moreover, many radical Koran schools preach antisemitism, misogyny, and hatred against liberal democracy and “non-believers”. Examples of antisemitism in established Muslim organizations (e.g. in the Islam Council/Islamrat, the Islamic Center Aachen, which belongs to the Central Committee of Muslims in Germany) have their share in nurturing and legitimizing forms of everyday antisemitism among marginalized Muslim youth. So, too, have radical Islamist organizations and publications that have spread over the last decade.

7. Academic & Media Responses and Political Opportunity Structures

Political opportunity structures for radical antisemitic mobilizations have improved over the last decade. There is also a verifiable increase in legitimacy of antisemitic stereotypes. This is, I argue, partly due to a problematic set of recurring claims about contemporary or “new” antisemitism. These claims resonate in some media and even in some academic discourse positions. Most prominently, they include:

a) The vivid claim that criticism of Israel is somewhat prohibited or “taboo” in Germany and Europe, and that there is an “almost totalitarian ideology on the topic antisemitism” (Sophia Deeg, *Freitag*, 5 August 2005). This persistent claim cannot be substantiated by empirical research. Media and discourse analyses suggest, to the contrary, that Israel is one of the most criticized countries in the German and European public sphere. Criticism of Israel cuts across progressive and conservative media, let alone radical right and left media (Behrens 2003; Jäger/Jäger/Clever 2003; Wistrich 2004; Jaecker 2004; Faber/Schoeps/Stawski 2006). Right or wrong, no established or relevant station or paper shies away from criticizing Israel. Criticism of Israel in the media, the academia, and in politics is as ‘normal’ in the free and democratic German Federal Republic, as it is a vivid part of public debate in other liberal democracies of the European Union or the USA. In fact, in Germany the book “The Israel Lobby” by Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer is, to give one example, a best-selling book (it is also a best-selling book in the US, where it received few favourable scholarly reviews). In spite of its one-sidedness, invented self-victimization as being “silenced”, and dubious claims about Israel lobbyists being responsible for the war in Iraq, the book was published by major publishing houses and received wide-spread reviews in the media and among some academics. In Great Britain, the Association of University Teachers (AUT) even launched a boycott of Israeli academia and academics, singling out only the democratic, Jewish state of Israel.

b) The closely linked claim that criticism of Israel would be impossible because of a “Jewish lobby” which makes inflationary use of “the antisemitism charge” against anyone criticizing Israel. Hence, it is frequently claimed, Jews or the “Israel lobby” “exploit” the antisemitism charge and the history of Holocaust “for their own material interests”. Here Norman Finkelstein’s unsubstantiated claims about the Jewish “Holocaust industry” resonate: The *tageszeitung* argues that the Israeli government and its international lobby organizations employ this “antisemitism charge...successfully” (*taz*, 6 July 2006). This claim, too, is hardly empirically verifiable. Incidents of unjustified accusations - branding legitimate criticism as antisemitism

– are isolated. In addition, such accusations are hardly ever raised by relevant political actors. The claim that critics of Israel are persecuted by “antisemitism charges”, however, does serve the function to create an image of self-victimization or “persecuted innocence”. It also helps to blur the distinctions between legitimate criticism and antisemitism and, hence, to a priori exonerate every form of anti-Israeli slander from the charge of being antisemitic (once this charge is portrayed as a mere instrument of the “Jewish lobby”). In reality, criticism of Israel is not a priori antisemitic and usually not seen as such in the public; in turn, criticism of Israel is not a priori free from antisemitic prejudice only because the target is Israel or “the Zionists”, not “the Jews”. In addition, to claim that Jews control the media & politics is itself an antisemitic myth. Antisemitic conspiracy theories resonate in the resilient myth of a powerful “Jewish Lobby”, “Zionist lobby” or “Israel lobby” working as secret “string-pullers” and dictating national policies, initiating wars, and controlling public opinion.

c) Some publicists and academic authors attribute the “new” antisemitism primarily to Israeli or Jewish behaviour or the Jewish state and see contemporary antisemitism, both in Europe and the Middle East, as a consequence of Israel’s existence and subsequent policies. Hence, Jews and Israel are seen as responsible for antisemitism and antisemitic violence directed against them. However, the claim that the Middle East conflict in general and Israel’s policies in particular are responsible for evoking antisemitism and antisemitic violence (in the Middle East, Europe, and Germany) has never been substantiated. Although antisemites exploit the Israel-Palestine conflict, antisemitism, like colonial racism, is an ideological matrix. It is a world-view which operates *independent* from group conflicts and the actual behaviour of the subjects of prejudice, here Jewish or Israeli behaviour. Rightly so, no serious scholar has so far claimed that an African dictator evokes racism, or makes racism understandable. Still, it is common to maintain that Israel’s policies cause antisemitism. The claim that current forms of antisemitism, like the radical antisemitism put forward by the Hamas Charta, are rooted in the “reality of Israel as an occupation army”, and that arbitrary violence against Israel and Israelis, like organized suicide bombing, is predominantly or exclusively a “reaction” to Israel’s “state terrorism”, is sometimes resonating in academic discourse (for a critique cf. Brumlik 2006; Brumlik 2007). An indicator of antisemitism in such arguing, then, is if “there is nothing Hamas can do that you won’t blame ‘in the final analysis’ on Israelis.” (Cohen 2007)²⁵ Accordingly, due to the nature of antisemitism, which is a collective prejudice and world-view, it is highly unlikely that antisemitism in Germany, Europe, and the Muslim world will dissipate with a peace settlement of the regional conflict in the Middle East (as much as such a settlement is desirable).

d) Linked to the claim above, antisemitism is more often than in previous decades denied to be a motivation for anti-Jewish statements or anti-Jewish violence at home and abroad; and the existence of manifestations of radical antisemitism is more often than in previous decades denied altogether. Simultaneously, such denial frequently corresponds with comparisons or equations of Israel and Nazism (according to the EUMC definition, such claims qualify as antisemitism). Such ideologemes have a substantial, negative political-discursive impact.

For example, the radical antisemitism, hatred of Israel, and Holocaust denial expressed by the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and the “state antisemitism” expressed by many Iranian government institutions and think tanks is often disregarded, not taken seriously, or even denied (just as their violation of human rights, gay rights etc.). This is also the case with manifestations of radical antisemitic propaganda distributed by anti-Israel terrorist groups like

²⁵ Israel and “the Jews” are often seen as the cause of violence leading to the destruction of humanity, as documented in a widely published statement: “We have created a culture of violence (Israel and the Jews are the biggest players) and that Culture of Violence is eventually going to destroy humanity.” (Arun Gandhi, “Jewish Identity Can’t Depend on Violence,” washingtonpost.com, January 2008)

Hamas and Hezbollah, which broadcast the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and demand that small children become martyrs and kill the “monkeys and pigs” (here Jews are frequently portrayed as filth and cockroaches that need to be eliminated; the Hamas charter orders Muslim to kill “the Jews”; its former leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi said that “the question is not what the Germans did to the Jews, but what the Jews did to the Germans”; cf. Goldberg 2008; Küntzel 2007) If the antisemitism of these organizations is noticed, it is often declared politically irrelevant or seen as subordinate to their (legitimate) “resistance” to occupation. The complex origins of antisemitism and terrorism, then, are reduced to “despair”. By the same token, hate crimes by Muslim immigrants against Jews and Jewish institutions/synagogues in Germany are still often misperceived simply as “protests against Israeli occupation”.

The demonization of Israel as an outcast “apartheid state” or even heir to Nazi rule is still a widely shared public opinion. It is all the more important to avoid such demonization, which is not legitimate criticism but antisemitic in nature, in public or academic discourse. However, references to Nazi rule when Israeli policies are discussed by academics, and to Jewish resistance against Nazism when Palestinian suicide bombings in civilian neighbourhoods are confronted, are still common. For example, Udo Steinbach, the former director of the German Orient Institute claimed: “If we see how Israeli tanks drive through Palestinian villages and how the desperate people resist with stones, shouldn’t we be allowed to ask with regard to Warsaw and the uprising of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto whether this then also constituted terror?” (quoted in *hagalil.com*). There is a crucial difference between – even one-sided – criticism of a government’s policies and human rights violations, on the one hand, and demonizing and delegitimizing the very existence of a country by applying Nazi imagery, on the other. *Die Zeit* points out: “Those who speak of Israel as an ‘apartheid state’ or even draw parallels to the Holocaust, apparently want to make clear: Israel and the Jews, who suffered from the Holocaust, have lost any legitimate moral claim. They do not have a legitimate claim for support.” (J. Krönig, “Judaphobie,” *Die Zeit*, 24 April 2007)

8. Conclusion

The “zone of acquiescence” and the boundaries of socially acceptable speech about “the Jews” have changed and expanded since 2000. Political mobilizations of antisemitism and “new” antisemitism as well as respective manifestations of propaganda have also considerably increased since then. Today, antisemitism is less often subject to public sanctions and legal prosecutions than a decade ago. There is also a greater readiness displayed by antisemites to openly communicate their prejudices. This may also indicate a rise in the legitimacy of various forms of antisemitism, while it is less clear if there is also a general rise in antisemitic attitudes or if such attitudes are only displayed more openly.

Be that as it may, we witness a new depth and public presence of antisemitic radicalism and hate crimes since the turn of the century in Germany and Europe. This is exemplified by new extreme right mobilizations, radical anti-Zionism or “new” antisemitism cutting through conventional left-right cleavages, and Islamic/minority antisemitism. However, extreme right hate crimes against Jews still exceed other hate crimes. But the new relevance and proliferation of antisemitic stereotypes does not only originate in political mobilizations. It also benefits from largely unrestricted antisemitism on the Internet and prejudiced perceptions of the Middle East conflict in media and the academia (for example, that antisemitism is caused by Israel). To the contrary, it needs to become clear that there cannot be any justification for antisemitism, as there cannot be any justification for racism, child molestation, slavery, or genocide.

The widening of the “zone of acquiescence”, more open and radical antisemitism, and improved political opportunity structures are a challenge to liberal-democratic society as a

whole. Antisemitism is at odds, and endangers, the principle values of pluralistic constitutional democracy. The “new” relevance of the problem should neither lead to alarmism, nor to ignorance toward the problem. Instead, it should guide sober and solid new policies.

9. Policy Recommendations

1. Annual Report on Antisemitism, commissioned by the Federal Government/Executive Branch

The *Verfassungsschutzberichte*, the reports by the intelligence services of Germany’s Constitutional Protection Agency, are necessary but insufficient sources to grasp the nature, extent, and dynamics of antisemitism in politics and society, and the political measures required to combat antisemitism. Most of the time, these phenomena are not fully reflected in forms of political membership or at the ballot box (although this is increasingly the case with the NPD’s electoral successes in East Germany). Limiting its attention to extremist groups and criminal activities, the Constitutional Protection Agency does not and cannot provide an understanding of the extent, problems, and measures relating to societal antisemitism.

In addition, the problem and political challenge is, unfortunately, not restricted to extreme right mobilizations and anti-Jewish fringe groups. However, extreme right successes and positive responses to their antisemitic campaigns among voters and potential voters do signify that the government branches are not only confronted with an isolated but with a societal problem and challenge. The Federal Government is asked to intervene in issues of this importance.

The annual report should be based on both political/governmental analyses and scholarly research that should be subject to public scrutiny. The annual report on antisemitism by the Federal Government could function as a) an assessment and alert system, b) as a means of public education and awareness-rising about antisemitism, and c) as a decisive tool to discuss, evaluate, measure, suggest, justify, and adjust governmental and public programs to combat antisemitism. In the annual report, the Executive could inform about measure which have been realized and which are intended, both in Germany and in relation to foreign policy, including the EU context (for example, on the broadcasting and financing of the radically antisemitic Al-Manar station; or the impact of the highly circulated antisemitic paper *Vakit*, prohibited in Germany by the former Minister of the Interior but published in Turkey with effects on Germany). In addition, the annual report may serve as a model for the EU and OSCE.

2. Prohibition of the NPD and other Extreme Right/Antisemitic Organizations and Groups

The NPD is neo-Nazi and militant in its core; it can be classified as a “neo-Nazi movement party” (Funke/Rensmann 2005). The party is not only against the constitution but a declared enemy of the constitution, which the party intends to abolish and replace by a *völkisch* German-ethnic order. Especially its political symbols and demonstrations point to a glorification and re-enactment of Nazism. NPD propaganda, which has included Holocaust denial in the past and is increasingly antisemitic, is repeatedly under suspicion of *Volksverhetzung* (“incitement of the people”). It is prohibited according to § 130 of Germany’s criminal law (StGB), for spreading “hatred against part of the populace” and by attacking “the human dignity of others”; by denying or downplaying the Holocaust, NPD activists were also subject to § 189 StGB, *Verunglimpfung des Andenkens Verstorbener* (“denigration of the remembrance of the deceased”).

The party has proven again and again to be the central agent of overt racism and political antisemitism in Germany today. Its prohibition will not be the key to solve the problem and dissipate antisemitism altogether. None the less, a prohibition of a party that has become increas-

ingly aggressive and continuously radicalized its antisemitic ideology, and its admiration for international antisemitic terrorist organizations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, Hezbollah (which is still not yet prohibited in the EU due to coordination problems), Hamas, and even Al Qaeda, will be a major step to delegitimize extreme right and antisemitic ideology. It will also inhibit future grassroots organizing by the extreme right among German youth, especially in East Germany, where the NPD has been an important factor in the political consolidation of extreme right youth cultures and antisemitic and racist views. Over the years, the NPD has increased its legitimacy, especially in the East, by not being prohibited and thus being misconceived as a democratic party. A common view, especially in the East, is that “if the NPD is legal, it is a democratic party just like any other.”

The NPD is a key *political* factor in the proliferation of antisemitism in Germany today, but it is not the only one. Other extreme right groups and publications have their share, as well as radical Islamist organizations. By prohibiting the pan-Islamist Hizb ut-Tahrir and other extreme right organizations, the German executive took a first major step against militantly antisemitic groups and the distribution of their propaganda in the German public.

3. New Policing Initiatives against Hate Crimes, Prosecution of Antisemitic Propaganda

Extreme right newspapers, websites, cartoons, to distribute propaganda that portrays Jews as cockroaches or vermin is beyond the legal limits of freedom of speech; the same applies to new variants of Holocaust denial. However, too little has been done to prosecute those crimes over the last years. In response, those publications have rapidly increased over the last five years and apparently feel encouraged by the limited political and legal opposition they meet today.

Attached you find three examples of antisemitic propaganda distributed by German websites (documents 1-3) which should be subject to legal scrutiny according to the German criminal code. Publications which downplay or ridicule the Holocaust and the memory of the deceased, or which instigate racist hatred and civil unrest, should meet the full force of the law. While taking into account the high value of freedom of speech granted by Article 5 of the Basic Law, radically anti-Jewish publications and websites, which portray Jews as ticks or vermin and praise such forms of antisemitic hatred, should be prohibited under the existing rule of law.

This also applies to non-German publications and media in Germany (e.g. al-Manar, Iqraa), which deserve equal prosecution before the law. Antisemitism is nothing inherent to “Muslim culture”, but rather a contested ideology among Muslims, just like political Islamism. The Federal Government and the National Parliament are challenged to make sure that moderate Muslims and secular Muslims feel safe to raise their opposition to Islamism and Islamic antisemitism, without, in turn, discriminating against Muslims or violating religious freedom.

There is an urgent need to make renewed efforts to de-legitimize antisemitism in the German public(s), including those public spheres and media which are not part of mainstream media and German-language mass communications. Political means, legal prosecution, and renewed efforts by the police should be employed in response to the proliferation of hate speech, possibly also on the international level. It is recommended that those measures may be addressed in a suggested annual report.

4. Government Programs and Support of Local Grassroots groups and Networks in Civil Society

Grassroots initiatives, civil society organizations and networks, and educational initiatives combating antisemitism need ongoing public and political support on various levels. Existing government programs against right-wing extremism should expand their focus on the multifaceted phenomena and challenges of antisemitism, including “intellectual” or academic an-

tisemitism. A good example is a project in cooperation with the Federal Agency for Civic Education and the Ministry of the Interior. "Mobile action and advisory teams" try to tackle antisemitism among Muslim youths and develop guidelines and material for education.

There is also the need for more non-Jewish supporters and groups fighting antisemitism. As Walter Mead points out (Foreign Affairs Nov/Dec 2007): "When antisemitic writers and politicians make vicious attacks, Jews are in a double bind: refrain from responding with outrage and the charge becomes accepted as a fact, express utter loathing at the charge and give anti-Semites the opportunity to pose as the victims of a slander campaign by venomous Jews." Positive support measures for, and the development of, civil society initiatives should be addressed in the annual report.

5. New Initiatives of Political Education on the Federal, State and Local Levels

A major task of a broader national political education initiative should include a deconstructing of wide-spread (potentially antisemitic) myths about Jews and antisemitism. These myths are mentioned above. They include the claims that a) criticism of Israel is "taboo" in the German public and in German politics because b) Jews and their "lobby" control the media, politics, and "exploit the Holocaust for their own (material) purposes", and that c) Israel's policies and Jewish citizens generate, instigate, or are responsible for, the new antisemitism. Criticism of Israel is perfectly legitimate and is, by no means, as such antisemitic. However, in turn, attacks against Israel are not per se free from antisemitism. Criticism of Israel is not taboo or sanctioned in the German public or German politics but, instead, empirical evidence suggests that Israel is one of the countries most criticized by the German media. By the same token, Jews are subject to public criticism like other Germans. The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional liberal democracy and it is not ruled by a „totalitarian“ pro-Israel or "Jewish lobby". There is no link between Jewish behaviour or Israel's policies and antisemitism, a stereotypical world-view detached from social reality.

New research on education on the Holocaust in German schools suggests that new Holocaust education initiatives are necessary. Knowledge of the Holocaust among high school students is more limited than expected. New education initiatives may have to explore new ways to teach the history of the Holocaust and its impact in an immigrant society. But they will have to make sure that the German school system does not shy away from this important task.

Agencies of political/civic education (both government- and party-related) need to serve as a model with high standards when dealing with radical, manifest, and latent forms of antisemitism, and when dealing with the complex Arab-Israel conflict. Agencies need to enlarge their efforts in educating about antisemitism. While supporting independent academic research, they need to make sure that sympathy for the political causes or suffering of the Israelis or the Palestinians do not lead to binary, unrealistic, one-sided guilt reproaches against "the Zionists" or to outright anti-Israel bias. Disregarding the complexities of the Middle East conflict and portraying one side as fundamentally "evil" can feed and strengthen antisemitic dispositions, or racism against Palestinians, for that matter. Open collaboration with antisemitic groups and organizations that deny Israel's right to exist should be prevented at any rate by government educational agencies, no matter how well intended. It also should be made clear that suicide bombings against civilian populations are human rights violations that may constitute "crimes against humanity".

6. School Projects and Education

Education on democratic values, liberal constitutionalism, group prejudices, the Holocaust, and antisemitism in particular should become more wide-spread and effective at the school level in order to combat everyday antisemitism among peers. This is particularly important since antisemitic myths about Jews are accessible and widely perpetuated in the Internet, and

since the propaganda by political agents like the NPD or radical Islamists is distributed at schools, youth centres, or religious centres. Effective programs need further support. It is important to reach out to youths in the early stages of political socialization. To increase and monitor efficiency, in this context, too, it is recommended to provide an annual report.

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4.3. *Antisemitic Tendencies in the Academic Context – The case of “new antisemitism”*

Yves Pallade²⁶

1. Introduction

Antisemitism in academia is by no means a new phenomenon; nor is it a usual one, for academics, while striving to approach an objective view of the world, are always part of society at large. This fact is to be borne in mind when setting out to inquire about the present manifestations of Jew-hatred in the field of higher education and scientific research. What makes antisemitism in academia extraordinary is the fact that it is in the intellectual and scholarly sphere where many of the discourses that shape our social reality and that are often taken as a given are produced. Indeed, the notion of antisemitism – the very term itself – has been the product of discourses that aspired or at least purported to be scientific in nature. Wilhelm Marr, its spiritual father, attempted to place the traditionally religion-based hatred of Jews onto a firm scientific footing and to provide it with a new pretext more suited to the epistemological criteria of modernity. Others followed in his footsteps and expanded the concept to universal dimensions, providing it with a world-explanatory character. Antisemitism, gaining purportedly objective consciousness of itself, constituted the negation of Enlightenment and its aspirations of human freedom through reason and science, yet ironically it bore the very marks of the *âge d’illumination*, whose illegitimate but unmistakable offspring it was.

The racial theories and teachings of the late 19th and early 20th centuries that climaxed in the Shoah made their mark not only on particular faculties and universities, but left imprints on numerous academic disciplines that can be felt to the present day. The *Gleichschaltung* of academia under National Socialism left virtually no field of science untouched by the negative normativity of its ideology, of which antisemitism constituted a if not *the* central element. A new and true German or Aryan science was contrasted to and substituted for a purportedly corrupted Jewish variant. Academia played an important role in justifying Nazi ideology and helping to implement it, perverting the products of science, initially conceived for the liberation and furtherance of the human being, into instruments for his enslavement and ultimately his annihilation. Some institutions of higher learning have undertaken critical accounting of their own history, while it remains very much a desideratum among others. Disciplines such as ethnology and in particular oriental studies have hardly – if at all – begun to reflect upon themselves. This has ramifications for the present, epitomized in particular in the way that a great many Arabists and orientalist scholars, not least in Germany, construe the conflict in the Middle East or the problem of Islamic antisemitism.²⁷

2. The “old” antisemitism in academia

While nowadays all-encompassing primary antisemitism does not feature in state ideologies in Europe, there exist various institutional anchor points in academia throughout the Continent and other parts of the OSCE region. Among these the Academy for Interpersonal Management (MAUP) in Kiev stands out. Through its publications and conferences it has repeatedly launched hefty attacks against Jews and “Zionists”, mixing classical Christian anti-Jewish motives such as the blood libel with more modern ones and engaging positively with

²⁶ Director, Foreign Affairs Network / B’nai B’rith Europe

²⁷ See Matthias Küntzel: *Djihad und Judenhaß. Über den neuen anti-jüdischen Krieg.* (ça ira, 2003, Freiburg), pp. 151-160

far-right activists such as the Ku-Klux-Clan leader David Duke. MAUP allegedly also received “significant funding from Arab and Muslims states”.²⁸

The broader range of freedom of expression that characterizes the sphere of academia, renders institutions of higher learning also as spaces where controversial and otherwise socially little accepted personal views can be more openly articulated. Hence, it was no coincidence that the leading German neo-Nazis Horst Mahler and Udo Voigt were able to attend a meeting of the Islamist group Hisb-ut-Tahrir at the premises of the Technical University of Berlin. Voigt found that their positions regarding their common enemies were “almost congruent”.²⁹ While the meeting had no openly academic pretension, the organizers used the university as an institution with a comparably greater degree of tolerance for dissenting views than other societal venues.

Other organizations with a consciously antisemitic agenda give themselves names that are meant to bestow upon them a degree of academic credibility such as the revisionist Institute for Historical Review in Torrance, California, the leading organization of Holocaust deniers, that publishes the *Journal of Historic Review*³⁰, or the Adelaide Institute in Australia.³¹

The “International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust”, one of the most highly publicized international gathering of Holocaust revisionists in recent years, that took place under the auspices of the Institute for Political and International Studies, a think tank of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Teheran in 2006, while arrogating to itself an academic character³², also featured a number of participants who can indeed look back on an academic career. One example is Robert Faurisson, one of the best-known Holocaust deniers, who had taught literature at the University of Lyon until 1979 before being transferred to the central French institution for distance learning in the wake of a controversy that erupted due to his revisionist writings.

Outside the OSCE region there are quite a number of examples of institutions that promote antisemitism in an openly and systematic fashion. One does not need to venture as far as Teheran where the worldwide international of Holocaust negationism has shaken hands under the benevolent auspices of the Iranian regime that has espoused and promoted antisemitism since its own coming into being in 1979.³³ They can be found even among OSCE partner countries such as Egypt where the Al-Azhar University of Cairo has functioned as a hotbed for theologically inspired Jew-hatred. Its head Grand Sheikh Muhammed Sayyid Tantawi, the highest religious authority of Sunni Islam, who was called a “reasonable man, a tolerant man” by Gunther Mulack, at the time Commissioner for the Dialogue with the Islamic World in the German Foreign Office³⁴, had written a PhD dissertation with the title “The People of Israel in the Koran and the Sunna”. In it he argued that the consumption of non-Jewish blood was a religious rite of the Jews and also quoted passages from both “Mein Kampf” and “The Proto-

²⁸ “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom 2004” and Designations of Countries of Particular Concern. Hearing before the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Second Session, October 6, 2004, http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa96357.000/hfa96357_0.HTM

²⁹ *Jungle World*, Nr. 48/2002, 20. November 2002, Deniz Yücel: Jihad im Überbau

³⁰ Institute for Historical Review, <http://www.ihr.org/>

³¹ Adelaide Institute, www.adelaideinstitute.org

³² IPIS – Institute for Political and International Studies, http://www.ipis.ir/English/conference_persian-gulf.htm

³³ Matthias Küntzel: Ahmadinejads Antisemitismus und der gegenwärtige Krieg, <http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/ahmadinejads-antisemitismus-und-der-gegenwaertige-krieg>

³⁴ Daniela Siebert: Gunther Mulack: Politische Differenzen zur Sprache bringen, 04 April 2005, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-469/_nr-306/i.html

cols of the Elders of Zion” affirmatively. His book was published in fourth edition in 1997 and continues to be a standard work of reference in the field.³⁵

By contrast, Western European universities have been subject to a wide-reaching ostracism of the more classical kinds of religiously and racially motivated antisemitism. Proponents of these manifestations of Jew-hatred certainly persist, yet they have become increasingly marginalized. One example is the sociologist Bernd Rabehl at the Free University of Berlin, who in an interview with the newspaper *Deutsche Stimme*, which is affiliated to the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), openly stated not only his sympathies for this political party and right-wing extremist views, but specifically compared the motivations of the party’s founder Adolf von Thadden with those of the Jews who founded Israel “after 1945 as a response to the discriminations”.³⁶ While the decision of his university department not to grant him lectureships any more was eventually suspended, his lectures were excluded from the exam curriculum. Another example is that of Konrad Löw, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Bayreuth, who has tried to portray historical antisemitism in Germany as a result of strong Jewish participation in left-wing revolutions. In 2004 he wrote a revisionist article for the *Deutschland Archiv*³⁷ in which he claimed that the majority of Germans had been “much more victims than perpetrators”³⁸, emphasizing an alleged Jewish contribution to the implementation of the “Final Solution”³⁹ and evoking a “German-Jewish symbiosis under the swastika”⁴⁰. The respective issue of the “Deutschland Archiv”, a publication of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, was subsequently pulped and the agency distanced itself in a letter to the subscribers from Löw’s essay.⁴¹ When in 2007 Claudio Moffa, professor of politics and history of Africa and head of a Masters Program on the Middle East at the University of Teramo, who had been noted for his anti-Zionist views, invited the French Holocaust denier Robert Faurisson to present his theses in a lecture, this met with a storm of protest from within academia all over Italy. Faurisson was eventually prohibited by the university to appear at its grounds and demonstrators succeeded in precluding him from speaking at a nearby venue.⁴²

3. The Working Definition of Antisemitism

The near absence of European institutions of higher learning with a systematic and open antisemitic agenda must not belie the fact that antisemitic attitudes are not only held among academics (as among the rest of the population), but that they diffuse into and articulate themselves through their work. Moreover, as in other sections of society the wide condemnation or proscription of religious and racial antisemitism has not only not done away with its underlying

³⁵ Matthias Küntzel: Antisemitismus als Kampfauftrag. Mahathiers Ansprache an die islamische Welt, November 2003, <http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/antisemitismus-als-kampfauftrag>

³⁶ Deutsche Stimme, März 2005, Das Ende der Dämonisierung. Bernd Rabehl im Gespräch über die alte und neue «Außerparlamentarische Opposition»

³⁷ The text of the article was later published in Junge Freiheit, 16 April 2004, „Eingedenk seiner mehr als tausendjährigen Geschichte“. Dokumentation: Deutsche Identität in Verfassung und Geschichte / Ein Aufsatz des Politikwissenschaftlers Konrad Löw in der Zeitschrift „Deutschland Archiv“ fällt aus Gründen der politisch-historischen Korrektheit der Zensur zum Opfer / Restauflage soll vernichtet werden, Konrad Löw

³⁸ „Würde man ganz konkret auf die Schicksale der Einzelnen eingehen, würde man wohl zu der Einsicht gelangen, daß sie weit mehr Opfer als Täter waren, Opfer freilich in nicht so schrecklichem Ausmaße wie das Gros der Juden.“

³⁹ „Aber Goldhagen hat doch bewiesen, daß Hitler schier zahllose Helfer bei der Umsetzung seiner Endlösungspläne fand: Deutsche, Ukrainer, Letten usw. Was nicht in sein Bild paßt, sind Juden. Doch auch von ihnen leisteten einige einen beachtlichen Beitrag als Judenräte, als Häscher, als Polizisten, in den Gaskammern.“

⁴⁰ „Gibt es einen zuverlässigeren Chronisten der deutsch-jüdischen Symbiose unter dem Hakenkreuz als den Juden und Literaten Victor Klemperer ...?“

⁴¹ Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 21 April 2004, Joachim Güntner: Schleusenwärter. Die Restauflage des «Deutschland Archivs» wegen revisionistischer Töne eingestampft

⁴² Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 August 2007, Wolfgang Schieder: Studienziel Tabubruch

ing psychology – the hidden wishes that it fulfils – but has also been unable to prevent the rise of new forms of articulation of Jew-hatred that manifest themselves in a socially more opportune and acceptable manner. Indeed, both the relevant expert institutions of the EU and the OSCE have taken account of this fact when drafting their Working Definition of Antisemitism. A considerable part of this document deals with forms of antisemitism that target the state of Israel as an indirect route in order to get at the Jews.

In order to determine when exactly criticism of Israel crosses the line towards antisemitism, Nathan Sharansky, the former Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs, proposed three criteria, called 3-D-test: „D“ stands for demonisation, delegitimation and double standards⁴³ – the three facets of what is nowadays known as anti-Zionism. Such criticism which demonises the Jewish State, which denies its right to exist or to defend itself as such, or which gauges its actions differently than those of other states, is antisemitic. These criteria have entered the Working Definition of Antisemitism that was developed and is used by the EUMC (nowadays FRA) and ODIHR.⁴⁴ They correspond to a fairly broad consensus among leading researchers of antisemitism and practitioners in the educational field of dealing with this specific problem. As Gert Weisskirchen, the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE on Combating Antisemitism, has pointed out: “We already have the tools in order to [implement the measures set out in the 2004 Berlin Declaration]. It is therefore time to make use of them more effectively.”⁴⁵

This notwithstanding, antisemitism continues to figure as a controversially debated subject in public and it remains questionable whether the Working Definition will at all – apart from policing and law enforcement – be applied in political practice. What qualifies as antisemitic, indeed who is an antisemite, often continues to form the subject of hefty – and sometimes even legal – disputes, particularly when relating to allegedly modernized manifestations of the phenomenon. Infringements against Jews or slander against the Jewish State are often treated as mere (over-)reactions to Israeli policies or legitimate criticism of Israel. The debate generally hinges on the issue of anti-Zionism and the question of when (or whether at all) it equals antisemitism. A number of legal arguments have revolved around the characterization of certain anti-Zionists as “antisemites”. One such case involved the publicist Henryk Broder who had been indicted and subsequently sentenced for – amongst other things – calling the publisher Abraham Melzer and the author Hajo Meyer “capacities for applied Judeophobia”⁴⁶ for having compared Israeli occupation policy with that of the Nazis, for having blamed Jewish behaviour for the rise of antisemitism, and for having accused Jews of exploiting the Holocaust.⁴⁷ While losing on most counts in a court of first instance, Broder eventually won his appeal on most points in the second instance. The court found that “Jewish antisemitism” indeed existed and allowed Broder to call his opponents “capacities for applied Judeophobia”.⁴⁸ Another case – also in Germany – involved Ludwig Watzal, an employee of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, who is co-editor of the academic supplement of the newspaper *Das Parlament* of the German Bundestag. In a warning letter sent by his lawyer to Samuel Laster, the editor of the Jewish news website *juedische.at*, he demanded that the latter sign a cease and desist declaration. This prepared declaration demanded inter alia that he refrain from calling Watzal an “anti-Zionist antisemite” as he had done in the caption of an article

⁴³ Natan Sharansky: Antisemitism in 3-D. Differentiating legitimate criticism of Israel from the so-called new antisemitism, <http://www.hagalil.com/antisemitismus/europa/sharansky-1.htm>

⁴⁴ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism, fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition-draft.pdf

⁴⁵ Gert Weisskirchen: Combating Antisemitism ‘Best practices’ already exist – it is time to make use of them. In: Equal Voices, Issue 17, 2006

⁴⁶ „Kapazitäten für angewandte Judäophobie“, Henryk M. Broder: Holo mit Hajo: Wie zwei Juden für die Leipziger den Adolf machen, http://www.achgut.de/dadgd/view_article.php?aid=852 (censored version)

⁴⁷ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 January 2006, Hans Riebsamen: Melzer obsiegt über Broder

⁴⁸ Der Tagesspiegel, 09 November 2007, „Den Adolf geamcht“

that had appeared on *juedische.at*.⁴⁹ Interestingly, this very statement did not constitute a demand for relief in the subsequent lawsuit anymore.⁵⁰

4. The “new” antisemitism in academia

While the old forms of antisemitism in academia persist and must continuously be confronted, they have in many respects been marginalized. Yet it is in fact the modernized and socially acceptable articulations of this old hatred that – largely unchecked – have been on the rise in recent years. Most notable among the discourses promoted by some academics has been the ‘nazification’ of the Jewish State, namely the comparison between Israel and its actions to the Third Reich and Nazi policies. However critical one’s perspective on the actions of Israel might be: Such criticism does not have much to do with the realities of the Middle East. It rather reveals something about the state of mind of the critic, who clearly uses the Jewish State as a psychological projection screen for his or her own sensitivities.

Such analogies can in fact take different forms. They might range from direct equations between Israel or its actions and the Third Reich or its methods to indirect variations of this theme such as the topos of the “Palestinians as the victims of the victims” or the characterization of Palestinian “refugee camps” as “concentration camps”. A particularly interesting version is the one presented by Udo Steinbach, the then director of the German Orient Institute in Hamburg and current director of the Institute of Middle East Studies, who said:

“If we see how Israeli tanks drive through Palestinian villages and how the desperate people defend themselves with stones, then we have to be allowed to ask with respect to Warsaw and the uprising of the Jews in the Warsaw Ghetto whether this was not also terrorism?”⁵¹

Steinbach leaves it open whether the uprising in the ghetto constituted in fact resistance – in this case the Israelis would be the same for the Palestinians as what the Nazis were for the Jews – or was rather a form of terrorism – in this case the Nazis would not really have been “the Nazis” and the uprising of the Jews against them not really justified. What this example shows is that the projection and the relativisation of guilt are in fact two sides of the same coin: The Holocaust does not have to be denied and the self-proclaimed critic does not have to become a sympathiser of the Nazis in order to castigate the Jews. Quite the contrary: the victims (or their descendants) are put in the role of the “new” perpetrators.

That this kind of antisemitism is hardly ever sanctioned by society is corroborated by the fact that Steinbach did not have to face any visible consequences on the part of his superiors. Neither did the Orient Institute’s board of trustees, which comprised well-known decision-makers from various sectors of society including politics, business, labour, and the academia, react at all to an open letter of protest that demanded Steinbach’s resignation; nor did its co-sponsors, namely the German Foreign Office and the City of Hamburg, intervene. The Green member of the Bundestag and then Federal Commissioner for Human Rights Claudia Roth, who in her speech on antisemitism that she had previously given at the Bundestag had cautioned explicitly against such analogies by pointing at their relativising function concerning “the historical

⁴⁹ text of cease-and-desist declaration (Unterlassungsverpflichtungserklärung) sent to Samuel Laster by Winfried Seibert on behalf of Ludwig Watzal

⁵⁰ Matthias Küntzel: Tag Watzal! Darf ich Sie Antisemit nennen? Die „juedische.at“ vor der Pressekommission des Hamburger Landgerichts, November 2005, <http://www.matthiaskuentzel.de/contents/tag-watzal-darf-ich-sie-antisemit-nennen>; Watzal’s journalistic activities will be examined below.

⁵¹ „Wenn wir sehen, wie israelische Panzer durch palästinensische Dörfer fahren und sich die verzweifelte Menschen mit Steinen wehren, dann müssen wir im Blick auf Warschau und im Blick auf den Aufstand der Juden im Warschauer Ghetto auch fragen dürfen, war das nicht auch Terror?“, Stellungnahme von Prof. Udo Steinbach: Kritik am Hamburger Orient-Institut und seinem Leiter, 06 August 2004, <http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/2004/08/steinbach.htm>

guilt of the German to the Jews”⁵², informed the professor in a letter that she found his remarks “not unproblematic” and ultimately contented herself with a written explanation by him, in which he de facto insisted on his comparison. So did her co-trustee and parliamentary colleague from the CDU Ruprecht Polenz who had told Steinbach’s critics that he found such comparisons “improper and mistaken”, but had failed to mention what kind of consequences he would practically take. While not denying the charge of antisemitism against the academic, both did not position themselves clearly on this matter, employing instead euphemistic language in their criticism.⁵³

In order to legitimise his analogy Steinbach referred to Holocaust survivors and “numerous direct mails from Jewish scientists”, who had purportedly “agreed with him – in part with qualifications”. He eventually tried to conclude the affair by portraying the argument as “an inner-Jewish discourse” on which he “would not comment”.⁵⁴ This recourse to alleged or real Jewish “chief witnesses” that are invoked to underpin one’s position reveals itself a pattern of antisemitic thinking, for it reproduces exclusion by implicitly assuming that

- a) the antisemitic nature of a remark depends on who the person is who makes it;
- b) people of Jewish origin cannot be subject to the kind of prejudice that others can;
- c) Jews have a particular inborn authority to speak on Israel and the Middle East conflict.

The only logical inference of such thinking is that Jews must either have been morally refined through suffering, in which case the injustice committed on them receives a sort of a posteriori purpose if not justification, or that they must be a priori different from all others people in that they are incapable of holding the same kind of resentments that everyone else can. In either case Jews are not perceived first and foremost as individuals but always as representatives of their group. The Working Definition of Antisemitism holds that one contemporary example of antisemitism could be “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.”⁵⁵ A corollary of this would also be to preclude that remarks and acts by any Jewish individual or group – no matter whether it is perceived as positive or negative – are perceived or portrayed as representative of any Jewish collectivity. Indeed, imputing a meaning to what a Jewish individual says that has relevancy above and beyond this person because of his or her belonging to a particular collectivity reveals a certain bias.

It seems that exactly such flawed and implicitly biased reasoning was behind the invitation of Alfred Grosser to a hearing on antisemitism in the German Bundestag in 2004 where he made the following statements: “As I was already allowed to say in the Frauenkirche in Dresden: it’s about understanding the suffering of others. This understanding generally does not exist on the part of Jews.”⁵⁶ – “But it is furthering antisemitism if one does not at the same time fight other forms of racism. And that is a task of Jews and Jewish organizations.”⁵⁷ – “And if

⁵² Deutscher Bundestag, 82. Sitzung, 11 December 2003, Claudia Roth, Antisemitismus bekämpfen

⁵³ For a more comprehensive overview of the Steinbach affair see: Yves Pallade: Medialer Sekundäntisemitismus, öffentliche Meinung und das Versagen gesellschaftlicher Eliten als bundesdeutscher Normalfall. In: Julius H. Schoeps, Klaus Faber & Sacha Stawski: Neu-alter Judenhass. Antisemitismus, arabisch-israelischer Konflikt und europäische Politik. (Verlag für Berlin-Brandenburg, 2006, Berlin)

⁵⁴ Stellungnahme von Prof. Udo Steinbach: Kritik am Hamburger Orient-Institut und seinem Leiter, 06. August 2004, <http://www.hagalil.com/archiv/2004/08/steinbach.htm>

⁵⁵ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

⁵⁶ „Wie ich schon einmal in der Dresdner Frauenkirche sagen durfte, es geht darum, das Leiden anderer zu verstehen. Dieses Verstehen ist auf jüdischer Seite im Allgemeinen nicht vorhanden.“

⁵⁷ „Es ist aber Antisemitismus fördernd, wenn man nicht zugleich andere Rassismen bekämpft. Und das ist eine Aufgabe von Juden und jüdischen Organisationen.“

the question is asked why I argue so harshly against the policies of the Israeli government while Rwanda is so much worse, I say exactly because ... My Jewish origin is the reason that I have to be stricter on Israel than elsewhere.”⁵⁸ Grosser, a noted sociologist and political scientist, who taught at Science Po in Paris and served as Studies Director at the French National Foundation of Political Science, is neither known for his strong Jewish identity nor for any particular expertise on antisemitism or even on the Middle East conflict for that matter. Yet it is the combination of his general – though in terms of the topic under discussion largely irrelevant – academic credentials and his Jewish family roots that are cited whenever he is interviewed about antisemitism and Israel, as if he possessed something inherently genetic that would enable him to speak with a particular authority on these matters. In his view the latter (Israel) enhances – or even causes – the former (antisemitism), as becomes evidently clear from an interview he gave to the *Berliner Zeitung*⁵⁹ in which he said: “Criticism of Israel and antisemitism have nothing to do with each other. It is rather Israel’s policies that promote antisemitism globally.”⁶⁰ Thereby Grosser provides antisemitism, an utterly irrational delusion or – as Adorno put it – “the rumour about the Jews”, with a seemingly rational pretext. The strategy of blaming the victim for what happens to it is by no means new. Antisemitism has always – and even more so after Auschwitz – portrayed the actions that flowed from it as acts of self-defence against alleged Jewish machinations and wrongdoings on the part of all or at least some Jews. Not only is “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews” therefore cited as one example of antisemitism by the aforementioned Working Definition, but also “Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel”. Grosser’s pronouncements have been appearing in numerous German and French media, most notably in a 10-page article in the February 2007 issue of Germany’s most renowned foreign policy journal *Internationale Politik*⁶¹, in which he expressed his incomprehension “that Jews nowadays despise others and claim the right to pursue policies mercilessly in the name of self-defence. Understanding for the suffering of others – does this basic European value not hold all the more for Israel?”⁶² This in turn implicitly imputes a cathartic if not reformatory character to the Shoah, providing the unspeakable ex post with a degree of purpose and reproducing the exclusion of Jews once more. Jews are now hated neither in spite nor because of Auschwitz, to build on a well-known bon mot, but because of not having learned the alleged lessons of the unprecedented crime to which they had been subjected.

These modern antisemitic patterns of arguing that have been outlined thus far all have in common that they seek to put antisemitism on a rational footing. Precisely such rationalization is in essence the first step towards justification. It highlights the crucial role played by scholars and intellectuals, for it is the aim of academia to advance the pervasion of the world through reason. Yet the failure to endow rationality with the necessary momentum of self-reflection by and on the subject himself abets irrationality and delusion. Variants of these antisemitic ideologemes can be found in otherwise respected academic discourse. Be it in German political scientist Eckhard Jesse’s defence of FDP Vice-Chairman Jürgen Möllemann

⁵⁸ „Und wenn die Frage gestellt wird, warum ich harsch gegen die Politik der israelischen Regierung argumentiere, wo Ruanda doch viel schlimmer ist, sage ich eben gerade. ... Mein jüdischer Ursprung macht, dass ich für Israel strenger zu sein habe als woanders.“

⁵⁹ *Berliner Zeitung*, 15 August 2006, “Israel Politik fördert den Antisemitismus”. Der Publizist Alfred Grosser plädiert für eine Strategie der Versöhnung gegenüber den Arabern

⁶⁰ „Kritik an Israel und Antisemitismus haben nichts miteinander zu tun. Es ist vielmehr Israels Politik, die den Antisemitismus in der Welt fördert.“

⁶¹ Alfred Grosser: Warum ich Israel kritisiere. In: *Internationale Politik*, Februar 2007

⁶² „Ich verstehe nicht, dass Juden heute andere verachten und sich das Recht nehmen, im Namen der Selbstverteidigung unbarmherzig Politik zu betreiben. Verständnis für die Leiden der anderen – gilt dieser Grundwert Europas nicht erst recht für Israel?“

against the “killer argument antisemitism”⁶³ for having remarked that “hardly anyone has increased the throng of antisemites, who unfortunately exist in Germany and who we have to fight, more than Mr. Sharon and in Germany a Mr. Friedman through his intolerant and invidious manner”⁶⁴; or in the following question posed by Norman Paech, then professor for Public Law at the University for Science and Politics in Hamburg and currently Foreign Policy Spokesman of the PDS parliamentary party in the Bundestag, to the German-Jewish professor Micha Brumlik in an open letter due to the latter’s criticism of the Canadian philosopher Ted Honderich for legitimising terrorism: “Has it occurred to you that such an executive censure of thought could give a fresh boost to antisemitism, which, after all, clearly exists in our society?”⁶⁵ On another occasion Paech has claimed that Israel was waging a “war of extermination”⁶⁶ in Lebanon, thereby using a specific term in characterizing the actions of the Jewish State that is clearly associated with the kind of battle conducted by the Nazis in Eastern Europe.⁶⁷ His usage of the ideogeme of the (co-)responsibility of Jews for antisemitism as well as the double standards in treating Israel by no means epitomize a slip of the pen, but constitute positions that Paech had already been promoting decades ago at university. At the time he had written in the *Hamburger Lehrerzeitung*: “Israel has, however, to ask itself indeed whether its Palestine policy does not fuel a latent antisemitism in Germany, which we cannot counter by remaining silent.”⁶⁸

The aforementioned ‘nazification’ of Israel can also manifest itself in the topos of the Palestinians as the “victims’ victims”. This is for instance advanced by the Jewish-born philosopher Ernst Tugendhat, who in his acceptance speech on the occasion of his receiving the Meister Eckhart Award by the Identity Foundation in 2005 said:⁶⁹

“As a Jew I am ashamed in the face of the oppression which the remaining Palestinians in the Westbank are subjected to at the hands of their Jewish occupiers. Non-Jews in this country too are not indifferent to the fate of the Palestinians because one can see in the antisemitic past of Central- and Eastern Europe an indirect co-responsibility. Since one has to fear that the Israeli settlement policy will be tantamount to the annexation of remaining Palestine..., one has to ask anxiously: should it have been only possible for us Jews to escape annihilation by shuffling our fate of expulsion off to another people?”⁷⁰

His espousal of the “victims of the victims” topos became once again evident in an interview published in 2006 in which he remarked: “Who used to be persecuted does not earn thereby the right to persecute others. If one has been kicked out of a house, it does not give one the

⁶³ “Schlage-tot-Argument Antisemitismus”, Hamburger Abendblatt, 29 May 2002, Günther Hörbst, „Totschlageargument Antisemitismus“

⁶⁴ „Ich fürchte, dass kaum jemand den Antisemiten, die es in Deutschland leider gibt und die wir bekämpfen müssen, mehr Zulauf verschafft hat als Herr Scharon und in Deutschland ein Herr Friedman mit seiner intoleranten und gehässigen Art.“, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18./19. Mai 2002, Machtkampf in der FDP

⁶⁵ Open letter by Norman Paech to Micha Brumlik, 29 October 2003, <http://www.steinbergrecherche.com/frpaech.htm#Doppelmoral>

⁶⁶ „Vernichtungskrieg“

⁶⁷ taz, 26.07.2006, „Deutsche Soldaten in Israel nicht denkbar“. Der Völkerrechtler Norman Paech, für die Linkspartei im Bundestag: Vorgehen Israels im Libanon unverhältnismäßig, Interview mit Norman Paech

⁶⁸ Cited in Eike Geisel: Der hilflose Antisemitismus. Anmerkungen zu seiner Hamburger Verübung. In: Ders.: Die Banalität der Guten. Deutsche Seelenwanderungen. (Edition Tiamat, 1992, Berlin), p.100

⁶⁹ Ernst Tugendhat: Vortrag anlässlich der Verleihung des Meister-Eckhart-Preises, 05 December 2005, <http://www.identityfoundation.de/pressemitteilungen.0.html>

⁷⁰ „Als Jude stehe ich beschämt angesichts der Unterdrückung, der die noch im Westjordanland verbliebenen Palästinenser von Seiten ihrer jüdischen Besatzer ausgesetzt sind. Auch auf nichtjüdischer Seite steht man ja hierzulande dem Schicksal der Palästinenser nicht gleichgültig gegenüber, da man in der antisemitischen Vergangenheit Mittel- und Osteuropas eine indirekte Mitverantwortung sehen kann. ... Da man befürchten muss, dass die israelische Siedlungspolitik auf die Annexion von Restpalästina hinausläuft ..., muss man sich beklommen fragen: soll es denn uns Juden nur möglich gewesen sein, der Vernichtung zu entgehen, indem wir das Schicksal der Vertreibung auf ein anderes Volk abwälzen?“

right to break into another house.”⁷¹ Given the implicit but obvious parallel drawn between the actions of Israel and those of the Nazis, attempts at rationalizing anti-Jewish sentiments would appear as a corollary of the underlying logic. Indeed, as early as 1991 – while teaching at the Free University of Berlin – Tugendhat had already posed the rhetoric question: “Must we Jews not say that our arrogance and your antisemitism belong together?”⁷² These positions would clearly qualify as antisemitic under the Working Definition of Antisemitism.

Similarly, in May 2007 the *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, one of Germany’s leading academic periodicals on domestic and foreign policy, published an article by Rolf Verleger, professor for neurophysiology at the University of Lübeck, in the wake of a debate about Jewish identity and the relationship to Israel.⁷³ Having become publicly known as a member of the board of directors of the Central Council of Jews in Germany for his criticism of Israel during the war in Lebanon in 2006, which had led to him being relieved from office as delegate by his hometown community,⁷⁴ he had subsequently launched a signature campaign in favour of greater international pressure on Israel to force it to end the occupation of the Palestinian territories.⁷⁵ It appears that Verleger’s rather one-sided criticism of Israel draws from sources such as the writings of the aforementioned Hajo Meyer, a Holocaust survivor, who has been trying to establish himself as one of the most vocal critics of Israel in recent years. Pleading for a universalist ethic deriving from Judaism, Verleger’s article refers to the book “The end of Judaism” by “the great Hajo Meyer”.⁷⁶ What can be clearly be understood as nothing short of a full endorsement of the latter’s positions – for there is not a word of distancing or criticism in Verleger’s text – gains a new dimension when taking into consideration that in this very book Meyer speaks among other things of the “Israeli Wehrmacht” and the “Jewish SS” and the myth that “the Jews are aiming at ruling the world” which was allegedly no longer to remain one.⁷⁷

Interestingly, the same issue of *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* also features an open letter by Michal Bodemann, a German-Jewish professor of sociology at the University of Toronto, to Micha Brumlik, defending both Alfred Grosser against the charge of antisemitism without dealing with what Grosser had in fact said and written, and Verleger’s signature campaign.⁷⁸ As in the cases of Grosser, Meyer as well as for instance those of the Jewish-American academics Chomsky or Finkelstein, who were both noted for their recent solidarity visits to the openly antisemitic terrorist organization Hezbollah in Lebanon⁷⁹ – the question of whether Jews can be antisemitic once again blends into the debate about academic antisemitism. That this could even lead to pseudo-scientific etymological strains and quasi-biologicistic patterns of arguing is demonstrated by the case of Kinan Jäger, a lecturer in political science at the University of Bonn, who is also frequently recommended by Germany’s Federal Agency for Civic Education as an expert on Middle Eastern issues. After having pre-

⁷¹ „Wer verfolgt wurde, erwirbt dadurch nicht das Recht, andere zu verfolgen. Wenn man aus einem Haus herausgeworfen wurde, gibt es einem nicht das Recht, in ein anderes Haus einzubrechen.“, Kölner Stadt Anzeiger, 25 March 2006, Die Politik der Unversöhnlichen

⁷² „Müßten wir Juden nicht sagen, dass unsere Arroganz und euer Antisemitismus zusammengehören?“ Cited in Oliver Tolmein: Deutsche Ethik. Wie der Philosoph Ernst Tugendhat für Frieden und für «Euthanasie» eintritt und damit auf begeisterte Zustimmung in der linken und alternativen Szene stößt. In: Konkret 05/91

⁷³ Rolf Verleger: Ethnizität als Religionsersatz. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 5/2007

⁷⁴ taz, 08 August 2006, Philipp Gessler: Vertreter des Zentralrats kritisiert Israel; taz, 14 August 2006, Philipp Gessler: Der Provokateur

⁷⁵ This campaign has been also signed by a number of well-known academics. See: Schalom 5767, <http://www.schalom5767.de>

⁷⁶ „Vgl. das Buch des großartigen Hajo Meyer, Das Ende des Judentums, Neu Isenburg 2005.“

⁷⁷ Hajo Meyer: Das Ende des Judentums. Der Verfall der israelischen Gesellschaft. (Melzer Verlag, 2005, Neu Isenburg)

⁷⁸ Michal Bodemann: Offener Brief an Micha Brumlik. In: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 5/2007

⁷⁹ MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series – No. 1165, U.S. linguist Noam Chomsky meets with Hizbullah leaders in Lebanon, 16 May 2006; Haaretz, 07 January 2008, U.S. academic Finkelstein meets top Hezbollah official in Lebanon

sented a lecture at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, in which he had advanced – in the manner of rhetorical questions – topoi such as that Israel was engaged in “state terrorism” or that Germany had responsibility to the Palestinians (as the victims of the victims), he was asked whether he considered it possible that he was making in part antisemitic arguments. Jäger replied to the question by arguing that he could not be an antisemite because he had Syrian ancestors and thereby was himself a Semite, and that moreover he had recently also found out that he had also a Jewish ancestor.⁸⁰ Not only does this reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of antisemitism on the part of this particular academic; it also betrays the aforementioned bias that whether a remark has indeed an antisemitic quality depends on who the speaker is or what family origins he has.

The same holds true for actual researchers of antisemitism itself. To deal with a social phenomenon does not lift a scholar out of a society that has also shaped his attitudes in one way or another. An approach to social research that aspires towards enlightenment requires first and foremost a permanent process of self-reflection on one’s own biases. As Rensmann has noted: “Research cannot limit itself a priori to an analysis of the extreme right or of neo-Nazism, as much as time has come for such examination. It also has to have an eye on social phenomena such as political, legal and socio-cultural processes and to develop reflexive ways and methods of dealing therewith, mindful of the fact that researchers on antisemitism themselves are not a priori free from activating stereotypes, if they write about antisemitism and about (images of) the Jews, and they therefore have to expose themselves to respective critical assessments.”⁸¹ The sociologist and head of the Lutheran Foundation for Advanced Studies in Villigst Klaus Holz constitutes a point in case. He has been noted for his work on “national antisemitism”⁸² and also gave the main lecture at an academic symposium on antisemitism that had been organized by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.⁸³ Yet in a lengthy dossier under the title “Guilt and Remembrance” that was published jointly with Elfriede Müller, a historian, and Enzo Traverso, a professor of political science at the University of Picardie in Amiens and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris, in the undogmatic left-wing weekly *Jungle World* in 2002⁸⁴, Holz reiterated various ideologemes of left-wing anti-Zionism such as the reproach that Israel’s Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was aiming at the “destruction of Palestinian civil society”⁸⁵ and that Palestinian “violence” was a reaction to Israeli “state terrorism”⁸⁶. While stopping short of drawing a direct analogy between Israel and Nazi Germany, Holz and his co-authors compared Israel’s policies to those of South Africa under the apartheid regime⁸⁷, while leaving it to others to infuse the ‘nazification’ topos with a degree of legitimacy: The Israeli filmmaker Eyal Sivan was adduced, who

⁸⁰ www.juedische.at, 04 July 2005, Ralf Schröder: Jäger gegen Israel. Auf den »Israelkritiker« Ludwig Watzal folgt endlich ein sympathischer Nahost-Experte.

⁸¹ „Die Forschung kann sich nicht a priori auf die Analyse der extremen Rechten oder des Neonazismus zurückziehen, so sehr diese Untersuchung an der Zeit ist. Sie hat den Blick auch differenziert auf *gesellschaftliche* Phänomene sowie politische, rechtliche und soziokulturelle Prozesse zu richten und dabei reflexive Auseinandersetzungsformen und –methoden zu entwickeln; eingedenk dessen, dass Antisemitismusforscher selbst nicht a priori frei davon sind, Vorurteile zu bedienen, wenn sie über Antisemitismus und Juden(bilder) schreiben und sich deshalb entsprechender kritischer Bewertungen aussetzen *müssen*.“, Lars Rensmann: Parameter einer selbstreflexiven Antisemitismusforschung. In: Sozialwissenschaftliche Literaturrundschau, Heft 52/2006, p. 63f

⁸² Klaus Holz: Nationaler Antisemitismus. Wissenssoziologie einer Weltanschauung. (Hamburger Edition, 2001, Hamburg)

⁸³ Klaus Holz: Neuer Antisemitismus? – Wandel und Kontinuität der Judenfeindschaft. In: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: Neuer Antisemitismus? Judenfeindschaft im politischen und öffentlichen Diskurs. Ein Symposium des Bundesamts für Verfassungsschutz, 05 December 2005, www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/symp_2005.pdf

⁸⁴ *Jungle World*, 13 November 2002, Klaus Holz, Elfriede Müller & Enzo Traverso: Schuld und Erinnerung. Die Shoah, der Nahostkonflikt und die Linke

⁸⁵ „Die Militarisierung der israelischen Gesellschaft und die Zerschlagung der palästinensischen Zivilgesellschaft sind langfristige Ziele des Premierministers Ariel Sharon ...“

⁸⁶ „Die israelische Besatzung ist der Ausdruck eines Staatsterrorismus, die palästinensische Gewalt ist eine Reaktion darauf.“

⁸⁷ „Die VertreterInnen eines »Groß-Israel« wollen eher die Ausweisung, um einen rein jüdischen Staat zu errichten. Der Vergleich mit einem Apartheidssystem ist weit zutreffender.“

had argued that the comparison between Sharon and the Nazis was customary among Israeli pacifists. Moreover, while calling the remark of the Portuguese author José Saramago that the Israeli blockade of Ramallah occurred “in the spirit of Auschwitz” and “this place is being turned into a concentration camp” absurd, Holz, Müller and Traverso belittled his comparison by suggesting that the Nobel Prize Laureate had only wanted to express his horror at the Israeli occupation policy and had done so by using a wrong historical image. They failed to mention a further statement that Saramago also made in this respect: “The Israeli people and its army are profiting from the Holocaust.”⁸⁸ The authors went on to argue that looked at through the “Auschwitz screen”⁸⁹ which was allegedly distorting the perception of left-wing defenders of Israel “Jews are only a metonymical figure, in which the murdered of yesterday are superimposed on the oppressors of today”⁹⁰. In their view “the banalisation of the events in the occupied territories in the name of the remembrance of Auschwitz deserves our outrage”.⁹¹ While conceding that the Israeli state never intended “to exterminate” the Palestinians, they claimed that the continuation of the occupation over decades could also “threaten the existence of the Palestinian population”.⁹² Conversely, Holz et al. denied that the Arab world was posing any existential threat to Israel.⁹³ Furthermore, they downplayed the historical nexus between Nazi Germany and contemporary Palestinian antisemitism, – which they euphemistically call “anti-Zionism”.⁹⁴

Klaus Holz not only comes repeatedly close to actuating the ‘nazification topos’ by defending those who draw such analogies and in using Israeli “chief witnesses” as proof of the legitimacy of such a comparison; he also rationalises Palestinian terrorism as an exclusive reaction to Israeli behaviour. A similar line is taken by him in arguing that “antisemitism among Muslim migrant groups” rather manifests itself “often only on the basis of their experience in the country of immigration. Its preconditions comprise their social, racist and religiously justified exclusion”.⁹⁵ This is relevant in terms of the Working Definition of Antisemitism, which does not differentiate between an antisemitism with or without rational justification, but mentions the following as a contemporary example of an anti-Jewish expression: “Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, *or even for acts committed by non-Jews.*”⁹⁶ Recent empirical research also refutes the veracity of Holz’ claim that antisemitism among Muslim migrants is largely a reaction to the Middle East conflict or Israel’s policies.⁹⁷

The singling out of Israel is clearly epitomized by the boycott movement among the academic teachers’ unions in Great Britain. It is an example of what the Working Definition of Antisemitism mentions as “Applying double standards by requiring of it [*Israel*] a behaviour not

⁸⁸ Simon Wiesenthal Center: Press Information, 2 April 2002, SWC condemns further statements on Israel by nobel laureate Jose Saramago

⁸⁹ „Sichtblende Auschwitz“

⁹⁰ „In diesem verworrenen Rollenspiel sind die Juden nur noch eine metonymische Figur, in der die Ermordeten von gestern die Unterdrücker von heute überlagern.“

⁹¹ „Wenn Saramagos Worte Kritik verdienen, so verdient die Banalisierung der Geschehnisse in den besetzten Gebieten im Namen der Erinnerung an Auschwitz unsere Entrüstung.“

⁹² „Wenn die Besatzungspolitik des Westjordanlandes und des Gazastreifens sich über Jahrzehnte fortsetzt, wäre nicht nur die Existenz der palästinensischen Bevölkerung bedroht, sondern auch die Demokratie in Israel und die internationale Akzeptanz des Staates.“

⁹³ „Eine existentielle militärische Bedrohung des Staates Israel steht aber im Moment gar nicht zur Debatte.“

⁹⁴ „Der Antizionismus in der arabischen Welt und der vieler PalästinenserInnen wird mit dem traditionellen Antisemitismus der westlichen Welt, der die Shoah hervorbrachte, in eins gesetzt.“

⁹⁵ „Vielmehr manifestiert sich der Antisemitismus in Einwanderergruppen häufig erst aufgrund ihrer Erfahrungen im Einwandererland. Zu den Voraussetzungen gehört ihre soziale, rassistisch und religiös begründete Ausgrenzung.“, Klaus Holz: „Die Gegenwart des Antisemitismus. Islamistische, demokratische und antizionistische Judenfeindschaft. (Hamburger Edition, 2005, Hamburg), S. 9

⁹⁶ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism (emphases added by the author)

⁹⁷ Draft Report. Task Force Project # 2006-13, Guenther Jikeli: Qualitative Study: Antisemitic Patterns of Argumentation Among Youth with Muslim/Arab Background in Europe, 2006 (unpublished)

expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.”⁹⁸ While several boycott resolutions against particular Israeli universities or academia in general were passed in recent years within these bodies that represent teachers in higher education, these could not be implemented for various reasons, but can nonetheless be assumed to have an impact on the general discourse about Israel and antisemitism.⁹⁹ By contrast, the anti-Israel boycott movement has so far not been able to gain comparable momentum in other European countries. However, even outside of Great Britain one can observe increasing attempts among certain sections in academia to promote in a more coordinated fashion positions that come very close or overlap with the topoi covered by the Working Definition of Antisemitism. A case in point was the so-called lecture series “Germany-Israel-Palestine” in 2005, which had been organized by Georg Meggle, a professor of philosophy at the University of Leipzig. While attempting to appear even-handed in the selection of the guest lecturers who were invited to address the audience, Meggle in fact invited a number of speakers who are known to promote positions that would qualify as antisemitic under the Working Definition of Antisemitism. Among them were:

- the aforementioned Ted Honderich, who on his website had previously claimed that “the Palestinians are right to look back to Fascist Germany and say they are the Jews of the Jews.”¹⁰⁰;
- the Israeli peace activist Uri Avnery, who in an article had previously remarked “The Sharon government is a giant laboratory for the growing of the antisemitism virus. It exports it to the whole world. Anti-Semitic organizations, which for many years vegetated on the margins of society, rejected and despised, are suddenly growing and flowering.”¹⁰¹;
- the aforementioned Noam Chomsky, who in addressing the Scottish Palestine Solidarity Campaign in December 2002 had claimed that “[b]y now *Jews in the US are the most privileged and influential part of the population*. Antisemitism is no longer a problem, fortunately. It’s raised, but *it’s raised because privileged people want to make sure they have total control, not just 98% control*. That’s why antisemitism is becoming an issue. Not because of the threat of antisemitism; they want to make sure there’s no critical look at the policies the US (and they themselves) support in the Middle East.”¹⁰²
- Uwe Steinhoff, philosopher and research associate at the University of Oxford, who in his lecture compared the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon with the Nazi organizer of the “Final Solution” Adolf Eichmann because of Sharon’s “indirect responsibility” for the 1982 massacres in Sabra and Shatila by saying: “Eichmann has by the way also never personally killed a Jew but has only helped in their murder.”¹⁰³;
- and the aforementioned Hajo Meyer, who in his lecture said that “what is happening to the Palestinians every day under the occupation” was “almost identical” with “what

⁹⁸ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

⁹⁹ For an overview of the history of attempts at boycotting Israel by British university teachers’ unions in recent years see: Anti-Israel Academic Boycott Resource Center, http://www.zionismontheweb.org/academic_boycott/

¹⁰⁰ Ted Honderich: After Terror: A book and further thoughts, 09 December 2002, <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ATT&furtherthoughts.html>

¹⁰¹ CounterPunch, 02 October 2002, Uri Avnery: Manufacturing Anti-Semites

¹⁰² Cited in: Oliver Kamm, Chomsky, antisemitism and intellectual standards, 15 February 2005, http://oliverkamm.typepad.com/blog/2005/02/chomsky_antisem.html (emphases added by the author)

¹⁰³ „Eichmann hat übrigens auch nie einen Juden persönlich umgebracht, sondern nur bei deren Ermordung geholfen.“, Hagalil.com, 24 February 2006, Tobias Jaecker: Antizionistisches Einerlei. Unter dem Deckmantel der Wissenschaftsfreiheit: Antisemitismus im akademischen Milieu

was done to the German Jews even before the ‘Final Solution’¹⁰⁴ and also claimed that “If there is something such as a rise in antisemitism at all, then its main cause lies in the demeanour of Israel itself”.¹⁰⁵

Stopping short of openly supporting Meyer’s views, Meggle clearly endorsed the moral lessons that Meyer had claimed to have drawn from the past and concluded by indirectly casting the Israelis as real or potential perpetrators: “He, who himself becomes perpetrator, ultimately loses his own soul. (This is the lesson, which [Steven] Spielberg’s ‘Prayer for Peace’ – his new film ‘Munich’ – rightly suggests to us and to the Israelis.)”¹⁰⁶

The hitherto most notable coordinated attempt on the part of German and Austrian academics at infusing antisemitic ideologema into public discourse is the so-called “Manifesto of the 25”¹⁰⁷. Although the signatories – most of them more or less well-known professors of political science at German universities as well as peace researchers – allegedly aim at a rebalancing of German-Israeli relations by stressing the continuation of friendship between the two countries while insisting on Germany’s right to voice criticism of its Israeli partner, their reasoning is not only a flawed one but reveals elements that appear relevant under the Working Definition. Their main argument is that the creation of Israel led to the plight of the Palestinians and was itself the direct result of the Holocaust, for which Germany and Europe bear responsibility. Hence, while they recognize the “global historic uniqueness of the Holocaust”¹⁰⁸, they claim that Germany and Europe also have a particular responsibility towards “the Palestinian population”¹⁰⁹, which “has not the least share in the outsourcing of a portion of the European problems into the Middle East”¹¹⁰. They maintain in particular that

“[I]t is the Holocaust that has brought suffering on (Muslim, Christian and Druse) Palestinians, which has been ongoing for six decades and is currently enhanced to the Degree of intolerability. This is not the same as if the Third Reich had committed genocide against the Palestinians. But innumerable deaths resulted in this case too, the tearing apart of families, the expulsion, or the dwelling in makeshift accommodation until today. Without the Holocaust against the Jews, Israeli policy would not see itself justified or / and constrained to flout so adamantly the human rights of the Palestinians and of the citizens of Lebanon in order to secure its existence.”¹¹¹

Not only does this account of the Middle East conflict distort history by denying the role played by the Palestinian and Arab national movement under the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in

¹⁰⁴ „Das „was den Palästinensern unter der Besatzung alles tagtäglich angetan wird“, sei „beinahe identisch“ mit dem, „was man schon vor der ‚Endlösung‘ mit den deutschen Juden machte.“, cited in: Hagalil.com, 24 February 2006, Tobias Jaecker: Antizionistisches Einerlei. Unter dem Deckmantel der Wissenschaftsfreiheit: Antisemitismus im akademischen Milieu

¹⁰⁵ „Wenn es überhaupt so etwas wie eine Zunahme des Antisemitismus gibt, dann liegt die Hauptursache dafür im politischen Verhalten von Israel selbst.“, cited in: Hagalil.com, 24 February 2006, Tobias Jaecker: Antizionistisches Einerlei. Unter dem Deckmantel der Wissenschaftsfreiheit: Antisemitismus im akademischen Milieu

¹⁰⁶ Telepolis, 23 April 2006, Georg Meggle: Deutschland/Israel/Palästina. <http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/22/22512/1.html>

¹⁰⁷ Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 November 2006, Freundschaft und Kritik. Warum die „besonderen Beziehungen“ zwischen Deutschland und Israel überdacht werden müssen / Das „Manifest der 25“

¹⁰⁸ „...weltweit historischen Einzigartigkeit des Holocaust ...“

¹⁰⁹ „Als Deutsche, Österreicher und Europäer haben wir nicht nur Mitverantwortung für die Existenz Israels ..., sondern auch eine Mitverantwortung für die Lebensbedingungen und eine selbstbestimmte Zukunft des palästinensischen Volkes.“

¹¹⁰ „Und die palästinensische Bevölkerung hat an der Auslagerung eines Teils der europäischen Probleme in den Nahen Osten nicht den geringsten Anteil.“

¹¹¹ „Es ist der Holocaust, der das seit sechs Jahrzehnten anhaltende und gegenwärtig bis zur Unerträglichkeit gesteigerte Leid über die (muslimischen wie christlichen und drusischen) Palästinenser gebracht hat. Das ist nicht dasselbe, als hätte das Dritte Reich einen Völkermord an den Palästinensern verübt. Aber zahllose Tote waren auch hier die Folge, das Auseinanderreißen der Familien, die Vertreibung oder das Hausen in Notquartieren bis auf den heutigen Tag. Ohne den Holocaust an den Juden würde die israelische Politik sich nicht berechtigt oder/und gezwungen sehen, sich so hartnäckig über die Menschenrechte der Palästinenser und der Bewohner Libanons hinwegzusetzen, um seine Existenz zu sichern.“

Nazi Germany's war against the Jews¹¹²; it clearly negates any idea of moral agency on the part of Arabs, portraying them in a rather paternalizing manner as the hapless objects of German action. "Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters *and accomplices* during World War II (the Holocaust)" is in fact cited as one contemporary example of antisemitism by the Working Definition of Antisemitism.¹¹³ Moreover, the signatories of the "Manifesto of the 25" claim that "[t]ogether with the initially mentioned implicit prohibition to voice open criticism of Israeli decisions, philosemitism in Germany bolsters antisemitism rather than weakening it".¹¹⁴ The notion that antisemitism nowadays constitutes somewhat a function of the degree to which Israel is (or is not) criticized, epitomizes flawed reasoning in the sense that it provides hatred of Jews with a rational basis. It becomes also relevant in the context of the Working Definition which holds "Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews" to be a contemporary example of antisemitism.¹¹⁵ Moreover, the very fact that the authors disclaim to be comparing the Holocaust to Israel's policies towards the Palestinians remains not only dubitable given the direct causal link they make between the persecution of the Jews by the Nazis and the plight of the Palestinians, but is clearly contradicted by the fact that the aforementioned Udo Steinbach and Georg Meggle feature among the signatories.

That an obsession with Israel informs modern antisemitism to a considerable degree has been acknowledged by the Working Definition which contains a section with five (not necessarily exhaustive) examples of possible antisemitic manifestations with regard to the Jewish State. However, while constituting an important tool in identifying antisemitism, the document has arguably so far not even filtered down to relevant state institutions such as Germany's Federal Agency for Civic Education that amongst other things deal precisely with educating and informing about antisemitism. Its aforementioned employee Ludwig Watzal, who used to maintain a lectureship at the University of Bonn and whose articles have also appeared in magazines such as *Intifada* on *anti-imperialista.com / antiimperialista.org*¹¹⁶, a transnational left-wing anti-imperialist website calling for solidarity with Hamas,¹¹⁷ support of Hezbollah¹¹⁸ and collecting funding for the "Iraqi resistance"¹¹⁹, published a piece entitled "An Israelization of the world?"¹²⁰ in the periodical *International*. It contains statements such as the following: "Does the rest of the world also face imminent Israelization now that the US has been Israelized?"¹²¹ This clearly relates to the following example of antisemitism with regard to Israel

¹¹² For accounts of the role of the Mufti and the Arab national movement in Nazi Germany's war against the Jews see: Matthias Küntzel: *Djihad und Judentum. Über den neuen antijüdischen Krieg.* (ça ira, 2003, Freiburg); Klaus Gensicke: *Der Mufti von Jerusalem und die Nationalsozialisten. Eine politische Biographie Amin el-Husseinis.* (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2007, Darmstadt)

¹¹³ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism (emphases added by author)

¹¹⁴ „Zusammen mit dem eingangs erwähnten unausgesprochenen Verbot offener Kritik an israelischen Entscheidungen stärkt der Philosemitismus in Deutschland den Antisemitismus eher als dass er ihn schwächt.“

¹¹⁵ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

¹¹⁶ <http://www.antiimperialista.com/de/view.shtml?category=31&id=1042360761&keyword=+>, Intifada 11, 12 January 2003, Ludwig Watzal: Steht den Palästinensern eine neue Vertreibung bevor?; www.antiimperialista.org/de/view.shtml?category=31&id=1071150184&keyword, Intifada 14, 11 December 2003, Ludwig Watzal: Zur Nahost- und Israelpolitik der USA und der Macht der Neokonservativen (Neocons) auf die Außenpolitik. Vom ehrlichen Makler zur Partei Israels

¹¹⁷ <http://www.antiimperialista.org/view.shtml?category=2&id=1063447151&keyword=+>, 13 September 2003, Campo Antiimperialista: Solidarität mit der Hamas!

¹¹⁸ http://www.antiimperialista.org/index2.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4612&Itemid=184, Erklärung des Antiimperialistischen Lagers zum Krieg im Libanon. Stoppt den israelischen Terrorkrieg!

¹¹⁹ <http://www.antiimperialista.com/view.shtml?category=44&id=1067790557&keyword=+>, 02 November 2003, Campo Antiimperialista: Spendet 10 Euro für den irakischen Widerstand!

¹²⁰ Ludwig Watzal: Eine Israelisierung der Welt? In: *International*, 3/2004

¹²¹ „Steht nach der Israelisierung der USA nun auch dem Rest der Welt die Israelisierung bevor?“

presented by the Working Definition of Antisemitism: “Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.”¹²² Moreover, in a (positive) review of “Galilee Flowers” by Israel Shamir, a book which abounds with classical stereotypes about Jewish revengefulness, materialism, control of the world stock market and domination of the media, that appeared in the weekly *Freitag*, Watzal wrote:¹²³ “To this was added the fact that he [*Israel Shamir*] converted to Christianity as Mordechai Vanunu did too; he will never be pardoned by Judaism for this. Therewith his problems began.”¹²⁴ The Working Definition cites the following example of contemporary antisemitism in this respect: “Making mendacious, dehumanising, demonising, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective ...”¹²⁵ The same example holds true for an earlier piece about an Israeli media entrepreneur entitled “Haim Saban, the media and Israel” that was broadcast by *DeutschlandRadio Berlin*.¹²⁶ Here Watzal sounded the following:

“The escapades of the so-called Holocaust industry are at any rate rather bizarre and an insult to the victims of National Socialist extermination policy. The actions of Saban have, however, nothing to do with conspiracy thinking, but they are evidence of how symbiotic the relationship between power and money is. Saban’s political desire is to obtain as much control over the media as possible. Peter Chernin, the President and head of the News Corporation has pointed out that the Hollywood mogul has not become involved in Germany for purely financial considerations, but that he regards the country as the basis for something bigger.”¹²⁷

Juliane Wetzel from the Center for the Study of Antisemitism at the Technical University Berlin commented on this radio piece at the time that “he [*Watzal*] activates the typical clichés of Jewish capital and Jewish power”.¹²⁸ Yet until today Thomas Krüger, the President of the Federal Agency for Civic Education, does not seem to have drawn externally visible consequences with respect to Watzal.¹²⁹

5. Conclusion

While most of the above mentioned statements by academics that qualify as “antisemitic” under the Working Definition of Antisemitism would probably hardly have any relevance under

¹²² EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

¹²³ Freitag, 03 June 2005, Ludwig Watzal: Die echten und die falschen Juden

¹²⁴ „Hinzu kam, dass er zum Christentum konvertierte, wie dies auch Mordechai Vanunu tat; dies wird ihm seitens des Judentums niemals verziehen. Damit begannen seine Schwierigkeiten.“

¹²⁵ EUMC: Working Definition of Antisemitism

¹²⁶ DeutschlandRadio Berlin, 16 September 2004, Ludwig Watzal: Haim Saban, die Medien und Israel

¹²⁷ „Die Eskapaden der so genannten Holocaust-Industrie sind jedenfalls ziemlich bizarr und eine Beleidigung für die Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Vernichtungspolitik. Die Aktionen Sabans haben aber nichts mit Verschwörungsdenken zu tun, sondern sie sind ein Beleg dafür, wie symbiotisch das Verhältnis von Macht und Geld ist. Sabans politisches Anliegen ist, eine möglichst große Kontrolle über die Medien zu erlangen. Dass sich der Hollywood-Mogul nicht nur aus finanziellen Erwägungen in Deutschland engagiert hat, sondern das Land als Basis für etwas größeres ansieht, hat Peter Chernin, Präsident und Leiter der News Corporation, deutlich gemacht.“

¹²⁸ „Er bedient die typischen Klischees vom jüdischen Kapital und jüdischer Macht“, Die Welt, 30 September 2004, Benedict Maria Müller: Rassismus-Vorwurf gegen DeutschlandRadio Berlin

¹²⁹ For a more detailed though by no means exhaustive overview of the various publishing activities of Ludwig Watzal see Patrick Neu: Pädagogisch wertvoll? In: Tribüne. Zeitschrift zum Verständnis des Judentums, 4/2005, Heft 176; Patrick Neu: Bundeszentrale hält an ihrem Kurs fest. In: Tribüne. Zeitschrift zum Verständnis des Judentums, 2/2006, Heft 178; Alexandra Makarova: Neutrales Haus in Erklärungsnot. Bei der Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung häufen sich Israel-kritische Peinlichkeiten. In: Jüdische Zeitung, Nr. 6 (10), Juni 2006; Martin Kloke: Israel – Alptraum der deutschen Linken? In: Matthias Brosch, Michael Elm, Norman Geißler, Brigitta Elisa Simbürger & Oliver von Wrochem (Hrsg.): Exklusive Solidarität. Linker Antisemitismus in Deutschland.“ (Metropol, 2007, Berlin)

penal law, this does not absolve society in general and its elites in particular from sanctioning such hateful language and those who inject respective narratives into public mainstream discourses. Indeed, as Lars Rensmann from the University of Michigan has remarked, „only the critical public pervasion of one’s proper cultural shares and political-psychological motives that are bound up with antisemitic images, together with a consistent public discrediting of antisemitic prejudice, could contribute to a reduction of anti-Jewish stereotypy, and that hence the importance of political discourses and processes of self-understanding should not be underestimated.”¹³⁰ Yet it must be concluded that societal decision-makers in most cases fall short of exploiting their respective possibilities, often failing to understand the nature of the problem as such even when pointed to it or shying away from controversial arguments that would inevitably ensue within their own ranks. The absence of firm and consistent political leadership on the issue of confronting the new forms of antisemitism highlights once again the important role that must be attached to education. It would have to take into account that anti-Zionism – while historically a distinct phenomenon that only partially overlapped with antisemitism – has nowadays become the most modern and socially opportune form of the old anti-Jewish resentment. A separation between the two categories – as is for instance done by the various Offices for the Protection of the Constitution on a federal and state level in Germany¹³¹ – is not only an artificial one, in that it overlooks the core of the problem, but could potentially also abet the social acceptance of modernized manifestations of antisemitism.

¹³⁰ „... dass nur die kritische öffentliche Durchdringung der mit antisemitischen Bildern verbundenen kulturellen Selbst-Anteile und politisch-psychologischen Motive in Koppelung mit einer konsequenten öffentlichen Diskreditierung antisemitischer Vorurteile kurz- wie langfristig zu einem Abbau judenfeindlicher Stereotypie beitragen können, insofern also die Bedeutung politischer Diskurse und Selbstverständigungsprozesse nicht unterschätzt werden sollte.“, Lars Rensmann: *Demokratie und Judenbild. Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004, Wiesbaden), p. 39

¹³¹ Senatsverwaltung für Inneres. Abteilung Verfassungsschutz: *Antisemitismus im extremistischen Spektrum Berlins*. (September 2004, Berlin), pp. 7-8; Stefan Kestler: *Antisemitismus und das linksextremistische Spektrum in Deutschland nach 1945*. In: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz: *Neuer Antisemitismus? Judenfeindschaft im politischen und öffentlichen Diskurs*. Ein Symposium des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz, 05 December 2005, www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/symp_2005.pdf; conversation with Thomas Sippel, President of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution in the federal state of Thuringia at the seminar “Bildungsinitiativen – Gegen Antisemitismus und Rechtsextremismus – für ein tolerantes und demokratisches Thüringen“, 27 November 2006

4.4. *Old Roots and Dangers*

Irina Scherbakova

1. Antisemitism in the Soviet Era

Throughout the entire Soviet period, one of the main ideological postulates was the postulate of friendship among peoples and the equality of all nations. There is no need to remind one how this was realised in Stalin's concrete policy at least from the beginning of the thirties: under the guise of the struggle against nationalism, representatives of the intelligentsia in the national republics, and otherwise, were subjected to repressions. Large-scale national operations ensued in the period of the Great Terror (1937-1938), during which tens of thousands of Poles and Germans living in the USSR became victims of political repressions. This was followed by the deportations of entire nationalities during the Great Patriotic War.

As far as the situation of the Jews in the USSR and manifestations of antisemitism are concerned, above all it should be noted that anti-Semitic sentiments never really disappeared in everyday life, despite the fact that all kinds of limitations for the Jews had been eliminated after October 1917. From the middle of the 1930s, after an ideological turn from the idea of world revolution to the idea of the creation of a Soviet empire, antisemitism became apparent in Stalin's initiation of the gradual substitution and exclusion of Jewish cadres from the most important state and party structures.

These tendencies, which intensified during World War II, became an element of Soviet state policy from the second half of the 1940s until the death of Stalin in 1953, taking the shape of the fight against cosmopolitanism right up to the famous "Doctor's Plot". This essentially led to the exclusion of teachers and professors of Jewish descent from all major Soviet universities and other higher educational institutions, to the introduction of secret quotas for students, and to restrictions in hiring and admission to post-graduate programmes at academic institutions.

To a great extent, this cadre policy continued even after the death of Stalin and ended only with the beginning of perestroika.

This sort of anti-Semitic policy resulted not only in the emigration of many scientists and scholars, but also led to stagnation – above all in the field of the liberal arts –, hindered the formation of scientific schools and brought about a drop in the scientific level at many universities. A vivid example is the situation in the philological department of Moscow State University, where such policy continued even after the anti-Semitic campaign of 1949-1950 and the virtual devastation of the scientific cadres. This also manifested itself in the selection of scientific cadres later on, which up to now has had an impact on the level and character of teaching in many humanities departments. (To understand what types of people made their scientific careers as a result of this policy, one must only look to the scandal that broke out in 2007 in the sociology department of Moscow State University, where a group of students came out against the dean, Vladimir Dobrenkov, who was trying to propagate aggressive right-wing radical-oriented Orthodoxy and xenophobia in the department. Pamphlets of an anti-Semitic character were

actively disseminated in the department, and more than ten instructors were forced to resign¹³².)

2. Changes in the Period of Perestroika

With the beginning of perestroika, antisemitism ceased to be an element of state policy. There was a revival of Jewish education, with the formation of Jewish studies departments and Jewish schools. Scientific and public educational centres were founded, and there was the publication of a large number of books devoted to the history of the Jews, the Holocaust and other topics that were previously excluded from publication in the Soviet Union.

Yet, at the same time xenophobic and ultranationalistic sentiments burst to the surface as a result of political and social upheaval, there was also an intensification of ideologies expressing these sentiments and clothing them with corresponding words and ideas. Antisemitism became one of the most important components of these constructions.

The foundations of a new far-right line were already laid in the Soviet era. The new far-right line was brought to life by nationally oriented intellectuals grouped around a whole series of magazines and newspapers having a readership of virtually millions at the time.

"These persons are, for the most part, people of the arts – writers, artists, philosophers and literature critics advancing the traditions of Slavophilism, the Black Hundred movement and the Eurasianist movement – who gave the conceptual basis to that ideological/psychological system (ultranationalism, ethnocentrism, aggressive xenophobia, feeling of national aggrievedness, traditionalism, intolerance of dissent, imperial Messianism, anti-Westernism, isolationism, mysticism of Russia's 'special path', anti-democratism, leader cult, statism, apology of violence, road to the establishment of a national dictatorship) constituting the core of present-day Russian neo-Nazism."¹³³

These ideas and concepts, which became the basis for the numerous right-wing radical and nationalistic groups and organisations that emerged in the 1990s, reached the public in the form of myriad slogans and catchwords. An entire segment of related publications appeared. Over the last 15 years in Russia, hundreds of anti-Semitic-oriented books, magazines and newspapers have been published, and the Internet is overflowing with anti-Semitic websites (it is also quite easy to obtain the regrettably well-known forgery *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as well as *Mein Kampf*, works of so-called Holocaust deniers and many other odious publications).

3. New and Old Myths

In certain Russian intellectuals, the collapse of the Soviet empire and a deep ideological crisis aroused sensations of calamity accompanied by the feeling of profound nostalgia and a desire to find those at fault.

The apology of the tsarist empire, which arose at the beginning of the 1990s, and the cult of the Tsar's family also served, in their own way, to fuel the revival of anti-Semitic sentiments. In connection with this, there appeared a large number of publications about the role of the

¹³²The student protest has still not produced any sort of result. A commission was formed which has not yet drawn any definite conclusions.

¹³³Vladimir Ilyushenko. *Natsional-radikalizm v sovremennoi Rossii* (National Radicalism in Contemporary Russia). Moscow 2007, p. 175.

Jews in the collapse of the monarchy and the organisation of the October Revolution that spoke of a worldwide Jewish and Masonic conspiracy against the Russian people.

Serving as conductors for such sentiments were also some former dissidents (for example, Igor Shafarevich, who elicited violent reactions with his anti-Semitic publications in the 1990s) as well as – unfortunately – Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, who produced a two-volume work called *Two Hundred Years Together* (2001). This work played a negative role insofar as the writer with his name, one way or the other, gave antisemitism "access to the salon", and to the extent that this work, which is dedicated to the history of the Jews in Russia, reproduces – albeit in a softer and, as it were, objectivist form – virtually the entire repertoire used in anti-Semitic propaganda.

All kinds of publications in the spirit of this repertoire can be found not only in dozens of publications of the marginal far-right media and glossy quasi-historical literature, but also on the pages of some literary journals and university publications.

The main elements of this anti-Semitic repertoire are easy to identify:

1. The Jews are directly responsible for the October Revolution and the collapse of the monarchy. They are the enemy within and the enemy without, the organisers of a worldwide Jewish-Masonic conspiracy, and the "Fifth Column". This is where the anti-Semitic literature usually cites figures that are supposed to show just how many Jews participated in the revolution.
2. The Jews are directly responsible for Stalin's repressions, for collectivisation and the so-called "genocide" of the Russian people.
3. In such publications, Stalin usually appears as the defender of the interests of the Russian people – as the person who rejected cosmopolitanism and put the country on the path of Russian patriotism and contributed to the forming of a national feeling.

The following is a typical example of this sort of reasoning taken from an article published in *Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta* and written by one of the most hateful of the anti-Semitic-oriented historians who seek to justify Stalin's policy:

*"The policy of the purges was manifestly defined by a striving to correct the disproportionate representation of Soviet nationalities occupying leadership positions in the most important departments and agencies... In terms of education and representation in party and state structures in the field of science and art in the 1930s, the Jewish nationality was far ahead of the rest. As the attitude toward national minorities and the great potential of the Russian people changed, such disparity began to be perceived as an abnormal situation. ... This, inevitably, was perceived by certain circles in the USSR and abroad as a manifestation of a policy of state antisemitism. In our view, this is more appropriately regarded as a reaction by a vast Slavic country to the internationalist, cosmopolitan experiments of the 1920s and 1930s."*¹³⁴

4. One of the forms in which anti-Semitic sentiments are manifest is the attempt to minimise in every way possible the importance of the Holocaust (even if its complete denial by the anti-Semitic discourse is not possible). A deceitful game of numbers is conducted toward this end:

"For instance, of the more than 55,000 Soviet Jews who were taken prisoner by the Hitlerites, only 4,457 persons survived – the others became victims of the Holocaust. Such a fate did not threaten the 10,172 Jews who fought on the side of Ger-

¹³⁴ A. Vdovin. *Evolutsiya natsional'noi politiki SSSR, 1917-1941* (Evolution of the National Policy of the USSR, 1917-1941). *Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta*, №3. 2002, p. 51.

many and were taken prisoner by the Soviets. The total number of Jews who came with the Hitlerites to subjugate the peoples of the USSR exceeded the number of Jews who participated in the partisan struggle against the occupiers on the territory of the USSR (17,500 persons). In all, according to information by the Israeli newspaper Vesti, 150,000 Jewish soldiers and officers fought in the ranks of Hitler's army on the fronts of the Second World War."¹³⁵

Of course it is also possible to come across the pet subject of anti-Semitic discourse: the "speculation regarding the Holocaust". For example, the following is said about Stalin's famous toast "to the health of the Russian people" given at a Kremlin reception in honour of victory on 24 May 1945 – a toast to which representatives of other nationalities of the USSR took offence:

*"... Stalin's speech was a distinct departure from the nationalistic intentions of cultivating in every way possible the idea of the Jews as the people who suffered more than others as a result of Hitler's genocide ... later on, some representatives of that nationality began to consider the tragedy of the war years as an eternal debt to be repaid by the rest of mankind."*¹³⁶

5. The justification of Stalin's anti-Semitic policy in the period of the Cold War follows the same line of thinking:

*"Still, these costs are precisely the same as the postwar repressions in the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee ... in terms of scale and negative consequences, they cannot be compared with the costs and repressions of Russophobic and national nihilistic nature that were typical of the first decades after October 1917... The postwar campaign against 'cosmopolitans' was by no means inspired by a mythical 'Stalinist antisemitism'. It was directed not only against the well-known doctrine of Allen Dulles ... but also against the Harvard Project developed in the USA, which, too, was aimed at destroying Soviet patriotism and substituting it with 'values common to all mankind'."*¹³⁷ (p. 53)

4. The New Nationalism

Since the end of the 1990s, those in power have become increasingly persistent in their efforts to inculcate in the consciousness of the people the necessity of creating a certain national idea that is supposed to serve as the basis for achieving national consensus and unity of the people. At the same time, there is overt rejection of the idea of democracy, human liberties and values common to all mankind. Gradually, with the help of rightwing radical-oriented ideologists, that national idea is increasingly turning into a Russian idea in which ethnocentrism prevails while, for the far right, it is virtually neo-Nazism. Today in Russia, we are witnessing more and more how so-called "patriotism" – the patriotic idea which is supposed to be the main component of national unification – is transformed into empty slogans glorifying Russia and the Holy Rus' (*svyataya Rus'*), while, in reality, they are a cover for xenophobia and national hate.

¹³⁵ A. Vdovin. *Natsional'nyi vopros i natsional'naya politiki SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny: mify i realii* (The National Question and National Policy of the USSR in the Years of the Great Patriotic War: Myths and Realities). *Vestnik moskovskogo universiteta*, №5. 2003, pp. 48-49.

¹³⁶ *ibid.*, pp. 49-50

¹³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 53

It is true, everyday antisemitism in Russia is today clearly giving way to anti-Caucasian and anti-Muslim sentiments, but that in no way means its intensity has diminished. The ideologists and media personalities who, today, actively propagate anti-Western sentiments, one way or the other, are playing the anti-Semitic card, even if it is in a different dressing.

In an ideological system that virtually reproduces the old triad – Orthodoxy, autocracy and *narodnost'* (roughly: "national identity" or "national character") – antisemitism plays a very large role as before. Today it has become quite evident that the Jewish question concerns not only the Jews, but essentially affects the interests of all minorities and serves as a sort of model, or litmus paper that reveals the degree of xenophobic and nationalistic sentiments in society.

5. Challenges and Possibilities

Above all it is important to remember that Russia is a country composed of many nationalities, and the kindling of hate among them is, in the end, self-destructive. This, nonetheless, is a realisation that millions of people share.

In this connection, the struggle against any manifestation of xenophobia automatically becomes a struggle against antisemitism.

Moreover it is imperative to prevent any instrumentalisation of Soviet history as well as the revival of Stalinism and the cult of Stalin. Such a revival, in fact, automatically gives rise to nationalism, antisemitism and the spirit of the Cold War.

In this sense, Russia's relationship with the West is extremely important, as is its membership in international organisations, which should serve as a restraining factor.

Undoubtedly, a huge role should be played by extensive educational work with respect to the younger generation (especially those who are open to nationalistic ideas). The practice of international youth exchange should be developed with particular consideration for the edifying and educational significance of the struggle against xenophobia and antisemitism.

It is necessary to increase the role of the international scientific community – for example, policy with respect to institutions of higher education, scientific exchange and so forth.

5. Panel discussion: The Role of Europe's Parliaments in Combating Antisemitism

5.1. Combating the ultra-right NPD in Saxony

Cornelius Weiss, MdL¹³⁸

The spectacular entry of the ultra-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) into the Saxon State Parliament in autumn 2004 (with 9.2% of the vote!) found the democratic parties and the media largely unprepared. Only a few years earlier, the then Minister-President of Saxony, Kurt Biedenkopf, had declared that the Saxons were immune to ultra-right ideologies. And yet for anyone willing to see it, it was already clear at that time that the ultra right's strategy – "Struggle for the street, struggle for hearts and minds, struggle for the parliaments" – was proving alarmingly successful, especially in Saxony's rural regions and smaller municipalities. We heard time and again of areas being declared "nationally liberated zones" – places where racism has reached such a scale that immigrants and foreigners dare not go there. More and more extreme-right "*Kameradschaften*" – informal associations of young neo-Nazis – or "military sports groups" (*Wehrsportgemeinschaften*), were being set up, some with a notorious propensity for violence, and the number of violent crimes and offences with an extreme right background was steadily increasing. And yet for years, this unsavoury aspect of our social reality was played down and hushed up by the governing party and many local functionaries, either in the mistaken hope that the brown spectre would vanish of its own accord or due to short-sighted concerns about Saxony's image. So of course the public at large was alarmed after the elections to the State Parliament, but all that the general and demonstrative outrage, mutual recriminations, frantic activity or the silent averting of eyes have done is to illustrate the initial impotence of politics, thereby boosting the right-wing radicals' triumphant success.

Unfortunately, it has become apparent that the presence of ultra-right parties in the local and state parliaments is by no means just a Saxon problem but is likely to remain a feature of daily politics in Germany for some time to come. 62 years after Auschwitz, this is not only an insult to the millions of victims of Nazi barbarity and a painful embarrassment for every democrat which damages the reputation of reunited Germany; it also has very significant political consequences. For example, now that it has acquired formal status as a parliamentary group in the Saxon State Parliament, the NPD – a party which sees itself as the backbone of organized right-wing extremism – can claim substantial financial and logistical resources from taxpayers' money, which greatly increases its scope for action. An even greater concern is that the NPD now has access to effective public platforms – the plenary sessions and the Saxon Press Association – which it utilizes in a very skilled and pro-active way. This is not surprising, given that as early as the mid-1990s, the NPD declared the Free State of Saxony to be the "strategic bridgehead to winning other state parliaments" and, since then, has shifted almost its entire intellectual and logistic centre to Saxony. Almost all its leading national figures stood as candidates in key list places for the State Parliament elections. So it is not only the usual boneheads and small-time criminals who constitute the NPD parliamentary group in the Saxon State Parliament; it is also highly articulate, educated intellectuals who are skilled in logical thinking and action, albeit within the parameters of their extreme-right tunnel vision. They cultivate an image as self-confident, disciplined and hard-working professionals and send out a clear message that they are responsive to the concerns and interests of citizens.

¹³⁸ SPD-Fraktion im Sächsischen Landtag

Their motions and draft legislation in Parliament tap into (and feed) certain moods, latent fears and prejudices within certain sections of the population, and often do so in a very skilled way. In the plenary debates, there is a carefully observed "division of labour" between the "moderates", whose task is to appeal to (lower) middle-class voters, and the ideological sharpshooters and demagogues who blatantly and, indeed, sometimes provocatively propound the NPD's long-term anti-constitutional objectives, albeit taking care not to lay themselves open to action under criminal law.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the NPD's concept of state and society differs fundamentally from the image of the citizen and society that underlies Germany's free and democratic constitution, the Basic Law. The extreme right may try to hide behind a modern façade – the pleasant professional, the nice neighbour – but in reality, they are still the same old fire-starters as before. They deny the freedom and equality of every individual, championing instead the notion of a "community of German nationality and destiny" which is based on ethnic origin. Their only motivation for participating in free elections at all levels is tactical: they blatantly exploit freedom of expression, the parliamentary system, the right to opposition, the protection of minority rights and the independent judiciary as tools in order to work for the abolition of these self-same democratic rights once they achieve the objectives they have set themselves, namely the "seizure of power" and establishment of a "Führer state" on the National Socialist model. As a logical consequence, these unreconstructed neo-Nazis exploit every opportunity – also in the Saxon State Parliament – to blatantly deny German war guilt and the genocide and war crimes perpetrated by the National Socialists in the name of the German people, and disseminate antisemitic, xenophobic hate propaganda at the same time.

For every democrat, it is clear that there can be no compromises and no mediation between the views and objectives of the ultra right and the fundamental principles of democracy, and that right-wing extremism must be combated by all democratic and legal means available. The presence of the NPD in the Saxon State Parliament is therefore viewed by all five democratic parliamentary groups – the CDU, the SPD, the Left Party, the FDP and the Greens – as a political challenge of the highest order. There is a broad cross-party consensus that in this situation, notwithstanding legitimate inter-party rivalry, cross-party solidarity in defence of democracy is imperative. Very soon after the convening of the State Parliament, initial approaches were made to develop a viable and cooperative strategy to deal with these enemies of democracy. One particularly important element of this process was, and remains, the binding commitment that no attempt will ever be made to achieve political objectives with the support of the NPD, and that the NPD will not be allowed to play the democratic parliamentary groups off against each other. In our practical parliamentary work, this means that no joint motions or legislative initiatives are brought forward in committee or in plenary with the involvement of the NPD, and that all the motions tabled by this party are unanimously rejected. In order not to give the impression that the NPD is "a party like any other", and thus to downplay its malign nature and bolster its status, there is also an agreement that as a general rule, only one speaker from each of the governing parties and the opposition parties will rise on any agenda item proposed by the NPD. Racist, antisemitic, nationalist and anti-democratic statements are quashed immediately and unequivocally. The Presidium of the Saxon State Parliament also makes swift and unequivocal use of its intervention opportunities, as provided for in the Orders – in other words, the Rules of Procedure – in response to provocative statements by the extreme right during plenary sessions.

However, anyone who has to deal with the NPD in Parliament needs a sound knowledge of history and social policy and, sometimes, strong nerves. Given the sheer effrontery of the NPD speakers, emotional reactions often cannot be avoided; indeed, they are a necessary and appropriate response in some cases. Expressions of disgust, heckling and a walk-out from the plenary chamber were absolutely the right responses to the debacle that occurred on the anni-

versary of the liberation of Auschwitz, for example. Nonetheless, we have to "ration" this type of grand gesture; otherwise, they lose their shock effect. It is also unhelpful to respond regularly in kind to provocations and verbal abuse, because it simply gives the extreme right an opportunity to play the martyr, which they seize with both hands. It is also absolutely essential to avoid appearing arrogant and didactic or to respond with misplaced but well-meaning platitudes or wishy-washy arguments, for this simply insults the intelligence of people who feel drawn to the radical right's populist theories in a rather nebulous way, and perhaps only temporarily. It is important always to keep one's cool and keep a visible distance from the enemies of our constitution, to subject their slogans and historical falsehoods to sober analysis, and to refute them with clear, accurate and verifiable arguments. This applies especially to policy areas outside the extreme right's usual agenda but which the NPD and the German People's Union (*Deutsche Volksumion* – DVU) are now attempting to hijack with their populist arguments – in other words, topical issues concerning social justice, family policy and the environment, as well as European integration and globalization (which the NPD invariably depicts as the devilish strategies of international or "Jewish capitalism" to undermine "German identity").

The political response to the radical right must not be confined to parliaments, however. In Eastern Germany in particular, the NPD has targeted and successfully infiltrated the fledgling civil society structures, including numerous youth clubs and organizations, and has slowly but surely changed or restructured them from within. According to recent sociological studies, racist and open or covert antisemitic positions are steadily increasing, notably among people who consider themselves part of the political centre. For example, 60 percent of Germans now agree with the statement: "There are too many foreigners living in Germany". So all the forces of democracy have a key responsibility, namely to cut the ground from under the populist clichés that are part and parcel of these racist and degrading ideologies, and which are now taking hold in society. This certainly cannot be achieved with short-term campaigns alone; it requires strategic thinking which not only addresses the symptoms, and it also takes determination and long-term commitment. It means involving the initiatives, projects and coalitions which work for an open, tolerant and liberal civil society and which, fortunately, have sprung up spontaneously all over the country, and providing them with financial and conceptual support. Saxony's CDU-SPD governing coalition is on the right track here with the launch of a Saxony-wide programme with a budget of three million euros. However – and this view is now shared by all the democratic parties – it also means that federal, state and local politicians need to put in a regular appearance, alongside the artists, church and trade union representatives, at demonstrations of democratic moral courage and public protests against marches, concerts or other neo-Nazi events – the much-quoted "uprising of decent people" – and send out a clear message by doing so.

Academic studies unanimously show that covert or overt racism, xenophobia and violence flourish best when they are nurtured by ignorance, whereas a general education on as broad an historical, political, social, economic and cultural basis as possible is the key to gaining an understanding of the essence of democracy and thus substantially boosting citizens' immunity to the siren call of the extreme right. That means that our educational establishments – from mainstream education to vocational schools and the universities – also bear much of the responsibility for the future of democracy. So it is extremely important for the democratic parties to continue to prioritize education policy at federal and state level.

Ultimately, however, our citizens will only defend our constitution courageously and on a lasting basis if they themselves see democracy as an asset to be protected. In politics, that means gearing all our efforts towards making the benefits of a free and democratic social order visible and liveable for every individual, every day. In view of the breathtaking speed of economic and social change in the process of globalization and technological development

and the ever-increasing problems that this creates for people seeking some kind of orientation in their daily lives, this is by no means an easy task.

In her book *Politik und Schuld. Die zerstörerische Macht des Schweigens* (Politics and Guilt. The destructive potential of silence), the President of the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt an der Oder, Gesine Schwan, drew attention ten years ago to the apparent paradox that it is now, after the end of the bipolar world, that democracy faces growing problems. Besides mass unemployment (which has depopulated entire regions of Eastern Germany, for example, with no prospect of any effective solution at present), she cites, as a key factor, the increasing size and unwieldiness of political spaces as a result of globalization, which, she argues, are involving more and more social groups, cultural traditions, divergent interests and economic linkages. This creates an unprecedented degree of complexity in the political sphere, requiring ever more complex consultancy and decision-making processes which are increasingly shifting to specialized and expert bodies and becoming quite unfathomable for the very people whom these decisions affect most.

This in turn leads to widespread psychological uncertainty among citizens, who feel abandoned or even cheated by the state and the political institutions, and makes them increasingly divorced from politics. Many citizens believe that the political parties and their representatives are becoming increasingly self-referential and wasting their time and energies in often unseemly wrangling over issues of rank and status, instead of addressing the urgent problems currently facing us, and doing so if necessary on a cross-party basis. The logical consequence of this is the public's refusal to show any political commitment, its failure to turn out for elections, and its withdrawal into small private spaces – in other words, its disenchantment with politics. For civil society, however, this is a highly undesirable situation, for civil society needs participation and commitment from as many citizens as possible if it is to survive and flourish. Worse still, the emerging conceptual vacuum is a breeding ground for irrational fears, resignation and aggression, with the result that the abstruse theories of the ultra-right political charlatans – although discredited by history – are enjoying a surge of popularity.

In this situation, I believe it is important to show unflinching and resolute commitment to the further development of democracy, and if necessary to adapt our democracy through the careful modification of established structures and processes and align it to new social conditions – for example, through the introduction of plebiscitary elements – and thus make it more vibrant and attractive to people. Federal President Horst Köhler put forward some very interesting proposals recently which merit consideration.

What is crucial, in my view, however, is for the political actors from the democratic parties to give far more thought to how they can make their work more transparent and thus improve their credibility. Politically mature citizens do not want to be constantly bombarded by placatory "spin" from an army of marketing strategists, media consultants and communications managers, and nor do they want to see any tactical games. What they want is fair and open competition between different ideas and objectives. And they want the unadorned truth, even if this is sometimes worrying. People want to know that they are being taken seriously, both with their worries and concerns and their ideas and initiatives. They want to understand why one specific set of policy decisions has been taken in preference to another. What the people want, in essence, is to be able to trust in the integrity of their elected representatives.

The most important prerequisite, if we are to retain our credibility in the eyes of the public and keep their confidence, is a clearly identifiable and sound political line and the courage to defend it, even when the going gets tough. Words and deeds – in other words, election promises and the practical policy action taken after the election – must be recognizably in harmony, and what is "politically feasible" must not be confused with bad compromises, nor tactical flexibility with caprice. Opinion polls – important though they are as part of a politi-

cian's tool kit – must not lead to the triumph of image over substance. This requires a reliable internal compass. For many of us, this compass is the Christian or the Jewish faith; for others, it may be Kant's categorical imperative, a vision for the future of society, or something else entirely. We politicians must pay greater heed to this compass than before. Then – and only then – will the democratic social order be able to develop its unique strengths to the maximum and finally put the neo-Nazi enemies of our constitution back where they belong.

5.2. About the Parliamentary Committee against Antisemitism

Jardena Lande¹³⁹

1. The Mission

The Parliamentary Committee Against Antisemitism is centred on the principle that Jews in the UK should not be left to fight antisemitism alone. It harnesses the goodwill of parliamentarians from all sides, and both Houses, in the struggle against prejudice and discrimination.

2. The Vision

As a registered All-Party Parliamentary Group with committed members and an enviable reputation within Westminster and Whitehall for its impartiality, integrity and measured approach, the Committee enjoys unique access and standing.

The Committee's purposes are to monitor and survey antisemitism wherever it arises; to exchange information amongst national Parliaments, non-governmental organisations and the public; to consider and take whatever action may be necessary to prevent further antisemitism; to promote inter-faith contact, dialogue and co-operation; to organise conferences, seminars, visits and other activities as may be desirable to achieve the Committee's purposes.

Membership of the Committee is restricted to members of Parliaments, and associate membership to ex-members of Parliament and distinguished individuals involved in the life of Parliamentary and governmental institutions.

The Committee provides parliamentarians, academics, journalists and members of the public with up-to-date information on antisemitism, antisemitic incidents and the efforts being made to combat them in the United Kingdom and abroad. The Committee commissions research, holds events, arranges briefings, publishes bulletins and provides a forum for debate and discussion on the subject.

3. The All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry Into Antisemitism In The UK

John Mann MP, Chair of the All-Party Parliamentary Group against Antisemitism, commissioned the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2005 following increasing public debate about a rise in antisemitism in the UK

The inquiry panel, chaired by former Europe Minister Rt Hon Dr Denis MacShane MP, was joined by senior Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat and UUP MPs and aimed to:

- Consider evidence on the nature of contemporary antisemitism;
- Evaluate current efforts to confront it;
- Consider further measures that might usefully be introduced.

The panel considered oral evidence and over one hundred written submissions from a wide range of organisations and individuals and published their report on 7 September 2006. [The Full Report](#) is available for download.

The panel's recommendations included improved reporting and recording of antisemitic attacks; a crackdown on anti-Jewish activity on university campuses; and improved international co-operation to prevent the spread of racist material online.

¹³⁹ Assistant of MP John Mann

The Government published a formal response to the inquiry on 29 March 2007 and is also available for [download](#).

6. Participants of the Conference

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Beck, Eldad

Yedioth Ahronoth, journalist/ foreign correspondent, Germany

Beck, Marieluise, MdB

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Südwestrundfunk (SWR), Editor TV abroad, Germany

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Initiative 9. November, Germany

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Amadeu Antonio Foundation, Germany

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University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, USA

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Task Force Education on Antisemitism, Germany

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B'nai B'rith Europe, Netherlands

Stawski, Sacha

Honestly Concerned e.V., Germany

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Stoiber, Heiko

Anti-Defamation League, USA

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Zimmermann, Nina C.

Evangelischer Pressedienst, Germany

Zlotina, Irina R.

Germany

Zrno, Branko

Delegation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia-Herzegovina

7. Further Links

<http://sicsa.huji.ac.il>

The Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew University Jerusalem

<http://tnd.odihhr.pl/>

ODIHR Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Information System

www.adl.org

Anti-Defamation League

www.ajc.org

American Jewish Committee, New York

www.ajcgermany.org

AJC Berlin Office/ Lawrence and Lee Ramer Center for German-Jewish Relations, Berlin

www.annefrank.org

Anne Frank House, Amsterdam

www.antirasizm.ru

Moscow Bureau for Human Rights

www.bnaibrith.org

B'nai B'rith International

www.bundestag.de/internat/interparl_organ/osze/index.html

German Delegation of the OSCE PA

www.ceji.org

European Jewish Information centre – Centre Européen juif d'information, Brussels

www.cidi.nl/index-en.html

Centre Information and Documentation on Israel, The Hague

www.cjc.ca

Canadian Jewish Congress

www.crif.org

The Committee Representing the Jewish Institutions in France, Paris

www.dialog.org.pl

Forum for Dialogue among Nations, Warsaw

www.dig-frankfurt.de

Deutsch-Israelische Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a. M.

www.eajc.org

Euro-Asian Jewish Congress, Moscow

www.fcje.org

Jewish Community of Spain

www.fsju.org

Fonds Social Juif Unifié

www.fzo.cz

Federation of Jewish Communities in Czech Republic, Prague

www.gert-weisskirchen.de

Private page of Gert Weisskirchen, Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE

www.helsinki.org.yu

Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, Belgrade

www.holocaust.kiev.ua

Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, Kiev

www.humanrightsfirst.org

Human Rights First, New York

www.iibsa.org

International Institute for Education and Research on Antisemitism – Internationales Institut für Bildungs-, Sozial- und Antisemitismusforschung, Berlin

www.isgap.org

Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy, New Haven, CT.

www.iuej.net

Institut Universitaire d'Études Juives Élie Wiesel, Paris

www.jf-stockholm.org

Council of Swedish Jewish Communities, Stockholm

www.kis.gr

Central Board of Jewish Communities in Greece

www.kngu.org

Congress of National Communities of Ukraine, Kiev

www.levandehistoria.se

Sweden Living History Forum, Stockholm

www.licra.org

International League against Racism and Antisemitism – Ligue Internationale Contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme, Paris

www.litjews.org

The Jewish Community of Lithuania, Vilnius

www.magenta.nl

Magenta Foundation, Amsterdam

www.movimientocontralaintolerancia.com

Movement against Intolerance, Madrid

www.musevicemaati.com

Jewish Community of Turkey

www.nigdywiecej.prh.pl

Never Again Association, Warsaw

www.osce.org/odihr/

Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw

www.romanianjewish.org

The Romanian Jewish Community

www.sova-center.ru

SOVA Center for Information and Analysis, Moscow

www.tau.ac.il/Antisemitism

The Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of contemporary Antisemitism and Racism, Tel Aviv

www.thecst.org.uk

The Community Security Trust, London

www.unwatch.org

United Nations Watch in Genf, Switzerland

www.wiesenthal.com

Simon Wiesenthal Center

www.worldjewishcongress.org

World Jewish Congress, Washington, DC

www.wupj.org

World Union for Progressive Judaism, Jerusalem

www.yadvashem.org

Yad Vashem - The Martyrs' and Heroes' Remembrance Authority, Jerusalem

www.zentralratjuden.de

Central Council of Jews in Germany – Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland, Berlin