

Federal Ministry of the Interior of
the Federal Republic of Germany

2004 Annual Report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution

CONTENTS

Organisational Data	9
I. Organisational data pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (<i>Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, BVerfSchG</i>)	9
1. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV)	9
2. Military Counterintelligence Service (Militärischer Abschirmdienst, MAD)	9
II. Other organisational data	9
Democracy and Protection of the Constitution	11
I. Protection of the Constitution under the Basic Law	11
II. Offices for the Protection of the Constitution: Tasks and powers	13
III. Supervision of the authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution	15
IV. Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution	16
V. Protection of the Constitution through information and awareness	17
Right-Wing Extremist Activities	21
I. Overview	21
1. Ideology	21
2. Developments within right-wing extremism	22
II. Statistical overview	27
1. Organisations and following	27

2.	Politically motivated crime	29
2.1	Defining politically motivated crime	29
2.2	Politically motivated crime and violent acts.....	30
2.3	Right-wing extremist crime and violence	31
2.3.1	Overview.....	31
2.3.2	Targets of violent crimes with an extremist background	34
2.3.3	Breakdown of violent crimes by <i>Land</i>	36
III.	Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence	39
1.	Violent right-wing extremist following.....	39
2.	Weapons and discussion of the use of violence	39
3.	Right-wing extremist skinheads	42
3.1	Inter-regional skinhead organisations	43
3.2	Blood & Honour after the ban	43
3.3	Right-wing extremist skinhead music.....	44
3.4	Distributors of right-wing extremist skinhead music.....	47
3.5	Skinhead fanzines	48
IV.	Neo-Nazism	50
V.	Political parties	55
1.	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)	55
1.1	Objectives.....	55
1.2	Organisation and development.....	68
1.3	Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats)	72
2.	Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union)	74
2.1	Goals and methods.....	75
2.2	Organisation and development.....	80
3.	Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans).....	83
3.1	Objectives.....	83
3.2	Organisation and development.....	87
VI.	Efforts to foster intellectual right-wing extremism.....	92
VII.	Anti-Semitism	95

VIII.	International connections.....	101
1.	Events with international participation	101
2.	Right-wing extremist activities within the Europäische Darstellungsverein für Lebendige Geschichte (EDLG, European re-enactment association for living history)	103
3.	International revisionism	104
IX.	Means of agitation and communication.....	107
1.	Periodical publications.....	107
2.	Unaffiliated publishing houses and distributors	107
3.	The Internet.....	111
Left-Wing Extremist Activities.....		115
I.	Overview.....	115
	Left-wing extremist developments	115
II.	Statistical overview.....	118
1.	Organisations and following	118
2.	Left-wing extremist crime and violence	120
III.	Violent left-wing extremism	126
1.	Autonomists	127
1.1	Following and self-definition	127
1.2	Forms of action	130
1.3	Autonomist structures with proto-terrorist elements	133
2.	Traditional anarchists	137
IV.	Political parties and other groups	139
1.	Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism).....	139
1.1	General developments	140
1.2	Extremist structures in the PDS	142
1.3	Participation in elections.....	147
1.4	Co-operation with German left-wing extremists outside the party	148

1.5	International links.....	149
2.	Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and its circle	152
2.1	DKP	152
2.2	Organisations associated with the DKP	155
3.	Trotskyist groups	157
3.1	The group Linksruck	157
3.2	Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative)	159
3.3	German followers of the Internationale Arbeitnervereinigung (IAV, International Workers Association)	160
4.	Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany)	162
5.	Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg'd society)	163
V.	Areas of activity	166
1.	Anti-fascism	166
2.	Protests against the Federal Government's social and labour market reforms	170
3.	Campaign by left-wing extremists against nuclear energy	172
4.	Evolution of the anti-globalisation movement	174
VI.	Means of agitation and communication	176
1.	Publishers, distributors and periodicals	176
2.	The Internet	177
Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State.....		179
I.	Overview.....	179
II.	Statistics.....	186
1.	Organisations and followers	186
2.	Extremist criminal offences and acts of violence in the category "politically motivated crime by foreigners"	188

III.	Goals and main activities of individual groups	190
1.	Arabs.....	190
1.1	Al-Qaeda (The Base) / mujahidin networks (Fighters for Allah’s Cause) / Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam).....	190
1.2	Algerian Islamist groups	197
1.3	Muslim Brotherhood (MB) / Islamic Centres.....	199
1.4	Islamist groups from the Middle East	200
1.4.1	Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement).....	200
1.4.2	Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, “Party of God”)	202
1.4.3	Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party).....	203
2.	Turks	205
2.1	Turkish Islamists	205
2.1.1	Hilafet Devleti (The Caliphate State).....	205
2.1.2	Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs).....	207
2.2	Left-wing extremists	213
2.2.1	Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party / Front)	214
2.2.2	Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists–Leninists)	217
2.2.3	Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi (MLKP, Marxist–Leninist Communist Party)	220
3.	Kurds.....	222
3.1	Overview	222
3.2	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) / Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy for Kurdistan) / Kongra Gel (The People’s Congress of Kurdistan)	223
3.2.1	General situation	223
3.2.2	Organisation.....	225
3.2.3	Kongra Gel propaganda	226
3.2.4	Financial and business activities	228
3.2.5	Criminal proceedings against former PKK / KADEK / Kongra Gel functionaries.....	229
4.	Iranians	230
4.1	Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People’s Mujahidin of Iran)	231
4.2	Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI).....	233
4.3	Iranian influence on Shiites living in Germany.....	234
5.	Kosovo Albanians	235
6.	Tamils	238
7.	Pakistanis.....	239

8.	Chechens	241
IV.	Means of agitation and communication	243
1.	Periodical publications	243
2.	The Internet	244
V.	Overview of other noteworthy organisations and their most important publications	247
Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities		249
I.	Overview.....	249
II.	The intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation	251
1.	Structural developments, and current situation and tasks of the services in the Russian Federation.....	251
2.	Intelligence targets and priorities	253
3.	Methods of gathering intelligence	254
3.1	Legal residencies of Russian intelligence services	254
3.2	Activities under central control.....	256
III.	Intelligence and security services of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)	257
IV.	Activities of intelligence services of countries in the Middle East and North Africa	259
1.	Iranian intelligence services.....	259
2.	Syrian intelligence services.....	260
3.	Libyan intelligence services	260
V.	Far East intelligence services	261
1.	Chinese intelligence services.....	261
2.	North Korean intelligence services	261

VI.	Proliferation	263
VII.	Arrests and convictions	265
	The Scientology Organisation (SO)	266
1.	Introduction	266
2.	Bases	267
3.	Objectives	269
4.	Publicity	274
	Security and Counter-Sabotage	276

Organisational Data

I. Organisational data pursuant to Section 16 (2) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz, BVerfSchG*)

1. Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (*Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV*)

The BfV subsidy from the federal budget amounted to € 141,047,434 in 2004 (2003: € 144,075,146.73). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution had 2,429 staff members (2003: 2,401).

2. Military Counterintelligence Service (*Militärischer Abschirmdienst, MAD*)

The MAD subsidy from the federal budget amounted to € 73,446,953 in 2004 (2003: € 64,938,585). The Military Counterintelligence Service had 1,277 staff members (2003: 1,249).

II. Other organisational data

In January 2005, the federal government and its agencies (*Bund*) and the federal states (*Länder*) together had a total of 1,003,959 personal data entries in the NADIS* (January 2004: 985,300). Of these, 567,636 entries (56.5 %) were based on security checks (January 2004: 57.8 %).

* *Nachrichtendienstliches Informationssystem* - Intelligence Information System

Democracy and Protection of the Constitution

I. Protection of the Constitution under the Basic Law

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany, known as the Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*, GG), guarantees German citizens a variety of basic rights, including the right to freedom of expression (Article 5), freedom of assembly (Article 8) and freedom of association (Article 9). These rights are extended even to opponents of our state's free fundamental democratic order. But limits to these rights must be clearly set wherever it becomes obvious that they are being misused for undermining the free and democratic order and thereby destroying the foundation on which these same rights are based.

Drawing on the painful lessons learnt from the failure of the Weimar Republic, whose Constitution lacked effective mechanisms for its defence, the principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values has been anchored in the Basic Law.

"Strong
democracy" ¹

This principle is characterised by three essential features:

- **commitment to values**, i.e. the state recognises its attachment to certain values it considers especially important and which are therefore not negotiable;
- the **readiness to defend values**, i.e. the state is willing to uphold these most important values against extremist positions; and
- preventive action to **protect the Constitution**, i.e. the state does not wait to react until extremists have violated the law.

¹ JESSE, Eckhard: *Der Verfassungsschutzauftrag der abwehrbereiten Demokratie: Theorie und Praxis* [Protection of the Constitution as a mandate of a democracy prepared to defend its values: theory and practice], and LANGE, Hans Gert: *Verfassungsschutz in der Demokratie - ein Instrument zur Sicherung des inneren Friedens* [Protection of the Constitution - an instrument for ensuring internal peace in a democratic state], both in: Federal Ministry of the Interior (eds.), *Wehrhafte Demokratie und Rechtsextremismus* [A strong democracy and right-wing extremism] (Series: *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit* [Texts on internal security]), Bonn 1992, pp. 7 seqq. and pp. 19 seqq.

The principle of a strong democracy prepared to defend its values is clearly expressed in a number of the Basic Law's provisions:

- Article 79 (3) provides that fundamental principles of the Constitution – including the inviolability of human dignity under Article 1 (1) – are unalterable and thus may not be modified by legislative process.
 - Under Article 21 (2), political parties that seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic fundamental order may be declared unconstitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*, BVerfG).
 - Article 9 (2) provides that associations which oppose the constitutional order or the idea of international understanding shall be prohibited.
 - Under Article 18, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) may declare certain basic rights to be forfeited if these rights are abused to attack the free democratic basic order.
 - Articles 73 No. 10 *litt.* b and 87 (1) 2nd sentence provide the basis for the establishment and operation of the Federal and *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution.
-

II. Offices for the Protection of the Constitution: Tasks and powers

Tasks

Pursuant to the Act on the Co-operation of the *Bund* and the *Länder* with regard to the Protection of the Constitution, and on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (short title: Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution - *Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz*, BVerfSchG), the main task of the federal and *Land* authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution is gathering and analysing information on the following:

- activities directed against the free and democratic order or against the existence or security of the Federal Republic or of one of the federal states (*Länder*), or intended to unlawfully hinder federal or *Land* constitutional bodies or their members from carrying out their official duties;
- intelligence activities or those that endanger state security, carried out on behalf of a foreign power within the area of the territorial application of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution;
- activities in the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which – by actual, or preparations for intended, use of force – threaten the foreign interests of the Federal Republic of Germany;
- activities within the area covered by the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution which are directed against the idea of international understanding, in particular peaceful co-existence.

Information-gathering

The agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution primarily gather the information needed for fulfilling their tasks from publicly accessible sources. Where this is not possible or effective, they may, within the limits of clearly defined legal powers and in accordance with the principle of proportionality, use intelligence methods for covert information-gathering. These resources include informers, surveillance, video and audio recordings, and interception of correspondence, mail and telecommunications in accordance with the Act (adopted by virtue of Article 10 of the Basic Law) to Restrict the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts and Telecommunications (*Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses* - short title: *Artikel 10-Gesetz*, abbr. G 10).

The Act to Fight International Terrorism (short title: Counter-Terrorism Act - *Gesetz zur Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus*), which

entered into force on 1 January 2002, extended the powers of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV).² Among other things, the Act gives the BfV the right, under narrowly defined conditions, to gather information from financial enterprises, airlines, postal services, telecommunications services, and teleservices providers.

Security vetting In addition, the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution are responsible for assisting with security clearance checks of personnel granted access, in the public interest, to classified information or of persons actually employed in, or recruited for, security-sensitive posts within essential civil or military establishments. The BfV's powers in this context are governed in detail by the Act on the Prerequisites and Procedures for Security Clearance Checks Undertaken by the Federal Government (*Gesetz über die Voraussetzungen und das Verfahren von Sicherheitsüberprüfungen des Bundes*, short title: *Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz*, SÜG - Security Clearance Check Act).

No police powers In carrying out their duties, the agencies for the protection of the Constitution have no police powers, i.e. among other things, they may not perform arrests or searches or seize any property.

Bound by law and justice The agencies for the protection of the Constitution are bound by the general law. This means above all that they may not violate any laws when carrying out their duties.

Within their area of responsibility, the authorities for the protection of the Constitution help to ensure the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany. As provided by law, they work closely, on a basis of trust, with other security authorities, in particular the other federal intelligence services - the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD), responsible for the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr, Bw), and the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND), responsible for foreign intelligence - and with police and criminal prosecution authorities. In view of the increasingly international nature of threat phenomena, the BfV also maintains active contacts with its partner services abroad.

² To be effective until 11 January 2007.

III. Supervision of the authorities responsible for the protection of the Constitution

Federal Government	The activities of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) are subject to supervision by the Federal Government and the German Bundestag. The Parliamentary Control Body established for this purpose is to be regularly provided with comprehensive information on the general activities of the BfV, MAD and BND and on incidents of special significance (Section 2 of the Act on Parliamentary Control of Federal Intelligence Activities [short title: <i>Parlamentarisches Kontrollgremiumsgesetz</i> , PKGrG – Parliamentary Control Body Act]). Upon request, this body must be permitted by the Federal Government to inspect records and files, and to conduct staff hearings. The Parliamentary Control Body appoints the independent G-10 Commission which, always in advance of any such operations, will consider the permissibility and necessity of restrictions of the privacy of correspondence, posts and telecommunications in accordance with Article 10 of the Basic Law. The same applies to the new information-gathering powers granted by the Act to Fight International Terrorism (see Section II above).
Parliamentary Control Body	
G-10 Commission	
Right to information	The BfV is legally obligated to provide data subjects, upon request, with information about their personal data files free of charge, if such persons provide reference to specific information and can demonstrate a particular interest in such information (Section 15 (1) of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution). Disclosure of information will be denied only if any of the reasons for refusal as listed in sub-section 2 of Section 15 applies.
Supervision by the courts	Should a person (data subject) claim that measures taken by the BfV have violated his or her rights, these measures are subject to judicial review.
Supervision by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection	The Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (BVerfSchG) contains a large number of provisions pertaining to data protection legislation which provide for extensive control exercised by the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection (<i>Bundesbeauftragter für den Datenschutz</i> , BfD).

IV. Annual Report on the Protection of the Constitution

Annual reporting

The Annual Report is intended to inform the public and increase general awareness about anti-constitutional activities in the Federal Republic of Germany. This report is based on intelligence collected by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in the course of its legally assigned duties, in co-operation with the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. The report cannot give an exhaustive overview but provides information about the essential findings, and analyses and evaluates significant developments and correlations.

With regard to the associations (political parties, organisations and groups) described in this report, the legal prerequisites for monitoring by the BfV have been met. However, the intelligence situation for the groups described may vary greatly depending on the scope and detail of information gathered, which in turn can influence the observation methods used by the BfV. Assessing a certain group as "extremist" does not always imply that *all* of its members pursue extremist aims.

All figures given for the potential membership of the organisations and associations mentioned in the report refer to Germany and in part are estimates and rounded. Also, it should be pointed out that the agencies for the protection of the Constitution do not have individual intelligence regarding all persons. This follows from the fact alone that the main mission of these agencies is to observe structures; this does not require detailed intelligence on all individual members of the observed organisations.

The English version was translated by the Translation Service of the Federal Ministry of the Interior. Unless otherwise noted, all quotes are translated from the German.

Finally, it should be noted that the Annual Report does not provide an exhaustive list of all associations that the agencies for the protection of the Constitution may consider relevant.

V. Protection of the Constitution through information and awareness

At the federal level, the task of protecting the Constitution by providing information and raising awareness is carried out jointly by the Federal Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV); at the level of the states (*Länder*), it is the responsibility of the *Land* Ministries of the Interior and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution. Maintaining a dialogue with citizens about the tasks of the agencies responsible for the protection of the Constitution is a central focus of this effort. In working with the public, these agencies provide information about their intelligence in order to enable each individual to make up his or her own mind regarding the threats anti-constitutional forces pose to the rule of law in our country.

Fundamentalism, extremism, xenophobia and violence are a constant challenge to a democratic and social state based on the rule of law. Fighting all forms of political extremism wherever they appear is therefore an ongoing priority of domestic policy.

The Federal Government considers it extremely important to prevent and fight such phenomena.

The Alliance for Democracy and Tolerance – Against Extremism and Violence (Bündnis für Demokratie und Toleranz – gegen Extremismus und Gewalt), initiated by the Federal Government and presented to the public on 23 May 2000, plays a special role in strengthening civil society and consensus on the values enshrined in the Constitution. This Alliance combines and mobilises forces in society to fight extremism, xenophobia and violence. One of the Alliance's key tasks is to promote, support, network and publicise local initiatives and projects by providing information, advice and documentation (see www.buendnis-toleranz.de on the Internet).

The Alliance also encompasses important public support programmes aimed at fighting xenophobia, racism, right-wing extremism and violence, such as XENOS, CIVITAS and ENTIMON, within the framework of the action programme "Youth for Tolerance and Democracy – Against Right-Wing Extremism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism" ("Jugend für Toleranz und Demokratie – gegen Rechtsextremismus, Fremdenfeindlichkeit und Antisemitismus"; see also www.bmfsfj.de).

Another instrument for countering xenophobia, racism and violence is the Forum gegen Rassismus (FgR, Forum against Racism). This body was constituted in March 1998, and by now its membership includes

some 80 organisations and public agencies, including 50 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating at the national or supraregional level. The FgR is, at the same time, the National Round Table established in keeping with the principles of the Vienna-based European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC).

In order to preserve the free democratic fundamental order, it is necessary to continually confront the various forms of extremism on a political and intellectual level. Thorough information and awareness-raising about the nature and scope of extremist activities are an essential part of this effort.

The series *Texte zur Inneren Sicherheit* (Texts on Internal Security) published by the Federal Ministry of the Interior also comprises monographs which, irrespective of the position taken by the editor, provide a platform for a policy discussion. In June 2004, a new monograph on *Extremismus in Deutschland - Erscheinungsformen und aktuelle Bestandsaufnahme* (Extremism in Germany - Its forms and manifestations, and an up-to-date inventory) was published. The articles contained in the monograph examine this phenomenon from various angles and present an easy-to-understand overview of the current state of extremism in Germany. Scholars and security experts comment on aspects of right-wing and left-wing extremism as well as extremism by foreigners. In addition, the monograph describes examples of possible ways open to public authorities and society for responding to extremist aims and activities. The booklet's structure allows the reader to familiarise him/herself with the subject-matter or to use the monograph as a reference work.

As part of its public information activities, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) disseminated information on its fields of activity and current findings via its website, through information stalls at numerous exhibitions and fairs, by a wide range of publications and by answering a large variety of questions from the general public.

The Internet is an important public information tool. The BfV website contains detailed information on the BfV's responsibilities and fields of activity. The primary focus is on roughly 30 publications available for downloading. On its "News" and "Exhibitions" pages, the site also provides regularly updated news about activities related to the protection of the Constitution and current information on the travelling exhibitions organised by the BfV.

In 2004, the public continued to show great interest in the BfV's travelling exhibitions. A total of around 60,000 people visited the two

exhibitions, which travelled to 18 different sites throughout Germany, on democracy and extremism: "Protecting democracy - Against extremism in Germany" (*Es betrifft Dich! Demokratie schützen - Gegen Extremismus in Deutschland*), and "Democracy is vulnerable - Right-wing extremism in Germany" (*Demokratie ist verletzlich - Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland*). In addition to individual visitors, mainly school classes visited these exhibitions to find out more about extremism and the forms it can take. BfV staff members accompany each exhibition to provide guided tours on site and answer visitors' questions.

In addition, the BfV took part in various trade fairs, such as the educational fair *didacta* in Cologne and the Essen *Security-Messe*.

In 2004, the BfV printed and distributed a total of roughly 65,000 brochures, including reprints. In addition, these publications can be accessed via the BfV's website, which is visited by many interested Internet users.

Contact address

For all questions regarding the protection of the Constitution, please do not hesitate to contact the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) at any time:

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On the Internet, the BfV can be found at:

<http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/>

Right-Wing Extremist Activities

I. Overview

1. Ideology

Nationalism and racism

Right-wing extremist ideology is characterised by nationalist and racist beliefs and attitudes. It is governed by the idea that ethnic affiliation with a nation or race determines the value of a human being. Because, according to right-wing extremist thinking, human and civil rights are subordinate to this criterion, right-wing extremists fundamentally contradict the Basic Law, which accords these rights special priority and protection. Right-wing extremists thus reject the universal principle of equality for every individual as specified in Article 3 of the Basic Law.

Authoritarian state and *Volksgemeinschaft* ideology

They typically call for an authoritarian political system in which the state and the people – in their view an ethnically homogeneous group – join together as a single unit within a supposedly natural order. In this ideology of *Volksgemeinschaft*, a National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics, the state's leaders intuitively act in accordance with the supposedly uniform will of the people. Starting from this premise, right-wing extremists believe that a state based on right-wing extremist ideology can do without the essential controls of a free democratic order, such as the people's right to exercise state authority through elections, or the right to form an opposition and take action.

Ideologically heterogeneous

Right-wing extremism in Germany demonstrates differing forms of nationalist, racist and anti-Semitic elements and differing goals. Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence – particularly right-wing extremist skinheads – usually have a confused view of the world marked by xenophobic and often racist attitudes. They express their desire to “free” Germany of foreigners through spontaneous acts of violence and aggressive music that incites hatred. Neo-Nazis concentrate more on targeted political activities, which are often intended to provoke specific action. Their beliefs are oriented on National Socialist notions of a totalitarian state based on racist principles and led by a “Führer”. In their view, the German people are “superior” and must therefore be protected from “racially inferior”

foreigners and Jews. The right-wing extremist political parties, by contrast, represent more nationalistic positions. For them, the nation is the supreme principle; this results in devaluing human and civil rights and in particular denying equal rights to those who are not members of the “German people”, which they define strictly in ethnic terms. Their aim is to establish an authoritarian state that would do away with the free and democratic order.

2. Developments within right-wing extremism

Rise in right-wing extremist violence

The number of right-wing extremist criminal offences and acts of violence rose in 2004 (see Section II, 2.3.1).

Smaller right-wing extremist following

The right-wing extremist following shrank again in 2004 (see Section II, 1). In particular, other than the NPD, the parties of the right-wing extremist spectrum lost membership. In 2004, the number of right-wing extremists willing to use violence stabilised at a high level. Nearly 45% of right-wing extremist skinheads and other violent right-wing extremists live in eastern Germany. The number of followers has risen sharply.

Legal proceedings on charges of attempted right-wing terrorist activity

In 2004, two legal proceedings against associates of the leader of the Kameradschaft Süd, a group made up of neo-Nazis and skinheads (see Section III, 2), on charges of belonging to and/or supporting a right-wing extremist terrorist association were pending in the Bavarian Higher Regional Court. According to the current state of the investigation, certain members close to the group's leadership acquired weapons and explosives and were planning, at least for a time, to set off a bomb at a Jewish community centre in Munich on 9 November 2003.³ In another case, the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court initiated proceedings against 12 persons on charges of forming a terrorist association. The persons were accused of acting under the name "Freikorps" or "Freikorps Havelland" and carrying out arson attacks on Turkish- and Asian-owned businesses.⁴

There were no further indications of terrorist activity by right-wing extremists in 2004, although security authorities confiscated weapons and explosives. Right-wing extremist Internet forums also contain an increasing number of calls to violence. But there is no indication of an intensive discussion of violence within the right-wing extremist scene. For tactical reasons, the great majority of right-wing extremists opposes the use of terrorist violence to achieve political aims (see Section III, 2).

Influence of right-wing extremist skinhead music

Many young people continue to find skinhead music appealing. Through such music, they come into contact with the right-wing extremist scene. Skinhead music thus plays an important role in bringing together and consolidating groups of extreme right-wing youth willing to use violence. With a plan known as "Project Schoolyard", right-wing extremists hoped to distribute CDs with right-wing extremist content nation-wide and win young followers. The skinhead sub-culture continues to be active particularly in organizing concerts. The number of concerts rose significantly in 2004. The

³ In the first trial, on 5 April 2005 four of the accused were found guilty of membership of a terrorist association and one was also found guilty of violating the Explosives Act; they were given suspended sentences ranging from 16 to 22 months. The fifth accused was found guilty of abetting the purchase and possession of weapons and given a suspended sentence of 18 months.

On 4 May 2005, the Bavarian Higher Regional Court in Munich found Martin WIESE guilty of leading a conspiracy; it found three other members of the right-wing extremist group Kameradschaft Süd guilty of membership of a terrorist association. Three of the accused were also found guilty of violating weapons and explosives law. Sentences ranged from seven years to two years and three months in prison. Three of those found guilty were given joint sentences in connection with their earlier offences.

⁴ On 7 March 2005, the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court found 11 juveniles guilty of membership of a terrorist association and gave them suspended sentences of up to several years. The 20-year-old chief accused received a sentence of four years and six months in prison.

number of skinhead bands has also grown, as has the number of distributors and right-wing extremist fanzines.

Although numerous skinheads take part in major NPD events (see Section III, 3), the skinhead scene tends to resist organised integration into right-wing extremist political parties.

**Neo-Nazi scene's
changed relationship
to NPD**

The number of neo-Nazi followers, which are largely organised in about 160 groups known as *Kameradschaften*, rose again in 2004. The neo-Nazis' strategy of organising as many demonstrations as possible is attractive to many young people. Neo-Nazis have set up "action offices" or "action alliances" in an attempt to counteract fragmentation within the scene. In 2004, a focus of neo-Nazi activity was opposing the Federal Government's social security reforms. In the view of influential segments of the neo-Nazi scene, the NPD's calls for a "German popular front" significantly increased the party's appeal. As a result, the NPD succeeded in integrating prominent neo-Nazis into its organisation (see Section IV).

**Significant growth in
NPD influence**

With its entry into the parliament of Saxony, the NPD gained significant influence among right-wing extremists. Its calls for a "German popular front" made it the centrepiece of efforts to unite the right-wing extremist camp. The NPD was able to reach agreement with the DVU on the parliamentary elections in Brandenburg and Saxony and on elections in coming years. The party has increasingly welcomed elements of the neo-Nazi milieu. Leading neo-Nazis joined the party, and one of them was elected to the national party executive. Compared to the year before, the NPD saw its membership grow in 2004. A fourth point was added to the party's three point-strategy ("battle for the streets", "battle for the minds", "battle for the parliaments"): "battle for the organised will". The party continues to maintain its openly aggressive antagonism towards the free and democratic order. Party chairman Udo VOIGT openly declared his positive attitude towards elements of Nazi ideology (see Section V, 1).

- DVU again elected to Brandenburg parliament** With a nearly constant level of membership, the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union) remained the largest and best-funded right-wing extremist political party. Within the party, the power of chairman Dr. Gerhard FREY remained unchallenged. The DVU and NPD agreed not to compete against each other for votes in the parliamentary elections in Saxony and Brandenburg. In the parliamentary elections in Brandenburg on 19 September, the DVU was again voted into the parliament, winning six seats. The party chairmen of the DVU and NPD agreed to continue their strategy of alliance in future state, federal and European-level elections (see Section V, 2).
- REP plagued by internal quarrels** There are still concrete indications that the REP is pursuing right-wing extremist activity. As in previous years, in 2004 the party, led by Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER, was plagued by internal conflicts over the party's direction and by declining membership. Numerous members sought contacts to other right-wing extremists due to their dissatisfaction with the party leadership. Nonetheless, the party won more votes than its competitors in the right-wing extremist spectrum in the European and Thuringian parliamentary elections. The REP also improved its results in isolated local elections. SCHLIERER was returned to office in the elections for the REP national executive, albeit with only about 60% of the votes (see Section V, 3).
- Unsuccessful attempts to make the movement more intellectual** Right-wing extremists' attempts to give their efforts a more intellectual image, particularly in the direction of what they call "cultural hegemony", remained unsuccessful also in 2004. The NPD reduced its emphasis on its "battle for the minds" in favour of its "battle for the parliaments" and "battle for the organised formation of opinion". Nor did other right-wing extremist organisations make any efforts in this direction (see Section VI).
- Anti-Semitism** Anti-Semitism continues to play a major role in all areas of right-wing extremism. In addition to open agitation and incitement against Jews, a more surreptitious form of anti-Semitism is on the rise, speculating on latent anti-Semitic attitudes among the general population and attempting in this way to gain influence (see Section VII).
-

Internet as a key medium

The Internet is the key medium of communication for right-wing extremists, who use it to present themselves, make verbal attacks, carry on internal debates and to mobilise attendance at their rallies and demonstrations. The number of websites run by German right-wing extremists – 950 – remained at the same high level as in earlier years. In addition to websites, right-wing extremists increasingly use interactive Internet services for purposes of information or discussion. Along with mailing lists and newsletters, discussion forums are becoming increasingly important for the scene. Right-wing extremists use spam to send more of their anti-constitutional propaganda to a larger audience (see Section IX, 3).

II. Statistical overview

1. Organisations and following

Right-wing extremist following continues to shrink	At the end of 2004, there were 168 (2003: 169) right-wing extremist organisations and associations in Germany. Membership of these organisations and the number of unaffiliated right-wing extremists totalled 40,700, or about 1.7% less than the previous year (41,500).
Same number of violent right-wing extremists	The number of subculture-oriented ⁵ and other right-wing extremists willing to use violence remained unchanged at 10,000. This category includes right-wing extremists who support the use of violence but have not yet committed any violent crimes. The largest group by far is made up of right-wing extremist skinheads whose subculture orientation clearly distinguishes them from other violent right-wing extremists, such as neo-Nazis.
Renewed increase in number of neo-Nazis	By contrast, the number of neo-Nazis increased by about 25% to 3,800 (2003: 3,000). The degree of organisation within the neo-Nazi scene is waning: 87 groupings demonstrated at least a minimum of organisational structure (2003: 95). This also included a significant proportion of the roughly 160 <i>Kameradschaften</i> .
Right-wing extremist party membership continues to fall	Only about 23,800 people (2003: 24,500) are currently members of any right-wing extremist political party. This number includes REP members, although not every member of the party should be considered a right-wing extremist. This drop of about 4% is due to further membership losses of the REP (about 500) and DVU (about 500). The number of other right-wing extremist organisations rose to 76 (2003: 69). About 4,300 (2003: 4,600) members/activists belong to this spectrum.

⁵ Not only skinheads are willing to use violence or actually behave violently. To a minor extent, neo-Nazis and – to a still smaller extent – members of right-wing extremist parties also demonstrate such behaviour. Therefore, willingness to use violence cannot be the only criterion for distinguishing between skinheads and neo-Nazis. The subcultural aspect, i.e. the fact that skinheads disassociate themselves from society's general standards, is much more important. This includes wearing military clothing, listening to aggressive music and drinking excessive amounts of alcohol.

Right-wing extremist following ¹						
	2002		2003		2004	
	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
Subculture-oriented and other right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence ²	1	10,700	2	10,000	2	10,000
Neo-Nazis ³	72	2,600	95	3,000	87	3,800
Political parties of which REP ⁴	3	28,100	3	24,500	3	23,800
DVU		9,000		8,000		7,500
NPD		13,000		11,500		11,000
		6,100		5,000		5,300
Other right-wing extremist organisations	70	4,400	69	4,600	76	4,300
Total	146	45,800	169	42,100	168	41,900
After deducting multiple memberships ⁵		45,000		41,500		40,700

¹ Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.

² Most of the subculture-oriented and other violent right-wing extremists (mainly skinheads) are not organised in groups. The statistics list not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those right-wing extremists presumed on the basis of pertinent indicators to be prepared to use violence.

³ After subtracting multiple memberships within the neo-Nazi milieu. This figure includes only those neo-Nazi groups and those of the 160 *Kameradschaften* that demonstrate a certain degree of structure and permanence.

⁴ Not all REP members can be assumed to pursue or support right-wing extremist aims.

⁵ Instances of multiple membership of political parties and other right-wing extremist organisations were subtracted from the overall figures (2004: 1,200).

2. Politically motivated crime

2.1 Defining politically motivated crime

**Definition of
“politically motivated
crime”**

At the decision of the Standing Conference of Interior Ministers of the *Länder* (IMK), a new system for defining “politically motivated crime” was introduced effective 1 January 2001. Political motivation is the central criterion for identifying such offences. An offence is defined as politically motivated if the circumstances of the offence or the attitude of the offender lead to the conclusion that it is directed against individuals due to their political beliefs, nationality, ethnic origin, race, colour, religion, ideology, origin, sexual orientation, disability, appearance or social status. This information is evaluated from various perspectives, paying particular attention to the nature and seriousness of the crime, the motive, and whether it has any international or extremist elements. At the same time, the catalogue of violent crimes was expanded and standardised nation-wide.

With this differentiated presentation, data can be analysed according to specific needs, providing a foundation for targeted use of appropriate measures for deterrence and prevention.

The figures quoted in this Annual Report on politically motivated criminal and violent offences with an extremist background are based on information from the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

2.2 Politically motivated crime and violent acts

In 2004, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) registered a total of 21,178 politically motivated crimes (2003: 20,477). This figure includes 11,860 (56%) propaganda offences (2003: 10,669, or 52%). Another 1,800 of these (8.5%) are categorised as politically motivated violent crimes (2003: 1,870, or 9.1%).

Classifying politically motivated crimes

In 2004, 12,553 politically motivated crimes were classified as “right-wing” (2003: 11,576), 3,521 were classified as “left-wing” (2003: 3,614), and 603 were classified as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners” (2003: 1,743). In 4,501 cases (2003: 3,544) it was not possible to assign the offence to a particular category.

Extremist criminal offences

In 2004, 14,183 (67%) criminal offences were classified as extremist (2003: 13,903, or 67.9%). Of these, 12,051 (2003: 10,792) were classified as “right-wing”, 1,440 (2003: 1,459) as “left-wing” and 461 (2003: 1,473) as “politically motivated crimes by foreigners”. In 231 cases (2003: 179), there were indications of an extremist background, but the offences were recorded without further classification.

2.3 Right-wing extremist crime and violence

2.3.1 Overview

Rise in right-wing extremist crime

Crimes and violence motivated by right-wing extremism constitute a subset of the class of right-wing politically-motivated crime. In 2003, 12,553 criminal offences were classified as right-wing politically motivated crime (2003: 11,576). Of these, 8,455 (2003: 7,951) were propaganda crimes pursuant to Sections 86 and 86a of the Criminal Code (StGB) and 832 (2003: 845) were violent crimes. In the area of right-wing politically motivated crime, 12,051 (2003: 10,792) criminal offences were classified as having an extremist background. Of these, 776 (2003: 759) were violent crimes. The number of criminal offences with a right-wing extremist background thus rose by 11.7%, while that of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background rose by 2.2%. Violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background made up 6.4 % of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background (2003: 7%). Of all crimes with a right-wing extremist background, 86.3% (2003: 86.1%) were either crimes involving illegal propaganda activities (8,337; 2003: 7,551) or incitement to hatred and violence against individuals or certain segments of the population (2,065; 2003: 1,744). Overall, 199 offences (2003: 141) fell into the category of violent crimes against actual or supposed left-wing extremists, and 67 offences (2003: 70) fell into the category of violent crimes against other political opponents.

Overview of violent and other crimes with a right-wing extremist background ¹		
Violent crimes:	2003	2004
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	7	6
Bodily injury	637	640
Arson	24	37
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	2
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	28	25
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	2	6
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	2	2
Robbery	12	9
Extortion	2	5
Resisting public authority	45	44
Sexual offences	0	0
Total	759	776
Other criminal offences:		
Property damage	225	243
Coercion, threat	93	97
Illegal propaganda activities	7,551	8,337
Desecration of cemeteries	26	20
Other criminal offences, esp. incitement to hatred	2,138	2,578
Total	10,033	11,275
Total number of criminal offences	10,792	12,051

¹ The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

Again in 2004, there were no homicides with a right-wing extremist background.⁶ The following information relates to the total of six attempted homicides:

In Pforzheim, Baden-Württemberg on 29 May, a 32-year-old male used newspapers to set a fire in the entryway of a block of flats inhabited mainly by Turkish persons. The fire was extinguished before anyone was hurt. During police questioning, the suspect stated that he had acted out of hate for foreigners and had consciously intended to send a signal protesting “excessive influence of foreigners”. The Regional Court in Karlsruhe found the accused guilty of 20 counts of attempted homicide concomitant with attempted serious arson and sentenced him to six years and six months in prison. The sentence is not subject to appeal.

On 17 April, several right-wing extremists driving a stolen car attempted to hit two persons associated with the left-wing extremist scene in Wegeleben, Saxony-Anhalt. One of the injured was brushed by the car, while the other was hit more directly and thrown on to the car’s bonnet. The accused beat one of the victims with iron bars. The Regional Court in Halberstadt sentenced the two defendants in June to two years in prison. The sentences are not yet final.

⁶ Note: In Potzlow, Brandenburg, on 12-13 July 2002, three males ranging in age from 17 to 23 attacked a 16-year-old youth due to his appearance, ultimately killing him. The chief accused was sentenced on a charge of homicide; the others were sentenced on charges of attempted homicide concomitant with bodily injury resulting in death. Following the final judgement of the Neuruppin Regional Court on 21 December 2004, the responsible *Land* Criminal Police Office reported the offence as a right-wing politically motivated crime with an extremist background.



2.3.2 Targets of violent crimes with an extremist background

Most politically motivated violent crimes with an extremist background were directed against foreigners: 368 (2003: 430), or 47.4%. Another 199 (25.6%) violent crimes were directed at real or supposed left-wing extremists (2003: 141, or 18.6%), while 37 (4.8%) were motivated by anti-Semitism (2003: 35, or 4.6%).

Violent crimes with a xenophobic background ¹		
	2003	2004
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	5	5
Bodily injury	377	310
Arson	19	29
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	1
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	12	7
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	1	1
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	1	1
Robbery	6	4
Extortion	1	2
Resisting public authority	8	8
Sexual offences	0	0
Total	430	368

¹ The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime***
by type




* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).
Only the most important types are included.

2.3.3 Breakdown of violent crimes by *Land*


In absolute terms, the highest number of violent crimes with a right-wing extremist background occurred in North-Rhine/Westphalia (116 registered offences); in terms of crimes per 100,000 residents, however, North-Rhine/Westphalia lies in the middle of the scale. It is followed by Brandenburg (105, at the top of the scale as a proportion of total population), Lower Saxony (101, in the middle of the scale as a proportion of total population), Saxony-Anhalt (71), Baden-Württemberg (67) and Saxony (63). A significant proportion of such crimes continues to be carried out in the eastern *Länder*. With an average of 2.07 violent crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, the rate was more than three times that in the western *Länder* (0.65).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime***
by Land



* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background
related to the area of right-wing politically motivated crime*
per 100,000 residents and Land**



* The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and population data from the Federal Statistical Office.

III. Right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence

1. Violent right-wing extremist following

Violent scene stable at high level

Following a slight drop in the number of right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence in 2003, this number remained unchanged at about 10,000 persons (2003: 10,000). The majority of these are right-wing extremist skinheads.

2. Weapons and discussion of the use of violence

The WIESE case

On 1 July, the Public Prosecutor General filed charges at the Bavarian Higher Regional Court in Munich against Martin WIESE, leader of the group Kameradschaft Süd, and three of his close associates.⁷ The three were charged with membership of a terrorist association. WIESE was suspected of leading a conspiracy. Investigators found that the four had acquired weapons and explosives and were planning, at least for a time, to set off a bomb at a Jewish community centre in Munich on 9 November 2003.

Already on 28 April, the Public Prosecutor General had filed charges at the Bavarian Higher Regional Court in Munich against five additional associates of WIESE's on suspicion of belonging to and supporting a right-wing extremist terrorist association (see Section I, 2).

“Freikorps Havelland”

On 23 November, the Brandenburg Public Prosecutor charged 12 persons aged 15 to 20 with forming a terrorist association; their trial at the Brandenburg Higher Regional Court began on 20 December.⁸ The persons were accused of having carried out arson attacks against a total of seven Turkish- and Asian-owned takeaway restaurants and businesses under the name “Freikorps” or “Freikorps Havelland” in the Havelland district of Brandenburg between August 2003 and May 2004. The attacks resulted in total damages of more than €600,000. According to the charges filed, the attacks were intended to intimidate foreign owners of takeaways in the region so that they would shut down their businesses (see Section I, 2).

⁷ For the court's judgement, see Note 3.

⁸ For the court's judgement, see Note 4.

Wargames

Military-type exercises may be a precursor for right-wing terrorist activity, especially if such exercises are used to prepare for violent confrontations with political opponents. In recent years, the authorities for the protection of the Constitution have repeatedly received reports of wargames of this type. For example, five persons engaged in wargame-like activity were arrested in a wooded area in the Barnim district of Brandenburg on 18 April; the police are now investigating them on suspicion of forming a criminal association. Police searches conducted in connection with this investigation revealed cut-and-thrust weapons, air guns and a simulated explosive device. Unlike the group associated with WIESE, however, the suspects had no explosives or weapons with live ammunition. Nor were there any indications that the suspects were planning serious crimes.

Weapons and explosives found

Weapons possession within the scene continues to represent a significant threat potential. Although this is usually motivated by a general affinity for weapons, the threat remains that right-wing extremists could use weapons or explosives spontaneously to commit very serious crimes. For example, explosives and weapons, among other things, were found during investigations of members of skinhead groups in early 2004 (see 3.1 and 3.2).

Police found similar items in two other cases:

- On 25 August, the police searched several properties in Hesse and Bavaria in connection with crimes committed at a private skinhead concert in Kirtorf, Hesse, on 3 July. They confiscated a large quantity of evidence, including several firearms and ammunition, some of it live.
- On 6 October, police found a World War II-era machine gun, eight rifles, several handguns and weapons parts along with two kilos of TNT in the possession of a 27-year-old right-wing extremist in Gmund am Tegernsee, Bavaria.

Calls to violence found in Internet forums

Anonymous support for violence is on the increase in Internet forums. For example, one user of the right-wing extremist forum Skadi.net called for attacks on Jewish facilities and institutions in order to rouse the “anti-Semitism of the Germanic people”. This could be followed by “attacks on politicians or political institutions,” the user added.

German right-wing extremists contributed numerous postings with content punishable by law, including incitement to violence, particularly in the German-language forum of the British website

combat18.org, discovered by the authorities in early 2004.⁹ For example, on 14 January a user with the pseudonym “Germanwarrior88” wrote:

“hi, i need some directions, for pipe bombs etc.! doesn’t matter what, as long as it explodes! I want to build some bombs with my buddies and blow up a punker shack or a Turkish shop. I would appreciate links or directions!”
(errors in the original text)

The forum participant “AusländerRaus” (foreigners out) was seeking accomplices for a violent attack on an individual and included the prospective victim’s photo and telephone number, among other things. The forum participant wrote: “He should be killed twice.” Elsewhere, the same participant wrote “we need a 2nd Rostock, Lichtenhagen”.

**Use of violence
discussed**

Only a small part of the right-wing extremist scene took part in such discussions, however. There was no indication of an intensive discussion of violence within the right-wing extremist scene in 2004. For example, the authorities were not aware of any new publications proposing strategies for an armed struggle. For tactical reasons alone, the great majority of right-wing extremists currently oppose the use of terrorist violence. This is expressed for example in an article by Jürgen SCHWAB, right-wing extremist writer and NPD theoretician, in the March issue of the party publication *Deutsche Stimme* (German Voice) (see Section V, 1). However, according to an Internet posting, the Berlin section of the “Anti-Anti-fascist Network” (see Section IV) regards the recent electoral success of right-wing parties as a final chance. Should this chance be wasted, the group wrote, “We will probably no longer be able to win THE STRUGGLE FOR OUR COUNTRY in the political arena ... but only with our fists and weapons!”

⁹ Right-wing extremists invoke the name of Combat 18, an organisation that first attracted notice in the UK but has largely been dormant following executive measures in spring 2003, in printed publications and on the Internet to advocate covert (terrorist) activity against all those who are seen as a “threat to the white race” or who oppose National Socialism.

3. Right-wing extremist skinheads

No firmly held worldview

As in previous years, right-wing extremist skinheads constitute a significant element of the right-wing extremist spectrum in Germany. Their sub-cultural lifestyle is oriented more on entertainment than on political activity. Nor does the majority have a firmly held right-wing extremist worldview. But by belonging to the right-wing extremist skinhead subculture, young people are exposed to nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic ideology.

Concentration in eastern Germany

The right-wing extremist skinhead scene continues to be concentrated in eastern Germany. Although the region contains only about 20% of the total population of the Federal Republic of Germany, about 45% of all right-wing extremists with a propensity to violence live in this region. Significant numbers of followers are found particularly in the greater Berlin area and in certain parts of Saxony and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.

Relationship to neo-Nazis

The relationship between skinheads and neo-Nazis remained ambivalent in 2004. Although members of both work together in *Kameradschaften* in many regions, most skinheads are more interested in activities with greater entertainment value, such as skinhead concerts and parties, than in political action. Nonetheless, the right-wing extremist skinhead scene continues to represent an important pool of potential support for neo-Nazi activities, especially demonstrations which attract a great deal of public attention. For this reason, a number of high-ranking neo-Nazis target their activities at this subculture; for example, Thorsten HEISE, the former *Land* chairman of the Freiheitliche Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (FAP, Free Workers' Party of Germany) runs a business distributing skinhead music.

Relationship to right-wing extremist political parties

The skinhead scene remains sceptical of right-wing extremist political parties. Although the scene has no contact worth mentioning to the Deutsche Volkunion (DVU, German People's Union) and Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans), the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, Nation-Democratic Party of Germany) has gained a certain degree of acceptance among right-wing extremist skinheads. This is largely the result of the NPD's policy, advocated for many years and now actively followed, of openness towards neo-Nazi and violent elements of the right-wing extremist spectrum. Large-scale events such as the NPD press festival in Mücke, Saxony, on 7 August, which featured not only two singer-songwriters but also three skinhead bands, attracted an audience of about 7,000, including a

large number of skinheads. The same was true of NPD-organised demonstrations like the one in Berlin on 1 May, at which skinheads made up a large part of the 2,300 participants. Nonetheless, incorporating skinheads into the party organization and members of this subculture taking part in political activity remain the exception.

3.1 Inter-regional skinhead organisations

The only right-wing extremist skinhead groups active in more than one region were the Hammerskins and Furchtlos & Treu (Fearless and loyal).

Hammerskins

Organised in regional “chapters”, the Hammerskins have about 100 members (2003: 120). The group, which is oriented on National Socialist and racist ideology and has been active in Germany since the early 1990s, hardly appeared in public. In a very few cases, Hammerskins members organised skinhead concerts, such as one in Kürnach, Bavaria, on 17 July, which about 500 people attended.

Furchtlos & Treu

The group Furchtlos & Treu, founded in 1999, claims to have several sections in both Germany and Croatia; like the Hammerskins, in 2004 it hardly appeared in public. This is likely due to executive measures taken on 15 January against five persons – including the group’s leader – in connection with an investigation into suspected violations of the War Weapons Control Act (*Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz*) and the Weapons Act (*Waffengesetz*). Three of the suspects were found to be in possession of plastic explosives, several thousand rounds of ammunition, four firearms and G3 rifle magazines.

3.2 Blood & Honour after the ban

No nation-wide organisation

Since the skinhead organisation Blood & Honour was banned by the Federal Minister of the Interior in 2000, its former leaders, particularly those in south-western Germany, tried to continue the banned group’s activities at least to some degree, but they were unable to maintain or restore its nation-wide organisation. Former Blood & Honour activists have maintained close contacts at the regional level, however. Some former members were observed outside the country wearing logos of the banned organisation. On 18 March, police searched the homes of ten right-wing extremists in Lower Saxony, Saxony and Brandenburg along with a publishing house in Lower Saxony on suspicion of continuing a legally banned association. The suspects are thought to have been involved in planning a successor to the now-defunct Blood

& Honour magazine in 2001. A carbine, another long firearm and ammunition were taken from the home of one suspect.

3.3 Right-wing extremist skinhead music

Skinhead music very important

Skinhead music plays an important role in the violent right-wing extremist subculture, particularly as a medium to attract young people to the scene. Right-wing extremist concerts offer an opportunity to get together, meet new people and strengthen existing contacts. The nationalistic, xenophobic and anti-Semitic attitudes cultivated by numerous skinhead bands influence and reinforce the vague right-wing extremist worldview of those who belong to this milieu.

“Project Schoolyard”

This was the effect intended by the German right-wing extremists who initiated “Project Schoolyard”. By distributing music CDs with right-wing extremist texts to schoolchildren free of charge, they hoped to attract more young people to the scene and interest them in right-wing extremist subject matter. With help from notorious music distributors, bands, *Kameradschaften* and individuals, the project’s initiators produced at least 50,000 copies of a sampler of songs by right-wing extremist groups and songwriters conveying anti-democratic, racist and National Socialist ideology.

For example, the song *Sturm über Europa* (Storm over Europe) by the band Aryan Brotherhood describes the “widespread fire” that is to engulf all of Europe and violently “free [it] from the enemy”. The “path to victory” will take its course, ultimately leading to the “final battle”. According to the song, the aim of the war is to resurrect a pan-European, National Socialist empire under German rule:

“The brothers take each others’ hands. Storm over Europe. With them comes a widespread fire. Storm over Europe. It stabs like a dagger. Storm over Europe, it will free her from the enemy. Storm over Europe.”

A general confiscation order has been in effect for these CDs since early August, and the CDs have not been distributed. However, in September the titles and cover of the sampler were offered for Internet downloading via a file-sharing system. A website originally intended to accompany the CD distribution has been accessible since early November. The website also offers numerous music files for downloading, along with further information about “Project Schoolyard” and links to contact addresses for right-wing extremist groups. A poster campaign was launched at the same time as the website; posters advertising “Project Schoolyard” and the website

were put up near schools. By the end of the year, a total of 31 poster and graffiti campaigns were carried out, primarily in Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg. Several home-made CDs containing songs from "Project Schoolyard" were distributed in Cottbus, Brandenburg.

Other right-wing extremists took up the idea of "Project Schoolyard" and started similar campaigns. For example, during the run-up to parliamentary elections in Saxony, the NPD handed out its own CD entitled *Schnauze voll? - Wahltag ist Zahltag!* (Fed up? Election day is payback time!) containing songs by right-wing extremist bands and songwriters (though no content punishable by law). The CD was also distributed as part of a "school campaign". In the US as well, a similar campaign was carried out under the leadership of an American distributor of right-wing extremist recordings. The distributor produced a sampler of 20 well-known right-wing extremist bands from the UK, Australia and the US, primarily for distribution in the US to white youths aged 13 to 19, but also available by mail order to interested parties in other countries. Customs officials were able to confiscate several shipments of the CD, whose contents were punishable under German law, upon arrival in Germany.

Major increase in right-wing extremist skinhead concerts

The number of right-wing extremist concerts in Germany rose significantly, from 119 in 2003 to 137 in 2004. The number of concerts with attendance of more than 300 rose from eight to 14; two concerts had attendance of more than 500 (2003: 2). Average attendance was also up: from 160 in 2003 to 165 in 2004. The most concerts were held in eastern Germany (80). Using bans, intensive investigative measures and checks of persons at meeting places, and by talking to owners of concert venues, who then often withdrew from rental agreements with concert organisers, the authorities were able to prevent 22 concerts from being held (2003: 22). In addition, police frequently checked persons travelling to or from concerts. The police broke up 11 concerts (2003: 17) after they had begun; there were only a few instances of spontaneous resistance.

Law enforcement authorities initiated an investigation of members of a right-wing extremist band and the organisers of a skinhead concert in Kirtorf, Hesse, on 3 July, where songs inciting hate and violence were performed. During searches conducted as part of this investigation, on 25 August police confiscated extensive evidence (see Section III, 2).¹⁰

¹⁰ Since then, charges have been filed. The trial is set to begin in late May 2005.

Secretive organisation

Due to the threat of prosecution, most skinhead concerts in Germany continue to be organised in secret. In some cases, the organisers even appear to sow misinformation intended to divert attention from their actual plans. In most cases, only a few members of the scene are informed of the concert venue ahead of time. Potential audience members are initially told only which bands are to perform and where they can get further information. Then they are guided via SMS from the pre-concert meeting point to the concert venue. If the venue is not owned or managed by right-wing extremists or sympathisers, concert organisers often conceal the real nature of the event (e.g. saying it is a birthday or engagement party) from those renting out the space.

The organisers of right-wing extremist demonstrations and other events (e.g. the “press festival” of the NPD-owned publishing house Deutsche Stimme) have also realised music’s potential and are seeking to increase their events’ appeal to young right-wing extremists by including performances by right-wing extremist bands and singer-songwriters.

Right-wing extremist skinhead bands

The number of right-wing extremist skinhead bands in Germany actively performing or recording rose to 106 in 2004, up from 95 in 2003. Turnover continues to be high: About 34 new bands were founded, while about the same number stopped performing. About 30 groups have been active for a number of years.

Landser remains popular

Although the members of the band Landser were found guilty in December 2003 of forming and belonging to a criminal association, the band remains popular within the right-wing extremist scene; “solidarity samplers” have again appeared. Singer Michael REGENER, who was found guilty of leading a conspiracy, continues to be active, although the group no longer exists in its original form. He now performs under the name Die Lunikoff Verschwörung together with members of the right-wing extremist skinhead band Spreegeschwader (Spree river squadron). However, apparently with the fact in mind that his sentence was not yet final (during the period covered by this report), he has been performing only songs with texts not punishable by law.¹¹

German right-wing extremist bands produced recordings with punishable content also in 2004. Several of these CDs, produced by music distributors in the US, among others, incite hate against Jews

¹¹ The sentence is now final.

and persons of colour and call for their death. For example, the song *Brennende Kohle* (Burning coals) from the CD *Der Ewige Jude* (The eternal Jew), placed by the Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons on its restricted list in September, by the band Volkszorn (The people's wrath) contains the lyrics:

“Negroes, they are as black as night; as black as charcoal. I'll pour petrol over you and set you on fire. Oh nigger, now it's your turn.”

Other songs on the CD describe Germany's political leadership as “controlled by Zionists” and as an “occupied government” whose representatives should be attacked:

“They change the laws as they like or rather the way a Jew dictates. You take bribes from a Jewish pig ... Servant of Jewish interests.”¹²

“It's your own fault, you wanted it this way. But now it's time to die, I won't be happy until your heads roll. But with the Jewish skullcap on your heads, you've disfigured yourselves. I don't know why you do that, but I know why I'll kill you.”¹³

In its song *Zeichen der Zeit* (Sign of the times) on the CD *Wir sind zurück* (We are back), the band Blitzkrieg calls for a “race war” against foreigners living in Germany:

“The whole multi-cultural madness is slowly getting out of control. Violence in the cities wherever you look, the people (*Volk*) are being forced into race war.”¹⁴

Right-wing extremist singer-songwriters

In 2004, 15 right-wing extremist singer-songwriters (2003: 18) performed at 42 right-wing extremist concerts (2003: 33). The most popular of these were Frank RENNICKE, Michael MÜLLER and Annett MOECK, who performed mainly at right-wing extremist party events.

3.4 Distributors of right-wing extremist skinhead music

More music distributors

An independent network exists to distribute right-wing extremist music. Members of the scene can buy such music, which is not

¹² From the song *Politiker* (Politicians) on the CD *Der ewige Jude* by the band Volkszorn.

¹³ From the song *Ihr habt es so gewollt* (You wanted it this way) on the CD *Der ewige Jude* by the band Volkszorn. The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (Federal Gazette No. 185 of 30 September 2004).

¹⁴ The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (Federal Gazette No. 207 of 30 October 2004).

available in stores, from more than 60 mail-order distributors active nation-wide (2003: about 50). In addition, there are numerous cult shops which also serve as meeting-places for the regional scene. At concerts, mobile dealers offer their wares.

Ordering via the Internet

The growth of music distributors active nation-wide is mainly due to the fact that the Internet is the predominant medium for ordering right-wing extremist music. Almost all music distributors active in Germany use the Internet because it requires relatively little effort and financial outlay. Updating their selection regularly, they are quickly able to build up a large clientele. Even interested persons who have no contacts to the scene can get access to right-wing extremist music through the Internet.

Material available from abroad

Most sellers of CDs and clothing who are based in Germany derive most of their income from the sale of items that are not illegal in this country. Because laws abroad differ, recordings that are punishable under German law are usually produced and sold by foreign distributors, also via the Internet. US companies in particular are increasingly targeting the German market and play a major role in producing and distributing CDs of German groups whose music is anti-Semitic, incites hatred and glorifies National Socialism.

3.5 Skinhead fanzines

Fanzine revival

Bucking the trend of previous years, the number of right-wing extremist fanzines rose in 2004. Whereas only about a dozen fanzines were in operation in 2003, in 2004 there were about 20. Fanzines – also in printed form – have regained significance.

The publications mainly contain interviews with right-wing extremist skinhead music groups, reports on experiences and concerts within the scene and reviews of recordings and fanzines. In recent years, there have been fewer articles with programmatic or xenophobic content.

Some publications that had not been published for some time reappeared in 2004. And new fanzines were launched in Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia.

Use of the Internet

In parallel to increased distribution of printed fanzines, Internet use has continued to grow in importance. This is likely because it is more up-to-date and less expensive to produce and use. In addition, online fanzines and similar websites, like the websites of bands and music distributors, forums and newsletters, serve as an information and

communications medium for the latest concert information and reviews, CD reviews and release information, and scene news. In one case, a right-wing extremist website advertised a printed publication of the same name, which could also be ordered from the website.

IV. Neo-Nazism

Ideology	<p>The neo-Nazi worldview is characterised by racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia. Neo-Nazis are oriented on National Socialist notions of a totalitarian state led by a Führer. They see themselves as fighting for a political cause and strive for a “German Reich” without any foreigners or Jews, led by a Führer and one party overseeing all policy areas.</p> <p>Very few neo-Nazis openly acknowledge their adherence to this ideology. Among themselves, however, neo-Nazis use greetings and slogans from the “Third Reich” and make programmatic statements that leave no doubt as to their political orientation.</p>
Larger neo-Nazi following	<p>The neo-Nazi following grew to about 3,800 activists in 2004 (2003: 3,000).</p> <p>This growth can be attributed to the fact that the scene is especially attractive to younger people. This is due mainly to the neo-Nazis’ strategy of using demonstrations, sit-ins and similar events to gain the public eye. And incorporating current political issues into their activity likely also had an impact.</p>
Organisation	<p>In structural terms, the neo-Nazi scene remain largely unchanged in 2004. Neo-Nazi associations continued to play only a subordinate role. Most neo-Nazis belong to one of the roughly 160 groups known as <i>Kameradschaften</i> (2003: 160).</p>
Attitude towards violence	<p>Many neo-Nazis are fascinated by weapons and explosives, as evidenced by occasional weapons finds. Wargames, often in combination with paramilitary training exercises, are also popular. Many neo-Nazi members of <i>Kameradschaften</i> already have a record of violent offences. But for tactical reasons, most <i>Kameradschaften</i> reject the use of violence to achieve their political aims. Instead, they do their best to appear law-abiding in order not to bring on any repressive measures by the state nor to jeopardise the positive public response they have long sought. The leader and members of the <i>Kameradschaft Süd</i> who were planning to set off an explosion (see Section III) are therefore not typical of <i>Kameradschaften</i> as a whole. But they do demonstrate how dangerous <i>Kameradschaften</i> or some of their members can become.</p>
<i>Kameradschaften</i>	<p>Groups known as <i>Kameradschaften</i> were founded in reaction to the bans on associations in the 1990s. By largely forgoing the kind of structures found in associations, the neo-Nazi scene hopes to make future bans difficult or impossible. In place of associations, the</p>

Kameradschaften are intended to create a sense of cohesiveness in the absence of organisational structures which are vulnerable to legal action. In fact, however, many of the supposedly “autonomous” *Kameradschaften* have also developed varying degrees of organisation. Headed by a leader (*Kameradschaftsführer*), who dictates the group’s activities, these groups usually have no more than 25 core members, whose average age is 23. Names such as Kameradschaft Hamm or Festungsstadt Rostock and a logo create a sense of group identity, which is further reinforced through public group activities, such as participation in demonstrations. The activities of most *Kameradschaften* are limited to a kind of regular pub evening; some carry out political activities in the narrower sense (discussions, political or legal training courses).

***Kameradschaft*
networks**

Creating *Kameradschaften* has fragmented the neo-Nazi scene and reduced its ability to take political action to the local, at most regional level. The lack of a “superstructure” has made it difficult to address the entire neo-Nazi scene or at least larger parts of it, to determine ideological orientations and define campaigns. In order to overcome these weaknesses, neo-Nazis have formed loosely structured networks between *Kameradschaften* which they call “action offices” (*Aktionsbüro*) or “action alliances” (*Aktionsbündnis*). Currently, there are eight such networks. The most important of these, having supra-regional significance, are the Nationales und Soziales Aktionsbündnis Norddeutschland (NSAN, National and Social Alliance of Northern Germany), active since 1997, along with its mouthpiece, the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland (Action Office Northern Germany); and the Aktionsbüro Mitteldeutschland (Action Office Central Germany), also known as Nationaler Widerstand Berlin-Brandenburg (Berlin-Brandenburg National Resistance). Thanks in large part to these “offices” and “alliances”, whose well-organised websites are building blocks of their virtual network, neo-Nazis were able to conduct campaigns with slogans such as “Get rid of Hartz IV – Get rid of the system”, “No Agenda 2010” and “No tax money for synagogue construction”.

F.A.F. banned

On 22 January, the Bavarian Ministry of the Interior banned a group of neo-Nazis active in central Franconia under the name Fränkische Aktionsfront (F.A.F., Franconian Action Front) among other things on the grounds of the group’s similarity to National Socialism.

**Hilfsorganisation für
nationale und
politische
Gefangene e.V.
(HNG, Relief**

Of the few remaining neo-Nazi associations, only the Hilfsorganisation für nationale politische Gefangene und deren Angehörige (HNG, Relief Organisation for Nationalist and Political Prisoners and Their Families, reg’d society) is still active nation-wide. Founded in 1979

Organisation for Nationalist and Political Prisoners and Their Families, reg'd society)	and headed by Ursula MÜLLER since 1991, the HNG with its roughly 600 members remains the largest neo-Nazi organisation in Germany. Its membership also includes representatives of other right-wing extremist camps. Most members do nothing more than pay their membership dues. But the HNG has an integrative function in the fragmented neo-Nazi scene which should not be underestimated. This is demonstrated by the annual meeting, which is always well-attended; in 2004, about 130 persons were present. The HNG mainly offers moral support for right-wing extremists in prison. This is intended to prevent them from breaking away from the right-wing extremist scene while serving their prison sentences and to ensure their smooth re-integration into the scene when they are released. This is also the aim of the monthly <i>Nachrichten der HNG</i> (HNG news), which includes among other things a “list of prisoners” to help initiate contacts to “nationalist prisoners”.
Demonstrations	Public awareness of neo-Nazis comes in particular from their numerous demonstrations. In 2004, there were 87 demonstrations (2003: 84), with attendance ranging from 13 to 3,800 persons (at the central Hess rally; see below). The demonstrations focused on the economic and social policy of the Federal Government. Apart from demonstrations against the government reform package known as Agenda 2010, right-wing extremists applied for permits for 12 demonstrations with the motto “Get rid of Hartz IV” in the second half of the year. Attendance at these averaged 50 – 70 persons.
Rudolf Hess memorial march	For years, the most important annual event for neo-Nazis and right-wing extremist skinheads has been a march in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, commemorating the death of Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess. ¹⁵ Since 2001, attendance at the march has steadily grown: On 21 August, about 3,800 persons marched through Wunsiedel (2003: 2,600). About 20% of these persons had come from abroad (see also Section VIII).
Participation in democratic demonstrations	Neo-Nazis also increasingly took part in civil protests, especially those directed against the Federal Government’s planned social reforms, and podium discussions. They attempted to use these to gain public and media attention and to disrupt them or exploit them to “hijack” certain political themes. For example, neo-Nazis took part in many of the “Monday demonstrations” protesting social reforms, for example in Magdeburg on 2 August. Neo-Nazis also took part in a demonstration in Stuttgart on 3 April organised by trade and labour unions and social

¹⁵ Hess died in the Spandau district of Berlin on 17 August 1987.

associations to protest government reforms. However, they did not succeed in controlling or influencing these demonstrations.

Relationship to NPD The relation of large parts of the neo-Nazi scene to the NPD has changed (see Section V, 1). Earlier cooperation which was mainly limited to specific occasions has given way to a major rapprochement. This new cooperation between numerous neo-Nazis and the NPD was apparent already at the 1 May demonstration in Berlin, for which NPD chair Udo VOIGT and neo-Nazi Thomas WULFF, on behalf of the “unaffiliated nationalists”, jointly sought to mobilise support.

But the neo-Nazi scene does not have a unanimous position regarding the NPD. For example, Hamburg right-wing extremist Christian WORCH organised a rival 1 May demonstration in Leipzig in which 900 persons took part.

After that, in an article published in May in the NPD party organ *Deutsche Stimme* (German voice) Thomas WULFF called for the creation of a “right-wing popular front”. The article also stated that, in the election campaigns, all activists should work to strengthen the NPD as the “political arm” of the movement. Ahead of the elections in Saxony, WULFF also called on all “unaffiliated nationalists” to support the NPD, and he himself campaigned on behalf of the NPD in Saxony.

**Leading neo-Nazis
join NPD**

In addition to WULFF, neo-Nazis Thorsten HEISE and Ralf TEGETHOFF joined the NPD immediately before the election. In a statement published on the Internet, they announced their wish to speak for all the “comrades” organised outside the NPD. At the moment, they wrote, the “struggle at the parliamentary level” is as important as the “struggle on the street” taking place in parallel. Following the elections in Saxony, more prominent neo-Nazi activists joined the NPD: Michael REGENER, former singer of neo-Nazi band Landser, and Norman BORDIN, the head of the Kameradschaft München. HEISE’s election to the party’s national executive at its national conference in Leinefelde, Thuringia, on 30-31 October was the high point so far of neo-Nazi reconciliation with the NPD. In particular, the positive statements by NPD party chairman Udo VOIGT about National Socialism and Adolf Hitler (see also Section V, 1) likely increased the NPD’s appeal for neo-Nazis, who have regarded the party with some scepticism up to now.

However, some neo-Nazis regarded the close cooperation with the NPD as threatening their leadership role in the “national resistance”. Hamburg right-wing extremist WORCH was initially one of the sharpest critics of the NPD and its “popular front”. But his uncompromising position regarding “popular front” advocates left him

increasingly isolated within the right-wing extremist scene. In December, WORCH published an “open letter” to the party presidium stating his basic willingness to work with the NPD. According to this letter, published on the Störtebeker-Netz website, the NPD had declared in writing that it had lifted its ban on public speaking and contacts for WORCH and others, removing the main obstacle to his possible cooperation with NPD. Such cooperation would be limited to specific topics, he wrote; he ruled out both one-sided support for the NPD and an electoral coalition of “nationalist” parties, saying that in his view, cooperation was a question of mutual support and benefit. He went on to write that considering the matter in greater detail made sense only after the notion of a “popular front” had been formulated more clearly. It remains to be seen, he wrote, whether the euphoria resulting from the election successes of the NPD and DVU lasts or dies down again.

In this “open letter”, WORCH deviated from his earlier, rigorously anti-NPD stance. With this about-face, he was obviously attempting to shore up his crumbling support and reinforce his own position within the scene. WORCH’s change of course also further strengthened the NPD’s position. With its strategy, the party succeeded in winning over one of its sharpest critics, at least with regard to specific topics.

**“Anti-anti-fascist”
activities**

Neo-Nazis continued to collect personal information on its political opponents, mainly at the regional level. In addition, the new Anti-Antifa-Network (AAN) website offers regionally active neo-Nazis a joint platform for publishing this information on the Internet. The website contains names and photographs of political opponents and lists meeting-places of the left-wing extremist scene, divided into sections for Berlin, Potsdam, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria and North-Rhine/Westphalia. The AAN website claims that its goal is simply to “prevent the threat of leftist and anarchist violence”. But the site’s homepage displays a picture of a submachine gun. In fact, publishing such information is at least a threat to the persons listed. So far there are no known cases of “anti-anti-fascist” publications leading to militant action against individuals.

V. Political parties

1. Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National-Democratic Party of Germany)

Founded:	1964
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Udo VOIGT
Membership:	5,300 (2003: 5,000)
Publication:	<i>Deutsche Stimme</i> (German Voice) monthly, Circulation: 21,000
Subsidiary organisations:	Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) Nationaldemokratischer Hochschulbund e. V. (NHB, National-Democratic University Union, reg'd society)

1.1 Objectives

The NPD won 12 seats (9.2%) in the Saxony *Land* elections on 19 September, thus gaining representation at state level for the first time since 1968. According to its website, the NPD is striving to “create a German popular front”. To achieve its goals, the party seeks closer relations with the neo-Nazi scene and the remaining right-wing extremist political parties. The party’s increasingly aggressive actions are openly aimed at doing away with parliamentary democracy and the rule of law. For tactical reasons, the party still officially rejects the use of violence to bring about the “national revolution” it desires. Party pronouncements demonstrate the NPD’s similarity to National Socialism. The NPD is also racist, anti-Semitic and revisionist, and its activities are aimed at denigrating the democratic order and rule of law set down in Germany’s constitution, known as the Basic Law.

**NPD wants to
“dismantle”
Germany;
Volksgemeinschaft
as new order**

The party continues to maintain its openly aggressive antagonism towards the free and democratic order. It wants to set up a new order in Germany in the form of a *Volksgemeinschaft*, the National Socialist term for a community based on shared racial characteristics. Party chairman Udo VOIGT stated in an interview published in the weekly *Junge Freiheit* (*JF*, Young freedom) that the party aimed “to dismantle the Federal Republic of Germany just as the people dismantled the German Democratic Republic 15 years ago” and that this was “obviously possible also using the ballot box”.¹⁶ After achieving this goal, he said, the NPD intended to call the politicians to account – also with retroactive effect – who had violated their oath to protect the German people from harm. VOIGT went on to say that it was obvious that the “liberal capitalist system of the Federal Republic” was facing imminent collapse. It would either “be eroded by its decline into a multi-cultural society”, or the people would put an end to it using “voting rights changed in a revolutionary way”, he said. According to VOIGT, the people must become aware of their “lack of say” in order to achieve “revolutionary change” through a “democratic uprising”. This process has already begun with the NPD’s success in the Saxony elections, he said.

In a speech at the national party conference in Leinefelde, Thuringia, on 30-31 October that was also published on the Internet, VOIGT explained what his party meant by “revolutionary change in voting behaviour”:

“When Germans overcome the mental barrier of political correctness and express this in a revolutionary change in voting behaviour by rejecting the established, anti-German parties, then the national revolution will have begun.”

(translated from the original)

Further, VOIGT asserted that the NPD’s demand for “overcoming the system” was not “hostile to the state”. In doing so, he referred to the “preliminary nature of the Basic Law” and demanded the “dismantling” of the “liberal-capitalist system” as written in Article 146 of the Basic Law. With regard to the same topic, on 9 October NPD national manager Frank SCHWERDT emphasised on the party’s website:

“Dismantling the Federal Republic (FRG) – that follows from the Preamble and Article 146 of the Basic Law, according to which the

¹⁶ *Junge Freiheit*, 24 September 2004, p. 2.

German people are to draft a constitution once they are free and reunited. This task has not yet been completed 15 years after partial reunification. Germany is more dependent on the superpower USA than ever. ... FRG politicians are attempting to convey the impression that the vassal relationship to the “leading Western power”, integration within the EU and the introduction of the multi-cultural society are all a subject of consensus in the republic and have constitutional status. ... If Germany wants to have a future, then all of that has to be dismantled as quickly as possible. Udo Voigt has pointed out that this is a process which deserves to be called “revolutionary”, and in *Junge Freiheit*, he drew a clear line between us and the established parties. Between us and them, there are no similarities, only differences. This must now be the NPD’s motto everywhere.”

“Reich” idea

The NPD continues to strive for the “restoration” of the “German Reich”. In its programme for the European parliamentary elections on 13 June, the party described its main task as “restoring the German Reich’s complete viability”; although, according to the programme, the Reich has continued to exist under international law since “23 May 1945, the day the Dönitz Reich government was arrested”, it is no longer capable of action.¹⁷

In the above-mentioned interview with *Junge Freiheit* VOIGT explained:

“After 1945, two vassal states came into existence, the GDR... and the FRG... . Only when both vassal states have disappeared will Germans be able to create their own state, where they can live in freedom.” (*Junge Freiheit*, 24 September 2004, p. 2)

Opposition to human rights

In an article entitled “EU constitution I. Bringing joy to the world with ‘Uncle Sam’ ” which was published in the party organ *Deutsche Stimme*, the deputy chairman of the NPD in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lutz DESSAU, wrote:¹⁸

“Behind the verbal facade of ‘human rights’ and ‘non-discrimination’ hides the will of an oligarchy to create a labour surplus through immigration, in order to depress wages and increase profits. ... The ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ is the expression of human rights imperialism in the proposed EU constitution.”

¹⁷ “European freedom instead of US imperialism,” NPD programme for the 2004 European parliamentary elections, p. 6.

¹⁸ In 2004, *Deutsche Stimme*’s circulation more than doubled, from 10,000 copies to 21,000.

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2004, p. 17)

**Race collectivism/
Volksgemeinschaft**

The NPD associates racist-collectivist notions with the “new order” it strives to set up. These notions are manifested particularly in the concept of *Volksgemeinschaft*, or community based on shared racial characteristics. Party chairman VOIGT told the *Berliner Zeitung* newspaper in an interview published on 29 October that in order to react to globalisation, “we must return to a *Volksgemeinschaft* in which it is possible to consolidate the will to change, in which group and individual interests have been overcome.”

Jürgen GANSEL, a member of the NPD party executive, wrote in *Deutsche Stimme*:

“For where the people [*Volk*] are destroyed, the community [*Gemeinschaft*] dies; where the community is destroyed, the culture dies; and where the culture is destroyed, the individual dies. Thoroughly rational individualism necessarily leads to collectivism of the masses brought down to a common, low level. More freedom and autonomy is not the solution to society’s problems, which have in part been correctly diagnosed, but rather regrounding the uprooted human social atoms in the *Volksgemeinschaft*, which provides a sense of meaning.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2004, p. 16)

**Volksgemeinschaft
and “popular front”**

The NPD party leadership’s current policy of forming a “popular front” also serves the goal of achieving a *Volksgemeinschaft*. For example, in a speech given at the national party conference, VOIGT stated:

“But we want a popular front in order to one day create a national *Volksgemeinschaft*.”

**Positive attitude
towards National
Socialist ideas**

In the January issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, a frequent contributor wrote that the “ruling liberal-capitalist system” was on its last legs. The only possible alternative, he wrote, is “overcoming the post-war (dis)order and returning to *Volksgemeinschaft* and a [race-based] national economy”.¹⁹ With this call for a “return” to a *Volksgemeinschaft*, the NPD draws on a key National Socialist term, namely a community united by blood and fate, in which the interests of the individual are unconditionally sacrificed to those of the race-based community.

Regarding his party’s relationship to National Socialism, VOIGT explained:

¹⁹ *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 1/2004, p. 5.

“We are not a party that condemns something just because it existed between 1933 and 1945. In fact, National Socialism largely realised the ideas of race-based identity from 1848, but unfortunately it was also imperialistic. ... National Socialism of course also exists today as a current in Germany. It does not serve as a model for the NPD, but we try to integrate the national-socialist current, along with the national-liberals and national-conservatives, as insisting on divisions between them only aids our political opponents.”
(*Junge Freiheit*, 24 September 2004, p. 2)

Hero-worship of Nazi figures; playing down crimes of the Nazi regime

The similarities between the NPD and National Socialism become obvious when one looks at the hero worship of leading representatives of the Nazi system. For example, VOIGT stated:

“Without doubt, Hitler was a great German statesman. But I also do not deny that he was ultimately responsible for Germany’s defeat.”
(*Junge Freiheit*, 24 September 2004, p. 2)

On the same topic, party manager SCHWERDT was quoted on the party website on 9 October as follows:

“Not viewing Adolf Hitler through the eyes of the re-educators and assessing him differently is an outrage in a state that is so intellectually deformed. And yet it will be necessary to lead the German public away from guilt and atonement complexes towards a more normal perspective on things. When historical events are placed in the proper context in the course of doing so, that can certainly not be wrong.”

In an article posted in November on the right-wing extremist website *die-kommenden*, right-wing extremist writer and former party ideologist Jürgen SCHWAB said that neo-Nazi Thorsten HEISE, newly elected to the NPD national party executive, “out-Hitlered” even Udo VOIGT. In response to a question from a television reporter at the NPD national party conference, HEISE was said to have called Hitler his political model and described him as the “greatest man of the past millennium.”

In an article entitled “March to honour Rudolf Hess; uplifting day for national resistance: 7,000 in Wunsiedel”, *Deutsche Stimme* reported on the demonstration commemorating “peace pilot Rudolf Hess” in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, on 21 August.²⁰ The article comes to the conclusion:

²⁰ *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 9/2004, p. 15.

“His death shall not have been in vain. His spirit and his deeds live on. This is why again next year, we will say: Rudolf Hess – martyr for Germany!”

In a brochure published in mid-2004 entitled “Evolution: One German’s criticism of the system”, Alexander KLEIN, chairman of the NPD district party organisation in Cologne, argued:

“Despite losing the war and despite the difficult years of the 1920s, thanks to fantastic national leadership, starting in 1933 Germany once again became one of the strongest countries in the world in economic terms. More than six million unemployed in 1933 found work within the next three years. As early as 1936, Germany had full employment. Germany’s renewed economic power, attained within such a short time, made certain politicians in other countries quite uncomfortable (example: Winston Churchill). So Germany was forced into a new war so that it could be destroyed.”

Belligerent and aggressive agitation against political opponents

Official party statements and those by leading party members in connection with attacks on the free and democratic basic order and its representatives continue to demonstrate a belligerent, sometimes even militant, tone. Though the party has regularly spoken out in official statements against the use of violence, central NPD figures do not hold to this line, offering renewed evidence of the NPD’s still-ambivalent relationship to violence. For example, in an interview with the *Berliner Zeitung* newspaper VOIGT said:

“A German uprising is overdue. But in my view, this uprising will not be a revolution fought with weapons and barricades. Violence should play no role. But if the movement leads to something else that we cannot control, then that is a totally different story. For me, revolution in Germany means above all that people will free themselves of their predetermined ways of thinking which they were forced into by complete re-education, so that they can feel German again.”
(*Berliner Zeitung*, 29 October 2004, p. 6)

In the March issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, Jürgen SCHWAB described the conditions under which he thought the use of violence to achieve nationalist goals was justified and effective.²¹ Violence is widely viewed as bad, SCHWAB wrote in “Liberation nationalism and the question of violence”, but the concept is in fact neutral and subject to different interpretations depending on the moral standpoint. Policy is dependent on violence to achieve its goals, he wrote; nationalists have no need for pseudo-moralist statements on the question of

²¹ *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2004, p. 20.

violence, as these only cause divisions within their own camp. He went on to write that it made more sense to judge violence on the basis of the existing potential for violence, i.e. with regard to the possibility of using violence to successfully pursue one's political aims. For this reason, he wrote, organised nationalism should for now rule out its own use of violence out of a sense of "national responsibility and party legality". In any case, he added, only the "national liberated" German Reich that is to be restored could claim a truly legitimate state monopoly on power.

At its demonstrations, the NPD also provides right-wing extremist demagogues who are not party members a forum for their calls to violence. Neo-Nazi Dieter RIEFLING spoke at an NPD demonstration in Hanover on 23 October with the motto "Stop corruption, pension theft and the dismantling of the social system" as follows:

"And when we have succeeded in bringing absolutely everyone together in the national opposition, under whatever circumstances, then starting from all corners of the country, we will march on Berlin, and we won't let any of these traitors get away. Every escape route will be barred. Barricades will be put up. Then Germany will have reawakened. ...

If it should come to physical confrontation with the leftist fascist rabble up there, then I know that these 200 and more German men and women will stand like a front and go into this battle as if walking into a church service."

In Erlangen on 2 October, right-wing extremist author Roland WUTTKE described Palestinian suicide bombers as role models during his speech at an NPD demonstration on the topic "Bill for Hartz IV – stop dismantling the social system – national solidarity now":

"We have an important message. We have something again to rouse young people to fight. It is idealism. And just ask yourselves: What power is stronger? Think of the pictures of young Palestinian women, young mothers, who put on belts loaded with explosives to die for their people, their nation. That's it."

"Strategy of speaking out"

In his speech at the national party conference, VOIGT again stressed the importance of the "strategy of speaking out" for the "struggle for national liberation" and demanded:

"Let us approach others, let us make it clear to them that we are striving for nothing more and nothing less than a *Volksgemeinschaft*. Let us force our ideas on them, yes, force them to think about us, our demands and aims."

The NPD also put this “strategy of speaking out” into practice. On 12 January, a group of right-wing extremists disrupted a podium discussion on the topic “Neo-fascism: A threat to society?” at an adult education centre in Buxtehude, Lower Saxony; for security reasons, the discussion leader broke off the discussion before it started. Among the approximately 25 right-wing extremists in attendance was also the deputy chairman of the NPD organisation in Lower Saxony, Adolf DAMMANN. NPD national manager SCHWERDT was quoted on the party website on 14 January as saying that the disruption should “encourage [every activist] always to show up at such events in the future in order to put the rabble-rousers on public display.”

Opposition to social reforms

The NPD used the debate over the future of social insurance systems for its propaganda against the hated “FDGO state”.²² For example, a regular contributor to *Deutsche Stimme* declared that the policy of cannibalising the social system disguised under the name “Hartz IV” was also an attack by the “liberal-capitalist system” on its most faithful followers, the middle class. But whoever has nothing left to lose in the “FRG” can win it all only in a new Germany, the author wrote, adding that withdrawing the social safety net from the middle class was “political dynamite”. The author concluded:

“Whether the protesters admit it or not, with their Monday demonstrations, they are questioning the system and thus find themselves in the best possible historical company. ... The exploitive system of the globalisers cannot lead to a lasting improvement of conditions and a return to full employment. This can only be achieved by the geographically oriented economy of the *Volksgemeinschaft*, which gives each his own. This is why the protest against Hartz IV must not exhaust itself in fruitless discussions of socio-political improvements to this worn-out system, it must demand system change.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 9/2004, p. 9)

In the same issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, Jürgen GANSEL, a member of the NPD national executive wrote the following in an article entitled “Anger is brewing and will boil over”:

“In Berlin and elsewhere, the rotting bones of the traitors to the people are beginning to tremble: For one thing, because the new ‘Monday demonstrations’ recall the end of the GDR; for another, because the national opposition is successfully taking part in the protests and

²² In German, FDGO stands for “free, democratic basic order”.

finding increasing acceptance by uniting nationalism with social and anti-capitalist demands. It looks very much as though the cartel parties' policy of social clear-cutting may go down in history as the beginning of the end of the FRG system with its contempt for the people. ... The spell laid by the FDGO state is losing its enchantment everywhere. ... When, since the disastrous year 1945, has this country's national opposition ever had such a chance to influence the opinion of its people? ... The historic task of the national opposition today consists in giving its utmost support to the nascent popular movement and influencing it along nationalist lines. Then not only the SPD government will fall, but the whole FRG."
 (*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 9/2004, p. 1, 4)

Agitation against the social reforms was a defining element in the NPD's campaign in the Saxony state elections on 19 September. The party called on the electorate to vote NPD "as payback for Hartz IV".

Racism and xenophobia

In 2004 the NPD continued to agitate with undiminished, aggressive racism and xenophobia. Racism is one component of its "reality-based view of humanity", which the NPD's party programme declares to be the foundation of its policy. In an article entitled "History of evolution: There was no 'African mother of humanity'. The 'multi-regional theory of evolution' contradicts apostles of multi-culturalism" published in the June issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, Safet BABIC, an ex-officio member of the NPD executive in Rhineland-Palatinate, stated accordingly:

"Modern Europeans are supposed to be able to see their prehistoric ancestors in every Ghanaian asylum fraudster and Kenyan bush drummer and honour them accordingly. Scientists have now made it clear ... Thus Europeans have different ancestors than Africans and Chinese, which also explains the great outward differences between the various races. ... The natural inequality of humans is the foundation of nationalist policy in the framework of the reality-based view of humanity. ... But differentiation should not be confused with making value judgements. You cannot objectively compare an oak with a palm tree, because you would first need an objective measurement scale. It is similar with races as organic groups. At the same time, however, it is possible to say which people belong in which environments [*Lebensräume*] and not in others. Ethno-pluralism, the idea of protecting racial diversity, is not based on arrogance, but on respect for nature."²³

²³ The NPD declared its allegiance to "ethno-pluralism" based on an ideal of racial diversity through ethnically homogeneous states also in the position paper "Strategische Leitlinien zur politischen Arbeit der NPD" (Strategic guidelines for NPD policy) published by the party executive in February 2002.

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 6/2004, p. 24)

The NPD's programme for the European parliamentary elections on 13 June also contains obvious references to the party's racist worldview. For example, according to the programme, in ethnic terms, "Europeans" all belong to the "type of people with white skin" and "are descended above all from tribes of Greek, Roman, Germanic, Celtic and Slavic origin". The NPD traces the "specific European national characters" to the "various combinations of these and other tribes".

Jürgen GANSEL, member of the NPD party executive, wrote in *Deutsche Stimme*:

"When an 80-year-old Frenchman today has to live in a Paris neighbourhood in which 60% of the population is Arab and Negro and can no longer feel safe as a Frenchman, then it must occur to him in a moment of reflection that, had the Germans won the war, there never would have been this multi-ethnicism as a result of Americanisation – the German Reich, as first among equals, would have become the guardian of a national, social and strong European Reich."

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2004, p. 4)

On the NPD website on 26 March, Alexander KLEIN, the NPD's candidate in the European parliamentary elections and chairman of the NPD district party organisation in Cologne, expressed opposition to Turkey's possible entry into the EU: Calling Turkey the historical "arch-enemy of the West", he claimed that the German people did not want "any Turks along". KLEIN went on:

"As producers and dealers, Turks control the international drug trade and are responsible for thousands of drug deaths across Europe every year. Turks are undermining public order by carrying out their political business on German soil as a flagrant provocation. ... Masses of unemployed Turks, whose temporary work contracts long since ran out in times of economic decline, are carelessly plundering the German social insurance funds and thus hastening the bankruptcy of the German state. ... It is clear to every German who loves his homeland: If Turkey were granted full membership in the EU, this would immediately lead to a renewed invasion of Europe – this time not by Turkish armies, but by extended Turkish families, benefits recipients and people looking for work. ... How dare our established politicians come to the fantastic conclusion that Germany and Europe are willing to commit racial, economic and cultural suicide so that the work of ten centuries can be left to Asian invaders?"

spread anti-Semitic propaganda.

In his speech at a party gathering in Senden, Bavaria, in April, VOIGT mocked Holocaust victims by saying the following about the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin:

“We don’t think of it as a Holocaust memorial; instead, we are thankful that they’ve already laid the foundation for the new German Reich chancellery.”

The NPD applied to hold demonstrations in Bochum on 13 and 20 March to protest a synagogue being built there. In order to avoid a final ban on both events, the party changed the initial slogan “Stop synagogue construction – 4 million for the people” to “No tax money for synagogue construction! A synagogue is to be built in Bochum. We say no!” On 12 March, the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) confirmed the ban on the demonstrations in a fast-track procedure requested by the NPD’s regional organisation. In its decision, the court stated that the higher administrative court in Münster rightly noted that the planned demonstration, as evidenced by its slogan and the text of the announcement, would constitute incitement and thus would violate the public order. The court wrote that the slogan was intended to isolate Jewish persons living in Germany in an aggressive and inflammatory way. Changing the slogan to demand that the synagogue not be built using tax money did not affect that intent, the court argued. In an initial reaction to the Federal Constitutional Court decision, the NPD’s national party manager said in a statement published on the NPD website on 14 March:

“When it comes to Jewish interests getting their way, the dirty dealings between politicians, public administration, media and judiciary function perfectly. But these dealings have now been revealed to a broad public. In this regard, the fuss over the NPD demonstration in Bochum can certainly be considered a success. Nonetheless: The NPD continues to demand that not a single cent of taxpayers’ money should be spent on building the synagogue. ... This artificially whipped-up hysteria requires the party on the Rhine and Ruhr to strengthen its efforts to clear things up.”

Revisionism

The NPD uses revisionist arguments in attempting to replace the historical representation of the National Socialist period with views that range from favourable to offering justification for the regime. The party does so because it sees its vision of an authoritarian and ethnically homogeneous state incriminated by the historically correct representation of the “Third Reich”. This is why the party denies the Hitler regime’s responsibility for starting World War II, denies atrocities

committed by some Wehrmacht soldiers during the war, and seeks to discredit Germany's efforts at reconciliation with its eastern neighbours by calling them "self-accusation rituals of BRD representatives". Further, the NPD seeks to relativise the mass murder of Jews, referring only to certain "errors" during the "Third Reich".

Referring to the celebrations commemorating the "tragically successful landing of the Allies in Normandy" 60 years ago, party executive member GANSEL stated that the celebrations had reaffirmed the "unholy alliance of Western democracyranny".²⁴ For the first time, he wrote, a German chancellor was present and celebrated the defeat of his own fatherland "and reinterpreted it as a 'victory for Germany' ". Denying the crimes of the Waffen SS, GANSEL added:

"There was the usual condemnation of the Waffen SS and its alleged crimes. Of course ignoring the latest historical research, Oradour-sur-Glane once again had to serve as an example of Teutonic barbarity in black uniform."

Further, GANSEL claimed that all of Europe lost World War II:

"Every unprejudiced observer of the post-war era must admit ... that the defeat of the German Reich as Europe's core of strength and the victory of the partisan powers USA and Soviet Union signed the death warrant for the entire continent."

GANSEL went on in the article to attack the "liberation lie" as follows:

"Contrary to the lying talk of the ruling political class, what were the Germans supposed to feel they had been liberated from on 8 May 1945? From a fair economic order, a unified state, national sovereignty and domestic peace? In 1945, the overwhelming majority of the generation who experienced it – despite certain errors made by the Third Reich – did not at all feel 'liberated', but rather defeated, subjugated and humiliated."

**Agitation against
parliamentary
democracy and the
rule of law**

In 2004 the NPD continued to agitate in a polemical, defamatory and derogatory manner against the democratic system based on the rule of law. This is clear from assertions regarding the alleged re-education of the German population and accusations that the country was being ruled from abroad. In addition, the party continues to make denigrating statements about representatives and institutions of the free and democratic order and criticises the democratic state based on the rule of law in a derogatory fashion. The party thereby aims to portray the

²⁴ *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 7/2004, p. 4.

parliamentary system as illegitimate, incompetent, corrupt and opposed to the interests of the people. It questions the democratic state based on the rule of law as a whole, with the goal of abolishing the state and replacing it with a different system.

In the August issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, national party manager SCHWERDT stated that “questioning the legitimacy of the system’s politicians” could only benefit a new kind of politics in Germany. Such questioning is “an enormous step forward” for Germany’s freedom, he said.²⁵

In June, SCHWERDT stated in *Deutsche Stimme*:

“The victorious powers of the Second World War gathered together a handful of willing collaborators who forced the ‘constitution’ called the Basic Law on the Germans from above.”
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 6/2004, p. 2)

On the same subject, the NPD stated on its website on 14 August:

“Already in 1942, President Roosevelt’s Jewish advisers by the name of Kaufman and Morgenthau had developed a plan to destroy the German people following the military collapse using forced sterilisations. This plan was replaced by the Marshall plan, because those responsible on the other side of the Atlantic thought that if [the German people] no longer existed, they would not be able to pay, either. Of course, they could not let this happen. They needed paying vassal Germans they were able to hold on to until now, with decades of corrupt, lying, deceitful political officials damaging to Germany.”

In a speech given at the national party conference, party chairman VOIGT stated:

“As we see it, since 1945 Germany has been an occupied country, led by a clique of more or less corrupt politicians who even collaborate here and there with the Allied war profiteers. Subjugation clauses and limits to sovereignty in the Basic Law, special treaties like the Status of Forces Agreement, financial agreement, Transition Convention and the 2+4 Treaty, loss of an independent currency and removal of borders stand in the way of German sovereignty.”

²⁵ *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2004, p. 2.

1.2 Organisation and development

Growing membership

In 2004, the NPD developed into a focus for attempts to unite the right-wing extremist camp. The Federal Constitutional Court decision in March 2003 to discontinue proceedings to ban the party did not result in a renewed sense of purpose, as the NPD had hoped, and the downward trend in membership continued into the first half of 2004. Not until the second half of the year did the party experience a noticeable rise in membership, particularly against the backdrop of its electoral successes, some of them substantial. At the end of 2004, the NPD counted about 5,300 members (2003: 5,000).

Improved financial situation

For years, the NPD's financial situation has been tense. One may assume that this will improve due to the party's success at the polls and the resulting public matching funds. Increased donations are also likely to have helped. For example, party chairman Udo VOIGT told the *Berliner Zeitung* on 29 October that donations to the NPD had shown "enormous growth" already after the *Land* parliamentary elections in Saarland. Donations were up by a factor of five, he said; people were again investing in the NPD.

Demonstrations as sign of alliance policy success

In 2004 the NPD continued its strategy of "fighting for the streets" and organised around 40 demonstrations (2003: about 50) – most in cooperation with neo-Nazis and skinheads.²⁶ The central focus was protest against the Federal Government's social reforms. The NPD conducted at least 15 demonstrations of its own focused on this issue, most of them in eastern Germany, with up to 300 participants. NPD members and/or functionaries also took part in mainstream protests against "Hartz IV", the government's reform of unemployment and welfare benefits. Together with "unaffiliated nationalists", the NPD conducted a demonstration in the Lichtenberg district of Berlin on 1 May; the police estimated attendance at about 2,300 (2003: about 1,300). The NPD-owned publishing house *Deutsche Stimme Verlag* held a press festival in Mücka, Saxony, on 7 August, which about 7,000 persons attended (2003: about 2,500). The main attraction however was likely the line-up of musicians performing rather than the political content. The NPD again took part in neo-Nazi demonstrations. For example, VOIGT spoke at the Rudolf Hess memorial event in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, on 21 August (see also Section IV).

²⁶ This number does not include information booths and smaller election campaign rallies.

Improved relations to the neo-Nazi scene

In 2004, the NPD discontinued its reticence towards the neo-Nazi scene, which it had assumed for tactical reasons during the proceedings to ban the party. The party succeeded in winning over a significant segment of the “unaffiliated nationalists” to support its strategy for building a “German popular front”.

Already in the April issue of *Deutsche Stimme*, VOIGT declared:

“We want to present ourselves as the party of all national forces ... The national resistance on the street needs a strong arm in the parliaments. A national, fundamental opposition in parliament needs a strong force on the street.”

(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 4/2004, p. 18)

Just before the party’s favourable showing in the Saxony elections, a number of prominent neo-Nazis, such as Thomas WULFF and Thorsten HEISE, announced they had joined the NPD. HEISE was elected to the NPD national executive at the national party conference on 30-31 October. Even neo-Nazi Christian WORCH, long one of the NPD’s sharpest critics, no longer rules out working with the NPD on specific topics. On the NPD’s relationship to the “free nationalists and the national resistance”, at the party conference VOIGT said that no one was planning a “mutual takeover” but rather that each viewed themselves as “part of a common resistance” (see also Section IV).

Better relations with the rest of the right-wing extremist spectrum

After the NPD’s surprising success in the European parliamentary elections on 13 June and especially after the local elections in Saxony, the party executive renewed efforts to improve relations with the remaining right-wing extremist parties. At the NPD’s initiative, an agreement was reached with the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People’s Union) on 23 June regarding participation in the *Land* parliamentary elections in Brandenburg and Saxony on 19 September (see “Participation in elections”). Following this success for both parties, in Berlin on 22 September NPD party chairman Udo VOIGT and DVU chairman Dr. Gerhard FREY agreed to form alliances for future elections as well. As the DVU published on its website, they agreed to work together for the long term with the aim of having only one “national list” for state, national and European parliamentary elections. At a further meeting, this time in Munich on 12 October, VOIGT and FREY affirmed that their parties would not campaign against or aside each other in state, national or European elections, but would “work together”. The national leadership of Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) however refused the NPD’s offer of a national alliance, stating on its website that the “option of rapprochement or cooperation with the NPD” was out of the question

for the REP.²⁷ The REP confirmed this course at its national party conference in Veitshöchheim, near Würzburg, Bavaria, on 27-28 November (see 3 below).

National party conference confirms plan to form “German popular front”

The NPD’s efforts to form a “German popular front” reached their climax so far at the party’s national conference in Leinefelde, Thüringia, on 30-31 October. By re-electing VOIGT as party chairman with 86.8% of the vote, the delegates demonstrated their support for his plan to “form a popular front on the right”. Neo-Nazi Thorsten HEISE was elected as an ex-officio member of the party executive. Four additional members of the party executive also have political roots in the neo-Nazi camp.

“Four-point strategy”

In his speech at the party conference, VOIGT said that the NPD would continue to follow its “three-point strategy”. He said that the “battle for the parliaments” and the “battle for the streets” had been more successful than the “battle for the minds”, in which the “minds” to be won still had to be liberated “from our enemies’ way of thinking”. VOIGT added a fourth point to the strategy: “battle for the organised will”. He described this as an “attempt to concentrate all national forces if possible” in order to gain power via the “organised will”. VOIGT sketched out future cooperation with the DVU as an “absolutely equal partnership”. He said that both parties would continue to exist and seek election agreements, joint or linked lists of candidates wherever election law permitted. Thus the NPD will campaign in the Schleswig-Holstein parliamentary elections in February 2005 as a “single national force”, he said. In the national parliamentary elections in 2006, the NPD will be in charge of the list of candidates, VOIGT said, while DVU leaders are willing to be candidates on the list. In return, the DVU will be in charge of the list of candidates for the European parliamentary elections in 2009 and NPD candidates will be included on the DVU list, he said. VOIGT said that the “battle for the organised will” was getting substantial support from the ranks of the Deutsche Partei (DP, German Party), the unaffiliated nationalists and former members of the REP.

Participation in elections

With successful showings in a number of elections, culminating in winning seats in the parliament of Saxony, the NPD gained electoral significance for the first time since 1969.²⁸ In 2004, the party ran in the

²⁷ In its issue of 16 November 2004, the *Berliner Zeitung* reported that the NPD was conducting preliminary talks with members of the Deutsche Partei (DP, German Party) and the Deutsche Soziale Union (DSU, German Social Union). The newspaper quoted a “party spokesperson” as saying that the aim was to place the “national popular front” on a broader footing.

²⁸ In 1969, the NPD won 4.3% of the vote, narrowly missing the 5% mark needed to win Bundestag seats.

European parliamentary elections, in four *Land* parliamentary elections, and in local elections in six German *Länder*. In the European elections on 13 June, the party won more than twice as many votes as in 1999: 241,743 (0.9%) in 2004 compared to 107,662 (0.4%) in 1999. The NPD also did better in the *Land* parliamentary elections, in some cases demonstrating spectacular gains. In the elections to the parliament of the city-state of Hamburg on 29 February, the party won 0.3% of the vote; it had not run in the 2001 elections. In the Thuringian parliamentary elections on 13 June, the NPD gained 1.6% of the vote (1999: 0.2%). On 5 September, the NPD gained 4.0% of the vote in the Saarland parliamentary elections (it had not run in the 1999 elections). And in the parliamentary elections in Saxony on 19 September, the NPD received 190,909 votes, or 9.2% (1999: 1.4%), winning 12 seats in the *Land* parliament.

With 96 seats on district, city and local councils, up from 36 previously, the NPD nearly tripled its representation at local level. In local elections on 13 June, the NPD won 10 seats in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where it had none before; five in Saarland, where it also had none before; 40 in Saxony (up from nine); and seven in Saxony-Anhalt (up from one). In local elections in North-Rhine/Westphalia on 26 September, the NPD won 12 seats, up from three previously. The NPD failed to win any seats in the Hamburg district elections on 29 February.

The NPD succeeded in popularising its “right-wing” critique of capitalism and globalisation, particularly in its campaign in the Saxony parliamentary elections (see also “Opposition to social reforms”). In an appeal for donations for its campaign in Saxony bearing the title “May a political earthquake shake the republic!”, the NPD declared that a vote for the “old parties” was a vote for “multi-culturalism, unemployment and the dismantling of the social insurance system”; whoever voted NPD would be choosing “a better future for our people”. The party also used slogans such as “Payback for Hartz IV: NPD now”, “Fed up? Election day is payback time” and “Close the border to low-wage labour!”

Following its success in Saxony’s parliamentary elections, the NPD was able to build on its dominant position within the right-wing extremist scene in Saxony. Saxony’s current importance for the NPD’s efforts is underscored by the fact that, after the *Land* parliamentary elections, leading party figures and prominent right-wing extremist writers moved their base of operations to Saxony in order to

professionalise the parliamentary group's work and present the NPD to the public as a serious party oriented on substantive issues.

NPD on the Internet

In late 2004, the NPD and its youth organisation Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) were found to have about 90 active websites (2003: 80). Along with the NPD national association, most NPD *Land* organisations, numerous district organisations and JN subdivisions are represented on the Internet. These sites offer reports and commentaries on current events, announcements of demonstrations, press releases, programmatic statements and other information about the party organisations. Many sites are updated only sporadically, however (for more on right-wing extremism on the Internet, see Section IX, 3).

**1.3 Junge Nationaldemokraten
(JN, Young National-Democrats)**

Founded:	1969
Headquarters:	Riesa, Saxony
National chairman:	Stefan ROCHOW
Membership:	350 (2003: 400)
Publication:	regional only

The NPD is the only right-wing extremist party to have a youth organisation with a significant number of members. According to the NPD statutes, the Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats) is an "integral part" of the NPD. By virtue of his office, the JN national chairman is an ex officio member of the NPD executive.

In a declaration on the anniversary of the uprising in East Germany on 17 June 1953 which was published on the Internet, the JN national executive stated that, unlike the established parties of the "FRG", the JN and NPD did not play down the consequences of political problems such as those rooted in globalisation, "cultural neglect and excessive foreign influence", but instead devoted themselves to the actual causes of problems. The declaration went on:

"This philosophy places us in fundamental opposition to the ruling political system of the FRG; at the same time, however, our

philosophy is also the foundation for true problem-solving competence for the benefit of our German people.”

The JN has lost almost all of its earlier autonomy. It is now publicly regarded as nothing more than an appendage of the NPD. Apart from organising a skinhead concert in Mücka, Saxony, on 27 November, which about 800 people attended, the JN carried out few independent activities (e.g. demonstrations). In early 2004, the JN national executive decided to launch a school newspaper campaign with the motto “Bringing nationalism to the schools”, but the campaign remained limited to individual activities in Lower Saxony.

The JN held its annual national conference in Mosbach, near Eisenach, Thuringia, on 2-3 October. Stefan ROCHOW was re-elected to the office of national chairman.

Membership levels declined. In late 2003/early 2004, the JN organisation in Berlin-Brandenburg chaired by Jens PAKLEPPA disbanded. Together with former NPD members from Berlin and Brandenburg, PAKLEPPA and other former members of the *Land* organisation became active in the right-wing extremist “New Order Movement” founded in early 2004.

2. Deutsche Volksunion (DVU, German People's Union)

Founded:	1987 *
Headquarters:	Munich
National chairman:	Dr. Gerhard FREY
Membership:	11,000 (2003: 11,500) **
Publication: <i>Zeitung (NZ)</i>	<i>National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-</i> Circulation: 40,000 **, weekly
* founded 1971 as a registered society; constituted 1987 as political party; 1987 – 1991 DVU Liste D	
** estimated	

The DVU has the largest membership of any right-wing extremist party. Since its founding, it has been led in autocratic fashion by its national chairman, Dr. Gerhard FREY, who also provides most of its funding.²⁹ FREY owns the DSZ – Druckschriften- und Zeitungsverlag GmbH (DSZ-Verlag) publishing house and is chief editor of the weekly *NZ*, which has the largest circulation of any right-wing extremist publication in Germany.

²⁹ For example, FREY largely covered the DVU's deficit dating from 1989. With support from the NPD, the party had hoped to win seats in the European Parliament and ran in the elections under the name "DVU – Liste D", ending up with an enormous deficit. FREY stated that he had spent about €9.2 million on numerous spectacular campaign events. Winning 1.6% of the vote, however, the DVU was entitled to only €1.89 million in public funds to reimburse campaign expenses. Since then, the party has been unable to pay off its debt.

2.1 Goals and methods

The party's anti-constitutional orientation rests on a hyper-nationalism in which German interests are absolute. This feeds into xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Americanism and a comprehensive revisionism. The party condemns all foreigners and Jews, who are mainly portrayed in negative stereotypes as anti-German.

There is no official party newspaper, but due to FREY's unlimited authority, the *NZ* can be regarded as the party's press organ, which reflects its programme. Like the DVU and DSZ-Verlag websites, this "free and nationalist" newspaper prefers to focus on political issues and events which it presents in a biased way – often marked by conspiracy theories – to serve as propaganda for the party's right-wing extremist views. Many *NZ* articles are ultimately advertisements for books published by FREY's presses that are recommended as providing more extensive information on the same topic; these publications are often little more than collections of earlier *NZ* articles.³⁰ Numerous *NZ* articles refer to new editions and books currently in preparation or soon to be published. Apart from political agitation, one of FREY's main interests is intensively advertising his publishing business to maximise revenue and profits.

NZ devotes a great deal of space to the subject of "foreigners in Germany". Another focus is biased articles intended to minimise the wrongs committed during the National Socialist era. Further, the newspaper encourages animosity towards Jews and attacks the rule of law, the democratic state and its representatives.

The authors are not interested in presenting issues as part of a democratic debate, but in stereotyping and denigration, as is obvious from the large number and constant repetition of such articles.

Xenophobia

The DVU's xenophobic attitudes are apparent in the *NZ*'s biased and stereotypical reporting on foreigners, crime by foreigners and asylum fraud. The constant repetition of sensational headlines such as "Bands of gypsies send children out to steal",³¹ "How gangs of foreigners are terrorising Germany",³² and "A city defends itself

³⁰ As in the case of the following books: *Helden der Wehrmacht – Unsterbliche deutsche Soldaten* (Heroes of the Wehrmacht: Immortal German soldiers), *Schweinejournalismus? Wenn Medien hetzen, türken und linken* (Dirty journalism? When the media incite, manipulate and con), and *Lexikon der antideutschen Fälschungen – 200 Lügen und populäre Irrtümer von A – Z* (Dictionary of anti-German falsifications: 200 lies and popular misconceptions from A - Z).

³¹ *NZ*, No. 18/2004, p. 7.

³² *NZ*, No. 27/2004, p. 1.

against crime by foreigners – Curfew for asylum-seekers sought”³³ is intended to stamp all foreigners in Germany as criminals. Statistics and original graphics add to the impact of such articles.

NZ articles with dramatic headlines such as “Invasion of welfare fraudsters from Eastern Europe”,³⁴ “Immigration Act – Popular betrayal! Instead of setting limits: Millions more foreigners can come”,³⁵ and “Millions of Turks want to come to Germany – They wait in slums for EU accession”³⁶ are intended to raise fears of mass immigration and “excessive foreign influence” (*Überfremdung*).

In connection with the EU’s eastward enlargement, the DVU fans fears that millions of eastern Europeans are moving to Germany. It demands a cap on foreigners, supposedly desired by the “majority of the people”:

“For this, Germany again has to pay billions, and it results in freedom of travel for eastern Europeans. We can thus expect millions more foreigners to storm Germany. Not to mention the entry of Romania and Bulgaria in the near future, with their millions of gypsies. The problems of integrating the foreigners already here are mounting, not least in view of mass unemployment; this is piling even more fuel onto a volatile social situation.”

(Undated flyer “Stop the immigration madness!”)

Intolerance and discrimination are behind the party’s xenophobic agitation. It hopes in this way to limit and undermine the inviolable principles of human dignity and equality as they apply to the foreign-born population.

Anti-Semitism

The party promotes an anti-Semitism typical of right-wing extremists; it is usually expressed implicitly, although sometimes it is quite obvious. In 2004, the NZ was full of headlines and articles containing subtly anti-Semitic content. These suggested that Jews in particular were keeping the German people from putting the Nazi past behind them and thus from gaining equal standing within the international community. These articles asserted that members of the Jewish faith or of Jewish origin were disproportionately represented in politics, the economy and the media; they discredited Jewish organisations, condemned German restitution payments and commented critically on

³³ NZ, No. 35/2004, p. 5.

³⁴ NZ, No. 24/2004, p. 1.

³⁵ NZ, No. 27/2004, p. 4.

³⁶ NZ, No. 1-2/2004, p. 1.

events in Israel and the occupied territories.

The sheer number of articles on this topic with headlines such as “Is Germany becoming a second Israel? Jewish emigration legalised”³⁷ and “The power of 0.12%: Jewish influence on radio and television”³⁸ is intended to suggest the supposedly threatening influence of “anti-German Jews” and a conspiracy directed above all against Germany. Such articles frequently conclude with a recommendation of the anti-Semitic publication *Das Netz – Israels Lobby in Deutschland* (The network: Israel’s lobby in Germany) published by the FZ – Freiheitlicher Buch- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH (FZ-Verlag).³⁹ The FZ-Verlag also offers the book *Jüdische Kriegserklärungen an Deutschland* (Jewish declarations of war on Germany), which takes up and perpetuates the right-wing extremist myth of a massive threat posed by “Jewry”.

Revisionism and relativising the Holocaust

The DVU continued its efforts to relativise the Holocaust, attempting to cast doubt on historical facts about the genocide of European Jews by mixing them with accusations of falsifications and long-refuted assertions presented as current information. In this context, Germany is repeatedly described as a victim. In articles about the “Holocaust memorial day” on 27 January, with headlines such as “Holocaust Day at the big house: Hitler, dead almost 60 years but more ‘present’ than ever” and “No memorial and no memorial day: To this day, the Germans are still second-class victims”,⁴⁰ discussing the Holocaust is secondary; the first priority is accusations about the number of victims.

In numerous articles, the NZ continued to criticise the planning and building of Holocaust memorials, which it regards as negative symbols of a supposedly one-sided process of coming to terms with the past. Articles with headlines such as “In Munich alone, 208 memorials to Nazi victims in Munich – ‘Shirkers’ Alley’ renamed ‘Square of the Victims of National Socialism’ ”⁴¹ and “Right down to the persecuted garden gnomes: A wreath of NS memorial sites in Berlin”⁴² criticised the number of existing memorials.

³⁷ NZ, No. 36/2004, p. 4.

³⁸ NZ, No. 27/2004, p. 11.

³⁹ The press is run by FREY’s wife.

⁴⁰ NZ, No. 7/2004, p. 8.

⁴¹ NZ, No. 1-2/2004, p. 1.

⁴² NZ, No. 7/2004, p. 2.

**Relativising other
Nazi crimes**

The weekly newspaper repeatedly relativises other Nazi crimes in order to present the 'Third Reich' in a more favourable light. For example, the *NZ* lists atrocities committed by other groups, from antiquity to the present, in a global catalogue of wrongs. Further, the crimes committed in Nazi Germany are trivialised in historically false reinterpretations or even questioned.

"The most serious falsehoods against Germany ... Did 238,000 people really die in Dachau? Also in the case of the horrific concentration camp injustice of Dachau, a lot of suffering has been caused by propaganda. As if it were not horrible enough that in fact nearly 30,000 people died in the NS camp, the number of victims has been inflated to as much as 238,000. ... After the arrival of American troops, US troops also committed frightful crimes in Dachau: Camp guards were shot at will ... and in nearby Webling, members of the Waffen SS were massacred ... there was also torture and show trials of Germans, with numerous deplorable legal violations."
(*NZ*, No. 39/2004, p. 12)

An article entitled "Was the lieutenant really a murderer? Journalistic tricks send ageing Wehrmacht officer to court" dealt with shootings carried out by SS members in Cumiana, Italy, during World War II. The article concludes with a reference to the current situation in Iraq:

"It's good to know that German soldiers have nothing to do with the current bloodbaths in Iraq. Unfortunately, Italy is right in the middle of it. We hope Italians will not have to dedicate memorials to the victims of Baghdad, Basra, etc. in their country one day."
(*NZ*, No. 20/2004, p. 2)

The DVU's right-wing extremist orientation is also apparent from its revisionist attitude towards representatives and institutions of the Nazi regime. For example, in an article entitled "The truth now on DVD: Spectacular productions marching to victory", the *NZ* No. 16/2004 advertised the DVD documentaries *Hitler-Deutschland in Farbe* (Hitler's Germany in colour), *Die Geschichte der Hitler-Jugend* (History of the Hitler Youth), *Die großen Feldzüge des Zweiten Weltkrieges* (The great campaigns of World War II), *Weltanschauung und Organisation* (Worldview and organisation) and *Spezialkommandos* (Special commandos). Such media products attempt to correct the supposedly false historical account by presenting the regime's alleged achievements. Numerous publications about well-known Wehrmacht personalities, German military tactics and the National Socialist era in general served the same purpose. One example of this tendency was the nine-part *NZ* series "The 50

most serious falsehoods about Germany: Lies and popular errors about our people”.⁴³

Opposition to principle of democracy

As in previous years, the DVU attacked the rule of law, the democratic state and its representatives in numerous polemic and defamatory *NZ* articles, hoping in this way to damage the reputation of institutions and individuals and weaken citizens’ trust in politics and the values anchored in the Basic Law.

“The German parties, their politicians and most of the managers no longer serve the country nor the people. A system of organised irresponsibility was created for the single purpose of hindering any kind of nationalist policy ...”

(*NZ*, No. 23/2004, p. 10)

“Further, it is an outrage that the Germans are supposedly incapable of deciding existential issues on their own, while ... the people’s representatives consider it legitimate to continually make policy that violates the interests of their own people”.

(*NZ*, No. 11/2004, p. 2)

Continuing agitation against the US

The DVU continued its anti-American agitation with the same intensity as in previous years. The *NZ* in particular expressed rigid anti-Americanism in commentaries on the Iraq war and terrorist attacks. The US was the focus of nearly every issue, with headlines such as “Children still in US prisons”⁴⁴ and “How Bush is deceiving the world: Key Jewish witness revealed”.⁴⁵ Writing about the terrorist attack in Madrid on 11 March, the *NZ* polemicised:

“Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the US has murdered more than 10,000 people, including countless children and defenceless persons ... But the US continues to use lies and hypocrisy to deceive the world.”

(*NZ*, No. 13/2004, p. 2)

In comparisons of the US Army and the German Wehrmacht, the *NZ* repeatedly glorified the latter, asserting that its actions had demonstrated greater morality than those of the US Army today. In doing so, it largely omitted mention of any Wehrmacht crimes.

⁴³ *NZ* No. 31 – 39/2004.

⁴⁴ *NZ*, No. 33/2004, p. 5.

⁴⁵ *NZ*, No. 6/2004, pp. 1-2.

Bruno WETZEL, the DVU's deputy national chairman, wrote an *NZ* commentary entitled "More than one kind of rogue state", which raised the question, directed at the US, as to who the "real rogue" is; he also criticised a statement of the president's on fighting "rogue states":

"According to Bush, there are plenty of 'rogue states' in the world that do not belong to the 'Western community of values', and he is determined to wipe them all out, one after the other. And this from the head of a state founded on the murder of millions of Indians and Negro slaves".

(*NZ*, No. 25/2004, p. 5)

In the same context, the DVU continued its anti-Semitic campaign associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; articles in the *NZ* called Israel's policy on the Palestinians "racist" and "genocide" and accused the US of supporting such policy and mass murder:

"But these people, like most of the others involved in the road map, were apparently insufficiently aware of the Israeli campaign of annihilation that had already been practised against the Palestinians ... And it (Israel) continues its racist policy against the Palestinians even more shamelessly since its friends from overseas have taken over the task of keeping its neighbour Iraq militarily engaged".

(*NZ*, No. 21/2004, p. 7)

"Bush's support for a policy of genocide against the Palestinians, financed by dozens of billions of dollars from American taxpayers, is vehemently opposed by right-minded persons of all races ... The democratic US stands for ... an endless series of mass murders around the globe".

(*NZ*, No. 20/2004, p. 3)

2.2 Organisation and development

Organisation

The DVU is divided into 16 *Land* party associations; due to the undisputed power of national chairman Dr. Gerhard FREY, however, they have no freedom to undertake their own initiatives or independent political work. FREY continued to set the party's ideological positions and goals, oversaw important personnel decisions, including those made by the *Land* party associations, and decided whether to take part in *Land* parliamentary elections. The other members of the national party executive, which has been reduced to only a few persons, play only a minor role. There is an almost complete absence of democracy within the party. FREY's leadership style allows him to keep the party largely closed off from

the influence of the REP and neo-Nazis, and formerly also from the NPD. However, this left the DVU more or less isolated within the right-wing extremist camp. It also made it very difficult for the party to attract young right-wing extremists from other parts of the milieu to make up for age-related membership losses.

DVU activities

In addition to the annual national party conference in Munich, seven *Land* party associations held joint party conferences in three other locations. Along with FREY, who was the main speaker, DVU members of *Land* parliaments and top DVU functionaries also gave speeches. Their presence was intended to demonstrate the success of the DVU's parliamentary and party work. Estimated attendance at the party conferences ranged from 120 to 350 persons.

Participation in elections

After winning seats in the *Land* parliaments of Brandenburg and Bremen and on several local councils, the DVU was able to establish itself along with the NPD as a serious right-wing extremist party. The DVU's material- and cost-intensive campaign style (mass quantities of posters, bulk mailings, etc.) coupled with its large debt load forced FREY to base decisions about which elections to enter on cost-benefit analysis. Thus he is prepared to invest large amounts in a campaign only if he anticipates winning enough of the vote to guarantee at least some direct financial returns (through public matching funds) and some indirect returns (through increased sales of his publications due to greater publicity). On 23 June, the party executives of the NPD and DVU agreed, in view of "increasing foreign influence and social impoverishment of the Germans, not to run against each other in the *Land* parliamentary elections in Brandenburg and Saxony on 19 September". As a result, the DVU ran only in Brandenburg and the NPD ran only in Saxony. The DVU's programme for the 2004 elections in Brandenburg attempted to reach out to voters beyond the right-wing extremist camp by campaigning on the issues of mass unemployment, social justice, excessive foreign influence and crime. Campaign posters bore the familiar DVU slogans: "Fed up?", "Criminal foreigners out" and "German jobs for Germans first". Given the rising criticism of the Federal Government's social reforms, the DVU added the supposed dismantling of the welfare state to its list of campaign issues with posters bearing the slogan "Hartz IV – It's a scandal. Fight back! Vote DVU!" It also used television and radio ads that were also put on the Internet. In one ad, the DVU attempted to capitalise on the efforts of SPD politician Regine Hildebrandt, who died in 2001. After the Potsdam regional court issued a temporary injunction, the DVU was no longer allowed to use Hildebrandt's image in its television ad. Winning 71,000 votes, or 6.1% of the second votes (1999: 5.28%), the

DVU gained six seats in the Brandenburg parliament.

**DVU representatives
in the Brandenburg
parliament**

In response to the poor image of earlier DVU parliamentary groups in various *Land* parliaments, the five-person (six since September) parliamentary group in the Brandenburg parliament has gone to great lengths to present itself in a serious light. The group regularly produced a publication available in print and on the group's own website, which also featured photos and video clips of some of the representatives. Selected legislative proposals drafted by the DVU parliamentary group were also posted on the Internet.

**Alliances and
cooperation**

FREY's political biography and thus also the development of the DVU are strongly marked by changing alliances and cooperation with right-wing extremists and right-wing extremist organisations (also those abroad). Although the DVU had always tried to use the NPD for its own ends, before the run-up to the parliamentary elections in Saxony and Brandenburg on 19 September the DVU viewed the NPD mainly as an opponent. At the NPD's suggestion, however, the two parties agreed not to run against each other in Saxony and Brandenburg. On 22 September, apparently encouraged by both parties' election results, DVU chairman FREY and NPD chairman VOIGT agreed further "that both parties would work together for the long term with the aim of having one national list for *Land*, national and European parliamentary elections" (see also 1.2, above).

3. Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans)

Founded:	1983
Headquarters:	Berlin
National chairman:	Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER
Membership:	7,500 (2003: 8,000)
Publication:	<i>Zeit für Protest!</i> (Time for protest) (formerly <i>DER REPUBLIKANER</i>) Circulation: 10,000, every two months
Subsidiary organisations:	Republikanische Jugend (RJ, Republican Youth), Republikanischer Bund der öffentlich Bediensteten (RepBB, Republican Union of Public-Sector Workers), Republikanischer Bund der Frauen (RBF, Republican Women's Union), Republikanischer Hochschulverband (RHV, Republican Higher Education Association)

3.1 Objectives

Again in 2004, there were concrete indications that the REP was pursuing right-wing extremist activities. As in the past, influential groups and REP functionaries continue to make no secret of their opposition to the free and democratic order. Nor do the efforts of party chairman Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER to lend the party a democratic facade manage to hide this. Party pronouncements are not limited to criticism of the current social or political situation in the Federal Republic of Germany; they attack the core principles of our Constitution. This finds varying degrees of expression in xenophobia, revisionism and attacks on the principle of democracy as well as collaboration with right-wing extremists. Not every member of the party pursues anti-constitutional aims, however.

Violation of human rights specified in the Basic Law

The REP's xenophobic activities, which violate the constitutional principles of equality and human dignity, are carried out largely on the premise that the German people are threatened with destruction. The REP's activities include sowing discord based on envy, fanning fears of an excessive number of foreigners, and condemning foreigners in general, accusing them of causing social problems and conflicts.

For example, in an article in their bimonthly publication, the name of which was changed in 2004 from *DER REPUBLIKANER* to *Zeit für Protest!*, the REP linked immigration to the "plundering of our social insurance funds":

"And why don't the health insurance funds reveal how many additional millions are going towards the costs of immigration? In this country, talking about the plundering of our social insurance funds is taboo; in eastern Europe and the Middle East, it is a promise."

(*Zeit für Protest!* No. 1-2/2004, p. 1)

In another article in the same issue, which was devoted to the future of the social insurance system, party chairman SCHLIERER wrote:⁴⁶

"Immigration to the blessings of social insurance is leading to the plundering of the social insurance funds."

On the website of the Berlin *Land* party association in September, a REP functionary wrote on the topic "The labour market disaster":

"The dilemma is great. Unlimited immigration, EU eastward enlargement and mediocre schooling have disastrous consequences. ... Ethnic conflicts due to a policy of multi-culturalism and the creation of sub-cultures lead to a rise in crime – reducing the area's attractiveness for business. ... The welfare state is being systematically bled dry by immigration (Green Card joke) and asylum policy. And the Germans end up paying for it, either with new reform taxes or with their jobs."

In an article in the March/April issue of *Zeit für Protest!* entitled "A minority in our own country," editor-in-chief Gerhard TEMPEL referred to "uncontrolled immigration" and the "organised mass crime" associated with it:

"In the meantime, everyone can see that first of all, integration is a failure and that the unmanageable multi-cultural situation has presented us with some problems that have gotten fully out of control."

⁴⁶ *Zeit für Protest!* No. 1-2/2004, p. 11.

These include the education disaster, organised mass crime, the wrecked social insurance system, the sense of being a stranger in one's own country."

On 26 May, the national party office put out a press release on the compromise reached between the Federal Government and the opposition on the Immigration Act. In the press release, which bore the heading "Republikaner: Immigration is destroying our country", SCHLIERER stated that the Federal Government and the parties represented in the Bundestag were harming Germany and its future through a completely misguided immigration policy that was doomed to fail. This would lead to a culture war as a latent civil war, he said, which was being played down as a social conflict:

"We are getting a multi-conflict society that is destroying our free and democratic order."

On the website of the REP Berlin *Land* association, deputy national chairman Björn CLEMENS in June wrote an article entitled "Black clothing – white skin" defaming foreigners, which he described as "matrons, veiled to below their armpits, who shove their way through our cities", an "Albanian with an absolutely honest face", and a "non-European extended family, which with the first ray of sunshine descends in hordes upon the city park to cook its ritually butchered meat on a stinking grill".

The REP's xenophobic attitudes are also apparent from its opposition to Turkey's possible entry into the EU. For example, the REP association for the Berlin districts of Pankow, Prenzlauer Berg and Weissensee gave a flyer the title "When five million Turks arrive". Its answer to the rhetorical question "what will the Turks bring?" was as follows:

"National-religious parallel societies and headscarf-wearing women who produce lots of children, as if the earth didn't already have a problem with overpopulation."

On the back of the flyer was a cartoon showing Chancellor Schröder holding a sign saying "Germany needs KEBAB!" The caption was "Gerhard the Turk makes policy."

The July/August issue of the party publication contained the statement:

"Vienna was yesterday – today the Islamic conquerors have their sights set on Berlin. Ten new mosques are supposed to be built in Berlin in the next few years. Not at all humble houses of prayer, as

would be appropriate for guests in a foreign country, but proud, showy palaces that are to be scattered across the entire capital in a strategic network, like beacons of conquest. In this case, the often-invoked freedom of religion is only a pretext.”

Defamation of the democratic rule of law

By attacking the democratic state under the rule of law and its institutions and representatives in a targeted and defamatory manner, the REP hopes to weaken the public’s trust in its ability to function and thereby in the value system anchored in the Basic Law. To do so, the REP typically disparages the “established political parties” as a whole, i.e. ultimately disparaging the multi-party system.

Referring to the founding of a REP district youth association in Bad Dürkheim, the district party chairman stated in a Republikanische Jugend (Republican Youth) press release dated 18 January:

“The political landscape needs far more young people whose ideals, moral values and hopes have not yet been destroyed by the old parties’ daily dealings with corruption, greed and obsession with power.”

A press release by the Herne REP association published on the Internet on 25 November criticised the “anti-German policy” of the North-Rhine/Westphalia *Land* government, saying that the governing coalition of Social Democrats and Greens had shown their true natures as “multi-cultural extremists”. Whoever robs one’s own people, at the same time spending more money on foreigners should not be surprised to be called a “multi-cultural extremist” in future, the press release stated. It went on to say that these politicians had forgotten their oath of office, in which they swore to preserve the German people from harm. One couldn’t help getting the impression, the press release said, that “perjured traitors” were at work, doing the opposite of what their oath required.

Revisionism

The party continued to question the existing German borders and demand changes to them.

For example, referring to Poland’s demands for reparations, SCHLIERER stated:

“Poland grabbed German lands already after World War I. ... Its occupation of Silesia after World War II constitutes an unacceptable land-grab which violates international law, nor is it legitimated by the 2+4 Treaty. Land-grabbers are not entitled to reparations.”⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Press release No. 39/04 of the REP national office, dated 13 September 2004.

3.2 Organisation and development

Continued decline in membership In 2004, the REP saw its membership decline to about 7,500 (2003: 8,000; 2002: 9,000). As in previous years, the party kept a low public profile apart from its election campaigning. Only about 200 persons took part in the annual Ash Wednesday meeting on 25 February in Geisenhausen, Bavaria (2003: about 600).

Continuing decline Although the REP won the most votes of any in the “nationalist camp” both in the European and Thuringian parliamentary elections, ending its election defeats of recent years, the party’s decline continued against the backdrop of internal conflict over national chairman SCHLIERER’s policy of distancing the REP from other right-wing extremist organisations. These disputes flared up again as a result of the NPD’s and DVU’s success in the 2004 elections. The attempt by the national party leadership to gain general party support for more moderate positions resulted in apathy and inactivity especially at grass-roots level, leading to a further decline in membership.

During the run-up to the local elections in Saxony on 13 June, the long-simmering conflict over the party’s direction again escalated between the Saxony *Land* association and the national party executive. According to a press release, the REP national executive distanced itself from the Nationale Bündnis Dresden (NB, Dresden Nationalist Alliance), founded on 24 April 2003 with significant participation from the NPD.⁴⁸ Both Kerstin LORENZ, chair of the REP organisation in Saxony who advocated the NB, and her deputy Harry BAAR, who campaigned for the NB, are the subject of proceedings to eject them from the party, the press release stated. REP deputy national chair Uschi WINKELSETT called the NB an “undercover NPD organisation”.

As a result of increasing conflict with the national party leadership, on 14 July LORENZ withdrew the REP’s list of candidates for the *Land* parliamentary elections on 19 September; the official explanation was that not enough supporting signatures had been collected. In fact, leading activists in the Saxony *Land* association had spoken out against the REP taking part in the election in order to improve the NPD’s chances. In an article published on the Nationales Forum website,⁴⁹ LORENZ stated:

⁴⁸ See the *Sächsische Zeitung online* newspaper of 9 June 2004.

⁴⁹ See the Nationales Forum website. The Nationales Forum (Nationalist forum), a “non-partisan forum”, was launched on the Internet on 1 July 2003 after the REP party executive shut down the REP Saxony forum. According to the editorial information, the site is run by an NPD member in Saxony. The site also posts articles by members of other right-wing extremist parties.

“In any case, I’m glad I foiled the plans of those who only wanted to fight the NPD and keep them from getting into the *Land* parliament! In my view, the REP has not been a true right-wing party for a long time and is increasingly turning into an accomplice of the established parties!”

On 18 September, the NPD in Saxony announced on its website that LORENZ had joined that party. According to the announcement, LORENZ explained that she no longer wished to sit by and watch the REP leadership fight the nationalist opposition in Saxony.

Despite growing criticism from within the party ranks, the REP national leadership adhered to its policy of distancing itself from other right-wing extremist groups, especially the NPD. In an article entitled “No brown popular front” which was posted on the website of the REP national executive, national party chairman SCHLIERER wrote that the REP opposed the NPD’s plans to form a “brown popular front” with the help of neo-Nazi *Kameradschaften*. SCHLIERER explained that for the REP, there was no question of a so-called “united right wing”, as “NPD and DVU on the one hand and REP, DSU and DP on the other ... [are] incompatible”.

Contradictory press releases from the REP and DP regarding cooperation between the two parties created confusion. A REP press release of 1 November created the impression that a joint declaration by the REP, DP and DSU, known as the Frankfurt Declaration, was de facto already in effect, whereas DP national party chairman Dr. KAPPEL was quoted on 2 November as saying that the chairs of the three parties had agreed to first seek approval from their parties’ governing bodies.⁵⁰

The question of cooperation with the REP set off a power struggle within the DP. Whereas Dr. KAPPEL spoke out in favour of such cooperation, the DP’s national party executive rejected the Frankfurt Declaration in a majority vote on 21 November, according to information published on the Internet. The DP national spokesman said that an alliance at that time would only lead to further division within the “free and patriotic structure of the political parties”.⁵¹

National party conference reinforces party

The REP national party conference including elections for party leadership positions was held in Veitshöchheim, near Würzburg, Bavaria on 27-28 November. According to an Internet press release

⁵⁰ Press release of the DP national party chairman dated 2 November 2004.

⁵¹ Press release of the DP national party spokesman dated 21 November 2004.

**leadership's
opposition to
"popular front"**

dated 28 November, Dr. Rolf SCHLIERER was re-elected as national party chairman with 145 out of 249 votes. His opponent, Björn CLEMENS, deputy national party chairman and deputy chairman of the North-Rhine/Westphalian REP party organisation, received 99 votes. The press release also stated that, by a large majority, the REP had passed a resolution affirming its allegiance to the free and democratic order and to parliamentary democracy, refusing to participate in a "right-wing popular front" and categorically rejecting cooperation with parties that wish to do away with "our state or the free and democratic order". The resolution expressly excluded joint activities and candidates with the "NPD or neo-National Socialist organisations and those associated with them", the press release said.

Following his re-election, SCHLIERER was able to gain support for his policy of opposing the "popular front". However, his relatively poor showing and the large number of votes for his opponent clearly demonstrate that there is still significant resistance within the party to the leadership's 'go-it-alone' policy.

**Cooperation with
other right-wing
extremists**

Despite this policy, which is strictly maintained in the party's external relations, the lack of sanctions against those within the party who advocate cooperation with other right-wing extremist parties is evidence of the REP's ambivalence on this issue.

- In Chemnitz, an electoral coalition using the REP name campaigned ahead of the local elections in Saxony on 13 June with an NPD candidate; the deputy *Land* party chairman responsible for the coalition did not face any sanctions from the REP.
- In Düsseldorf, DVU candidates campaigned on a REP list (together with REP deputy national chairman Björn CLEMENS, among others) for the local elections in North-Rhine/Westphalia on 26 September without any known reaction from party leaders.
- A statement from the REP association of Berlin published on the right-wing extremist Stoertebeker-Netz website on 16 August recommended that all members and interested persons vote for the DVU in the upcoming parliamentary elections in Brandenburg; it was important, the statement said, to support the DVU, the only right-wing party represented in the Brandenburg parliament.
- In an interview with the NPD party publication *Deutsche Stimme*, Kerstin LORENZ, former chair of the REP organisation in Saxony, said in August that the REP enforced its decisions on isolation from

other parties as it saw fit; it was impossible to say in advance who would face sanctions.

Additional examples demonstrate the lack of distance between numerous REP members/functionaries and other right-wing extremists:

- Then-deputy chairman of the Berlin REP organisation Dr. Konrad VOIGT declared at an “inter-party discussion evening” on 13 February (attended by several leading NPD functionaries, including NPD national party chairman Udo VOIGT) that he found it “an impressive experience to be able to hold such a meeting with German patriots from different partisan backgrounds. It is possible to believe again in the political resurrection of the German people”, he said.⁵² The Dresden Nationalist Alliance hosted the discussion evening, which followed a demonstration by the Junge Landsmannschaft Ostpreussen (Young *Landsmannschaft* of East Prussia).
- In its February issue, the NPD party publication *Deutsche Stimme* reported in an article entitled “Successful resistance against Islamification” about the “Augsburg Alliance – National Opposition”, an “alliance between members of the NPD, DVU, REP, DP and unaffiliated forces” that had opposed construction of a mosque in Augsburg.
- According to an NPD Internet report, on 19 June numerous activists from the NPD, JN, REP and unaffiliated nationalists gathered near a US consulate to direct attention “to the numerous war crimes and hypocrisy of the ‘Western community of values’ ”.
- According to the NPD national party manager and chairman of the Thuringia party association, Frank SCHWERDT, the NPD received support from REP followers in the Thuringia parliamentary elections on 13 June.⁵³
- The REP district association of southern Württemberg reported in a press release dated 20 September on the previous day’s multi-party “Lake Constance Day” in which “so-called ‘right-wing parties’” took part, along with the chairman of the REP organisation in Baden-Württemberg, Ulrich DEUTSCHLE, and the party’s former national chairman Franz SCHÖNHUBER.

⁵² *Deutsche Stimme*, No. 3/2004, p. 11.

⁵³ See the Thuringia NPD website regarding the *Land* parliamentary elections in Thuringia on 13 June 2004.

Participation in elections

The REP took part in the European parliamentary elections, the parliamentary elections in Thuringia and in local elections in six *Länder*.

In the European parliamentary elections on 13 June, the REP won 1.9% of the votes, only a small improvement over its results in the last European parliamentary elections in 1999 (1.7%). The party gained its best results in Saxony (3.4%), followed by Baden-Württemberg (2.8%) and Rhineland-Palatinate (2.7%).

In the parliamentary elections in Thuringia, also on 13 June, the REP received significantly more votes than in the last parliamentary elections there on 12 September 1999: 2.0% of the vote, compared to 0.8% in 1999.

The REP received varying results in the local elections. In 2004, its decline in the local elections in Baden-Württemberg continued. On 13 June, the party gained only 40 seats in the entire *Land* (1999: 59 seats). In Saxony-Anhalt (2 seats, as in 1999) and in Thuringia (no seats, as in 1999), the REP remained at the same low level.

It was more successful in local elections in Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony and North-Rhine/Westphalia. In Rhineland-Palatinate on 13 June, the REP won a total of 51 seats on district, city and local councils (1999: 25 seats) and in Saxony it gained a total of seven seats on one city council and two local councils (1999: two seats). In the local elections in North-Rhine/Westphalia on 26 September, the party significantly improved its results over 1999, gaining a total of 29 seats (1999: 17).

REP on the Internet

In late 2004, about 110 REP websites were found, including those of the national, *Land*, district and local REP associations, party functionaries and representatives in local and district governments (2003: 120). The website of the national party association contains current news, press releases and the party programme, among other things (for more on right-wing extremism on the Internet, see Section IX, 3).

VI. Efforts to foster intellectual right-wing extremism

Like any politically motivated movement, the extreme right wing also needs an ideology on which to base its alternatives to the existing system. But both efforts initiated in the early 1980s to achieve “cultural hegemony” and attempts to co-opt important issues in the public discourse have failed to provide the desired results. Not least due to the lack of capable political actors, the tendency noted in recent years to neglect intellectual programmatic efforts continued in 2004. The inability of individuals such as Horst MAHLER and Dr. Reinhold OBERLERCHER to find adherents for their increasingly confused theories also contributed to the failure of attempts to make right-wing extremism more intellectual.

NPD gives other strategic aims priority over “battle for the minds”

Again in 2004, the NPD was unable to successfully implement its strategy for raising the party’s intellectual standards and influencing public opinion. The “battle for the minds” lost priority to the “battle for the parliaments” and the “battle for the streets”. The “National-Democratic Training Centre” on the grounds of the NPD’s national office in Berlin did not yet start operating. In 2004, the party publication *Deutsche Stimme* contained significantly fewer strategic-ideological articles than in previous years. In his speech at the national party conference in Leinefelde, Thuringia, on 30-31 October, national party chairman Udo VOIGT noted that the “battle for the streets” and the “battle for the parliaments” had been more successful so far than the “battle for the minds”. The party can win the support of “true elites” only if it succeeds in “overcoming predetermined ways of thinking and avoiding the effective penalisation through PC (political correctness)”, he said. Right-wing extremist journalist Jürgen SCHWAB, one of the most important figures in the NPD’s efforts to increase its intellectual appeal, wrote an article published on the Internet in which he criticised the NPD for failing to realise that “politics without theory” amounted to “mindless phrasemongering”. But since its electoral successes in Saxony, SCHWAB went on, the NPD party executive has “flattened” everything “that could have helped with theory and educational efforts”.

- Deutsches Kolleg** Led mainly by Dr. Reinhold OBERLERCHER, Horst MAHLER and Uwe MEENEN, the Deutsches Kolleg (DK, German seminar) sees its chief task as training a “nationalist intelligentsia”. In 2004, however, legal proceedings brought against the three activists in the Berlin regional court on joint charges of incitement limited their activities. On 7 December, OBERLERCHER and MEENEN were each fined;⁵⁴ proceedings against MAHLER had already been discontinued on 20 September in accordance with Section 154 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO). But separate proceedings against MAHLER alone on charges of incitement continued in the same court.⁵⁵ MAHLER in particular exploited the proceedings as a public forum for his revisionist and anti-Semitic remarks (with which his co-defendants did not always agree).⁵⁶ MAHLER’s performance and the apparent disagreement between him and OBERLERCHER on how to conduct their defence seems to have divided the two men. In October, OBERLERCHER led a DK training course without MAHLER for the first time in years; for his part, MAHLER conducted seminars at the right-wing extremist Collegium Humanum e.V. (Humanist seminar, reg’d society) in Vlotho, North-Rhine/Westphalia starting in early 2004. The DK’s influence on the right-wing extremist scene remained limited, as the seminars and lectures focused on highly theoretical and sometimes far-fetched topics that were difficult to follow.
- Deutsche Akademie** Nor has the Deutsche Akademie (German academy), which operates in part within the NPD milieu, lived up to its aim of forming an “oppositional intellectual elite”. The Deutsche Akademie, which sees itself as an inter-organisational institution, says on its website that its goal is to create “an intellectual alternative to the liberal-capitalist system of vassalage on German soil”; such an alternative system must have priority, the website states, or else every kind of political effort will remain “amateurish and incomplete”. With its demand that ideology should take priority over action and political aims, the Deutsche Akademie apparently ran into conflict with the NPD’s priorities; the NPD scheduled a demonstration in Frankfurt on 3 April, the same day that Jürgen SCHWAB was to lead the seminar “Violence – Crime – Morality”.

⁵⁴ The court’s decisions are not yet final.

⁵⁵ On 12 January 2005, the Berlin regional court sentenced MAHLER to 9 months in prison without possibility of remission. The judgement is not yet final.

⁵⁶ Due to MAHLER’s revisionist and anti-Semitic incitement before the court, the Berlin public prosecutor filed new charges of incitement against MAHLER. This trial is still under way.

Published in Berlin, the weekly newspaper *Junge Freiheit* (*JF*, Young freedom) continues to offer a forum for right-wing extremist authors although the newspaper itself is not a focus of observation by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. For example, the chief ideologue of the French “New Right”, Alain DE BENOIST, wrote an article entitled “Freedom needs community” in which he criticised the “remarkable feebleness” of the concept of the individual and denigrated the simple “rhetoric of human rights”.⁵⁷ Questioning the significance of human rights as the basic value of a constitutional state, he went on: “The individual as such” could “not be an authentic legal subject”, as rights could only be “associated [with] membership in a political whole”. The article also argued that the power of the “political authorities” was subject to limits, “not because individuals [had] unlimited rights by nature”, but because of the “obligation of the political authorities to respect the freedom of members of society”.

In their articles, the editorial staff and regular contributors sometimes use standard right-wing extremist arguments and write favourable commentaries on right-wing extremist figures, organisations and publications. The *JF* also seems to place special emphasis on relativising German responsibility for World War II. For example, a regular contributor wrote in an article that “Germany’s aggressive foreign policy” was simply “one of several reasons for the outbreak of World War II”.⁵⁸ The author also criticised the fact that Germany’s “security requirements and striving for power” at the time had been regarded as illegitimate from the very beginning. The article also argued that Hitler was sometimes misrepresented. For example, the author wrote, Hitler initially – in the 1920s – rejected uniting Europe by force, on the grounds that it would lead to “mixing of the races”. Instead, he advocated a “Europe of free and independent nation-states”, the article claimed.

The weekly newspaper also regularly published advertisements of right-wing extremist organisations.

⁵⁷ *Junge Freiheit*, No. 5/2004, p. 15.

⁵⁸ “Die vereinte Entfesselung – Deutschlands aggressive Außenpolitik war einer von mehreren wesentlichen Gründen für den Ausbruch des Zweiten Weltkrieges” (A common unleashing: Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was one of several key reasons for the outbreak of World War II), *Junge Freiheit* No. 3/2004, p. 16.

VII. Anti-Semitism

In 2004, anti-Semitic activity in all areas of right-wing extremism remained virulent. However, the tendency to favour insinuation over direct expression continued. Apparently as a result of increased vigilance by the prosecuting authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany and of the general social consensus condemning anti-Semitism, right-wing extremists now openly express their antagonism towards Jews almost exclusively in media produced outside Germany.

- Anti-Semitic criminal offences** In 2004, 100 incidents of vandalism of Jewish cemeteries, synagogues and memorials were reported, compared to 113 in 2003.⁵⁹ There were 37 violent offences motivated by anti-Semitism, up from 35 in 2003, and the total number of offences motivated by anti-Semitism was also up, to 1,316 in 2004 compared to 1,199 in 2003.
- Definition of the term** In right-wing extremist discourse, anti-Semitism based on religion is almost completely insignificant; racist, social and political grounds play a larger role. For example, right-wing extremists increasingly take advantage of mainstream political and social criticism of individual policy decisions by Israel in order to make blanket denunciations and question Israel's right to exist. Their fundamental rejection of Israel is not derived from political considerations relating to the Middle East conflict, but is based instead on their fundamental rejection of Jews. Aside from this "anti-Zionist" variety, right-wing extremists also subscribe to "secondary anti-Semitism", which accuses Jews of exploiting Germany's responsibility for the Holocaust to blackmail Germans into accepting their financial and political demands. Finally, all forms of anti-Semitism attribute negative characteristics to Jews in general in an attempt to "justify" isolating them, discriminating against them, persecuting them and even murdering them.⁶⁰
- Open anti-Semitism** Skinheads in particular are responsible for direct attacks on Jews; skinhead bands use their music to spread extremely aggressive and offensive texts. On its CD *Geheime Reichssache* (Reich secret file), which was produced in the US and marketed from there to Germans, the skinhead band Kommando Freisler openly calls for the murder of

⁵⁹ In case of discrepancies between earlier statistics, these figures are based on more recent information.

⁶⁰ For definitions and descriptions of the various forms of anti-Semitism, see Armin Pfahl-Traughber, *Antisemitismus in der deutschen Geschichte* (Anti-Semitism in German history), Opladen 2002.

Jews.⁶¹ The song *Judenschwein* (Jew swine) contains the following lyrics:

“With ears as big as sails, yeah, that nose on your face, your oversized skull covered with a hat, Jew no one can fail to recognise you. You better run when the brownshirts go through the streets. Because in Germany, every child knows that Jews are only for burning. The oil supplies will soon run out, then it’ll get cold inside. But listen carefully people, Jews are as plentiful as grains of sand on the beach.”

The lyrics were written to the melodies of popular songs. A song with the same title as the German pop tune *Im Wagen vor mir* (In the car ahead of me) contains the threat:

“But one day we will kill all the pigs. They’ve earned it, it would only be fair ... Shoot them and hang them and then burn all of them, and not only here, also in other countries. And when the world has no more Jews, our Germany will finally be free again.”

The skinhead band Volkszorn (The people’s wrath) refers directly to the anti-Semitic propaganda of the “Third Reich” to incite hatred of Jews. The title song on its CD *Der ewige Jude* (The eternal Jew) contains the lyrics:⁶²

“The eternal Jew, he is still here. The eternal Jew, the global threat. He poisons and pays the whole wide world. The Jew must die or our days are numbered.”

Implicit anti-Semitism

These skinhead bands believe themselves to be safe from prosecution by producing and marketing their CDs abroad. In their German publications, right-wing extremists rely almost entirely on insinuations that are not directly punishable by law. Yet the main thrust is almost always clear, making this a suitable way to reinforce latent anti-Semitic attitudes both in right-wing extremist readers and in others. Right-wing extremists frequently point to the actual or supposed Jewish background of prominent figures in public life, both currently and in the past, although it has no bearing on their position. This is supposed to create the impression that every Jew is part of a conspiracy directed against Germany and the world. On the 35th

⁶¹ The name “Kommando Freisler” refers to Roland Freisler, president of the Nazi Volksgerichtshof (people's court). The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (Federal Gazette No. 163 of 31 August 2004).

⁶² The Federal Board for the Review of Media Harmful to Young Persons (BPjM) has placed this CD on its restricted list (Federal Gazette No. 185 of 30 September 2004).

anniversary of the death of Theodor W. Adorno, the philosopher, sociologist and co-founder of the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt, Jürgen GANSEL, a member of the NPD party executive, wrote in the party organ *Deutsche Stimme* (German voice):

“In 1903, Theodor Wiesengrund was born to a Jewish wine merchant ... Together with Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse and Friedrich Pollock, all of them sons of rich Jewish fathers ... these cooks stirred up a dish that was anything but kosher: a poisonous mess to corrode the internal organs and the mind of the collective German body.”
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2004, p. 16)

GANSEL’s comments on the institute’s exile during the Nazi dictatorship can also be read as justifying the persecution of the Jews in the “Third Reich”:

“Anyone who like Adorno and his helpers ... has made it his aim to destroy the community of race [*Volksgemeinschaft*] which provides identity, stability and cohesiveness should not be surprised when the uprooted individual suddenly becomes a plaything easily manipulated by anonymous power structures.”
(*Deutsche Stimme*, No. 8/2004, p. 16)

Anti-Semitic conspiracy theories

Right-wing extremists regularly accuse Jews of having plotted for centuries to control the world. For years, myths about a secret “master plan” have been a key element of the right-wing extremist discourse. As in previous years, attorney Horst MAHLER, repeatedly convicted of politically motivated offences, in 2004 again openly attacked Jews.⁶³ In his attacks, he invokes the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy which invented the Holocaust to oppress Germany above all:

“The German Reich’s path to arrogance [sic] requires overthrowing the Jewish occupation. The Jewish occupation will fall when the Auschwitz lie is unmasked.”⁶⁴

During his trial at the Berlin regional court on charges of incitement, MAHLER sought to justify the annihilation of the Jews using a crude mixture of religious and racist elements.⁶⁵

⁶³ On 8 April 2004, the Berlin-Tiergarten local court temporarily prohibited Horst MAHLER from practising law on the grounds of incitement, among other things (see also Section VI, “Deutsches Kolleg”).

⁶⁴ Horst MAHLER, *Das Ende der moralischen Geschichtsbetrachtung führt zur Antwort auf die Judenfrage. Einlassung zur Anklage wegen Volksverhetzung vor der 22. Großen Strafkammer des Landgerichts Berlin* (The end of the moral observation of history leads to the answer to the Jewish question: Statement in response to charges of incitement at the Berlin regional court) (see also Section VI, “Deutsches Kolleg”).

⁶⁵ See also Section VI, “Deutsches Kolleg”.

“If the Jews continue as slaves of Satan to destroy the world, they will be wiped out like the Indians and the blacks in Australia ... Like the annihilation of the Indians, the annihilation of the Jews would be an act of God and thus not a crime.”⁶⁶

But insinuations are usually enough to keep alive the image of a world conspiracy led by Jews. For example, an article in the weekly *National-Zeitung/Deutsche Wochen-Zeitung* (NZ, National newspaper/German weekly) alleging that both US presidential candidates were obligated to “the Zionist lobby” bore the headline “Bush and Kerry in same secret alliance!”⁶⁷ In the journal *Deutsche Geschichte* (German history), the headlines “Who really governs America” and “The influence of the Israel lobby” are placed one directly above the other.⁶⁸ The brief summary at the head of the article stated:

“Who governs America? The Jewish lobby in the US. It is the most powerful lobby in the United States. When it puckers its lips, the White House whistles, and when Ariel Sharon sneezes in Jerusalem, all of Washington catches a cold.”
(*Deutsche Geschichte*, special supplement, September 2004)

This is not meant as criticism of the legitimate efforts of Jewish organisations but rather implies that the US is controlled by Jews.

Anti-Semitism and esoterica

Anti-Semitic arguments have also become acceptable in certain areas of esoterica, which is actually apolitical. At least since the appearance of the two-volume *Geheimgesellschaften und ihre Macht im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert* (Secret societies and their influence in the 20th century) by a right-wing extremist writing under the pseudonym of Jan van HELSING, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories have met with increasing interest among readers of esoterica, who are not typically associated with right-wing extremist thought.⁶⁹ The esotericists usually draw on “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion”, an anti-Semitic forgery dating from the early 20th century which supposedly contains the secret plans of a “world alliance of Freemasons and Learned

⁶⁶ Horst MAHLER, *Das Ende der moralischen Geschichtsbetrachtung führt zur Antwort auf die Judenfrage. Einlassung zur Anklage wegen Volksverhetzung vor der 22. Großen Strafkammer des Landgerichts Berlin* (The end of the moral observation of history leads to the answer to the Jewish question: Statement in response to charges of incitement at the Berlin regional court) (see also Section VI, “Deutsches Kolleg”).

⁶⁷ NZ, No. 42/2004, p. 1.

⁶⁸ *Deutsche Geschichte*, special supplement, September 2004.

⁶⁹ By order of the Mannheim local court, both volumes were confiscated nation-wide effective 18 March 1996. But the Mannheim regional court overturned the order on 9 April 2001.

Elders of Zion” to take over the world.⁷⁰ Van HELSING describes the aims of the alleged conspirators as follows:

“It is the private international bankers! ... the ones who run Wall Street and from Wall Street take over or ruin conglomerates, even whole countries. And precisely these comrades, who have enslaved the world through their system of charging interest, will use an engineered banking collapse (possibly with war or another terrorist attack as a pretext) ... to set the next milestone on the way to their one-world government, the new world order.”⁷¹

Stefan ERDMANN, author of *esoterica*, also cites the “Protocols” as evidence of an alleged conspiracy to create a “new world order”:

“The protocols, the main theses, if you will, have already been implemented in large part – that is beyond doubt!”⁷²

Even if only implied, constant reference to a Jewish-led world conspiracy is also capable of creating antagonism in readers. Thus anti-Semitic *esoterica* acts as a link between right-wing extremists and the largely apolitical esoteric scene. The fact that van HELSING’s books are published in large numbers also reinforces this effect.

Anti-Semitic propaganda within right-wing extremism today is not a new development, neither in terms of its content nor its intensity. As on earlier occasions, current political events are used as an opportunity to articulate anti-Jewish attitudes. Such propaganda primarily targets an audience with latent anti-Semitic attitudes. According to various sociological studies, over the long term up to 20% of the population has such attitudes.⁷³ Whether anti-Semitic propaganda has an effect on such persons, and if so, what kind, has not yet been studied. In any case, it is impossible to prove a causal

⁷⁰ “The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion” is an anti-Semitic forgery created by the Russian Okhrana, or czarist secret police; it was first published in Russia in 1903. Right-wing extremists of all stripes continue to use it today as “proof” of the existence of a world-wide Jewish-Masonic conspiracy (cf. Ernst Piper, “Die jüdische Weltverschwörung” (The Jewish world conspiracy), in Julius H. Schoeps and Joachim Schlör, eds. *Antisemitismus: Vorurteile und Mythen* (Anti-Semitism: Prejudices and myths), Munich and Zurich, 1995).

⁷¹ Jan van HELSING, *Hände weg von diesem Buch!* (Hands off this book), Fichtenau 2004, p. 208.

⁷² Stefan ERDMANN, *Banken, Brot und Bomben* (Banks, bread and bombs), Vol. 1, Fichtenau 2003, p. 277.

⁷³ For a summary of the results of individual studies, see Werner Bergmann, “Wie viele Deutsche sind rechtsextrem, fremdenfeindlich und antisemitisch? Ergebnisse der empirischen Forschung von 1990 to 2000” (How many Germans are right-wing extremist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic? Results of empirical research from 1990 to 2000) in Wolfgang Benz, ed. *Auf dem Weg zum Bürgerkrieg? Rechtsextremismus und Gewalt gegen Fremde in Deutschland* (On the way to civil war? Right-wing extremism and violence against foreigners in Germany), Frankfurt/Main 2001, pp. 41-62.

relationship between the development of anti-Semitic agitation, latent anti-Semitic attitudes and anti-Semitic crimes.

VIII. International connections

For decades, German right-wing extremists have maintained a variety of contacts with like-minded people in other countries. To cement international relations, information-sharing and consultation on joint activities, they participate in meetings in Germany and abroad. However, efforts to build stable international, right-wing extremist umbrella organisations have repeatedly failed due to ideological differences, the instability of many right-wing extremist organisations and the egotism of their leadership.

1. Events with international participation

The following are examples of events with international attendance:

- On 1 May, the NPD and “unaffiliated nationalists” organised a demonstration in the Lichtenberg district of Berlin with the slogan “Save German jobs – fight the dismantling of the social insurance system! No to EU eastward expansion and to Turkey joining the EU!”; police estimated attendance at about 2,300 (2003: about 1,300). This included representatives from “friendly foreign organisations” from the US (National Alliance), Romania (Iron Guard), Spain (La Falange) and Austria (Bund freier Jugend (Alliance of free youth)).
 - On 8 May, the chairman of the Dutch right-wing extremist party Nederlandse Volks Unie (NVU, Dutch People’s Union), Constantijn KUSTERS, spoke at a demonstration to protest the destruction of a World War II monument in Marienfels, Rhineland-Palatinate. Of the approximately 230 demonstrators in attendance, 10 were sympathisers from the Netherlands.
 - According to the NPD, Austrian right-wing extremists including Otto SCRINZI, Gerhoch REISEGGER and Herbert SCHWEIGER as well as Claus NORDBRUCH, a right-wing extremist who lives in South Africa, spoke at the so-called 2nd Freedom Convention of the Deutsche Stimme-Verlag on 21-23 May. The NPD reported that NORDBRUCH’s speech in particular received enthusiastic applause.
 - According to the NPD, representatives from Romania (Iron Guard), Spain (La Falange) and France (Front National) took part in the party’s “Third European Summer University” in Saarbrücken on 23-25 July.
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- On 7 August, the NPD-owned publishing house Deutsche Stimme-Verlag held its annual press festival in Mücka, Saxony. Speakers included Alexander KAMKIN, foreign commissioner of Russia's National-Patriotic Front. According to the NPD, the presence of guests from the US, Canada, Spain, Italy, the UK, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and France “underscored the international significance of the press festival for the nationalist resistance”. Entertainment was provided by the US right-wing extremist skinhead band Youngland, among others.
 - On 21 August, about 3,800 right-wing extremists took part in the central memorial event in Wunsiedel, Bavaria, on the 17th anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess (2003: 2,600). About 20% of those attending had travelled from the UK, Italy, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Russia.
 - The traditional Ulrichsberg memorial ceremony to commemorate soldiers killed in the two world wars was held near Klagenfurt, Austria, on 18-19 September. About 1,000 people attended the ceremony. About 50 right-wing extremists from France, Italy and Austria (2003: 80) including about 30 Germans (2003: 40) met on the margins of the event.
 - The right-wing extremist Arbeitsgemeinschaft für demokratische Politik (AFP, Working group for democratic policy) conducted its 39th Political Academy in Feldkirchen, Austria, on 15-17 October. Among the 70 participants were 10 Germans.
 - A few German right-wing extremists joined the approximately 3,000 Spanish participants at the annual memorial ceremony for General Franco and Falangist leader Primo de Rivera in Valle de Los Caidos, near Madrid, on 20 November. An NPD delegation took part in a political rally organised by the Spanish group La Falange in Madrid the next day.
 - About 1,600 persons (2003: approx. 1,500) took part in a memorial march for Daniel Wretström, who died in 2000 after a fight with a group of foreign youths, held in Stockholm on 11 December, including nearly 100 Germans (2003: 200), among them activists from Hamburg, Rostock and south-western Germany. Stefan ROCHOW, chairman of the NPD youth organisation Junge Nationaldemokraten (JN, Young National-Democrats), spoke, as did representatives of several Swedish organisations.
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2. Right-wing extremist activities within the Europäische Darstellungsverein für Lebendige Geschichte (EDLG, European re-enactment association for living history)

Founded in 1995, the EDLG has its headquarters in Bad Oeynhausen, North-Rhine/Westphalia. The association sees itself as a member of the world-wide re-enactment movement, in which participants re-enact historical battles using uniforms and equipment that are as historically accurate as possible. Such re-enactments, for example re-creating battles from the American Civil War, are increasingly popular also in Germany.

Out of the approximately 80 members of the EDLG, about 25 chose to concentrate on the Waffen SS; during re-enactment exercises, they preferred to portray the 1st company of the 3rd armoured infantry regiment of the division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler". This group was also engaged in activities to disseminate neo-Nazi ideas within and beyond the EDLG. The association's founder, chairman and ideological head of this "right-wing extremist platform" within the EDLG was a neo-Nazi who had previously been convicted of illegal weapons possession.

Because it is against the law in Germany to display uniforms with SS insignia in public, the relevant association members mostly conducted their re-enactments abroad. Through intensive cooperation with German and foreign security authorities, it was possible to determine that some EDLG members were in possession of weapons in violation of the Weapons Act (WaffG) and/or the War Weapons Control Act (KWKG). The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) then asked the responsible public prosecutor's office to authorise an investigation. On 25 November, Federal Criminal Police officers searched the homes of the EDLG chairman and one other member. The officers confiscated a working MP 40 submachine gun, an MG 42 machine gun with two replacement barrels, a functioning bolt assembly for an MG 42 and a PPSH submachine gun with ammunition drum, among other things. Both persons were arrested.

Police questioning turned up further EDLG members suspected of illegal weapons possession. Subsequent searches conducted in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Hamburg and North-Rhine/Westphalia resulted in the confiscation of 65 rounds of live machine gun ammunition, 2.5 kilos of black powder and other weapons in working order prohibited under the Weapons Act and/or War Weapons Control Act.

Police investigations revealed no indications that the neo-Nazi group within the EDLG was pursuing wider aims or was involved in terrorist activity. Further, as the authorities for the protection of the constitution had suspected, the majority of EDLG members distanced themselves from the activities of this “hard-core group” and thus could not be considered right-wing extremists.

3. International revisionism

A variety of organisations and activists are engaged in right-wing extremist revisionism. This includes all attempts to re-interpret history for political reasons. The right-wing extremist scene concentrates its efforts on public opinion regarding the “Third Reich” because the thought of its crimes turns many people off to ideas from the right-wing extremist camp. To overcome this obstacle, various authors try to portray the Nazi state in a positive light. In doing so, they conceal their true motives and attempt to give their activities the appearance of academic research. They claim that, following their unbiased examination of the past, they have arrived at new research results which necessitate a re-evaluation of events.

To do so, they use the following methods, among others:

- Revisionists point to individual achievements of the “Third Reich”, such as autobahn construction, the 1936 Olympic Games or social benefits, without putting these in the overall context of the state policy of oppression.
- They emphasise the suffering of the German population caused by aerial bombing and expulsions during World War II while playing down or failing to mention German wrongdoing.
- They fail to mention documents and statements which contradict their arguments, or claim that they are false.
- They base their assertions on supposedly scientific reports which are in fact the pseudo-scientific work of like-minded persons.

In recent years, internationally coordinated activity by Holocaust deniers has steadily declined. Revisionists were unable to reverse this trend in 2004. In the Federal Republic of Germany, their activities were largely limited due to executive measures taken by law enforcement authorities.

The most active German revisionist is still Germar RUDOLF, who in his 1993 *Rudolf Gutachten* (Rudolf report) claimed that no mass murder took place in the gas chambers of Auschwitz; on the basis of

that and other acts, he was sentenced to prison in 1995. He fled the country before he could be sent to prison, however, and founded Castle Hill Publishers in the United Kingdom to publish revisionist materials. RUDOLF is now in the US and has moved his business headquarters to Chicago. From there he distributes the *Vierteljahreshefte für freie Geschichtsforschung* (Quarterly journal for independent historical research).

His efforts faced a severe setback in August when assets in the amount of €213,927.63 held for him in a bank account in Heidenheim, Baden-Württemberg, were seized at the order of the Mannheim local court in connection with an investigation into the distribution of writings denying the Holocaust. The account was in the name of his German assistant Rudolf GROSSKOPF, who was the subject of investigation. The seized assets were the proceeds of distribution through the Internet by the Belgian revisionist mail order company Vrij Historisch Onderzoek (V.H.O, Free historical research), which sells writings by RUDOLF and other Holocaust deniers.

Led by Belgian revisionist Siegfried VERBEKE, the V.H.O. long sold reprints of revisionist works from the 1950s and 1960s as well as books that had been confiscated or placed on restricted lists in Germany. In recent years, the V.H.O.'s activities were increasingly restricted due to financial difficulties and disorganisation as well as to action taken by the Belgian authorities.

VERBEKE was arrested in Belgium on 26 November on a warrant that had been issued by the Mannheim local court on 14 July against him and RUDOLF; VERBEKE was later released. It was not possible to extradite him to Germany because he is awaiting trial in Belgium on charges of disseminating materials denying the Holocaust. After VERBEKE's arrest, the NPD called for donations to ensure "optimal legal protection" for him; the call for donations was published on the NPD website in December under the heading "Support freedom of speech – support Siegfried Verbeke". The donations were to be made to a support fund registered under the name of a Belgian lawyer. Although a Verein zur Rehabilitierung der wegen Bestreitens des Holocausts Verfolgten (VRBHV, Society for the rehabilitation of those persecuted for denying the Holocaust) was founded as early as 9 November 2003, it did not revive revisionist activity as its founders had hoped. The organisation, whose members include well-known Holocaust deniers such as Jürgen GRAF of Switzerland, Robert FAURISSON of France, Ingrid RIMLAND of the US and Ernst ZÜNDEL of Germany as well as RUDOLF, seeks to re-open criminal

proceedings against Holocaust deniers.⁷⁴ The VRBHV could then use the trial as a public forum to disseminate its arguments. But in 2004, the group was unable to have any proceedings re-opened, nor did it carry out any other activities of note.

⁷⁴ ZÜNDEL had been in custody in Toronto, Canada, since February 2003 after applying for asylum and while his legal status was being clarified. On 1 March 2005, he was deported to Germany on the basis of a non-appealable decision of the federal court in Ottawa. In Germany, he was placed in provisional custody while under investigation on charges of incitement and other offences. The investigation was initiated in 1996 by the Mannheim public prosecutor's office.

IX. Means of agitation and communication

1. Periodical publications

In 2004, the number of right-wing extremist publications remained almost unchanged at 103 (2003: 102). The total number of copies amounted to around 4.4 million (2003: 4.4 million); 50 of these publications appeared at least four times a year.

2. Unaffiliated publishing houses and distributors

There are currently 36 right-wing extremist publishing houses and distributors of various sizes and significance which are not affiliated with any political party or organisations (2003: 38). They attempt to spread their political attitudes and values by producing and disseminating books and magazines as well as CDs, DVDs and video cassettes. These are often revisionist or biased portrayals of the “Third Reich”. In recent years, anti-American themes and conspiracy theories have made up an increasing proportion of the publications on offer. Described as the work of clandestine forces, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 continue to be cited as key evidence of a world conspiracy, often said to be Jewish-led. Criticism of US foreign policy is largely used by right-wing extremists to defame democratic principles and institutions in general. Many publishing houses and distributors also offer calendars, posters and jewellery, in some cases also clothing, intended to meet customers’ growing need for symbolic, publicly displayed integration into the right-wing extremist spectrum. A broad palette of products also increases the potential for profits.

The significance of right-wing extremist publishers and distributors varies. There are a few large publishing houses, a number of small operations and distributors which are only engaged in marketing other publishers’ products.

Nation Europa Verlag in Coburg, Grabert-Verlag in Tübingen, Arndt-Verlag in Kiel and Verlagsgesellschaft Berg in Inning am Ammersee are among the most established publishers and are well-known among right-wing extremists. Their products are advertised in numerous right-wing extremist publications.

**Nation Europa
Verlag**

The importance of Nation Europa-Verlag in the right-wing extremist publishing world is due less to its books than to its journal *Nation &*

Europa. Deutsche Monatshefte (Nation & Europe: German monthly). Although its circulation has stagnated at about 18,000 (available only by subscription), in its 54th year *Nation & Europa* continues to be one of the most important mouthpieces for German right-wing extremists. The authors regularly deal with current affairs as well as strategic and ideological issues. For example, right-wing extremist Karl RICHTER, who is on the editorial staff, published numerous anti-American and anti-globalisation articles amounting to a fundamental rejection of the basic values of western democracy:

“Other western values are also based on deceit. So-called human rights, for example. They are nothing more than a fiction of the Freemasons and the Enlightenment which were not even taken seriously by their inventors.”⁷⁵

In an article on the “return of race theory”, RICHTER uses the latest genetics research as “proof” for his rejection of human rights, especially the postulate that all people are equal:

“We can await the researchers’ latest findings with confidence that not only size, skin colour and disposition to certain diseases are genetically determined, but also intelligence, aptitude and personality ... The insanity of great equality, temptation of western humanity since 1789 at the latest, is coming to an end.”⁷⁶

The former national chairman of Die Republikaner (REP, The Republicans) party, Franz SCHÖNHUBER, continues to write his own column in *Nation & Europa*, called “Aus meiner Sicht” (In my view). In addition to carrying on efforts to overcome divisions within the right-wing extremist camp, SCHÖNHUBER also used his column to express defamatory remarks about democracy and the rule of law:

“And what are ‘democratic elections’ today? Products of manipulation influenced by mass media campaigns! And where are the control centres for the whole thing? In Hollywood, Washington and Tel Aviv!”⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Karl RICHTER, “Mit Amerika in den Untergang? Das “Werte”-Trugbild” (Going down with America? The “values” deception), *Nation & Europa. Deutsche Monatshefte*, No. 7-8/2004, p. 40.

⁷⁶ Karl RICHTER, “Gen-Forschung widerlegt linken Gleichheits-Wahn: Rückkehr der Rassenkunde” (Genetics research contradicts leftist equality madness: Return of race theory), *Nation & Europa*, No. 6/2004, p. 18f.

⁷⁷ Franz SCHÖNHUBER, “Aus meiner Sicht. Kardinalfragen” (In my view: cardinal issues), *Nation & Europa*, No. 2/2004, pp. 40-43.

Undermining the system of democratic elections also takes on an anti-Semitic tone here, as the reference to Tel Aviv draws on the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy.

Grabert-Verlag

In 2004, both the Grabert-Verlag publishing house and its sister press, Hohenrain-Verlag, launched Internet websites where their publications are presented and offered for sale via e-mail. The publishing programme of Grabert-Verlag is more strongly oriented on current political issues than in the past. After the success in 2003 of Gerhoch REISEGGER's conspiracy theory book, *Wir werden schamlos irregeführt! Vom 11. September zum Irak-Krieg* (We are being shamelessly misled! From Sept. 11 to the Iraq war), the press concentrated on anti-American literature also in 2004. REISEGGER's new book, *11. September: Die Bildbeweise* (Sept. 11: Pictorial evidence), published by Hohenrain-Verlag, portrays the terrorist attacks on the US as a hoax intended to aid in creating a "new world order".

Revisionist books continue to make up Grabert-Verlag's standard repertoire. Grabert-Verlag also publishes the bi-monthly newsletter *Euro-Kurier* (Euro courier), containing short editorials and press news, and the quarterly journal *Deutschland in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (DGG, Germany in history and the present).

Arndt-Verlag

In 2004, Arndt-Verlag, run by Dietmar MUNIER, hardly published any books of its own. The press traditionally concentrates on books, calendars and videos portraying the Nazi regime in an uncritical light. These include in particular the large-format collections of photographs appearing in the series *Zeitgeschichte in Farbe* (Recent history in colour) focusing on supposedly positive aspects of National Socialism. The large-format volume *Mythos Neuschwabenland: Für Hitler am Südpol* (The myth of New Swabia: For Hitler at the South Pole), which focuses on the German expedition to Antarctica in 1938-39, was published by Bonus-Verlag; like Pour le Merite-Verlag, it belongs to the same company as Arndt-Verlag. Arndt-Verlag also specialises in nostalgia for former territories of the German Reich, with products ranging from books on Silesian and East Prussian traditions to videos, calendars and audio recordings.

Verlagsgesellschaft Berg

Headed by Dr. Gert SUDHOLT, Verlagsgesellschaft Berg mbH was formed by the merger of three independent presses: Druffel, Türmer and Vowinckel. Verlagsgesellschaft Berg publishes mainly military history and revisionist works. Although in recent years it had hardly published anything of note, its German edition of UK author Martin Allen's book *The Hitler/Hess Deception* (HarperCollins, 2003; in

German as *Churchills Friedensfalle – Das Geheimnis des Heiß-Fluges 1941*), published under the Druffel-Verlag imprint, was more successful. Verlagsgesellschaft Berg held its fourth weekend seminar on “experiencing history”, with the same relatively high number of participants as in the previous year. Well-known right-wing extremist authors gave anti-American and nationalist talks on the theme “World policy is geopolitics: Thinking in terms of continents”.

**Gesellschaft für
Freie Publizistik,
reg'd society**

With 500 members, the Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik e.V. (GFP, Society for free journalism, reg'd society) is the largest right-wing extremist cultural association. The group held its annual convention in Friedrichroda, Thuringia, on 23-25 April 2004, with the theme “The new axis: Europe's chances against America”. Dr. Pierre KREBS, head of the Thule Seminar, spoke on “Europe's culture vs. the American way of life” and the supposed decline of Europe; arguing in racist and xenophobic terms, he stated:

“Europe alone believes the dogma of a planet of half-breeds. Integrating the alien is of course unthinkable ... The all-determining foundation is and remains bio-cultural identity.”⁷⁸

Dr. Rolf KOSIEK, former “chief ideologue” of the NPD, has led the GFP since May 1992. Its members are predominantly publishers, editors, writers and booksellers. In addition to the proceedings of its annual convention, the GFP publishes the quarterly *Das Freie Forum* (The free forum), which reports among other things on the prison sentences of right-wing extremists in the Federal Republic of Germany in order to create the impression that the freedom of speech and of the press are being violated.

Patria mail-order

Led by Franz Ludwig GLASAUER, the Patria mail-order house, based in Kirchberg, Bavaria, is unusual among the unaffiliated distributors: Apart from audio recordings documenting the Nazi era, the company mainly sells clothing bearing various right-wing extremist motifs. Patria owns the “Consdaple” brand; T-shirts printed with the word “Consdaple” are worn under open jackets so that only the letters “NSDAP” (the German initials of the Nazi party name) are visible. By selling items associated with symbols from Germanic myths, with the number 88 (popular within the scene as a numeric code for the eighth letter of the alphabet = HH, or “Heil Hitler”), and with various motifs from the right-wing extremist skinhead milieu, Patria provides products

⁷⁸ Pierre KREBS, “Europas Kultur statt American Way of life” (Europe's culture vs. the American way of life), Gesellschaft für Freie Publizistik, reg'd society, ed., *Die neue Achse. Europas Chancen gegen Amerika* (The new axis: Europe's chances against America), proceedings of the 2004 annual convention, pp. 111-129; quote taken from p. 115.

allowing right-wing extremists to publicly display their allegiance and their need for visible integration within the milieu.

3. The Internet

German right-wing extremists now use the Internet, particularly the World Wide Web (WWW), as a matter of course. They have further increased their presence in all areas of this medium. To disseminate their anti-constitutional propaganda, to communicate with each other and to mobilise and steer the right-wing extremist scene, they use not only their own websites, but also other Internet services in their attempt to spread their anti-constitutional message and actively intervene in political discourse.

**No change in high
number of websites**

The number of websites run by German right-wing extremists – 950 – remained at the same high level as in earlier years (2003: 950, 2002: 1,000).

Right-wing extremists use the Web as a tool to fight their “political” opponents and to agitate against institutions of the democratic state.

Special web pages on current issues

The Internet offers them the possibility of publishing their views independent of what they regard as the establishment press. Their aim is to create an “alternative public”. As part of this effort, they increasingly focus on anti-globalisation and anti-Americanism, topics previously considered the property of the “leftist” camp. To gain more attention for right-wing extremist protest actions, website operators are setting up a growing number of special web pages intended to mobilise followers to take part in demonstrations, rallies and memorial marches and to distribute flyers.

“Bait” for children and young people

The multi-media World Wide Web represents a virtually inexhaustible treasure trove for children and young people. Right-wing extremists take advantage of their curiosity by designing their websites to appeal to this group. They offer games, music, prohibited symbols, images and insider information which are especially appealing to young people, often also because they are forbidden.

Unlawful content provided anonymously from abroad

The majority of German websites with punishable content (including Nazi symbols and music with inflammatory texts) are run anonymously from servers located outside Germany, mainly in the US. Right-wing extremists take advantage of the fact that in many cases, local laws allow the dissemination of such content.

Thanks to intensive research, in recent years the authorities for the protection of the constitution have in many cases successfully identified website operators who were attempting to conceal their identity. In several cases, when punishable content led to information being given to the prosecuting authorities, this resulted in executive measures against those responsible.

File-sharing

Right-wing extremists are also becoming active in other areas of the Internet. For example, songs with lyrics that are punishable by law or banned are spread via music-sharing services. Files are typically shared via free services such as KaZaA, eDonkey or eMule.

At the initiative of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA), on 24 March police searched the homes of 342 persons on 333 properties nationwide. The persons in question, most of them youth, had offered right-wing extremist music containing punishable texts for downloading over the KaZaA file-sharing network.

E-mail

Right-wing extremists use e-mail to communicate both individually and

collectively. In addition, free encryption software allows them to communicate confidentially. E-mail is used not only to exchange information among individual users, but also to disseminate information automatically by means of mailing lists and newsletters. For example, event dates and calls to action can be sent to a large number of addresses at the same time. The number of recipients varies; in some cases, only persons known to the scene may be given passwords to access such information.

**Discussion forums
very popular**

Discussion forums, some of them with several hundred participants, continue to be popular among right-wing extremists. Topics include current political issues and specific action against institutions and representatives of the democratic state.

For example, in a message entitled "Web addresses of the parl..." dated 11 January, unknown persons published in a right-wing extremist discussion forum the e-mail addresses of all 603 Bundestag representatives. Other forum participants reacted to the information by noting that it was "not a bad way to let off some steam and send this or that minister an e-mail" and that "somebody should send them a load of spam ... with viruses and stuff like that".

For some time already, right-wing extremists have been sending spam (unsolicited bulk e-mail) with right-wing extremist contents to a wide variety of recipients. In mid-2004, they used a new variation to disseminate their unwanted propaganda:

**Dissemination of
right-wing extremist
e-mail using
computer viruses**

In the early hours of 10 June, unknown persons launched a large-scale campaign to send right-wing extremist propaganda e-mails automatically using a special computer virus. This virus was based on the worm "Sober.G", which had been circulating on the Internet since late 2003. The virus took advantage of the worm's ability to spread by using unprotected computers to send right-wing extremist e-mails. In this way, numerous private individuals as well as media businesses appeared to be the senders. The e-mails contained statements such as "Violence by foreigners: Where were you, Mr. Rau?" and "Germany needs German children!" The e-mails often contained links to notorious right-wing extremist websites. Investigations by the Munich public prosecutor's office are under way.

Left-Wing Extremist Activities

I. Overview

Left-wing extremist developments

As left-wing extremists see it, the existing political system represents a certain form or phase of capitalism or imperialism, which they oppose. Depending on their specific ideological and political orientation, they wish to establish in its place a socialist/communist society or one which in their view is “a system without rulers”, or anarchy. Their actions draw on revolutionary Marxist or anarchist ideologies which they believe have been modified and “refined” to fit current conditions.

Left-wing extremist action takes a variety of forms. It ranges from public rallies, open agitation (flyers, placards, periodicals, electronic means of communication) and participation in elections to covert attempts to gain influence in committees and institutions in society. Some groups see violating the law, including acts of violence committed openly or covertly (e.g. vandalising property, violent riotous assemblies, bodily injury) as a means to achieve their political ends.

Again in 2004, militancy by left-wing extremists included coordinated actions that in some cases crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence, as well as those committed during typical street rioting in confrontation with the “apparatus of repression” or political opponents. Almost all criminal offences were committed by groups from the autonomist scene or by other, undogmatic groupings in the same tradition.

But the autonomist scene showed nowhere near its earlier level of activity in connection with its traditional protest campaigns or with current topics of political conflict; instead, it continued to seek orientation and new strategies. Its weakness results in part from autonomists’ incapacity for organisation and systematic efforts. Given the strong fluctuations within the scene, efforts to recruit and integrate young followers were inadequate. In many places, broad democratic alliances have taken over traditional left-wing extremist themes, such as the “anti-fascist struggle”; together with the right law enforcement

tactics and strategy, this prevented certain activities by violent left-wing extremists before they could take place.

“Anti-German” attitudes became more popular, which proved especially polarising and led to serious conflicts, physical attacks and the collapse of group structures within the autonomist scene. After German reunification, followers of this “anti-German” current opposed what they saw as an increasingly powerful, imperialistic “greater Germany” tending towards a nationalism which threatened to wipe out other ethnic groups. In contrast to the left-wing extremists’ traditional pro-Palestinian positions, this group demands special consideration for the Jewish people and unconditional solidarity with and rigorous support for the state of Israel, for example by the US.

The electoral success of right-wing extremist parties and their public appearances, which left-wing extremists frequently regarded as provocations, gave the “anti-fascist struggle” greater significance in the second half of 2004, at least in the affected parts of eastern Germany. In particular, individual groups which felt that simply reacting to public appearances by right-wing extremists was insufficient significantly stepped up their activity.

Revolutionary-Marxist organisations continued to rely on traditional strategies based on a long-term class struggle, showing significant involvement in social protest campaigns in 2004. Trotskyists in particular shifted the focus of their activities from opposing globalisation to fighting cuts in social spending and building up a “new leftist party”.

The Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany) was able to take advantage of popular dissatisfaction with the Federal Government’s labour market and social reforms and use the Monday protest marches held under the motto “Down with Hartz IV - we are the people” for their own ends.

Left-wing extremists’ activities connected with the anti-nuclear campaign remained at a relatively low level; in recent years these culminated in protests against rail shipments of radioactive waste from La Hague, France to an interim storage site near Gorleben, Lower Saxony. The shipment in November was overshadowed by a serious accident in Avicourt, France, in which a French anti-nuclear activist was fatally injured by a train carrying radioactive waste. Although initial reaction to the death was not marked by notable violence on the part of anti-nuclear extremists – more than 1,000 protesters took part in nation-wide demonstrations of solidarity – it apparently strengthened the resolve of some militants to carry on their struggle.

Conflict within the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism) over party policy continued, though the party's success in elections helped deflect public attention from it. This conflict, which has raged for many years, has to do with the party's ambivalence: While cooperating in government and public administration at various levels, it has not lost sight of its ultimate goal of achieving a socialist order beyond the boundaries of the existing society.

II. Statistical overview

1. Organisations and following

Slight decrease in left-wing extremist following

In 2004, the structures and forms of organised left-wing extremism showed little change from 2003. The overall number of supporters and active members dropped slightly.

At the end of 2004, after deducting multiple memberships, around 30,800 persons (2003: 31,300) were found to be members of organisations and other associations at least suspected of pursuing left-wing extremist objectives. This figure also includes supporters of the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, Communist Faction of the PDS), which is thought to have about 1,000 members. The PDS claimed about 65,800 members at the end of 2003 (at the end of 2002: 71,000).⁷⁹

In late 2004, the spectrum of left-wing extremists prepared to use violence comprised about 5,500 people (2003: about 5,400) (mainly organised in anarchist groups); as in the previous year, this included around 5,000 persons who described themselves as autonomists.

The membership of Marxist-Leninist, Trotskyist and other revolutionary Marxist associations declined slightly to 25,700 (2003: 26,300). Some of these are supported by organisations which are influenced by left-wing extremism. In late 2004, such organisations had a total membership of about 18,000 (2003: about 19,000).

⁷⁹ Number of members as of 31 December 2003; current figures for 2004 are expected in mid-2005.

Left-wing extremist following ¹									
	2002			2003			2004		
	Groups	Persons		Groups	Persons		Groups	Persons	
Left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence ²	56	5,500 ³		55	5,400 ³		61	5,500 ³	
Marxist-Leninists and other revolutionary Marxists ⁴									
– Core and subsidiary organisations	43	26,000		49	26,300		49	25,700	
– Organisations influenced by left-wing extremism	30		15,200	33		19,000	30		18,000
Total	129	31,500	15,200	137	31,700	19,000	140	31,200	18,000
After deducting multiple memberships		approx .	approx. 11,700		appro x.	appro x.		appro x.	appro x.
		31,100			31,300	14,500		30,800	13,500
PDS ⁵		approx.			approx			approx	
		78,000			71,000			65,800	

¹ Some of the figures are estimated and rounded off.

² The statistics include not only those with records as suspects or perpetrators, but also those left-wing extremists presumed, on the basis of pertinent indicators, to be prepared to use violence. Only groups which have established structures and have been active for some time have been included.

³ The scene can potentially mobilise an additional several thousand people.

⁴ Including the KPF as well as members of other left-wing extremist groups in the PDS.

⁵ The PDS is listed separately in the table due to its ambivalent status. Membership is the same as at 31 December of the previous year; see note 79.

2. Left-wing extremist crime and violence ⁸⁰

Crimes and violent acts motivated by left-wing extremism constitute a subset of left-wing politically motivated crime. In 2004, a total of 3,521 criminal offences were classified as left-wing politically motivated crime (2003: 3,614); of these, 789 were classified as violent crimes (2003: 803). In this area, 1,440 criminal offences were recorded as motivated by extremism (2003: 1,459), including 521 violent crimes (2003: 483). Violent crimes motivated by extremism included a total of 11 offences (2003: 21) in the category “campaign against nuclear energy”, 10 offences (2003: 1) in the category “anti-globalisation” and 273 offences (2003: 226) in the category of “crimes against actual or supposed right-wing extremists”.

⁸⁰ Cf. Section II, 2.1 and 2.2 in the part on right-wing extremist activities for the definition of politically motivated crime and violent acts.

Overview of politically motivated violent and other crimes with a left-wing extremist background ¹		
Violent crimes:	2003	2004
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	1	0
Bodily injury	192	226
Arson	36	31
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	118	144
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	29	19
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	5	12
Extortion	0	1
Resisting public authority	102	88
Sexual offences	0	0
Total	483	521
Other criminal offences:		
Property damage	510	490
Coercion, threat	35	19
Other criminal offences	431	410
Total	976	919
Total number of criminal offences	1.459	1.440



¹ The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.

Overview of violent crimes committed by left-wing extremists against actual or supposed right-wing extremists ¹		
	2003	2004
Homicide	0	0
Attempted homicide	1	0
Bodily injury	134	149
Arson	6	16
Causing an explosion with intent to injure or damage property	0	0
Contributing to rioting or civil disorder	53	70
Dangerous disruption of rail, air, ship or road transport	1	12
Unlawful deprivation of liberty	0	0
Robbery	3	10
Extortion	0	1
Resisting public authority	28	15
Total	226	273

¹ The figures are based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This overview includes both actual and attempted criminal offences, with the exception of homicides. Each offence was counted only once. For instance, if bodily injury was committed while contributing to rioting or public disorder, only bodily injury, as the more serious offence, is shown in the statistics. If several criminal offences were committed, only the most serious offence was counted.


Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime*
by type



*) including activities directed against CASTOR transports of nuclear waste


* Figures based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).
Only the most important types are included.

Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime* by Land



* Graph based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA).

Violent and other crimes with an extremist background related to the area of left-wing politically motivated crime* per 100,000 residents and Land



* Graph based on data supplied by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) and *Länder* population data from the Federal Statistical Office.

III. Violent left-wing extremism

Left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence, above all those from the autonomist scene, continued to constitute a threat to the internal security of the Federal Republic of Germany in 2004. Overall, autonomists' capacity for mobilisation remained weak and they continued to seek new strategies. But widespread protests against the Federal Government's labour market reforms (Agenda 2010, Hartz IV) and the successes of right-wing extremist parties in state parliamentary elections in Saxony and Brandenburg led to increased and sometimes militant activity especially in the second half of the year.

The activities of some individual autonomist groupings occasionally crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence.⁸¹ However, Germany has no established terrorist organisations prepared to carry out serious attacks or murders comparable to the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction), which officially disbanded in 1998.

Structure:	Groups exist in almost all major cities, above all in large conurbations such as Berlin, Hamburg and the Rhine-Main area, but also in smaller university towns such as Göttingen.
Supporters:	roughly 5,500 (2003: roughly 5,400)
Publications:	More than 50 insider publications; <i>INTERIM</i> , published in Berlin, is influential nation-wide; various youth magazines, usually distributed free of charge, are also well-regarded in the scene.

⁸¹ As defined by the authorities for the protection of the Constitution, terrorism is the long-term struggle to achieve political aims by means of attacks on persons and property, especially serious criminal offences such as those named in Section 129a (1) of the Criminal Code, or offences that aid in their preparation.

1. Autonomists

1.1 Following and self-definition

**Autonomists:
largest share of left-
wing extremists with
a propensity to
violence**

With a following of up to 5,000 persons nation-wide, autonomists represent the largest share of all left-wing extremists prepared to use violence. Militant autonomists are responsible for almost all violent crimes motivated by left-wing extremism, including bodily injury, dangerous disruption of road and rail transport, and arson.

As a heterogeneous movement made up of more or less independent groupings, the autonomist scene has no leaders, uniform ideological strategy or hierarchical structures. In general, there is a high level of turnover among the movement's followers, who tend to be relatively young. In recent years, recruitment has been insufficient to replace those leaving. A militant group active in the Hamburg area for years described this situation with unusual openness:

“some comrades have simply abandoned us and withdrawn into their private lives, for the usual reasons: disorientation, burn-out, too busy with their jobs, studies, family etc.
this all has a great impact on the autonomist scene.”
(*INTERIM*, No. 603, 14 October 2004, pp. 21-22)

Autonomists advocate a life free of outside pressures, “autonomous” in the literal sense of the word, and disregard norms and authority. Their sense of identity is characterised by various attitudes of protest: anti-fascist, anti-capitalist, anti-patriarchal. Diffuse fragments of anarchist and communist ideologies form the basis of their often spontaneous activities.

**Aim: to overthrow
the system**

Like all left-wing extremists, autonomists strive to overthrow what they see as the “ruling system”. For example, an association of violent left-wing extremist groups in Berlin calling itself ACT! described its aims as follows:

“ACT! sees itself as revolutionary in the sense that the society we are striving for lies beyond the existing society. Our critique of the ruling structures aims at ending every form of exploitation and oppression. This includes the conviction that overcoming these structures cannot be achieved in parliament nor at the negotiating table. We do not believe in any welfare state, any religion nor in any dialogue with those in power. We aim to show, develop and foster resistance. We

aim to take possession, strip others of their possessions and rebel. What happens after that – we’ll see!”
(*INTERIM*, No. 588, 12 February 2004, p. 24)

United in their readiness to use violence

Autonomists consider the use of violence to be a legitimate means to achieve their aims. They claim violence is justified, necessary and a legitimate means to fight the “structural violence” inherent in a “system of coercion, exploitation and oppression”. They rigorously reject the state monopoly on power. For example, an announcement by left-wing extremists of a nation-wide demonstration on behalf of the “European day of action against dismantling the welfare state” held in Berlin on 3 April stated:

“In reality, the power of the state is what sets the scene for capitalist exploitation. ... We thumb our noses at democratic participation ... since we have no desire to bargain over ‘mild’ reforms or the conditions of our own exploitation. ... The structure must be overthrown. ... Resistance must start where it hurts them. Resistance must be disorderly, implacable and excessive.”
(*INTERIM*, No. 591, 25 March 2004, p. 24)

Attempts at networking

Overall, the group of those willing to use violence became more diverse. For example, despite general resistance to organisation and hierarchy, a small number of autonomist groups pushed for more structure and networking, on both the regional and national levels.

Their aim is to combine forces and coordinate activities. These attempts to strengthen networks go hand in hand with a greater focus on theory to reinforce the ideological foundations of their efforts. These activities clearly go beyond those of “traditional” autonomists, which tend to be more spontaneous. In its founding document, the ACT! network mentioned above wrote:

“In 2004, we look ahead and draw our conclusions from our most recent struggles. ACT! is a network of four groups of radical leftists in Berlin. ... On the basis of our common political praxis, we aim to coordinate future activities and conduct joint debates on political aims. ...
ACT! will take militant, i.e. irreconcilable positions.”
(*INTERIM*, No. 588, 12 February 2004, p. 24)

“Anti-German” positions

At the same time, “anti-German” attitudes long marginalised by violent left-wing extremists have been gaining ground, leading to serious polarisation.

Followers of “anti-German” ideology regard Germans as having an inherent tendency to nationalism automatically leading to the

destruction of other ethnic groups. Such “anti-Germans” believe that the Federal Republic has neither overcome its National Socialist past nor adequately dealt with it, but merely suppressed it and is now conjuring up a new edition of the “Third Reich” under the guise of democracy.

In their view, in order to prevent a new Holocaust, it is absolutely necessary for the German people to dissolve and become part of a multi-cultural society. “Anti-Germans” demand absolute solidarity with the state of Israel and support all measures guaranteeing its existence as a refuge for survivors of the Nazi Holocaust and preserving it from threat. This includes the US-led war against Iraq, which is viewed by more traditional left-wing extremists as imperialist aggression.

Demonstrations by “anti-German” groups, like their most recent in Erfurt on 3 October, with the slogan “Hate Germany – solidarity with Israel”, typically include Israeli, US and British flags and slogans such as “USA – anti-fascism” “Stalingrad ’43 – Thank you, Red Army!” and “Bomber Harris – do it again!”

“Anti-German” positions led to serious ideological confrontations among left-wing extremists. These confrontations are often hateful, especially on the relevant Internet websites. In practice, this conflict has already led to the break-up of long-standing associations and even physical attacks at demonstrations and other events.

1.2 Forms of action

There is a wide range of left-wing extremist action, including arson and bombings, dangerous disruption of road and rail traffic and violent demonstrations where stones and other missiles are thrown. Such activities are directed against both people and property. Targets include those whom left-wing extremists consider “henchmen” and “profiteers” of the “system” (such as police officers), as well as (supposed) right-wing extremists and their organisations. In addition to “overt” forms of activity, such as flyers, posters, Internet calls to action and left-wing extremist publications, militancy is also an “option”, as expressed in the underground publication *radikal*, which reappeared in spring 2004 after five years of inactivity:

“Militancy is in principle one of a number of legitimate means of political action. Like demonstrations, happenings and the distribution of flyers, if used properly, militant action can bring about useful political results. If we think of Nazis, of functionaries who take over a neighbourhood, or of the forces of repression. Each practice is justified in certain situations. Militancy expands the possibilities of political intervention and is in principle therefore neither right nor wrong. It depends on the context. ... It is important and right to ask oneself about the purpose of militant actions in view of the current political background. Each group and generation should consciously decide for itself on the question of means.”

(*radikal*, No. 157, Spring 2004, pp. 4-5)

Decisions about the form and target of an action depend largely on the extent to which the motives and intentions behind such action can be communicated to the public. In particular, autonomists wish to make sure that no “non-participants” (as they are called by insiders) are injured. Left-wing extremists with a propensity to violence vainly hope in this way to gain widespread acceptance extending to parts of “bourgeois society” for their position on controversial issues.

Street riots

Street riots are a typical form of violence committed by autonomists (they also call it “mass militancy”). On such occasions activists often cover their faces and dress in uniform “combat gear” to form what is known as “black blocks”.

Such rioting often breaks out during protests against right-wing extremist rallies and is a regular element of May Day demonstrations, particularly in Berlin. Although 1 May in Berlin was less violent in 2004 than in previous years, after the demonstrations, several hundred masked persons committed serious criminal offences, such as

shooting off firecrackers and other fireworks at police officers, throwing stones and bottles and setting fires. Already in the afternoon, protests against an NPD march turned violent. The police had to encircle more than 450 troublemakers for several hours. More than 192 police officers were injured in the rioting and 186 persons were taken into custody.

In retrospect, participating activists portrayed the evening riots in particular in a positive light; with a view to the future, they wrote for example:

“The unregistered evening demonstration ... showed what we could do. A core of organised groups and almost all participants in masks represented an initial attempt. Maybe we can build on that. ... There is certainly some potential for the coming years. ... The rioting was significantly shorter and also limited to a smaller area than in past years, but it was more determined and more clearly directed against the cops.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 597, 17 June 2004, pp. 5, 9)

Clandestine activities

In contrast to mass militancy, clandestine militant actions, i.e. attacks prepared and carried out conspiratorially, involve greater planning and targeting. Such attacks often border on terrorism (cf. 1.3, below) and are usually followed by letters claiming responsibility and attempting to justify the attacks. Such attacks often occur in connection with topical campaigns and are sometimes coordinated with regard to time and location.

One example of coordinated action occurred on the morning of 27 April, ahead of the May Day rioting in Berlin:

- Around 1:30 a.m., unknown persons used paving stones to break several windows of a government employment office in the Mitte district of Berlin. At the same time, windows were broken in the Berlin office of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD, Social Democratic Party of Germany) across the street. A brief explanation stated that the act was directed against sites where “welfare robbery” was being thought up, legitimised and implemented.
- Around 1:32 a.m., a fire alarm went off in a government employment office in southwest Berlin. Remains of incendiary devices with timers, which had not functioned properly, were found at the source of the fire on the building’s ground floor. Another timed incendiary device was found hidden on the first floor of the building. A group calling itself Autonome Gruppen (Autonomist Groups) claimed responsibility.

“We see our act as an attempt by groups of the radical left to do something to stop the ongoing dismantling of social rights, cuts and reductions in all areas of life.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 594, 6 May 2004, p. 31)

- At 1:55 a.m., a data processing firm’s mobile advising station parked in the car park of a government employment agency in northern Berlin was set on fire and destroyed. In a message headed “Down with Agenda 2010! No to forced labour and social control”, the unnamed authors claimed responsibility for the act and indicated their pleasure at seeing the “wildly raging flames” they had ignited on the employment agency’s premises. They accused the data processing firm of acting as a “sub-contractor in the service of the new Hartz laws and sharing responsibility for turning up the pressure to work under worsening conditions.”

Media

Autonomists continue to use “proven” methods such as printed publications, information “shops” and clandestine meetings.⁸² In addition, they take advantage of modern communications technologies such as the Internet and mobile telephony, including the possibilities of protected communication.⁸³

Modern information and encryption technologies such as the free encryption program Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) benefit the left-wing extremists’ mainly conspiratorial activities and increase their ability to act, making it more difficult for them to be investigated.

⁸² Several insider publications, some of which are produced and distributed in a conspiratorial fashion, regularly publish position papers, letters of activists claiming responsibility for attacks, calls for demonstrations and instructions for building incendiary and explosive devices as well as other articles on theoretical and practical issues relevant for the left-wing movement. Most of these publications – e.g. *Swing* (Frankfurt/Main), *EinSatz* (Göttingen) and *incipito* (Leipzig) – are mainly of regional importance. The biweekly magazine *INTERIM* published in Berlin has nation-wide influence, as does the underground magazine *radikal*, which appeared in 2004 for the first time since 1999.

⁸³ For example, some left-wing extremist websites are hosted by providers abroad to avoid criminal prosecution in Germany.

1.3 Autonomist structures with proto-terrorist elements

Difficult to distinguish from terrorism

Organisations have developed within the militant autonomist scene whose attacks have crossed the line of what constitutes terrorist violence.

“No-name” militancy

The members of these small, clandestine groups live a life that looks perfectly normal to the rest of the world. They leave behind few traces that could help the authorities identify them and as a rule sign each of their letters claiming responsibility for an attack with a different name in order to avoid criminal prosecution (“no-name” militancy). However, some groups do operate under the same “brand name” as an expression of continuity, to be recognised and to provide a contact point. But all such groups see their militancy as an essential and direct expression of their opposition to the “system” and a fixed component of their own way of life.

Two typical examples of “no-name” militancy:

- On 4 February, unknown persons attached incendiary devices to the underside of two vehicles parked in a publicly accessible used-car park of a DaimlerChrysler dealership in Munich; although fully functional, the devices failed to operate. In a message headed “An initiative of the Maxwell Schreiber Group”, the perpetrators justified the action, which took place shortly before the NATO Security Conference in Munich, by referring to DaimlerChrysler’s participation in a number of weapons projects around the world.

“In our view, it is not only legitimate, but also necessary, to reveal DaimlerChrysler’s role as a central pillar in the European arms industry currently undergoing modernisation.”
(*INTERIM*, No. 589, 26 February 2004, p. 12)

The message also stated that as the only ones profiting from these deals, economic, political and military elites were responsible for growing threats to the livelihood of those in areas affected by war, as well as their misery and death.

- In the early morning of 20 March, unknown persons threw several incendiary devices through a window in a classroom of a vehicle and equipment manufacturer in Bad Oldesloe, Schleswig-Holstein, causing damage valued at more than €100,000. In apparent coordination with that attack, on the same night two Bundeswehr ambulances parked for repairs on the premises of a subsidiary of the Bad Oldesloe manufacturer were set on fire. An additional Bundeswehr vehicle parked nearby was destroyed, and two civilian

vehicles were damaged. Here, too, material damages were extensive.

A letter claiming responsibility for the attacks was signed “AK Origami (folding up weapons projects)” and stated that they were directed against European arms projects (the targeted company also produces vehicles used by the military) on the first anniversary of the imperialist attack on Iraq.

“Our actions ... are intended to demonstrate that there are starting points for anti-militaristic interventions.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 592, 8 April 2004, p. 13)

Debate on militancy continues

The “militancy debate”, a discussion started in mid-2001 about connections between militant groups and the legitimacy of more drastic measures beyond mere property damage, continued in 2004, largely led by the militante gruppe (mg, militant group).

On the first day of the year, the mg carried out an arson attack against the office building of the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in the Steglitz district of Berlin. One room was completely gutted by the fire; two others were damaged by the heat and smoke. In an e-mail “declaration of attack”⁸⁴ sent to various news media on 1 January 2004, the authors criticised the DIW and its director, stating that the DIW was not a neutral research institute but rather a forge of ideas and mouthpiece of the Deutscher Arbeitgeberverband (DAV, German Employers Federation) with the aim of perfecting capitalism. The e-mail added that for many people, this meant being forced further into poverty and subjected to the “oppressive mechanisms of social technocracy”.

Fighting “social technocracy”

The mg stepped up its fight against “social technocracy” with another arson attack, this time on 30 March against an office in northern Berlin shared by the government employment agency and the Pankow welfare office. In a statement, the mg said that the city councillor responsible for social welfare benefits was in the vanguard of the attack on the lowest classes and that he and the director of the employment office bore administrative responsibility for the “social technocratic harassment and repression of marginalised and downgraded segments of the population.”

In this context, the mg again stressed the significance of its project to link militant groups, which it calls the “platform process”:

⁸⁴ *INTERIM*, No. 586, 15 January 2004, p. 19.

“We and other groups regard this platform project as an important building block in structuring and organising the militant and potentially armed resistance in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]. Building up a militant platform is in our view both a prerequisite and a starting point for grounding and (re-)orienting revolutionary politics which do not simply commit to paper the organised class struggle from below, but put it into action using the means at hand.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 592, 8 April 2004, p. 10)

In the course of the year, the mg carried out two additional attacks with the same rationale:

- an arson attack against the vehicle pool of Deutsche Telekom in the Wedding district of Berlin on 7 May,
- coordinated arson attacks on the offices of the Tempelhof-Schöneberg welfare office and the Reinickendorf district council in Berlin, and sending a live 9mm cartridge to the city councillor responsible for social welfare benefits on 23 September.

The dates of the attacks on 30 March and 23 September were chosen to coincide with major demonstrations in Berlin to protest social welfare cuts (2-3 April and 2 October). The mg apparently regarded this as the most favourable opportunity in a long time to use militant actions to gain a (positive) response from broader segments of the population:

“The debate over ‘HARTZ IV’ has in some cases reached a level of confrontation that exceeds the framework set by the rule of law. ... For us as revolutionary leftists, this means taking advantage of the greater openness of broader segments of the population and taking the protests further on behalf of social revolution and the class struggle. This offers us a chance, through actions that are carefully planned and carried out, to do more than just throw a spanner in the works of the social technocracy.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 602, 30 September 2004, pp. 14-15)

**Paper on
reappraising history**

At the same time, the “militancy debate” continued, with sometimes lengthy position papers, including a 68-page text on reappraising history entitled “Armed struggle – uprising – revolution in classics of early socialism, communism and anarchy” intended to be the first in a series. In this paper, the mg sums up the preceding process of discussion and organisation in hesitantly positive terms:

“In our view, the fact that it has been possible to carry on the process of discussion for about three years now is already a sign of success. Given our general lack of political significance as the revolutionary left, and the internal dissent over many issues of antagonistic politics, it is by no means self-evident that nearly a dozen militant groupings have contributed ideas and in some cases practical action to this three-year platform process.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 600, 2 September 2004, p. 13)

However, in 2004 the militancy debate did not make any progress in terms of substance. In a paper otherwise positive towards the mg’s project, a group of writers calling themselves “Friends of *INTERIM*” arrived at the same conclusion:

“The militancy debate has reached a dead end.”

(*INTERIM*, No. 600, 2 September 2004, pp. 4-5)

**Autonome Zelle “In
Gedenken an Ulrike
Meinhof” shows
signs of disbanding**

The Autonome Zelle “In Gedenken an Ulrike Meinhof” (Autonomous cell “In memory of Ulrike Meinhof”), which was active for a number of years in northern Hamburg and surroundings, did not participate in the debate, neither contributing papers nor taking part in any activities. In comments published in October, the group attributed this to processes of internal discussion and erosion:

“as mentioned at the start, our group is currently showing signs of disbanding, which we are trying to stop at the moment through intensive substantive discussions/target-setting. but one thing is clear to us, no matter what happens here. they, those in power, they have weapons, factories, money, but we have humanity!”

(*INTERIM*, No. 603, 14 October 2004, pp. 21-22)

**New issue of
underground
magazine *radikal*
published**

For the first time since 1999, a new issue of the underground publication *radikal* appeared in April 2004. The editorial staff referred to the “militancy debate” in positive terms, stating that it had led to a discussion of general problems associated with militant politics.

“With this issue, we are consciously locating ourselves in this context. Even though we can ‘only’ offer technical knowledge, we hope for suggestions on form and content and an ongoing political discussion.”

(*radikal*, No. 157, Spring 2004, p. 5)

Overall, the debate cannot be expected to produce any rapid progress with implications for practical applications. But it is important to continue monitoring whether the mg's positions and activities find a positive response among other autonomists with a propensity to violence and whether this could lead to new threats.

2. Traditional anarchists

The spectrum of traditional anarchists in Germany is mainly made up of groupings from the "grass-roots movement" and followers of the anarcho-syndicalist Freie Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter Union (FAU, Free Workers Union), which is associated with the Internationale Arbeiter Assoziation (IAA, International Workers Association).

Members of the loosely associated "grass-roots movement" (unchanged from previous years at about 200 persons) advocate doing away with all forms of "violence and rule" through "power from below". Their publication *Graswurzelrevolution – für eine gewaltfreie, herrschaftlose Gesellschaft* (Grass-roots revolution – for a non-violent society without rulers; No. 286, February 2004) states: "Anarchy is the goal, anarchism is the path to that goal." Anarchists regard the state of anarchy, or the absence of rule, as the ideal society. One of their forms of activity is civil disobedience, which they use in their protests. Like other traditional anarchists, followers of the "grass-roots movement" distinguish between violence against persons, which most reject, and violence against property, which is defined as "non-violent", although as a conscious violation of rules it may include criminal offences such as property damage and coercion. As in previous years, followers of the "grass-roots movement" were again involved in the "anti-militarist struggle", among other things by protesting against nuclear weapons based in southern Germany; they also supported protests against nuclear transports.

The anarcho-syndicalists who belong to the FAU-IAA (still numbering about 300 persons) describe themselves as an aggressive "grass-roots democratic workers' union initiative". Their aim is a society based on self-organisation and self-administration; in order to achieve this aim, they rely on "revolutionary work" in factories and on "direct action" such as boycotts, strikes and the occupation of buildings. In a "declaration of principles" published on the Internet, the FAU-IAA describes anarcho-syndicalism as a specific approach for breaking out of existing conditions and attaining a society without rulers. According

to the declaration, their fundamental rejection of and opposition to rule is based on the realisation that, starting from international capital to nation-states all the way to everyday life, “oppression, exploitation and lack of representation” function by means of “personal, economic and political/military mechanisms of power”. The FAU-IAA views itself as the “power of rejecting what exists”, as “subversive and in irreconcilable, fundamental contradiction to all systems of rule”.⁸⁵

The activities of the anarcho-syndicalists focused on cuts in social spending (in their words, “social clear-cutting”) in Germany in connection with the government’s reform programme known as Agenda 2010. For example, the FAU-IAA participated in numerous demonstrations and events related to this issue. A call to take part in a “powerful black-red/anti-capitalist bloc” at the traditional May Day demonstration in Frankfurt bore the motto “Our agenda is resistance – destroy capitalism!” and stated:

“The gigantic redistribution of society’s wealth from the poor to the rich disguised as 'reform' is a mortal attack on all wage-earners and all who are poor or ill.

This internal attack parallels the aggressive military policy of Germany, the EU and NATO. They make war on everything that stands in the way of their world order of exploitation, misery, expulsion and environmental destruction.

Resisting these developments is important and the right thing to do.”
(Call by the Frankfurt FAU to take part in the May Day demonstration in Frankfurt)

⁸⁵ “Prinzipienerklärung” (Declaration of principles) of the FAU-IAA.

IV. Political parties and other groups

1. Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism)

Founded:	1989/90 Name was changed from Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED, Socialist Unity Party of Germany) to PDS
Headquarters:	Berlin
Party Chairman:	Lothar BISKY
Membership: ⁸⁶	65,753 (as of December 2002: 70,805), of which on the territory of the former West Germany
	4,378 (2002: 4,708)
Publications: (selected)	<i>DISPUT</i> (Dispute), monthly; <i>PDS-Pressedienst</i> (PDS Press Service), weekly; <i>Mitteilungen der Kommunistischen Plattform der PDS</i> (Bulletin of the Communist Faction of the PDS), monthly; <i>Marxistisches Forum</i> (Marxist Forum), at irregular intervals; <i>PDS International</i> , at irregular intervals

Party-internal conflicts over strategy and tactics continued, but lost some of their intensity after better PDS election results. Disputes between factions over the party's political profile continue to focus on the party's ambivalent image and action: On the one hand, it wants to take part under existing social conditions - for example as part of governing coalitions in *Land* governments; on the other hand, its long-term aim is to overthrow the system in order to establish a socialist society. The party conference in Potsdam on 30-31 October went off without major conflicts, as no fundamental decisions regarding the party's existence were on the agenda.

⁸⁶ Number of members as of 31 December 2003; current figures for 2004 are expected in mid-2005.

Openly extremist elements continue to be active within the party on the basis of the party programme and statutes. The PDS also continues to co-operate with left-wing extremists in Germany and abroad. Together with foreign communist parties, it founded the Party of the European Left. These facts serve as indications of left-wing extremist activity.

1.1 General developments

Party conference in Potsdam

At the party conference in Potsdam on 30-31 October, Party Chairman Lothar BISKY and most of the other members of the party executive were re-elected to their offices. Sahra WAGENKNECHT, a representative of the traditional faction and member of the national co-ordinating council of the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, Communist Faction of the PDS), was also re-elected. For the first time, a member of the speakers' council of the dogmatic leftist group known as Geraer Dialog/Sozialistischer Dialog (GD/SD, Gera Dialogue/Socialist Dialogue), Dorothee MENZNER, was also elected to the party executive.

Overthrowing the system

Despite ongoing controversy over the new party programme adopted in October 2003, the party conference – the party's supreme body, according to party statutes – confirmed the party's basic policy orientation. The large majority of delegates approved the main motion put forward by the party executive: "For a strong PDS: Socially minded, with all our might! - A socialist party in the German Bundestag in 2006". According to this motion, the PDS continues to strive, regardless of its co-operation in governments and parliaments, for a system going beyond the current social order. The party describes this position as a "strategic triangle":

"The PDS will ... concentrate on an independent, leftist-socialist policy. ... For our understanding of socialist policy, opposition and protest, the right to have a say in changes and alternatives that point beyond capitalism constitute an indissoluble strategic triangle. We are convinced that society can and must be changed – and to the benefit of the people."

(Joint issue of *DISPUT* 11/2004 and *PDS-Pressedienst* 45/56 of November 2004, p. 50 f.)

To establish socialism, the PDS considers it necessary to push back and ultimately overcome the "existing conditions", i.e. "capitalist

society” and the “power and property relations” responsible for exploitation and oppression.⁸⁷

Remembering the founding and end of the GDR

The party is still convinced that the attempt to establish a socialist state on German soil was legitimate. For example, the former speaker of the PDS Council of Elders called to mind the 55th anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on 7 October 1949, decried its passing and asserted:

“The victor reviles the GDR, which after all fell, ‘failed’.
... he fears what the GDR represented - socialism. Socialism has been declared dead, but it did not die with the GDR. As long as there is capitalism, the alternative, the only known alternative so far, is socialism.

(*KPF Bulletin*, No. 9/2004, p. 3.)

The PDS describes its own role accordingly as “social opposition”. Thus a leading functionary stressed:

Social opposition

“Change begins with opposition – that is still true. But our earlier slogan did not refer primarily to the narrow parliamentary space, but to the social opposition, on the street, at events, and naturally taken from there to Parliament as well.”

(*Neues Deutschland*, 11-12 September 2004, p. 22)

Participation in Hartz IV protests

The PDS was apparently not involved from the very beginning in organizing the “Monday demonstrations” associated with protests against the Hartz IV programme of unemployment benefit reforms, but was instead taken by surprise by this development. As the protests continued, however, PDS members participated in the demonstrations everywhere in the eastern German *Länder*; in some places, they even served as the main speakers. In many places, the PDS also provided technical support. Two of the main authors of the new PDS party programme described the anti-Hartz protests as the possible start to a “new transformation of society”.⁸⁸

Smaller membership

The decline in party membership continued again in 2004. The PDS claimed about 65,753 members at the end of 2003 (at the end of 2002: 70,805). This figure is nearly half of the 1993 number: 131,406 members. The main reason for this negative trend is party members’ very high average age: According to the party, more than 60% of

⁸⁷ PDS party programme, op. cit., p. 2 ff., p. 21 f.

⁸⁸ *Neues Deutschland*, 19 August 2004, p. 4.

PDS members are over 60, and only 3.6% are under 30.

1.2 Extremist structures in the PDS

In its programme and statutes, among others, the PDS continues to allow extremist groupings to be politically active within the party. This openness is portrayed as “pluralism”, which the party wishes to preserve. Openly extremist groups continue to be represented in important party bodies; they send a certain number of delegates to party conferences according to a predetermined distribution plan; and they continue to receive financial support in accordance with the party’s financial planning.⁸⁹

Within the party, the following groups in particular are active: the Kommunistische Plattform der PDS (KPF, Communist Faction of the PDS), the Marxistische Forum der PDS (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS), the organisations of the Forum Kommunistischer Arbeitsgemeinschaften (Forum of Communist Working Groups, formerly the Bund Westdeutscher Kommunisten, or Alliance of West German Communists) and – at least in two *Länder* – the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Junger GenossInnen in und bei der PDS (AGJG, Working Group of Young Comrades In and With the PDS). The Geraer Dialog/Sozialistischer Dialog (GD/SD, Gera Dialogue/Socialist Dialogue), founded in February 2003, is another nation-wide grouping of hard-line leftists in or associated with the PDS. The hard-line groupings within the party repeatedly stressed their wish to work together more closely.⁹⁰

KPF

The KPF remains strongly committed to the Marxist-Leninist tradition. At an event in January 2004 commemorating the 80th anniversary of Lenin’s death, a member of the national co-ordinating council of the KPF stressed that Lenin’s teachings continued to be relevant today. Studying Lenin’s works on strategy and tactics in the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolution help in arming oneself for the struggles of the present and future, the council member continued. The same is true, he said, of Lenin’s statement regarding participation in bourgeois parliaments:

“As far as the parliamentary issue is concerned, Lenin stressed above all the need to closely link parliamentary work with extra-parliamentary action. In doing so, he left no doubt that, as significant as the work in

⁸⁹ *DISPUT*, No. 4/2004 of April 2004, p. 36 f.

⁹⁰ Resolution of the 2nd meeting of the 12th national conference of the KPF, *Mitteilungen der KPF*, 10/2004, p. 21; *Bulletin des GD/SD* (Bulletin of the GD/SD), 1/April 2004, p. 3.

parliament may be, the extra-parliamentary struggle of the broad masses is the more important part.”

(Mitteilungen der KPF, No. 2/2004 of February 2004, p. 30)

With regard to the self-image of a revolutionary party of the working class (and thus also of the PDS), the KPF functionary went on to say that parties which opposed capital and worked on behalf of socialism in the spirit of Marx, Engels and Lenin, with the class consciousness of the proletarian avant-garde and in close alliance with the broadest masses of workers as the foundation of their party discipline, had not become obsolete:

“They can – and must – be true partners – not ‘leaders’ – to the new social movements which, though powerful, cannot fulfil the tasks of a revolutionary political party due to their breadth, specificity and heterogeneous character – which are their very strengths. For socialist, communist parties working in the spirit of Marx and Lenin, that is an enormous challenge. The legacy of Lenin will help master it.”

(Mitteilungen der KPF, No. 2/2004 of February 2004, p. 31)

The KPF continues to be represented in important party bodies. At the party conference, for example, Sahra WAGENKNECHT, a member of the national co-ordinating council of the KPF and a KPF national spokesperson until March 2004, was re-elected to the party executive with more than 60% of the vote. The KPF’s influence within the party was obvious from the make-up of the list of candidates for the European parliamentary elections: Contrary to the wishes of the party leadership, the KPF succeeded in placing WAGENKNECHT as its candidate near the top of the list, where she would be guaranteed a seat as long as the PDS won 5% of the votes. In fifth place on the list, WAGENKNECHT won a seat in the European Parliament as a representative of the PDS.

MF

The Marxistisches Forum (MF, Marxist Forum of the PDS) is a group of orthodox communist members and sympathisers. In addition to the nation-wide MF headquartered in Berlin (about 60 persons), the Marxistisches Forum Sachsen (Marxist Forum of Saxony) is an independent, state-wide working group associated with the PDS regional organisation in Saxony. Referring to the group’s understanding of its political tradition, the MF spokesman stated in January:

“Naturally, the bourgeois does not regard the October Revolution as its heritage. So, when we speak of heritage, what ties do we have to

the October Revolution of 1917 and its consequences? For me at least, it is anti-capitalism and the struggle for socialism. ... With every attempt, positive or negative, the experience of the great liberation of 1917 will be useful as an example inspiring courage and hope, and as a forceful lesson to do things differently.”
(*Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 1/2004 of January 2004, pp. 13, 27)

GD/SD

The Geraer Dialog/Sozialistischer Dialog (GD/SD, Gera Dialogue/Socialist Dialogue) arose as a reaction to the party conference in Gera, Thuringia, in October 2002, which was characterised by serious disagreement over fundamental issues. Since then, the GD/SD has increasingly become a catch-all for extremist elements in the PDS. Representatives of other extremist groupings such as the KPF and MF participate in its executive bodies (national speakers' council and national co-ordinating council). In a statement of 10 January, the general assembly confirmed its role as a collective movement:

“The PDS continues to have thousands of members who still hold fast to the goal of an alternative, socialist order for society. We wish to lend them strength: in as diverse a way as possible, as a perceptible socialist force within and beyond the PDS.”
(*Bulletin des GD/SD*, No. 1/April 2004, p. 3)

In its Socialist Action Programme, presented and adopted at the membership assembly in Berlin on 13 January, the GD/SD expressed its opposition to the existing order and the political balance of power and its support for fundamental change; it also made demands in line with traditional Marxist-Leninist positions:

“In this situation, socialist politics must make clear that those involved in the steadfast struggle to preserve and improve their living conditions must also fight for fundamental change in the balance of power. Political consciousness and oppositional power are formed in this struggle. ... The goal is to recognise the current struggles and opposition to the power of corporations and banks as part of the struggle for progressive social change and, in the long term, for an alternative, we would say, a socialist society. ... This is why we regard the extra-parliamentary struggle for social and political improvements to be decisive and want to be involved in it, together with others.”
(*Bulletin des GD/SD*, No. 1/April 2004, pp. 5, 9)

The GD/SD is striving for a socialist, anti-capitalist renewal in the party, as expressed by the GD/SD speakers' and co-ordinating council in July:

“We are fighting for the future of the anti-capitalist left in Germany. We are doing so within and outside the PDS. We are doing this with the awareness of our strength – but with the confidence of people who know that capitalism is not history’s last word.”
(*junge Welt*, 3-4 July 2004, p. 11)

At the PDS party conference in Potsdam, Dorothee MENZNER, member of the GD/SD national speakers’ council, was elected to the party executive with more than 50% of the votes. The GD/SD has significant support especially in the western German *Länder*.

**Youth organisation
solid**

The name of the youth organisation solid is an acronym of the German words for socialist, left-wing and democratic.⁹¹ The group, which is affiliated with the PDS, claims to have more than 1,300 members.⁹² Actual membership is likely to be around 800 persons. The organisation lost some members when the PDS founded its own youth organisations in the states of Berlin, Brandenburg, Hesse and North-Rhine/Westphalia. According to its annual budget, the PDS gives solid annual funding of €70,000.⁹³

The organisation continues efforts to deepen its co-operation with communist youth organisations abroad. For example, representatives of communist youth organisations in Greece, France, Italy, Finland and Denmark were guests at the national conference of delegates in Berlin on 2-4 April. A joint delegation made up of PDS and solid members met with the Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (Austrian Communist Party) in Graz on 9-12 September. Together with the communist youth organisations Jeunes Communistes of France and Giovani Communisti of Italy and the leftist-socialist youth organisation Neolaia Synaspismos from Greece, solid organised a workshop at the European Social Forum in London on 14-17 October entitled “Consequences of the European Constitution on everyone’s life”.

Solid also works with other German left-wing extremists. For example, the organisation’s website advertised a seminar on theory and practice in the urban guerrilla movement, to be held in Trier on 19-21 November and 3-5 December; seminar speakers included members of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF, Red Army Faction).

⁹¹ According to the statutes, Section 1 para. 2, solid is officially associated with the PDS. “It is legally independent from a party as defined in the Basic Law.”

⁹² *DISPUT*, No. 6/2004 of June 2004, p. 30.

⁹³ *DISPUT*, No. 4/2004 of April 2004, p. 36 f.

PDS founds own youth organisation

During 2004, the PDS founded its own youth organisations in a number of *Länder*. The main reason given for this development was the legal separation between solid and the PDS, as solid is only affiliated with the PDS and is not part of the party.⁹⁴ The PDS-Jugendforum NRW (PDS Youth Forum of North-Rhine/Westphalia) was founded on 10 January as a working group of the PDS in North-Rhine/Westphalia. The PDS-Jugend Hessen (PDS Youth of Hesse) was founded on 16 March; solid members also belong to the group. The founding declaration stated:

“We stand for modern socialist politics with real expectations of more social justice and a more peaceful society, without losing sight of our main goal, namely pushing back and ultimately overcoming capitalism. For this reason, the PDS-Jugend Hessen regards itself as rigorously anti-capitalist.”

(*Neues Offenbach*, No. 2/2004, no date, p. 3)

The PDS-Jugend Berlin-Brandenburg (PDS Youth of Berlin-Brandenburg) was founded in Potsdam on 17-18 April. Unlike solid, this group expects members to explicitly identify with the PDS programme and aims.⁹⁵ The group’s chairman stated that it hoped to form new “cadres” for the party, whose membership is ageing.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ According to press release 14/2002, p. 6, the PDS party executive officially recognised solid as a PDS-affiliated youth organisation on 25 March 2002.

⁹⁵ Draft statutes of the PDS-Jugend Berlin-Brandenburg.

⁹⁶ *Neues Deutschland* (New Germany), 19 April, 2004, p. 16.

1.3 Participation in elections

In 2004, the PDS did surprisingly well in elections.

European parliamentary elections

The PDS regarded the European parliamentary elections on 13 June as a test run for the German parliamentary elections in 2006. The party won 6.1% of the vote (1,579,693 votes), 0.3 percentage points more than in 1999 (1,567,745 votes), increasing its seats to seven from six, including a seat for Sahra WAGENKNECHT, member of the national co-ordinating council of the KPF. Leading party functionaries expressed their satisfaction with the results, saying that the party had announced its comeback at the national level. The PDS official in charge of elections described this result as a “nation-wide signal” and as “urgently needed for the party’s future”.⁹⁷

Land parliamentary elections

After its good showing in the *Land* parliamentary elections, the party displayed a growing sense of optimism.

For example, in the elections for the Thuringian parliament on 13 June, the party won 26.1% of the votes (264,268 votes; 1999 results: 21.3% and 247,906 votes). This gave the PDS a total of 28 seats, including five candidates elected directly (1999: 21 seats, no directly elected candidates).

In the elections to the Saarland parliament on 5 September, the party won 2.3% (10,237 votes), nearly tripling its result of 1999 (0.8% and 4,483 votes). However, it still failed to come close to entering the *Land* parliament.

In the elections to the Brandenburg parliament on 19 September, the party won 28% of the second votes (326,922 votes; 1999: 23.3%, 257,294 votes) and 29 seats (1999: 22), including 23 directly elected candidates (1999: 5), making it the second-strongest party in the parliament.

In the Saxony parliamentary elections on 19 September, the PDS also maintained its position as second-strongest party there, winning 23.6% of the vote (490,488 votes; 1999: 22.2%, 480,118 votes) and 31 seats (1999: 30), including four directly elected candidates (1999: none).

Local elections

In local elections in Saarland, Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate on 13 June, the PDS won a larger percentage of the vote than in the previous elections. Due to lower voter participation in local

⁹⁷ *DISPUT*, No. 4/2004 of April 2004, p. 47.

elections in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, the PDS won a larger percentage of the vote than in the previous elections, although the actual number of votes received was smaller.

In local elections in North-Rhine/Westphalia on 26 September, the PDS won 1.4% of the vote (1999: 0.8%).

1.4 Co-operation with German left-wing extremists outside the party

Relationship with the DKP

Due to their shared traditions, the PDS maintains a critical stance towards the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) while acting in solidarity with it. Their relationship is multi-faceted, ranging from talks and participation in party conferences to joint lists of candidates for local elections.

During the preparations for the European parliamentary elections, there were various contacts at the executive level. For example, the chairmen of the two parties and other leading functionaries met for an informational discussion.⁹⁸ A member of the PDS national party executive was a speaker at the DKP European elections conference in Berlin on 10-11 January.⁹⁹ DKP chairman Heinz STEHR was a guest at the PDS European party conference in Berlin on 31 January-1 February.¹⁰⁰ But unlike 1999, in the 2004 European parliamentary elections the PDS and DKP did not have shared lists of candidates.

The parties mainly co-operate on the local and regional levels, often through communist forces in the PDS, particularly those of the KPF. For example, the DKP chairman sent a greeting to the 12th national conference of the KPF on 18 September.¹⁰¹

In the local elections in North-Rhine/Westphalia, DKP members ran on open PDS lists in various cities (Düsseldorf and Münster) and districts (Recklinghausen, Düren, Wuppertal and Velbert).¹⁰²

Co-operation with autonomists

Some PDS representatives, organisations and structures continued to work in alliances with left-wing extremists who are prepared to use

⁹⁸ *Unsere Zeit (UZ, Our Time)*, 30 January 2004, p. 7.

⁹⁹ *UZ*, 16 January 2004, p. 1; *UZ*, 6 February 2004, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ *UZ*, 6 February 2004, p. 6.

¹⁰¹ *Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 10/2004, p. 23.

¹⁰² *UZ*, 1 October 2004, p. 6; *UZ*, 3 September 2004, p. 12.

violence. For example, a member of the PDS faction in the Berlin *Land* parliament applied for a permit for a demonstration on 20 November organised largely by anti-fascist groups and bearing the motto “No homezone for fascists! Antifa means attack!”

The PDS national party executive and the youth organisation solid lent their support to a major demonstration in Nuremberg on 6 November with the motto “Together against welfare cuts, Agenda 2010 and Hartz IV! A different world is possible and necessary!”¹⁰³ A “nation-wide anti-capitalist bloc” of various autonomist groups, initiated by organisierte autonomie (oa, Organised Autonomy) of Nuremberg, also took part in the demonstration.

1.5 International links

The PDS is openly committed to internationalism; it continues to maintain a variety of contacts with communist parties abroad, for example by sending delegations to their party conferences, attending conferences and taking part in other bilateral discussions. For example, the PDS signed a common call to the European elections drafted by 14 communist, socialist and leftist-environmental parties, including the communist parties of Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Luxembourg, Portugal and Slovakia as well as two Italian communist parties.¹⁰⁴ In the document, the signatories agreed to co-operate in a number of ways.

Founding of the Party of the European Left

The PDS claims to have played a crucial role in the initiative to found the Party of the European Left (EL). For example, at the invitation of the PDS, an initial meeting of 19 leftist parties from 17 countries was held in Berlin on 10-11 January. At the founding congress in Rome on 8-9 May, 15 parties from 13 countries joined in supporting the EL: In addition to the PDS, these included the Communist Refoundation Party (PRC) of Italy, the communist parties of Austria, France, San Marino, Slovakia and Spain, the United Left of Spain and the United Left of Catalonia, as well as leftist-socialist parties from Estonia, Greece, Romania, Hungary, Switzerland and the Czech Republic. In accordance with the statutes, the PDS, like all the other member organisations, has designated two members to serve on the EL

¹⁰³ Flyer “Together against welfare cuts, Agenda 2010 and Hartz IV! A different world is possible and necessary!” Responsible author under the terms of the Press Act: Walter Bauer/Sozialforum Nürnberg (Social Forum Nuremberg); *Neues Deutschland*, 8 November 2004, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ *Neues Deutschland*, 22-23 May 2004; *PDS-Pressedienst* No. 23, 4 June 2004, p. 9.

Executive Board: currently one member of the board and one staff member responsible for international relations. In its Statute, adopted at its founding congress, the EL says of itself:

“We unite democratic parties of the alternative and progressive Left on the European continent that strive for the consistent transformation of today’s social relationships into a peaceful and socially just society ... Therefore we feel ourselves obligated to the values and traditions of the socialist, communist and labour movement ... of peace and international solidarity, of human rights, humanism and antifascism, of progressive and liberal thinking, both nationally and internationally. ... We defend the legitimacy of our movement which inspired millions of people and brought them social security. We keep the memory of these struggles alive including the sacrifices and the sufferings.”
(Statute of the Party of the European Left, as quoted in *DISPUT*, No. 6/2004 of June 2004)

The EL has 17 representatives in the newly elected European Parliament. Together with the Party of Italian Communists, the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia from the Czech Republic – both with observer status – and the communist parties of Greece and Portugal, they make up the Confederated Group of the United European Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the European Parliament, with a total of 41 seats. With seven seats, the PDS is the strongest member party in the GUE/NGL.

European co-operation

The PDS also belongs to the New European Forum of the Left (NELF). NELF is an association of 17 communist, leftist-socialist and leftist-environmental parties and organisations from 14 European countries. It includes the PDS as the only German member organisation, as well as the communist parties of France and Italy.

Solidarity with Cuba

The PDS sets particular store by its solidarity with Cuba. For example, the delegates to the PDS party conference on 30-31 October resolved that all party structures and organisations should strengthen their political and material solidarity with Cuba.¹⁰⁵

The main group involved in this work is the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Cuba Si beim Parteivorstand der PDS (Working Group ‘Cuba Si’ of the Party Executive of the PDS), founded in 1991; according to PDS information, it comprises 39 regional groups. The working group continued collecting cash and in-kind donations for humanitarian

¹⁰⁵ Joint issue of *DISPUT* No. 11/2004 and *PDS-Pressedienst* No. 45/46, p. 67.

purposes and together with the KPF took part in the project “Computers for Cuba”. With regard to this project, Cuba Si stated:

“We declare our decisive solidarity with the struggle of the Cuban people and their revolutionary government for the right to sovereignty and self-determination! Hands off Cuba!”

(Declaration of Cuba Si dated 12 May 2004, as quoted in *Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 7/2004, p. 16)

At its 12th national conference on 18 September, the KPF also emphasised its solidarity with Cuba:

“We are intensifying our solidarity with socialist Cuba ... and therefore not least with the governments of these countries.”

(*Mitteilungen der KPF*, No. 4/2004, p. 22)

Solidarity with Kurdistan

For years the PDS – both individual representatives and party organisations – has taken up concerns of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which has been banned from all activity in Germany, and its successor organisations, the Kurdish Congress for Freedom and Democracy (KADEK) and Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA GEL), in order to provide political support for them. PDS chairman Lothar BISKY was a guest speaker at a rally marking the Kurdish New Year Newroz; about 25,000 persons attended the rally in Hanover on 20 March. BISKY called on his audience to demand peace, justice and freedom, and expressed his empathy and support for the hundreds of thousands, in some places even millions, of Kurds demonstrating for their rights on the Kurdish New Year holiday.¹⁰⁶ For Kurds, Newroz is inseparable from the long history of the Kurdish struggle for freedom and peace and opposing political, social and cultural oppression.

The Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (Rosa Luxemburg Foundation), with ties to the PDS, organised a discussion forum in Berlin on 23 February entitled “Turkey, the EU and the Kurds”; in addition to PDS members, one member of the KONGRA GEL executive council also took part, among others.

¹⁰⁶ *Kurdistan Report*, No. 113 of May 2004.

2. Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and its circle

2.1 DKP

Founded:	1968
Headquarters:	Essen
Chairman:	Heinz STEHR
Membership:	about 4,500 (2003: 4,700)
Publications:	<i>Unsere Zeit (UZ, Our Time)</i> Circulation: 7,500 (2003: 7,500) weekly

Continued revolutionary orientation

The DKP continues to regard itself as the “party of scientific socialism” and views the “working class [as] that revolutionary force” which, allied with other parts of the population, “revolutionises the relations of property and power and can realise socialism”.¹⁰⁷ The DKP hopes to raise “crucial, fundamental social issues like property and power relations” and insert “socialist visions of the future” into current protest movements.¹⁰⁸

In its proposed plan of action, at the 17th party conference in February 2005 the party executive defined the most important areas of struggle as the “anti-imperialist” effort, resistance to social welfare reform, and rejection of the EU Constitution and Federal Government measures to oppose terrorism.

The party saw a slight decline in membership, mainly caused by the loss of older comrades.

Difficult financial situation

The party also remained on a weak financial footing. In its report and statement of account prepared in accordance with Section 23 of the Political Parties Act (Parteiengesetz), the DKP reported income in 2003 of €1.2 million, including €512,000 in donations. The party was able to avoid bankruptcy in 2004 only because it unexpectedly inherited significant sums of money and assets from deceased party

¹⁰⁷ “DKP working plan for 2005/2006 (orientation for action)”, in: *UZ*, 12 November 2004.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*

members. The party publication *Unsere Zeit* proved to be especially expensive, although orthodox communists regard it as essential. In order to ensure its weekly publication, the party sought donations and new subscribers, but circulation continued to decline.

Internal conflicts

A more serious problem for the party was the escalation of internal conflicts, above all between western and eastern party associations over issues of policy and ideology. These conflicts increasingly hindered the party's ability to act and the "unity and purity" crucial to orthodox communists. The conflicts essentially arise from differing views of the party, ideological orientations, strategy and tactics. The majority of DKP members come from the former West Germany; they and the party leadership adhere to the principle of legality chosen by the DKP for its "reconstitution" in 1968 in reaction to the 1956 ban on the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD, Communist Party of Germany) in West Germany. As a result, the DKP avoids openly anti-constitutional terms such as "dictatorship of the proletariat", using less pointed ones such as "power of the working class" instead; it is also careful to distance itself from revolutionary organisations engaged in terrorist activity, for example outside Germany. The party hopes to gradually overcome the existing social order with the help of allies, traditionally the labour unions but more recently also those in social movements opposed to neo-liberal capitalism.

This consensus is no longer shared by large parts of the eastern German party organisations, nor by isolated advocates of a more open extremism in western Germany. Whole party organisations in eastern Germany, mainly those controlled by former functionaries of the SED, the ruling communist party in East Germany, reject the DKP's semantic caution. These organisations are mainly associated with the Berlin/Brandenburg district organisation and the neo-Stalinist magazine *RotFuchs* (Red Fox). In summer, the party leadership warned those engaged in "leftist opportunist deviations":

"The foundations of our party-internal democracy are being interpreted differently and are keeping the DKP from making a mark as a politically viable, unified force. There is too little concerted effort. For example, how can one explain that regional DKP newspapers in Berlin represented positions on key political problems like the Iraq conflict that differed from the positions worked out in the party executive; that policies and individual comrades in positions of leadership have been publicly attacked ..."

(Report by Heinz Stehr at the 7th conference of the party executive on 26-27 June 2004, *DKP-Informationen*, No. 4/2004, 1 July 2004, p. 23)

The conflict also affected the DKP's international efforts and kept the Central Arbitration Committee of the party executive busy: DKP member Klaus von RAUSSENDORF, who before 1989 had been an East German agent in the Federal Foreign Office, founded a "German solidarity committee Free Iraq" in July, which openly called on the DKP to support the terrorist "resistance" in Iraq.¹⁰⁹ The party executive rejected this demand, choosing instead to work with its "brother party" in Iraq, which was co-operating with the Iraqi government.

Little connection to protest campaigns

Due to its internal conflicts, the DKP was unable to have much impact on protest campaigns. On the other hand, it was pleased to note signs that certain labour unions were loosening their ties to the political parties represented in the Bundestag:

"On the other hand, we are witnessing how the unions are forging new alliances, hesitantly; but one can see an openness to the social movement."

(Report given at the 8th conference of the party executive on 18-19 September 2004, quoted in *DKP Informationen*, No. 6/2004, 25 September 2004, p. 9)

Participation in elections

The DKP participated in the European parliamentary elections on 13 June with its programme "A different Europe is possible!"¹¹⁰ The party received 37,000 votes (0.1%).

The DKP had greater success with selected, highly focused campaigns in local elections in Saarland in June and North-Rhine/Westphalia in September, winning a surprising proportion of the vote. Winning 15.6% of the vote, it took six seats on the local council of Püttlingen, Saarland; and with 6.5%, it won four seats on the local council of Bottrop, North-Rhine/Westphalia.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ *junge Welt*, 15 November 2004.

¹¹⁰ *DKP-Informationen extra*, 10 December 2003.

¹¹¹ *UZ*, 18 June 2004; *UZ*, 1 October 2004.

2.2 Organisations associated with the DKP

A number of organisations associated with the DKP either largely share the party's orientation or are headed by DKP members.

SDAJ and AMS

The youth and student organisation **Sozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterjugend (SDAJ, Socialist German Workers' Youth)** and the **Assoziation Marxistischer StudentInnen (AMS, Association of Marxist Students)** remained closely linked to the DKP. Politically, they are indistinguishable from the DKP, but are independent in legal terms. However, with only 300 and 50 followers, respectively, the SDAJ and AMS are unable to adequately fulfil their traditional role as the DKP's "reserve cadres".

VVN-BdA

The **Vereinigung der Verfolgten des Naziregimes – Bund der Antifaschistinnen und Antifaschisten e.V. (VVN-BdA, Union of Victims of Nazi Persecution – Alliance of Anti-Fascists, reg'd society)** still has a large number of – mostly older – communists among its leadership. With its predominantly elderly membership, the group initiated almost no activities with an external impact. Its activity was limited to propaganda, in line with the typical communist analysis, arguing that right-wing extremism is inherently linked to market economy systems, and thus that state institutions in western democracies are more likely to support right-wing extremist activity than fight it. The VVN-BdA demanded "efficient anti-fascist action strategies opposing neo-Nazi street marches and government permission for them";¹¹² it deplored "increasing Nazi activity and tolerance for it on the part of the police, judiciary and elected officials", in contrast to the "defamation of the VVN-BdA and other anti-fascist groups".¹¹³ Thus even 60 years after the end of World War II, the VVN publication *Antifa* focused on the struggle against "historical revisionism", i.e. maintaining myths of communist resistance as the main source of legitimacy for communist regimes, as a central concern of the "ideological struggle". VVN-BdA functionary Dr. Ulrich SCHNEIDER complained that the current social discourse was paying too little attention to an "anti-fascist perspective on the economic and social forces driving fascism and war".¹¹⁴ The VVN-BdA agreed with the DKP on this point; the latter viewed "the conflict over historical truth

¹¹² VVN-BdA publication *Antifa*, December 2003/January 2004, p. 15.

¹¹³ *Antifa*, April/May 2004, p. 27.

¹¹⁴ *Antifa*, April/May 2004, p. 9.

and the political consequences” as an “important socio-political conflict”.¹¹⁵

In May, the VVN-BdA assumed the leadership of the largely dormant umbrella organisation of communist resistance fighters *Fédération Internationale des Résistants* (FIR, International Federation of Resistance Fighters). FIR’s offices were moved from Vienna to Berlin, and SCHNEIDER became the organisation’s new general secretary.¹¹⁶

**Bundesausschuss
Friedensratschlag**

The main public activity of the **Bundesausschuss Friedensratschlag** (German Peace Forum) in 2004 was its conference in Kassel on 4-5 December. The conference reinforced the group’s adherence to a Leninist analysis of the causes of war and suggested a connection between the Nazis’ war strategy and the European Community’s plans for joint military structures. In a resolution, the participants contrasted the historical reminder “Fascism and war - never again” with the present normality of war, armament, “dismantling of the welfare state and the revival of racist and fascist ideologies” 60 years after Germany’s liberation from war and fascism. The resolution therefore endorsed Europe, but opposed the current draft EU constitution.

**Deutscher
Freidenker-Verband**

Communists are traditionally active within the **Deutsche Freidenker-Verband (DFV)**, German Association of Freethinkers), and the DFV did not object when its national chairman, Klaus HARTMANN (DKP) made statements describing terrorist activity in Iraq as legitimate resistance permitted under international law and comparing measures taken by the Iraqi government and US troops with war crimes committed by the SS and Wehrmacht units in Lidice and Oradour during World War II.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁵ UZ, 12 November 2004, p. 19.

¹¹⁶ UZ, 14 May 2004, p. 7.

¹¹⁷ Press release of the DFV executive dated 11 December 2003.

3. Trotskyist groups

Seventeen international Trotskyist umbrella organisations with 21 sections and splinter groups continue to be active in Germany, with a total of around 1,700 activists (2003: about 1,800). These are organised in groups ranging in size from very small to viable structures with several hundred members.

Members of action-oriented Trotskyist currents participated in social protest campaigns and other typical areas of left-wing extremist activity. As they often have young supporters, are tightly organised and co-ordinated on an international level, their activities were at times much more prominent than those of larger left-wing groupings.

By contrast, ideologically rigid groups remained insignificant and isolated even within the left-wing extremist spectrum; as self-appointed guardians of orthodox Trotskyism, they largely restricted their activities to ideological struggles with competing Trotskyist groups. One such group, the Spartakist-Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (SpAD, Spartacist Workers' Party of Germany) celebrated the 40th anniversary of its international umbrella organisation and swore to keep fighting for a "revolutionary avant-garde party with a democratic-centralised structure in the tradition of the early Communist International under Lenin and Trotsky" and to win the support of the "boldest and farthest-seeing of the young generation ... for the programme of proletarian revolution".¹¹⁸

3.1 The group Linksruck

With roughly 400 members (2003: roughly 500), Linksruck remained the most agile Trotskyist organisation in Germany. As the German section of the London-based international Trotskyist umbrella organisation International Socialist Tendency (IST), Linksruck unconditionally adheres to the IST's programme. The British section of the IST, the British Socialist Workers Party (SWP), politically dominated the European Social Forum of the anti-globalisation movement which met in London in October.

**Opposition to
"dismantling the
welfare state"**

Linksruck had a difficult time distributing its forces among various fields of action. The organisation made opposition to the "dismantling

¹¹⁸ "Vierzig Jahre Spartacist: Vorwärts zur Wiedergeburt der Vierten Internationale" (Spartacist for Forty Years: Forwards to the rebirth of the Fourth International) in *Spartacist*, No. 24, German edition, Summer 2004, p. 5.

of the welfare state” (*Sozialabbau*) its priority. It regarded a large-scale demonstration against the Federal Government’s social policy in Berlin on 3 April as an “earthquake within the German working class”¹¹⁹ and demanded “an end to cutbacks – dump Schröder!”¹²⁰ At the same time, it called on its members to “interfere” in the project of a “new Left Party” using the typical Trotskyist tactic of entryism, or infiltration. It said that its members should work within such a party to achieve the “recognition that capitalism cannot be reformed” and to ensure that the struggle for reforms would be a struggle to overthrow the capitalist order of society.¹²¹ According to the internal instructions, in case of doubt this effort was to take priority over the involvement of Linksruck cadres in the anti-globalisation network ATTAC, although this involvement has existed for years.

Opposition to US policy on Iraq

Linksruck continued its opposition to the US-led intervention in Iraq, especially as this issue remained the dominant one for the IST. Linksruck sought contact to Muslim groups as part of its campaign to gather signatures in opposition to a possible headscarf ban for Muslim teachers in several German *Länder*; the campaign attracted little public attention. The group also continued to display no qualms about terrorist forms of “resistance” in Iraq and the Israeli-occupied territories. Writing about the European Social Forum (London, 14-17 October), a member of the Linksruck national leadership published the following on the Internet about the group’s position:

“As in Florence, in London the war against Iraq played a central role. The reason is clear: On the one hand, a situation is brewing in Iraq that is similar to the one thirty years ago in Vietnam. If the US suffers defeat, that will be a world-wide victory for the movements opposing war, oppression and globalisation. If not, more wars will threaten, which would speed up the rulers’ neo-liberal agenda.”

¹¹⁹ *Linksruck-Notizen* (Linksruck Notes), 9 February 2004, p. 1.

¹²⁰ *Linksruck – Zeitung für internationalen Sozialismus* (Linksruck – Newspaper for international socialism), No. 174, 17 March 2004, p. 1.

¹²¹ “Sieben Thesen von Linksruck zur Diskussion um eine neue Linkspartei,” (Seven theses from Linksruck regarding the discussion of a new Left Party), *Linksruck-Notizen*, 5 April 2004.

3.2 Sozialistische Alternative (SAV, Socialist Alternative)

SAV is the German section of the international Trotskyist umbrella organisation Committee for a Workers International (CWI) based in London. The organisation aims to “abolish the capitalist system of profit everywhere in the world and build up a federation of socialist democracies”.¹²²

The number of SAV members rose slightly to 400 from 380 in 2003. Its strongest local groups were those at its headquarters in Berlin and in Hamburg, Kassel, Cologne, Aachen and Stuttgart.

The group declared that capitalism could be toppled “not by reforms, but only through revolution”. Doing so requires a “revolutionary socialist party”, which SAV said it would work to create.¹²³

Election victories

The SAV took part in local elections, gaining a larger percentage of votes as well as seats on the local councils in Aachen, Cologne and Rostock. It also forecast greater opportunities offered by the founding of new parties to bring together the employed, the unemployed and young people and prepared its members to take part in founding a new party to the left of the SPD (Social Democratic Party). Within the new party, the SAV aims to work on behalf of a “socialist programme and a socialist perspective”, as it has already done within the anti-globalisation network ATTAC.¹²⁴

Work with the unions

The SAV continued to advocate a union-based opposition capable of mounting campaigns. It therefore took part in related activities by the “Initiative to network union leftists” mounted by the “Network for an aggressive and democratic ver.di”.¹²⁵ At the SAV’s insistence, the network was founded in 1996 within the ÖTV union, ver.di’s predecessor. The SAV publication had the following to say on the topic:

“The unions must be overhauled from top to bottom, using strikes and the rapid creation of a union-internal opposition in order to be recreated as the workers’ fighting organisations.”
(*Solidarität - Sozialistische Zeitung*, No. 27 of July/August 2004, p. 4)

¹²² The SAV publication *Solidarität - Sozialistische Zeitung* (Solidarity: Socialist Newspaper), No. 29 of October 2004, p. 11.

¹²³ *Solidarität - Sozialistische Zeitung*, No. 24 of April 2004, p. 7.

¹²⁴ Flyer published by the SAV central office in October 2004.

¹²⁵ *Solidarität - Sozialistische Zeitung*, No. 28 of September 2004, p. 7.

3.3 German followers of the Internationale Arbeitnehmergeverbindung (IAV, International Workers Association)

The IAV's long-term entryism

For the last 15 years, the Paris-based umbrella organisation IV. Internationale/Centre Internationale de la Reconstruction has played a special role in international Trotskyism. Its followers, called Lambertists after Pierre LAMBERT, who founded this current, follow a strategy known as long-term entryism, or infiltration: Without revealing their Trotskyist orientation, they prefer to work within socialist/social democratic parties. After deciding on this strategy in the second half of the 1980s, the Lambertist International immediately founded apparently harmless cover organisations: the IAV at international level and the Europäische Arbeitnehmergeverbindung (EAV, European Workers Association) at European level. Each conducts “open world” conferences and European conferences, respectively, on a regular basis.

Followers of the former Internationale Sozialistische Arbeiterorganisation (ISA, International Socialist Workers Organisation), as the German section was named, have published the journal *Soziale Politik & Demokratie – Für eine wirkliche sozialdemokratische Politik* (Social policy & democracy: For a truly social-democratic policy) since the early 1990s. In that publication, they portray themselves as members of the SPD and labour unions. The aim of this group, whose membership has remained essentially unchanged for years, is to alienate the social-democratic grass-roots from its supposedly “rightist leaders” and win its support for revolutionary causes; to do so, the group carefully hides its Trotskyist orientation and follows the classic tactics for forming a “unified front from below”. Lambertist Trotskyists therefore go out of their way to demonstrate their apparent loyalty to the party they have infiltrated. “We need our SPD back - not some leftist party or other”, followers told the journal *Soziale Politik & Demokratie* in March.¹²⁶ Nonetheless, not long after that they initiated the campaign “A call to alarm: Schröder must go – whether he wants to or not!”, saying among other things: “Let us join together to free the party from the leaden chains with which Schröder and his policies threaten to strangle it. Let us organise in order to chase Schröder away and save the party.”¹²⁷ But as expected, the conference on this topic, held in Cologne on 9

¹²⁶ *Soziale Politik & Demokratie*, No. 112, 31 March 2004, p. 3.

¹²⁷ *Soziale Politik & Demokratie*, No. 117, 15 August 2004, pp. 1-4.

October, attracted no participants other than those already active for many years in Trotskyist cadres.

4. Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany)

Founded:	1982
Headquarters:	Gelsenkirchen (Central Committee)
Chairman:	Stefan ENGEL
Membership:	more than 2,000 (2003: around 2,000)
Publications:	<i>Rote Fahne</i> (Red Flag), weekly; <i>REBELL</i> (Rebel, magazine of the youth organisation of the same name), every two months; <i>Lernen und Kämpfen</i> (Learn and Fight), several times a year

The Maoist/Stalinist-oriented MLPD held its seventh party conference in spring, as usual in conspiratorial fashion and at an undisclosed location. At the conference, the party declared that it had a great potential “to actually move and lead the masses in unity with the objective of destabilising imperialism and thereby become the party of the masses.”¹²⁸ At the same time, it announced to its comrades that the times were getting harder and the demands made of the comrades were growing.¹²⁹

Instrumentalising the Monday demonstrations

The party initially profited from the increasing protests against the Federal Government’s social reforms. As early as 2003, the party had organised Monday demonstrations in eastern German cities to protest the “dismantling of the welfare state” (*Sozialabbau*). Largely isolated within the left-wing extremist spectrum, the party was again initially alone in this effort. But as dissatisfaction with the Federal Government’s labour market reforms flared in July, the MLPD was able to take advantage of its advance preparation. For several weeks, as up to several thousand people spontaneously turned out for the demonstrations with the MLPD’s motto “Get rid of Hartz IV - We are the people”, the party was able to use the protests for its own ends.

¹²⁸ Documents of the 7th party conference of the MLPD, Report of the Central Committee, p. 247.

¹²⁹ Documents of the 7th party conference of the MLPD, Report of the Central Committee, p. 318.

“In many cities, the MLPD helped initiate the protests. It supports the principle of equal co-operation on an anti-fascist footing and encourages ordinary people to speak up and become new politicians. Wherever the MLPD appeared alone, its information stands, for example, were virtually overrun ... The fact that the MLPD is participating in and strengthening the Monday demonstrations is in the interests of the workers’ and popular movement.”

(*Rote Fahne*, 13 August 2004, p. 4)

The MLPD was not able to maintain its control over the Monday demonstrations in the face of interference from competing left-wing extremist groups. The party was right in identifying Trotskyists and forces associated with the DKP as being behind “attempts by certain ATTAC, PDS and union leaders to splinter” the protests.¹³⁰

MLPD role in work stoppages at Bochum Opel plant

The events nonetheless provided a boost to motivation within the small party, which viewed the often spontaneous protests as the start of a “revolutionary ferment” that was only waiting for party leadership. In mid-October it believed this view had been confirmed when a party group was able to contribute to a spontaneous work stoppage at the Adam Opel AG plant in Bochum.

5. Rote Hilfe e.V. (RH, Red Aid, reg’d society)

Founded:	1975
Headquarters:	Göttingen (national secretariat)
Membership:	more than 4,600 (2003: more than 4,600)
Publication:	<i>Die Rote Hilfe</i> (Red Aid), quarterly

The outstanding event for the RH was the group’s national delegates’ assembly (BDV) in Straussberg, Thuringia, on 11-12 September. The national delegates’ assembly is the organisation’s highest-ranking body and meets every two years, according to the statutes. The assembly elected a new national executive and ruled on structural issues. The assembly agreed to increase regular financial support for

¹³⁰ *Rote Fahne*, 24 September 2004, p. 3; *Rote Fahne*, 17 September 2004, p. 11.

the group *Angehörige und Freunde der politischen Gefangenen* (Friends and Relatives of Political Prisoners) and for Azadi, a separate legal aid fund to help Kurds allegedly subject to political persecution due to their activities on behalf of the PKK or its successor organisations. In Strausberg, the RH portrayed itself as stable and viable; it has apparently overcome its organisational and financial weakness of the late 1990s. In line with the RH's goal of remaining non-partisan and neutral with regard to the various left-wing currents, the group's membership includes followers from the entire left-wing extremist spectrum. The more than 4,600 members are organised into 37 local groups throughout almost the entire country.

Again in 2004, one of the RH's important areas of activity was providing financial support for left-wing extremists whom the RH thinks are being made criminally responsible for their political activities in the Federal Republic of Germany. In accordance with its statutes, the RH spent nearly 50% of its funds (nearly €100,000) for this purpose. As part of its "anti-repression efforts", the RH used targeted press releases and statements of solidarity, for example drawing a connection between "Political Prisoners' Day"¹³¹ on 18 March and its 2003 campaign on behalf of a commando group to release all political prisoners. Members of this group were sentenced in December 2003 to imprisonment on several counts of arson.¹³² The RH demanded that the sentences be overturned.

Other efforts focused on a member of the RH national party executive from Heidelberg, who had been barred for the foreseeable future from practising his profession as a schoolteacher due to his involvement with a left-wing extremist group that advocates militancy. The RH organised a major demonstration in Heidelberg on 23 October (motto: "No to the renewed practice of professional bans! Fight all forms of state repression!"¹³³) and a number of informational events around the country.

During the 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy on 6-8 February, a strong police presence was able to prevent rioting by violent left-wing extremists. As a follow-up to the protests, in October the RH distributed a 52-page document and CD-ROM entitled *Der Umgang des Staates mit den Protesten gegen die*

¹³¹ The traditional day of commemoration on 18 March recalls the bourgeois resistance to feudalism in 1848 and the start of the Paris Commune in 1871. As early as 1923, the Internationale Rote Hilfe (International Red Aid) declared this date to be a "day of solidarity with political prisoners".

¹³² Both the prosecution and the defence appealed the sentence. A decision is still pending.

¹³³ *Die Rote Hilfe*, No. 1/2004, p. 29.

Sicherheitskonferenz 2004 in München. Ausnahmezustand – Polizeikessel – Massenfestnahmen – Polizeiübergriffe - Überwachung (How the state dealt with protests against the 2004 Security Conference in Munich: State of emergency, police encirclement, mass arrests, police harassment, surveillance).

The RH also opposed the growing electronic networking between European countries, which it calls the “European repression network”. A headline in the RH newspaper *Die Rote Hilfe* No. 3/2004 asserted that there was no resistance to the expansion of the national and European apparatuses of repression. The RH criticised the European Arrest Warrant, the creation of new computer search and surveillance systems and a new European “border regime”. To defend against these measures, the RH called on the European left and persons politically active in “anti-fascist, anti-sexist, anti-racist, anti-imperialist, anarchist, communist ... groupings” to link their resistance efforts and discuss creating Europe-wide anti-repression structures.

V. Areas of activity

1. Anti-fascism

Anti-fascism aimed at overthrowing the system

The “anti-fascist struggle” or “anti-fascism” is a traditional focus of activity and discussion among left-wing extremist groups and followers. It has long been directed only superficially against right-wing extremism; its ultimate aim is to overthrow the existing social order, in which it believes fascism is rooted. After the recent success of right-wing extremist parties in *Land* parliamentary elections, anti-fascism again became a focus of attention. At least some violent left-wing extremist elements consciously tried to overcome their lengthy inactivity, associated among other things with limited willingness to mobilise, with uncertainty and frustration and the collapse of organisational structures.

“An absolutely current example of successful anti-fascist struggle is the protest of 1 May 2004 in Berlin-Friedrichshain, where militant action successfully prevented a Nazi march in Berlin on May Day for the first time in years. We must build on such activities. ... Teach the Nazis a lesson – scare the state racists!”

The Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS, Party of Democratic Socialism) also noted in an analysis that confronting right-wing extremism was not an obvious goal at present. According to the analysis, however, right-wing extremism was not a temporary phenomenon, nor an “abscess” of a single social group, nor simply the old Nazi movement in a new form. The PDS analysis went on:

“The openness to right-wing extremism and xenophobia clearly originates within the social conditions of here and now, it is primarily and essentially a product of modern society with its characteristics and contradictions. And we must oppose it here and now.”

(“A(n un)forgotten issue!? Some thoughts on confronting right-wing extremism, by the right-wing extremist/anti-fascist working group of the PDS party executive”, working group circular No. 4/04, p. 5)

Violent left-wing extremists – in particular those in favour of more committed co-operation within a more structured framework, and opposed to an exclusive focus on the issue of anti-fascism - unmistakably called for showing no tactical reserve and “fighting

bourgeois society ... as the breeding ground for fascist resentments".¹³⁴ Another grouping stated:

"The task of radical critique is to reveal and attack the contradictions of capitalist society. ... Therefore, a joint organisation of groups and persons with the same substantive orientation is necessary – only in this way is it possible to organise joint resistance to the existing social order. We also believe that a different world is possible. But this can only arise by overcoming the current social order."

Activities

Many "traditional" autonomist anti-fascist groups focused their activities on fighting right-wing extremist organisations in their regions. They sought confrontations with their right-wing extremist opponents in the street and attempted to prevent or at least disrupt their marches. Members of the autonomist scene in Gera, Thuringia, put out a call to action with the motto "Stop Nazi terror!":

"Hit the fascists wherever you find them – We will no longer sit by and let right-wingers go about their business in Gera, but will fight the Nazis – at every level and with every means possible. ... Fight back – no peace for fascists!"

Also in 2004, "anti-fascists" undertook intense efforts to uncover right-wing extremist activity and oppose it with violence.

As part of what they call "antifa research", autonomist groups collected information about functionaries, training facilities, meeting places and other logistical facilities and published it in print or on the Internet and used it to prepare militant actions. For example, in a campaign called "Live better without Nazi shops", an anti-fascist group in Saxony called on supporters to disrupt the "largely undisturbed activity and business of Nazi shops". On the Internet, the group called for the following action:

"The centres of activity in the Nazi scene must be made public, the actors named and the gradual takeover of sub-cultural milieus must be stopped. ... Attack Nazi structures and the right-wing lifestyle!"

Militant activity

The following are examples of militant actions by left-wing extremists directed against right-wing extremists:

- An "anti-fascist" alliance from Hamburg called on supporters to demonstrate on 31 January against a march by right-wing extremists protesting the travelling exhibition on the Wehrmacht's involvement in war crimes during World War II, "Verbrechen der Wehrmacht. Dimensionen des Vernichtungskrieges 1941 – 1944"

¹³⁴ *Jungle World*, No. 41, 29 September 2004, p. 19.

(Crimes of the Wehrmacht: Dimensions of the war of annihilation 1941 to 1944). Among the initial signers of the call to action were the Deutsche Kommunistische Partei (DKP, German Communist Party) and the PDS, along with autonomist/anarchist groupings. About 3,500 persons took part in the demonstration, including roughly 2,000 left-wing extremists, more than half of whom were considered willing to use violence. They attacked police officers with stones and bottles, among other things. Due to the violence, the police called a halt to the demonstration. The participants then joined another demonstration and moved in groups, some of them masked, through the city centre. They threw manhole covers, traffic signs and chairs at a police station and built barricades and set them on fire. Twenty-six police officers were injured and 15 demonstrators taken into custody.

An announcement previously published on the Internet by “anti-fascist groups from Northern Germany” stated:

“Come ... to Hamburg and show the Nazis in green and brown what hell on earth is like! ... On the very same day – a number of years after the 6th army of the Wehrmacht capitulated in Stalingrad, we will attempt to make Hamburg a second Stalingrad for the Nazis!”

- In the early hours of 20 April, unknown persons parked a car on the sidewalk directly in front of the NPD national office in the Köpenick district of Berlin and set it on fire. The fire caused large-scale smoke and heat damage to the building’s facade. The car, bearing stolen number plates, burned completely. Numerous caltrops were found in the vicinity. According to a letter claiming responsibility for the deed published in the Berlin-based autonomist magazine *INTERIM* (No. 598 of 1 July 2004):

“Early on the morning of 20 April 2004 we carried out an attack against the NPD headquarters in Berlin-Köpenick. ... The failure of the procedure to ban the NPD on 18 April 2003 clearly demonstrated that especially when it comes to anti-fascism, we cannot depend on any Federal Government, and that independent initiative is more necessary than ever. The many successful and largely militant actions against the NPD headquarters in Berlin-Köpenick have shown that this is possible.”

- In Leipzig on 3 October, about 3,000 persons, including several hundred members and supporters of the autonomist scene, prevented a march led by Hamburg right-wing extremist Christian WORCH. The demonstrators, many of them masked, set fire to
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several barricades made of rubbish skips in the city centre, set fire to a motor vehicle, overturned other vehicles and threw paving stones, breaking windows of businesses and banks. Intervening police officers were showered with stones, bottles and fireworks. A total of 16 police officers were injured.

- Isolated militant actions were directed against functionaries of right-wing extremist organisations in reaction to the success of right-wing extremist parties in the Brandenburg and Saxony parliamentary elections in September. Actions were limited to regions in which right-wing extremists had won in the elections. In Dresden on 5 October, unknown persons set fire to the van of the deputy chairman of the “Dresden Nationalist Alliance”. The cab was gutted by the fire. The perpetrators spray-painted the vehicle with the message “Have a good trip home, NPD”. The “Antifa Dresden” published a call to action on a website primarily used by autonomists; the call referred to “anti-fascist actions taken against the NPD” ahead of the elections and announced future actions:

“Even though the neo-Nazi members of the *Land* parliament are protected in the parliament by their immunity, this security will be more than illusory. They drive cars, rent offices in their constituency, hire employees, use infrastructures, etc. etc. etc. In future, radical leftists will increasingly focus on all that and much more.”

2. Protests against the Federal Government's social and labour market reforms

Left-wing extremists of various ideological backgrounds have long regarded "intervention" in socio-political conflicts ("economic struggle" in communist parlance) as their area of special expertise. Thus they thought they would be able to take advantage of widespread protests against the Federal Government's social and labour market reforms, which many apparently found too harsh, as a revolutionary potential for their own ends of overthrowing the system. As early as 3 April, left-wing extremist groupings had mobilised followers using numerous announcements of large-scale demonstrations in Berlin, Cologne and Stuttgart largely organised by the labour unions as part of the European Day of Action for Social Europe. In addition, left-wing extremists were involved in planning an "autumn campaign" of protests against labour market reforms together with non-extremist organisers. Violent left-wing extremists, especially those from the autonomist scene, took advantage of the protests to stage their own sometimes militant actions, from vandalism to arson attacks. In the course of 2004, four arson attacks against government employment agencies and social benefits offices were carried out by the militante gruppe (mg, militant group) alone.

In early August, however, the campaign plans were overtaken by spontaneous street protests especially in eastern Germany, fanned by the Federal Government's planned reforms (Agenda 2010, Hartz IV, long-term unemployment benefits). Left-wing extremists admitted that they too had been surprised by the "Monday demonstrations".¹³⁵ Only the Marxistisch-Leninistische Partei Deutschlands (MLPD, Marxist-Leninist Party of Germany), itself isolated within the left-wing spectrum, had for some time already been holding weekly protests under the name "Monday demonstrations". In view of the subsequent growth of the protests and temporary rise in the number of participants, MLPD chairman Stefan ENGEL stated euphorically:

"Political mass demonstrations are becoming more and more influential and mark the end to a period of relative quiet in the class struggle. We can expect these mass demonstrations to become a political movement with millions of followers."

¹³⁵ See e.g. "Der Stand der Bewegung: Am Arsch die Räuber!" (The status of the movement: The robbers on your tail!), Gruppe Internationaler SozialistInnen (GIS, Group of International Socialists), 28 September 2004.

ENGEL went on to emphasise the MLPD's "leading and organisational role" in the Monday demonstrations in many places and mistakenly concluded that "the masses, in their valiant struggle, [had] closed ranks with the MLPD".¹³⁶

Along with the MLPD, almost all the other revolutionary Marxist parties, organisations and groups drew on their expertise and infrastructure possibilities to play a part in the growing street protests and use the Monday demonstrations for their own ends. The different groups displayed various levels of aggression: Whereas the DKP routinely called for an "end to social clear-cutting", the Trotskyist group Linksruck loudly demanded that the Federal Government be overthrown and a "new leftist party" be founded.¹³⁷

The PDS also attempted to instrumentalise the protests for its own ends. Leading party functionaries proposed "drawing on the experience of the East German civil rights movement and immediately setting up a round table of those affected, government, unions, the church, charities and associations of unemployed persons." With conscious reference to the events of 1989, party strategists regarded the street protests, in which many of their members and followers were involved, as the possible start to a "new transformation of society".¹³⁸

But such attempts to exploit the Monday demonstrations tended to backfire. Left-wing extremists used the protests mainly to attract attention to themselves and thus the conflicts among the different groups; here, the main bone of contention was the MLPD's striving for dominance. Following a heated argument, the movement quickly split, resulting in two separate Monday demonstrations as early as 23 August and then two competing "nation-wide network meetings". Overall, even left-wing extremists noted that the various alliances, "marked by power struggles and turf wars", remained the exclusive "domain of functionaries and hobby politicians"; "average Joes" had rarely "blundered in", and if so, then "only once and never again".¹³⁹

The nation-wide demonstration in Nuremberg on 6 November to protest cuts in the social security system and the reform programmes Agenda 2010 and Hartz IV was the last significant protest action of 2004. As many as 7,000 people took part in the peaceful

¹³⁶ *Rote Fahne* (Red Flag), 18 August 2004.

¹³⁷ *Linksruck*, No. 181 of 7 July 2004, p. 1.

¹³⁸ *Neues Deutschland*, 19 April 2004, p. 4.

¹³⁹ See footnote 135.

demonstration, including an “anti-capitalist bloc” made up of about 1,000 persons; this was also the high-water mark for autonomist efforts opposing social security cuts.

By contrast, autonomists did not play a major role in the Monday demonstrations. They neither initiated nor organised any street protests; even their participation was marginal, in some cases limited to forcing actual or supposed “Nazis” out of the protests.

3. Campaign by left-wing extremists against nuclear energy

Again in 2004, left-wing extremists called for participation in protests against the peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, their influence on the anti-nuclear movement, most of whose followers are not extremists, remained minor.

Violent left-wing extremists made it clear that their struggle was still ultimately aimed at overthrowing the system. For example, in a call to action dated July 2004, ahead of the shipment of nuclear waste (CASTOR transport) in early November, a group calling itself *militanter atomkraftgegnerinnen* reloaded (mar, militant opponents of nuclear power reloaded) stated:

“Autonomists continue to be an important part of the anti-nuclear resistance, just as the struggle against nuclear energy is part of our radical leftist identity. But in our eyes, joint resistance based on a minimum of consensus opposing the use of nuclear power is not enough! ... In segments of the anti-nuclear movement, the substantive critique of the overall construct of capitalism has been stagnant for years; it remains stuck on the more or less personalised criticism of the major operators and the government and focuses exclusively on environmental protection. This does not lead us, as part of the Autonomist Groups, to conclude that we should relinquish this segment and stop going to the Wendland area [of Lower Saxony]. On the contrary, we see this as an area to present open-ended critiques of state and society. In doing so, we are not looking at Wendland as a new subject of revolution. But there are a number of people here who are open to constructive criticism, because they have at least recognised the workings of the capitalist economic system behind the facade of democracy, which they are not willing to accept. This is a place for us to start, to accompany each other for a while and create new structures out of which a joint oppositional force can arise.”
(*INTERIM*, No. 604, 28 October 2004, p. 8)

The six shipments of radioactive waste from Germany to reprocessing plants in La Hague, France, and Sellafield, United Kingdom, were conducted without major disruption.

As in previous years, the main focus of protest activity was the shipment from La Hague to the interim storage site in Gorleben, Lower Saxony, from 6 to 9 November. The call to action quoted above referred to this shipment and closed with the following slogans:

“Take Germany apart, dismantle the nuclear state!
Screw by screw, rail by rail!
no risk, no fun!”
(*INTERIM*, No. 604, 28 October 2004, p. 8)

Another call to action used Biblical language in encouraging criminal activity:

“Gird thyself with weapons ... Honour thy open-ended spanner, that thou mayest loosen screws and bolts easily ... Respect the violation of the law ... The revolution is great!”
(*INTERIM*, No. 604, 28 October 2004, p. 9)

As many as 5,000 persons took part in the nation-wide protests immediately before and during the transport (2003: 4,500); as in 2003, this included about 250 activists from the left-wing extremist spectrum or its sphere of influence, among them about 100 autonomists.

On the morning of 7 November, the transport was stopped near Nancy, France, for two hours; two anti-nuclear activists had used pipes to chain themselves to the train tracks. In the afternoon, a serious accident occurred in Avricourt, France, as a French anti-nuclear activist, 21, was hit by the transport train and fatally injured while trying to chain himself to the tracks.

After the accident, more than 1,000 persons, most of them belonging to the left-wing extremist spectrum, held memorials and solidarity rallies in numerous cities throughout Germany.

The political discussion of plans to transport nuclear waste from the former research centre in Rossendorf, Saxony, to the interim storage site in Ahaus, North-Rhine/Westphalia, was also accompanied by anti-nuclear protests. Left-wing extremists also took part in the various, largely peaceful events.

There were also some isolated militant actions not related to nuclear waste transports. For example, militant opponents of nuclear energy damaged tracks on the premises of the nuclear power plant in

Philippsburg, Baden-Württemberg. They justified the deed as a response to statements by elected officials who, according to various press reports, were in favour of increased reliance on nuclear energy.

4. Evolution of the anti-globalisation movement

After causing sometimes severe riots at international summit meetings again in 2003, militant left-wing extremist critics of globalisation were unable to do so in 2004 as meetings of this kind were not held at accessible locations in Europe. The most important summits, such as the annual G8 meeting and the meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, were held in the United States. Only the World Economic Forum was held in Davos, Switzerland, on 21-25 January, accompanied by rioting caused mostly by Swiss militants. The rioting took place at some distance from the actual site of the forum, however. The protests had no impact on the course of the forum, which led to heated discussions and recriminations among the various organisers of the protests. In a statement published on the Internet, members of a group calling themselves the "Revolutionary alliance against the WEF" summed up:

"In the end, the WEF is now stronger after the 04 protests than ever before; by contrast, the resistance has splintered into small, nearly rival groups."

Major events organised by the anti-globalisation movement were the 4th World Social Forum in Mumbai (Bombay) on 16-21 January, with 100,000 participants, including about 250 Germans; and the 3rd European Social Forum in London on 14-17 October, with 20,000 participants, including up to 1,500 Germans.¹⁴⁰ As left-wing extremists noted as early as October 2003, the global movement was able to use such mass discussion events to create an important forum for sharing experience, refining analyses, developing strategies and co-ordinating resistance.¹⁴¹ Despite all efforts at co-ordination, however, the highly heterogeneous nature of the "movement" again led to parallel events. For example, the meeting Mumbai Resistance (MR 2004), organised in part by terrorist groups, took place alongside the World Social Forum; the European Social Forum was flanked by the autonomist series of events called Beyond ESF.

¹⁴⁰ "London – ein Schritt nach vorne" (London: One step forward), *Linksruck*, No. 187 of 27 October 2004.

¹⁴¹ *Junge Welt*, No. 252 of 29 October 2003, special supplement on the European Social Forum, p. 3.

German opponents of globalisation were involved in the process of preparing for the European Social Forum largely through the “Initiative for a Social Forum in Germany”, whose members include notable figures from the DKP, the PDS and Linksruck. Representatives of the initiative took part in a European assembly to prepare for the ESF. The first Social Forum in Germany, mainly prepared by the “Initiative for a Social Forum in Germany”, is planned for July 2005 in Erfurt, Thuringia.

VI. Means of agitation and communication

1. Publishers, distributors and periodicals

In 2004 more than 30 publishers and distributors serving the left-wing extremist audience disseminated newspapers, journals and books. There was no significant change from the previous year in the total number of publications they produced (nearly 220) nor in their volume (about eight million copies).

The Berlin-based publishing house 8. Mai GmbH (8 May Ltd.) deserves mention due to the influence of the national daily newspaper it produces, *junge Welt* (jW, Young world). With a circulation of 12,000, it is a significant printed publication in the left-wing extremist camp and contains at least indications of left-wing extremist activity. The newspaper appeared under the same name in the German Democratic Republic as the central organ of the communist youth organisation FDJ; its current publisher has no party affiliation and is majority owned by the Linke Presse Verlagsförderungs- und Beteiligungsgenossenschaft junge Welt e.G. Members of the editorial staff and a large proportion of the regular and guest authors belong to the left-wing extremist spectrum. The newspaper adheres to a traditional communist orientation and advocates establishing a socialist society. Reporting and commentary on current political events, articles on policy issues and the selection of topics follow strict ideological, anti-capitalist lines. For example, the paper documented a speech given at the closing rally of the “Anti-capitalist and social revolutionary bloc” in Cologne on 3 April:

“A liberated society can be set up only by going beyond the capitalist system of production and beyond patriarchy, racism and the bourgeois state.”

(Supplement to *junge Welt*, 10-12 April 2004, p. 2)

There are growing indications that *junge Welt* accepts the use of violence in the struggle against capitalism and imperialism. The newspaper describes movements such as the Kurdish Kongra Gel, the Basque ETA and Colombia’s FARC-EP as “freedom organisations” and fails to criticise or distance itself from their acts of violence. This is most obvious in its reporting on terrorist activities in Iraq, which it calls an “entirely justified use of violence” and a “legitimate reaction”. The newspaper repeatedly published interviews with representatives of such terrorist organisations, thereby offering

them a political forum. For example, a spokesman of the “Communist Party of Iraq” argued:

“It is absolutely unacceptable that we, the oppressed, are being accused. The resistance in Iraq has never targeted civilians. But those who collaborate with the occupiers are considered a legitimate target. Of course, civilians may be harmed by attacks on military targets. ... But you must also realise that not everyone in civilian clothing is a civilian. ... Every person and every object that helps the occupation is a legitimate target.”

(Supplement to *junge Welt*, 24-25 January 2004, p. 5)

2. The Internet

Left-wing extremists routinely use the Internet and its services, including the World Wide Web, newsgroups and e-mail, to disseminate information, mobilise supporters and promote efforts at greater networking within the scene. The possibilities for archiving otherwise unstructured and fragmentary information serve as a tried and tested means to this end.

Internet portals such as nadir, Partisan.net and left-action bring together the Internet presence of numerous diverse groups, initiatives and projects, making them easier to find:

“Once leftist materials are on the Net, search engines make them accessible to people who are not part of the scene. Newspapers, books and pamphlets published once on nadir will never go out of print. They can also be regularly updated on the Net.”

(nadir website, 19 November 2004)

These portals offer information on nation-wide activities and events relevant to the left-wing extremist spectrum.

Current information is categorised by topic, such as “anti-fascism”, “anti-racism”, “welfare cuts” and “anti-nuclear”, and often enhanced with audio or video files.

Campaigns initiated by left-wing extremists are reinforced by “mobilisation pages” published on the Internet for this purpose; they often remain for the long term and may be updated, like the annual nation-wide mobilisation for May Day demonstrations.

Mailing lists are also very important. They are used to send text-oriented information to interested persons; this information is often more current than that found on websites.

In mid-2004, the established website LINKE SEITE discontinued most of its services, ostensibly due to financial difficulties. It is currently only offering the option of signing up for a newsletter.

Left-wing extremists have increasingly turned to the German website Indymedia as a source of information.

Indymedia describes itself as

“an international network of media initiatives and activists for independent and non-commercial reporting from below – locally and globally. It sees itself as part of a global resistance to capitalist globalisation.”

(Indymedia Deutschland website, November 2004)

The German branch of Indymedia describes itself as

“a multi-media network of independent and alternative media, media workers, committed individuals and groups. It offers open, non-commercial reporting and background information on current social and political issues. It aims to promote the work of existing alternative organisations.”

(Indymedia Deutschland website, November 2004)

The “open posting” area makes up the core of the Indymedia Deutschland website. In this area, groups and individuals may publish their announcements, reports and other items directly on the media platform, without needing any special access authorisation.

The scene is aware not only of the advantages offered by the Internet; it also recognises its limitations and discusses them in a critical manner.

“The way the Antifa mobilises has also greatly changed. Flyers, posters and information events no longer determine the extent of mobilisation; instead, the Internet is increasingly relied on as the main means of distributing information. Thus every call for participation is initially “global”, or at least national. But since it is difficult to determine via the Internet whose attention this call has attracted or even reached, the number of participants has become a great source of uncertainty. Because a “nation-wide” homepage, unlike nation-wide information events and poster campaigns, does not show how serious those issuing the call are and how much energy they have invested in preparations ... In order to achieve nation-wide networking, it is important first of all for local groups to organise and establish regional networks.”

(*Antifaschistisches Info Blatt* (Anti-fascist info sheet)), Berlin, No. 63, Summer 2004, pp. 6-9)

Activities by Extremist Foreigners that Endanger the Security of the State

I. Overview

In 2004 extremist and terrorist groups of foreigners continued to pose various levels of threat to Germany's internal security. As in 2003, the most potent threat remained that from Islamist terrorist groups who feel duty bound to join the worldwide jihad (defined as a violent struggle or "holy war" against the West). Despite the fact that attacks have in the past been thwarted and numerous arrests have been made across Europe (including in Germany), Germany continues to be under threat and thus remains a target for terrorist groups. The attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, in which 191 people were killed and more than 1,600 were injured, show very clearly the level and extent of the threat.

Jihadi groups and their ideology

The spectrum of jihadi groups includes Osama BIN LADEN's al-Qaeda (The Base) and the mujahidin networks collaborating with it, as well as regional Islamist organisations. They have declared war on the West and its liberal culture. In their eyes the United States in particular symbolises the "immorality" and "decadence" of the West. Jihadi groups also accuse the United States of interfering in the affairs of Muslim states, the *Umma*, or community of believers, and of siding with Israel in the Middle East conflict. Furthermore, they see the United States as the driving force behind Western-style globalisation, which in the eyes of the Islamists will be played out to the detriment of Muslim states.

Islamist terrorist groups believe that the Koran legitimises their violent struggle. According to their ideologists, violent jihad against the "unbelievers" and those who have "fallen away from the true faith" is a Muslim duty and legitimate in order to defend and expand the Muslim territory.¹⁴² They believe that the jihad will not be over until Islam as they understand it has become the dominant religion the world over. Those waging this form of jihad are called mujahidin (Fighters for Allah's Cause). Most mujahidin have had paramilitary training, usually

¹⁴² Muslims draw a distinction between Muslim territory, in which Muslims are in the majority, and the Muslim "diaspora".

in camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan; some already have experience of fighting jihadi battles in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq. Personal contacts forged in these training camps and combat missions form the basic link in the network of mujahidin. It is chiefly Muslims from Arab states who have visited such training camps. The clandestine net has been cast across all five continents, though the density varies, and has proved to be flexible and resilient. Nevertheless, deep-seated hatred of Western values and achievements does not seem to hinder the mujahidin from using the most modern means of communication, in particular the Internet.

The impact of the wide-ranging, intense international investigations and security service operations on both al-Qaeda's and the regional groups' operations was short-lived. Previous attacks and especially the attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004 lead one to assume that Islamists will continue to set their sights on "soft" targets which are difficult to protect. Al-Qaeda and its supporters will continue in their efforts to carry out spectacular terrorist attacks that claim many lives. Repeated statements by Osama BIN LADEN and his deputy AL-ZAWAHIRI confirm that in fact they are more motivated than ever – especially following the war in Iraq and the ongoing occupation of the country.

The attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 and those in Madrid are further indications that Europe is part of al-Qaeda's and the mujahidin groups' theatre of operations. A statement by Osama BIN LADEN (the so-called reconciliation initiative) which was broadcast by an Arabic TV station on 15 April together with a (good-quality) German translation confirmed what the German security services had ascertained, namely that the threat against Germany's interests is concrete. In the eyes of militant Islamists, Germany is one of the so-called crusaders and therefore under the same threat as the rest of the world. The range of Islamist terrorist targets thus also includes German interests and facilities. Nevertheless, this threat is secondary when compared to the grave threat to US, Israeli, Jewish and British interests and facilities, also those in Germany. Nevertheless, facilities of other allies of the United States and Russia (conflict in Chechnya), as well as pro-Western Muslim states are likewise deemed to be at risk.

Iraq continued to be the focal point of the current international jihad. The situation in Iraq continued to mobilise considerable numbers of Islamists, in particular followers of al-Qaeda and the mujahidin. Rejection of the presence of the US military and its allies as well as

calls to fight the “occupiers” and “torturers” are stereotypical of current Islamist agitation. This line of argumentation is often used to recruit fighters for the jihad.

The Taliban and its allied mujahidin are still carrying out terrorist activities in Afghanistan. Three Bundeswehr soldiers were injured in an attack on a German ISAF patrol on 26 November, for which the Revolutionary Islamic Mujahidin Army of Afghanistan claimed responsibility.

**Islamist
organisations in
Germany**

The threat to Germany's internal security from those Islamist organisations who are not actually carrying out terrorist activities in Germany should also not be underestimated. It should, however, be stressed that of the more than three million Muslims currently living in the Federal Republic only around one per cent belongs to an Islamist organisation.

The goal of some of these organisations is to replace the existing state and social systems in their countries of origin with a strict Islamist state based on sharia law. Some of them openly acknowledge that their goal is the worldwide rule of Islam.

By and large supporters of the Lebanese Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, “Party of God”) and Palestinian Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) do not take part in public activities. Both organisations, however, are opposed to the existence of the state of Israel. Their supporters chiefly restrict themselves to taking part in religious events held in their mosques and to collecting donations.

Nevertheless, supporters and sympathisers were appalled and horrified by the killing of leading Hamas functionaries. They reacted by holding spontaneous demonstrations and emotionalised debates.

Other Islamist groups are pursuing a more broad-based strategy. Although they are likewise working towards replacing the current systems of government in their countries of origin with an Islamist state, they are also endeavouring by legal means to create enclaves for their supporters in Germany so that they can lead their lives according to sharia law. In their view sharia law constitutes an Islamic legal system which regulates all spheres of life and whose implementation in Germany is a precondition for practising “true” Islam. The Islamist social system they are striving to establish is irreconcilable with the basic principles of a free democratic basic order, such as the sovereignty of the people, the principle of equality,

the principle of majority rule or the right to education and to engage in parliamentary opposition.

Corresponding groups are above all pursuing a long-term strategy of exerting political influence and targeted public relations campaigns. Such “tactical” Islamism will pose considerable and long-term challenges to the free democratic social order.

The largest of these groups is the Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society). With around 26,500 members it is also the largest Islamist organisation in Germany. It continues to have links with the Turkish Islamist Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party), which is under the influence of Necmettin ERBAKAN (cf. Section III, 2.1.2). The IGMG endeavours to represent itself as an organisation that is willing to integrate and that believes in a free and democratic basic order. However, its attempts to strengthen its own religious and cultural identity and to protect against alleged assimilation into German society are in reality more conducive to fostering the emergence and spread of an Islamist milieu in Germany.

Supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) are in some respects taking a similar approach to the IGMG. Their ideas are disseminated by the Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V. (IGD, Islamic Society in Germany, reg'd society) and its affiliated Islamic Centres. Like the IGMG, the MB concentrates on educational work.

**1st Arab–Islamic
Congress in Europe
banned**

There had been plans to hold the 1st Arab–Islamic Congress in Europe in Berlin from 1–3 October 2004. The invitation to the event, which was published on the Internet, came out against “American hegemony” and advocated the “liberation of all occupied territories and countries in the struggle against the American–Zionist hegemony and occupation”. The Congress was announced as the “first serious, practical step in supporting the resistance movement against aggression and occupation in Palestine and Iraq”.

Since the aim of the Congress had been to support the Iraqi and Palestinian resistance and thus also the use of terrorist means, it was banned by the Berlin Senate Department of the Interior on 20 September. At the same time the Federal Public Prosecutor instituted investigative proceedings against all three organisations involved on suspicion of the recruitment of members and supporters of a foreign terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129b of the Criminal Code. On 18 September the main organiser’s temporary

residence permit for Germany was withdrawn upon his return from a stay in Lebanon. He was subsequently deported to Lebanon.

Anti-Semitism

The recently coined term “new anti-Semitism” refers to the basic anti-Semitic stance of Islamist ideology and of the Islamist organisations propagating it. Islamism comprises a mélange of anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish ideas which originated in the Islamic world plus anti-Semitic elements imported from Europe chiefly in the 20th century. In addition, Islamist organisations often hide their anti-Semitism behind anti-Zionist criticism of Israel. Of particular importance for this anti-Semitic propaganda by Islamist organisations and their extreme conspiracy theory-oriented anti-Semitism are the “Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion”, which are widely available in the Islamic world.¹⁴³

Islamist organisations direct their hatred against the state of Israel and the “Zionists”, among others. Depending on the level of extremism of the organisation in question, these are accused of conspiratorial manipulation of Western states, above all the United States. The Jewish migration into Palestine, the founding of the state of Israel and the unresolved conflict between the Arab states and Israel triggered an Islamist anti-Zionism which has since the 1950s developed into an eliminatory anti-Zionism with deeply anti-Semitic undertones (anti-Zionist anti-Semitism). Statements and programmes published by Islamist organisations tend to use the terms “Zionist” “Israeli” and “Jew” interchangeably. This Islamist anti-Zionism was and is extremely anti-Jewish. Reference is therefore also made to the eternal enmity between “the Jews” and Muslims/Islam, to which Islamists believe reference is already made in the Koran and which is underpinned by Islamist concepts of history.¹⁴⁴ In contrast to the anti-Semitism of German right-wing extremists¹⁴⁵, Islamist anti-Semitism is not rooted in racism. Nevertheless, “the Jews” are ascribed negative social, cultural, religious and political characteristics and behaviours in an attempt to justify that they are to be rejected, fought or even eliminated as a people. Osama BIN LADEN’s appeals have followed in this ideological tradition since 1998, when he declared that the killing of Jews, Americans and their allies anywhere in the world was a Muslim duty.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴³ The “Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion” are an anti-Semitic forgery; cf. Section VII in the chapter “Right-Wing Extremist Activities” for more details.

¹⁴⁴ It was especially Sayyid Qutb’s essay *Our fight against the Jews*, said to have originated around the early 1950s, which was influential in shaping this ideology.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Section VII in the chapter “Right-Wing Extremist Activities”.

¹⁴⁶ Statements of 23 February 1998, 17 May 1998 and 16 September 2001.

In 2004, the activities of non-Islamist extremist groups of foreigners in Germany were above all influenced by developments in their respective countries of origin and the situation following the end of the war in Iraq.

Left-wing extremism Left-wing extremist foreign organisations are mainly characterised by their Marxist–Leninist and Maoist ideologies. These predominantly Turkish groups are still pursuing the goal of the “revolutionary” destruction of the existing social order and the establishment of a socialist or communist system in their countries of origin.

Turkish left-wing extremist organisations The ideology of Turkish organisations is characterised by stark anti-imperialism, which, as in previous years, again gave rise to protests against the United States and NATO in 2004. During the NATO Summit in Istanbul on 28/29 June several bomb attacks were carried out in Turkey, for which the Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed (FESK) claimed responsibility. The Turkish security services believe the FESK to be the armed wing of the Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi (MLKP, Marxist–Leninist Communist Party). The military wing of the Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) claimed responsibility for a failed bomb attack in Istanbul on 24 June. The DHKP-C continued to focus its agitation on the issue of the “political prisoners” in Turkish prisons who had been moved from large cells into solitary confinement.

**PKK/KADEK/
Kongra Gel** Kongra Gel (The People's Congress of Kurdistan) was founded as a successor to the Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan), which is banned in Germany, and to the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party). According to its statements, Kongra Gel has continued its previous politics in Europe, namely of achieving a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish issue. Nonetheless, in June the Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG, People's Defence Forces), the militant wing of Kongra Gel, declared its five-year “unilateral ceasefire” vis-à-vis Turkey to be over. There were subsequently more clashes in the second half of the year.

Against the background of the debate on the start of accession talks between the European Union (EU) and Turkey, Kongra Gel carried out a Europe-wide campaign in which it called on Turkey to cease military operations against the HPG and to end the “solitary confinement” in which Abdullah ÖCALAN was being held. In a six-point “road map” it further demanded that concrete steps be taken to solve the Kurdish issue.

Nationalism	Nationalist groups – again primarily Turkish groups – measure a person’s value by his/her membership of a race or nation. Particular importance is attached to the nation both in political/territorial and ethnic/cultural terms.
Iranian opposition groups	The goal of extremist Iranian opposition groups continues to be a fundamental change in the existing system of government in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The activities of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People’s Mujahidin of Iran) and its European wing, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), are chiefly directed against the MEK’s inclusion in the EU’s list of terrorist organisations.
Asian separatists	Separatist organisations from South-East Asia, primarily the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) from Sri Lanka, focused on fund-raising activities in Germany to boost their financial position.

II. Statistics

1. Organisations and followers

The offices for the protection of the constitution estimate that the 24 (2003: 24) active Islamist organisations in the Federal Republic of Germany had around 31,800 (2003: around 30,950) members in 2004.

With around 27,250 (2003: 27,300) supporters, Turkish Islamist organisations have the largest following of all the groups of extremist foreigners. The largest organisation is still the Turkish Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e.V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs, reg'd society), with around 26,500 (2003: 26,500) members.

The number of supporters of Arab Islamist organisations dropped slightly to 3,250 (2003: 3,300). The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) remains the largest group, with around 1,300 (2003: around 1,300) supporters. The Lebanese Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, "Party of God") has around 850 (2003: around 800) supporters in Germany.

No exact figures are available as regards followers of international mujahidin networks living in Germany.

The marked increase in the number of supporters of other Islamist groups of foreigners to 1,250 (2003: 300) can be attributed to the fact that the Pakistani Tablighi Jama'at (Muslim Faith, with 450 supporters) and the Chechen separatist movement (500 supporters) were both included in the statistics for the first time in 2004.

In 2004, the number of members and supporters of the 47 (2003: 46) non-Islamist extremist foreigners' organisations and foreigners' organisations constituting a state security risk again dropped to 25,720 (2003: 26,350). The number of followers of left-wing extremist or left-wing extremist-oriented foreign groups dropped to 17,290 (2003: 17,470); membership of nationalist groups of foreigners dropped to 8,430 (2003: 8,800).

Groups of extremist foreigners and their followers ¹									
Nationality / ethnicity		Left-wing extremists		Extremist nationalists		Islamists		Total	
		Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons	Groups	Persons
Kurds ²	2004	21	11,950					21	11,950
	2003	21	11,850					21	11,850
	2002	22	11,850					22	11,850
Turks ²	2004	12	3,150	1	7,500	5	27,250	18	37,900
	2003	12	3,370	1	8,000	6	27,300	19	38,670
	2002	12	3,650	1	8,000	5	27,300	18	38,950
Arabs ²	2004	4	150			14	3,250	18	3,400
	2003	4	150			14	3,300	18	3,450
	2002	4	150			14	3,150	18	3,300
Iranians	2004	2	1,150			1	50	3	1,200
	2003	2	1,200			1	50	3	1,250
	2002	2	1,300			1	50	3	1,350
Others	2004	2	890	5	930	4	1,250	11	3,070
	2003	2	900	4	880	3	300	9	2,080
	2002	2	900	4	900	2	100	8	1,900
Total	2004	41	17,290	6	8,430	24	31,800	71	57,520
	2003	41	17,470	5	8,880	24	30,950	70	57,300
	2002	42	17,850	5	8,900	22	30,600	69	57,350

¹ The figures refer to Germany and are partly estimated and rounded off.


² Banned groups are also included in these figures.

2. Extremist criminal offences and acts of violence in the category “politically motivated crime by foreigners”¹⁴⁷

Extremist criminal offences and acts of violence committed by foreign extremists constitute a subset of the category “politically motivated crime by foreigners”. In 2004, 603 (2003: 1,743) criminal offences, including 86 (2003: 122) acts of violence, fell into this category; 461 (2003: 1,473) criminal offences were classified as motivated by extremism, of which 61 (2003: 88) constituted acts of violence.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Section II, 2.1 and 2.2 in the chapter “Right-Wing Extremist Activities” for the definition of “politically motivated crime” and “politically motivated crimes and violent acts”.

**Violent and other crimes with an extremist background
in the category “politically motivated crime by foreigners” ***
by Land



* The graph is based on data supplied by the BKA.

III. Goals and main activities of individual groups

1. Arabs

1.1 Al-Qaeda (The Base) / mujahidin networks (Fighters for Allah's Cause) / Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam)

Al-Qaeda (The Base)	
Founded:	In the mid-1980s
Leader:	Osama BIN LADEN
Membership/Supporters:	No exact figures available
Mujahidin networks	
Founded:	In the early 1980s in Pakistan/Afghanistan
Membership/Supporters:	No exact figures available
including:	
Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam)	
Founded:	In 2001 as a successor to Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam)
Leader:	Abdullah AL-SHAFI
Membership/Supporters:	No exact figures available

The mujahidin are characterised by a pan-Islamic ideology calling for the defence of the Muslim world against the "unbelievers", combined with a militant rejection of Western society and its values.

Trend towards decentralised structures

Despite the US military intervention in Afghanistan in autumn 2001, Osama BIN LADEN's cadre organisation al-Qaeda still constitutes the core of the mujahidin movement. The collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan forced al-Qaeda members and other mujahidin to move to Pakistan and Iran, as well as to the Arabian Peninsula, to South-

East Asia, Chechnya and northern Iraq. BIN LADEN and Dr Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI, the organisation's "spiritual leaders", broadcast their messages via audiotape and video recordings.

Al-Qaeda members arrested

2004 again saw the arrest of high-ranking al-Qaeda members. In August 2004 Pakistani security forces arrested Ahmed GHAILANI, a Tanzanian al-Qaeda member, who had been wanted since 1998 for his involvement in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Naem Noor KHAN, a Pakistani computer expert who is believed to have played a key role as regards communications within the al-Qaeda network in Pakistan, was also arrested. Shortly afterwards Dhiren BAROT, alias Abu Issa AL-HINDI, a British national, was arrested in the United Kingdom along with 13 others. The British authorities accused the al-Qaeda cell headed by BAROT of planning an attack in the United Kingdom.

Mujahidin terrorist attacks

On 11 March explosive charges detonated in Madrid on four commuter trains, killing 191 people and injuring around 1,600. The co-ordinated attacks were carried out by Islamist terrorists. Mujahidin and al-Qaeda had added Spain to their list of targets on account of the country's involvement in the US-led coalition in Iraq. Several co-ordinated attacks were also carried out in Iraq against Spanish military and intelligence personnel stationed there, as well as a Spanish diplomat.

Authentic video

On 13 March a videotape was found in the vicinity of a mosque in Madrid. The tape contained a two-minute statement by a man calling himself Abu Dujan AL-AFGHANI, "spokesman for the military wing of al-Qaeda in Europe", in which he claimed responsibility for the events in Madrid exactly two and a half years after the "blessed attacks in New York and Washington". It is believed to be authentic. Further attacks would follow, AL-AFGHANI said.

Consequences for security situation

Investigations so far suggest that the attacks in Madrid were planned and carried out by an autonomous mujahidin cell. There is also evidence to indicate that despite the intensity of police investigations, even relatively small mujahidin organisations are in a position to prepare and carry out complicated attacks requiring a high degree of co-ordination without being discovered.

Series of attacks in Saudi Arabia

Four people were killed and 198 injured in a bomb attack on 21 April on the Saudi Arabian domestic intelligence service's headquarters in Riyadh. A communiqué from the al-Haramain Brigades, which claimed responsibility for the attack, stated that the al-Qaeda heroes were

being distracted by the war against the crusaders and were thus unable to carry out such attacks in Saudi Arabia. They, however, would keep the Saudi security forces busy by carrying out terrorist attacks to divert attention from al-Qaeda. The statement contained threats of further attacks.

Two US citizens, two British citizens and one Australian were killed in an armed ambush by Islamist terrorists on the branch offices of a US company on 1 May in Janbu, Saudi Arabia.

On 29 May numerous people were taken hostage in a housing complex for foreigners in Khobar, Saudi Arabia. The hostage-taking ended when the Saudi security forces freed the captives the following night, although 22 people were killed. Three of the four kidnapers managed to escape.

A statement by the then leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, Abdul Aziz AL-MUQRIN, was posted on the Internet, confirming the mujahidin's determination to continue the jihad.

On 24 May AL-MUQRIN had published a strategy paper on the subject of kidnapping in which he recommended that hostage-takers execute their hostages to strengthen their negotiating positions.

AL-MUQRIN was also responsible for the kidnapping of Paul Marshall Johnson, an American, on 15 June. An ultimatum was posted on the Internet calling on the Saudi government to release imprisoned mujahidin fighters within 72 hours. It also stated that the hostage would be executed once the ultimatum elapsed. Photographs of Johnson's beheading were posted on the Internet as "proof".

On 29 December suspected members of a Saudi al-Qaeda cell carried out a bomb attack on a government facility in Riyadh. Saudi security forces managed to thwart a second attack.

The police carried out searches immediately after the attack and, among other things, cornered three high-ranking al-Qaeda leaders, who died in the ensuing shoot-out.

**Further attacks by
Islamist terrorists
around the world**

An attack was carried out against the Australian embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia on 9 September, killing nine people and injuring 182. The Islamist Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, Islamic Community) claimed responsibility for the attack. The JI was responsible for the deaths of 202 people, most of them Australians, in an attack on the island of Bali on 12 October 2002.

On 7 October 2004 three co-ordinated bomb attacks were carried out on tourist centres in and around Taba on the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. Thirty-four people were killed and more than 120 injured. In total, three Islamist groups claimed responsibility for the attacks, but the statements have not yet been authenticated.

Due to the similarity between these attacks and al-Qaeda's modus operandi (car bombs, several simultaneous explosions, "soft targets"), a link to al-Qaeda cannot be ruled out.

Murder of Theo VAN GOGH

The Dutch publicist and film-maker Theo VAN GOGH was assassinated in Amsterdam by an Islamist extremist on the morning of 2 November 2004.

Islamist agitation had been targeting VAN GOGH on account of a film he had made in collaboration with the Dutch politician Ayeen Hirsi ALI. The film was critical of Islam, among other things. A threatening letter written in Dutch and addressed to ALI was found on the corpse; the perpetrator was found carrying a suicide note.

The murder of VAN GOGH triggered controversial discussions outside of the Netherlands, too. Mosques, Islamic schools and – presumably as a counter-reaction – churches were attacked in the wake of the incident.

Mujahidin activities in Germany/arrests and convictions

Criminal proceedings continued in 2004 against members of a mujahidin network led by Musab AL-ZARQAWI who were arrested in April 2002. In November 2003 Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court had already sentenced a member of this mujahidin network, the Jordanian Shadi ABDALLAH, to four years in prison for membership of a terrorist organisation. The judgement is final. Four other people are currently being tried before Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court for membership and support of a terrorist organisation.

Proceedings against EL-MOTASSADEQ

By appellate decision (on points of law) of 4 March, the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) overturned the decision of the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg in proceedings against the Moroccan national Mounir EL-MOTASSADEQ and remitted the case to that court.¹⁴⁸ The Federal Court of Justice principally complained that the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg had not sufficiently accounted for the fact that its means of ascertaining the truth were in fact limited. Furthermore, given the limited amount of evidence on

¹⁴⁸ On 19 February 2003, EL-MOTASSADEQ was given a 15-year prison sentence for aiding and abetting 3,066 counts of murder and for membership of a terrorist organisation in connection with the attacks of 11 September 2001.

which the decision was to be based, caution should have been applied when assessing that evidence. EL-MOTASSADEQ's retrial before the Hanseatic Higher Regional Court in Hamburg began on 10 August.

**Proceedings
against GARNAOUI**

Proceedings against the Tunisian national Ihsan GARNAOUI began before the Berlin Court of Appeal on 4 May. GARNAOUI is accused, among other things, of attempting to found a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129a of the Criminal Code. He is also accused of attempting to recruit four members of the al-Nur mosque in Berlin to carry out a suicide bombing in Berlin.

While making the arrest on 20 March 2003, police confiscated maps of Germany and the Netherlands, a flight simulator computer program, a CD-ROM containing a low-altitude flight over Germany (including the option of enlarging photographs of 150 cities and sensitive objects), bomb-making ingredients, and a loaded pistol.¹⁴⁹

**Perceived enemy/
statements**

Numerous statements made in the context of the war in Iraq called on Muslims to take part in the fight against the United States. Those supporting the United States and its allies were criticised and the negative consequences of lending such support – above all for Muslim states – were listed. For example, it was claimed that after occupying Iraq the United States was planning to successively colonise each Muslim state. The era of “puppet governments” was over, it was claimed.

**Conscious use of
shock tactics**

AL-ZARQAWI's decision to broadcast a video of the beheading of the American Nick Berg on the Internet added a new dimension in terms of propaganda tactics. The shocking effect of this cruel act was consciously employed to grab international media attention.

**Wave of
kidnappings and
murders**

It also sent out a signal to other Iraqi resistance groups, leading to a wave of kidnappings and murders. In some cases a ransom was demanded, in others unrealistic political demands were made, such as, for example, the immediate removal of troops or calls on aid agencies and private firms in Iraq to immediately stop their work and to recall their staff.

**Propaganda and
misinformation**

Aside from the violent jihad, propaganda and misinformation were important areas of mujahidin activity. Osama BIN LADEN and AL-

¹⁴⁹ On 6 April 2005, GARNAOUI was given a prison sentence of three years and nine months by the Berlin Court of Appeal for tax evasion, breaches of the law concerning weapons and the foreigners' law, as well as forgery of a document. The Court found that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he had attempted to found a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129a of the Criminal Code. On 8 April 2005, the Federal Public Prosecutor lodged an appeal on points of law (*Revision*).

ZAWAHIRI sent out videotape and audiotape messages to Arabic TV stations such as *Al Jazeera* and *Al Arabia*.

On 15 April Osama BIN LADEN issued an audiotape message to European governments containing a “peace offering” in the event that they withdrew their troops from Iraq and other Muslim countries. However, Osama BIN LADEN and other Islamists must have been aware that none of the governments would react to this “offer”. Following BIN LADEN’s example, other Islamists subsequently posted threats and ultimata to the purported supporters of the “US occupiers” on the Internet. Threats issued in the summer months focused on Italy.

As in 2003, the Abu Hafs al-Masri brigades claimed responsibility, for example, for the Madrid attacks in March. Although the group's existence remains in doubt, it managed to receive repeated media coverage.

Iraq

Al-Qaeda and other mujahidin networks continue to use the situation in Iraq as a motivating force to recruit new fighters for the jihad. They claim that the United States and its allies attacked a Muslim country, leaving their soldiers behind as “occupiers”. These soldiers need to be driven out, they claim. Mujahidin fighters from Europe also followed the calls to go to Iraq to fight against the “unbelievers” there. Against this background Iraq remained one of the most important arenas for the jihad.

Situation in Iraq still unclear

The security situation in Iraq continues to be very tense. Ambushes and attacks on military convoys driven by US armed forces or by allied forces, on aid agencies, private companies, Iraqi facilities and their employees continued almost daily in 2004.

AL-ZARQAWI's group

The group led by Abu Musab AL-ZARQAWI was responsible for numerous terrorist attacks on police stations, security forces and members of the Iraqi government. One example is the attack on 17 May in which the president of the provisional governing council, Abdel Zahra Uthman MUHAMMAD, alias Izzedin SALIM, was killed. These attacks also targeted those Iraqis who are purportedly supporting the “occupiers”: for example, 49 Iraqi military recruits were kidnapped and murdered on 25 October 2004.

In October AL-ZARQAWI swore an oath of allegiance to Osama BIN LADEN and to al-Qaeda. In consequence, the group he had been leading up until that point, Jamaa al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War Movement), changed its name to Tanzeem Qaedat Al-

Jihad Fi Bilad Al-Rafidayn (Al-Qaeda's Organisation for Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers). However, the group continues to act independently and is not controlled by BIN LADEN or other al-Qaeda members.

Role of Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam)

The goal of the Kurdish Islamist group Ansar Al-Islam (AAI, Supporters of Islam) is to found an independent Islamic state in the Kurdish part of Iraq. Following the official end to combat operations in Iraq, AAI extended its original area of operations around Halabja to cover the whole of northern Iraq, including the Sunni triangle around Baghdad. The group has since been waging a guerrilla war in that region against the occupying forces and their Iraqi allies, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan–Iraq (DPK-I). Jaish Ansar al-Sunna (The Army of the Protectors of the Sunna [faith]), also known as Ansar al-Sunna (AAS), arose out of AAI in 2004. The group's leadership is believed to be identical to that of AAI and it functions as a type of umbrella organisation and repository for foreign mujahidin in Iraq.

In early February, among other things AAI carried out attacks on PUK and DPK/I party offices in Arbil and Mosul. Jaish Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and subsequent murder of 12 Nepalese nationals. The group posted footage of the beheading of one of the hostages and of the shooting of the remaining victims on the Internet.

Measures against members of the AAI in Germany

On 9 December 2003 the Federal Public Prosecutor initiated investigations into AAI structures based on the suspicion of membership of a foreign terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129b of the Criminal Code. The suspected AAI member Amin Lokman MOHAMMED was arrested in Munich in this connection on 2 December 2003. Up until that time AAI/AAS supporters had mainly been involved in logistical and fund-raising activities.

On 3 December 2004 three suspected supporters of AAI were arrested in Berlin, Stuttgart and Augsburg. They are under suspicion of having planned an attack against Iyad ALLAWI, then Prime Minister of Iraq, during his official visit to Berlin on 2 and 3 December.

1.2 Algerian Islamist groups

Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front)

Founded: In 1988 in Algiers; officially sanctioned as a political party in Algeria in 1989; banned there since 1992

Leader: Group of functionaries

Publications: *Al-Ribat* (The Link), weekly

Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA, Armed Islamic Group)

Founded: In 1992 in Algeria

Leader: Rachid UKALI (killed in July; his successor, Noureddine BOUDAF, was arrested in November); leader currently not known

Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC, Salafist Group for Call and Combat)

Founded: In late 1997 in Algeria as a splinter group of the GIA; known as the GSPC since early 1999

Leader: Adelmalek DOURKADAL, alias Abou MOSSAB ABDELOUADOUD

Total membership/ supporters: Around 350 (2003: around 350)

Supporters of the FIS living abroad continue to be split into two rival wings.

The National Executive Office of the FIS Abroad was constituted in August 2002 and managed by Mourad DHINA, who lives in Switzerland. It disbanded in October 2004. As the supporters of the moderate wing led by Rabah KEBIR were hardly involved in its inception, they – as well as the Algerian FIS leadership – rejected both DHINA's leadership and the National Executive Office as the FIS's foreign representation.

The Algerian FIS leadership is currently pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the Algerian government. For example, Abbassi MADANI, an FIS leader, resumed talks with the Algerian president after he was re-elected with a big majority in April. In the run-up to the elections MADANI had already signalled his willingness to hold talks with the Algerian government in order to have the FIS re-sanctioned as a political party in Algeria, albeit under a different name.

In view of this recent reconciliation, FIS supporters in Germany are of differing opinions as to the organisation's future course. Those loyal to DHINA have previously strictly rejected a compromise with the Algerian government, whilst KEBIR and his followers support the view held by the FIS in Algeria. On the whole people have adopted a wait-and-see policy, since they are hoping the outcome of negotiations between the FIS and the Algerian government will point the way ahead.

**Change in the
GSPC leadership**

Once again the leadership of the GSPC ¹⁵⁰ changed during the course of 2004. In June the former national GSPC leader, Nabil SAHRAOUI, and an unspecified number of his followers were killed in an offensive carried out by the Algerian Army in the hills of Bejaia, around 260 kilometres east of Algiers. The previously little known Abdelmalek DOURKADAL, alias Abou MOSSAB ABDELOUADOUD, was named as his successor.

In a communiqué dated 6 June 2004 the GSPC threatened "war" on all foreigners in Algeria. Smaller local units were capable of carrying out attacks against individual foreigners, it claimed, and would require little logistical effort. If they "succeeded", international reactions and the impact on Algerian economic interests would be all the greater if foreign companies or their representatives were hit by such attacks.

¹⁵⁰ The GSPC was responsible for kidnapping 32 European tourists, including some Germans, in the Algerian desert in February/March 2003. After one group of hostages was freed in May 2003 by the Algerian Army, the remaining hostages were released in August 2003. One German hostage died whilst in captivity.

1.3 Muslim Brotherhood (MB) / Islamic Centres

Founded:	In 1928 in Egypt
Leader:	Mohamed Mahdi Othman AKEF, in Egypt
Membership/Supporters:	Around 1,300 (2003: around 1,300)
Publications:	<i>Risalat ul-Ikhwân</i> (Circular of the Brotherhood)

After its founding in Egypt by Hassan AL-BANNA in 1928, the Islamist MB spread to nearly all Arab states and those countries in which Arab Muslims live. The MB's main objective is to establish in these countries a state system which is "truly Islamic" according to its definition and one which is oriented exclusively on the Koran and the Sunna (the accounts of the prophet Mohammed's daily practice). It is attempting to achieve this objective by exerting influence on religious, political and social life.

The MB sowed the seeds for numerous other Islamist organisations, including the Algerian FIS (cf. 1.2 above), the Tunisian En Nahda (Movement of Renewal), the Egyptian Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI, Islamic Group) and Jihad Islami (JI, Islamic Holy War), and the Palestinian Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement, cf. 1.4.1 below).

On 14 January Mohamed Mahdi Othman AKEF, one of 16 members of the Egyptian MB's Shura (consultative council), was elected to succeed the sixth religious leader, Ma'moun AL-HUDAIBI, who died on 9 January. AKEF has been a member of the MB since 1948. From 1954 to 1974 he served a prison sentence for his alleged involvement in the 1954 attempt to assassinate the then President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel NASSER. From 1984 to 1987 AKEF was head of the Islamic Centre in Munich (ICM).

AKEF countenances suicide attacks in Iraq and in the Palestinian territory:

"The Muslim Brotherhood condemns all suicide attacks in independent Arab and Muslim countries. However, attacks in Palestine and Iraq are a (religious) duty. These two countries are occupied territories and all means must be applied to drive out the occupiers. That is why the Muslim Brotherhood supports suicide attacks in Palestine and Iraq: to

drive out the Zionists and the Americans.”
(Interview with AKEF published in the Egyptian weekly newspaper *Al Arabi*, 18 January 2004)

Role of the IGD

The Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e. V. (IGD, Islamic Society in Germany, reg'd society) has its headquarters in the ICM and is the largest organisation of MB supporters in Germany. By its own account, it also maintains Islamic centres, for example, in Nuremberg, Stuttgart, Frankfurt (Main), Cologne, Marburg and Münster.¹⁵¹

The motto of the IGD's 26th Annual Conference – held on 18 September in Essen and on 19 September in Berlin – was “Muslims in Germany: A boon, not a threat!” Several thousand people took part in the two events.

1.4 Islamist groups from the Middle East

1.4.1 Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement)

Founded:	In early 1988 in the Gaza Strip (in 2004 still Israeli-occupied territory)
Leader:	Khaled MASHAAL (headquarters: Damascus, Syria)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 300 (2003: around 300)

Issedin-el-Kassem brigades

Palestinian supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) founded the extremist Sunni Hamas in early 1988 shortly after the start of the first intifada (Palestinian uprising). Their spiritual leader, Sheikh Ahmed YASSIN, died in spring 2004. The organisation’s policy paper, the Hamas Charter, states that the movement's key goal is to establish an Islamic state covering the entire Palestinian territory. The military wing of Hamas, the Issedin-el-Kassem brigades, has carried out terrorist attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territory which have claimed numerous lives. The brigades are named after the Syrian national Issedin El-KASSEM, who was killed in the 1930s while fighting against the British Mandate in Palestine.

¹⁵¹ Programme of the IGD annual conference, 18/19 September 2004.

The approximately 300 Hamas supporters living in Germany are not members of any established organisation. In 2004 they restricted their activities in Germany to collecting donations and taking part in rallies on the conflict in the Middle East.

Several high-ranking Hamas functionaries were killed in 2004, including Sheikh Ahmed YASSIN on 22 March and his successor Abd al-Aziz RANTISSI on 17 April. Shortly after YASSIN's death, RANTISSI had publicly declared that Israeli interests should be attacked anywhere, anytime and using any means – although he subsequently explained that he had not meant that attacks were to be carried out outside of Israel and the Palestinian territory. As before, the Issedin-el-Kassem brigades confined their terrorist activities to Israel and the Palestinian territory.

Spontaneous, peaceful demonstrations with limited numbers of participants were held in several German cities in response to YASSIN's death. Participants in a demonstration held on 26 March in Berlin carried banners declaring, among other things, "Freedom for the Palestinian people", "Down with the occupiers" and "Israel, the apartheid state".

Al-Aqsa society

The activities of Al-Aqsa, a registered fund-raising society based in Aachen, did not attract any media interest in 2004. The society was founded in 1991 and banned by the Federal Minister of the Interior on 5 August 2002 as it was found to be providing funding to Hamas. Up until that time the society had regularly passed on donations to facilities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with close links to Hamas. In its judgement of 3 December 2004 the Federal Administrative Court (BVerwG) upheld the decision to ban the society. The Court found that the al-Aqsa registered society had long been providing considerable amounts of funding to Hamas social welfare facilities in the Palestinian territory. Since Hamas should be regarded as a homogeneous whole, the Court argued, the society thus supported acts of violence carried out by Hamas against Israeli nationals and thus infringed the idea of international understanding.

Immediately after the Federal Administrative Court had handed down the judgement, executive measures were carried out on 3 December against fund-raising organisations suspected of being successor organisations to the al-Aqsa registered society.

1.4.2 Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, “Party of God”)

Founded:	In 1982 in Lebanon
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 850 (2003: around 800)
Publications:	<i>Al-Ahd</i> (Commitment), weekly (only in Lebanon); <i>Al Manar</i> (The Lighthouse), TV station, among others

Founded in 1982 in Lebanon, the Shiite Hezbollah is under the political influence of Iran, which also provides financial support. It has been represented in the Lebanese parliament since 1992. Hezbollah was able to make gains in local elections held in the spring. Hezbollah still has an armed wing, the Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (Islamic Resistance), which has in the past been responsible for carrying out attacks together with the organisation’s security service, and is still a significant military force today.

Hezbollah is a staunch supporter of the intifada and denies Israel’s right to exist. The organisation takes credit for the Israeli Army’s withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 as an example of its successful fight against Israel. At the same time Israel was threatened with military operations, in particular following the death on 19 July 2004 of Ghalib AWWALI, a high-ranking member of Hezbollah’s security service.

Members of Hezbollah living in Germany continue to show little interest in active involvement in local societies. The numbers of the faithful attending mosques only rose at certain times, such as Ashura – the commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam HUSSEIN and the holiest Shiite festival. Otherwise the numbers of people attending mosques – including at religious festivals – remained low. Only a few so-called victory celebrations were held on 23 May, the anniversary of the withdrawal of the Israeli Army from southern Lebanon, which has been celebrated annually as the “Day of Liberation” since 2000. The

Hezbollah member of the Lebanese parliament, Mohammed YAGHI, again took part in some of these events in 2004.

Exchange of prisoners in Israel

Hezbollah sympathisers living in Germany followed with interest the exchange of prisoners in Israel in January and saw this as a great success for the Hezbollah leader, Sheikh Hassan NASRALLAH. The exchange of the German national Steven SMYREK, who converted to Islam in 1992 and was given a 10-year prison sentence in Israel in 1997, was of marginal interest.¹⁵²

1.4.3 Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party)

Founded:	In 1953 in Jordan
Leader:	Ata Abu AL-RASCHTA, alias Abu Yassin (since April 2003)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 200 (2003: around 200)
Publications:	<i>Khilafa Magazine</i> (The Caliphate; English); <i>Hilafet</i> (Caliphate; Turkish); <i>Al-Waie</i> (Arabic); <i>Expliciet</i> (Explicit; Dutch)
Banned:	Since 15 January 2003

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami was founded in Jordan in 1953 by Taqi ud-din AN-NABHANI, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In the same year AN-NABHANI published his book *Nizam-l-islam* (The Islamic Way of Life), which today still serves as the organisation's basic ideological foundation. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami is orientated to the entire Islamic community, or *Umma*, and sees itself as a pan-Islamic movement. It rejects the MB's policy of upholding Islamic nation-states.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami's primary objectives are to unify the *Umma* in a worldwide Islamic state headed by a caliph, to introduce sharia law and to liberate the Muslim world from Western influences. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami sees Islam as a spiritual system which pervades all

¹⁵² By his own account, SMYREK had undergone military training and had been hired to reconnoitre busy squares in the Tel Aviv area for subsequent suicide attacks. He had had contacts with Hezbollah.

areas of life. It rejects all secular forms of government and believes they must be overcome by force:

“We must vouch for the fact that laicism, democracy, nationalism, pragmatism, capitalism and socialism are wrong and heathen, that Islam is the only true religion and the religion of God, which stands above all religions, ideologies, views and world orders. Islam alone can determine people’s lives. We must reject all other religions and world orders and work towards realising this fact.”
(Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami flyer, 4 December 2002)

The organisation says that Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami units (so-called *wilayat*, “administrative districts” or “provinces”) have been established in the Arabian Peninsula, in Europe and Central Asia, among others.

In Germany, the organisation was mainly active in university towns in 2004. It distributed flyers, magazines and brochures, mainly targeting academics and students. The publications regularly contained anti-Jewish, anti-Israeli and anti-Western views:

“Reconciliation with Israel is a kind of treason which is forbidden by Islam. The fight against and elimination of Israel is a duty dictated by Islam.”
(Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami flyer, undated)

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami banned

The Federal Minister of the Interior banned Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami in Germany with effect from 15 January 2003, among other things because it opposed the principle of international understanding and because the organisation approved of violence as a means for achieving its political aims.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami appealed the ban. The Federal Administrative Court determined the admissibility of the organisation’s petition in an interim judgement dated 21 January 2004. The action is, however, still pending.

Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami did not conduct any public campaigns in Germany in 2004.

2. Turks

2.1 Turkish Islamists

2.1.1 Hilafet Devleti (The Caliphate State)

Founded:	In 1984 in Cologne
Headquarters:	Cologne
Leader (prior to ban):	Metin KAPLAN
Membership:	Around 750 (2003: around 800)
Publications:	<i>Barika-i Hakikat</i> (The Light of Truth)
Banned:	12 December 2001

The goal of Hilafet Devleti, which has been banned in Germany, was to overthrow the secular system in Turkey and replace it with a society based exclusively on the principles set out in the Koran and the Sunna. The organisation strictly rejected democratic forms of government and called for the worldwide rule of Islam. Metin KAPLAN, the self-appointed “Emir of the Believers and Caliph of the Muslims“, also called on his supporters to be prepared to take part in the jihad.

The ban on Hilafet Devleti and a total of 36 sub-organisations has acted as a deterrent for a large number of its supporters. Numerous subsequent police measures, in particular searches carried out in December 2003 on the premises of around 1,200 subscribers of the now defunct newspaper *Beklenen Asr-i Saadet* (The Promised Century of Bliss), led to increased uncertainty among former Hilafet Devleti members and to a further decrease in activities.

Nevertheless, remaining supporters of the “Caliph” continue to maintain organisational ties and to disseminate his teachings in Germany: Between March and October the newspaper *Barika-i Hakikat* (The Light of Truth) was published at irregular intervals in the Netherlands and distributed in Germany. The aim was to continue

agitating against Western forms of state and government and against Turkey, albeit to a lesser extent. Occasionally the newspaper draws on old publications by the founder of the organisation, Cemaleddin KAPLAN.

**KAPLAN
deported**

On 5 October 2004 Cologne Administrative Court confirmed the immediate enforceability of the deportation order imposed by the City of Cologne against Metin KAPLAN. In its decision, the Administrative Court stated among other things that KAPLAN was a role model for Islamic extremists; it was thus imperative that he be removed from the Federal Republic of Germany without delay.

Metin KAPLAN was taken into custody on 12 October and deported to Turkey. He was brought before a judge in Turkey the following day and subsequently arrested and accused of attempting to overthrow the government by force. Proceedings began on 20 December 2004.

2.1.2 Islamische Gemeinschaft Millî Görüs e. V. (IGMG, Islamic Community Milli Görüs)

Founded:	In 1985 in Cologne (as the Vereinigung der neuen Weltsicht in Europa e. V. [AMGT, Association of the New World View in Europe, reg'd society])
Leader:	Osman DÖRING (known as Yavuz Celik KARAHAN)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 26,500 (2003: around 26,500)
Publications:	<i>Millî Görüs & Perspektive</i> (National Newspaper & Perspective), at irregular intervals, among others

Organisation and facilities

The IGMG is the most important Islamist organisation in Germany in terms of membership, finances and level of organisation. Membership is estimated at 26,500, although the IGMG reaches out to a much wider audience on account of its dense network of facilities and its diverse events and publications. The majority of followers are immigrants from Turkey who are now living permanently in Germany. The organisation claims to have more than 200,000 members across Europe in a total of 740 mosques and cultural clubs, 514 of them in Germany alone.¹⁵³ Since 1995 the Europäische Moscheebau- und Unterstützungsgemeinschaft e. V. (EMUG, European Mosque Building and Support Society, reg'd society) has been responsible for managing the organisation's extensive property holdings.

Close links with Islamist parties in Turkey

The IGMG has always had close links with the banned Islamist Refah Partisi (RP, Islamist Welfare Party) and its successor party the Fazilet Partisi (FP, Virtue Party), which were under the influence of Prof. Necmettin ERBAKAN. It thus currently has links to the Saadet Partisi (SP, Felicity Party), whose declared aim continues to be to abolish the secular society in Turkey and to establish a social system and way of life based on Islam in the sense of a universal and all-encompassing order. The SP hereby bases its activities on the ideology developed by ERBAKAN, which is well-known as the concepts of *Millî Görüs* ("national view") and *Adil Düzen* ("just order").

¹⁵³ IGMG website, 22 November 2004.

In answer to the question “What is Millî Görüs?” Mete GÜNDOĞAN, one of the SP’s deputy chairmen, replied in the *Millî Gazete* (National Newspaper): “On the political level we call the movement which Millî Görüs has made its own the Felicity Party.” Other statements by GÜNDOĞAN show what high expectations the “modern civilisation project” has of the principle of Millî Görüs:

“Put another way, this project will be over when three jobs have been carried out simultaneously and brought to a successful conclusion. These are: 1. A Turkey worth living in, 2. The revival of Greater Turkey, 3. A new world. Today’s world is not based on a just foundation. A global system of profits is trying with all its might to enslave the entire world. But things cannot go on like this. First our region and then the entire world must be reorganised based on just principles. That, for you, is the vision of Millî Görüs.”
(*Millî Gazete*, 7 June 2004, p. 6)

Necmettin ERBAKAN has been banned for life from taking on any political role, which is why he has no official function within the SP. He nevertheless continues to be seen as the *de facto* leader of the party. During a reception held by the Ankara SP Association in February, the current party chairman, Recai KUTAN, confirmed that ERBAKAN was still its leader: “The court may well have handed down that judgement, but his leadership of Millî Görüs will continue (as before).”¹⁵⁴

**Part of the
Millî Görüs
movement**

In an interview the IGMG Secretary-General, Oguz ÜCÜNCÜ, made it clear that the IGMG is rooted in the Millî Görüs movement:

“Millî Görüs originated in Turkey. But we never saw ourselves as a foreign organisation of a party. We saw ourselves as part of a movement.”
(*taz*, 7 May 2004, p. 4)

He went on to say that ERBAKAN was a “role model”. His appearance at big IGMG events had in the past “naturally” given rise to “waves of enthusiasm”.¹⁵⁵

The last such big IGMG event which ERBAKAN attended in person was the party's 2002 annual conference in Arnheim, the Netherlands. Since then ERBAKAN has usually maintained contact with his European supporters via a live video link-up, by means of which his

¹⁵⁴ *Millî Gazete*, 5 February 2004, p. 1.

¹⁵⁵ *taz*, 7 May 2004, p. 4.

speeches and messages of greeting are broadcast during these events. In 2004 his messages were again broadcast live at IGMG events in Germany.¹⁵⁶ Furthermore, SP functionaries attended IGMG events in person, giving speeches and outlining the party's ideology. For example, in a speech made on the occasion of a seminar organised by the IGMG Southern Bavaria Region, the former member of parliament and mayor of Corum, Prof. Arif ERSOY, described the identity and goals of the Millî Görüş movement.¹⁵⁷

Although ERBAKAN himself is no longer active in the political arena and his party slipped into political oblivion at the last elections (on 3 November 2002, where it gained 2.5% of the votes), the IGMG still has close links with the Millî Görüş movement. There are at present no indications that the organisation intends to sever links with its spiritual father figure, ERBAKAN, or to concentrate exclusively on the concerns of Muslims in Europe – as some members of the organisation have demanded.

***Millî Gazete*
(National
Newspaper)**

The Turkish daily newspaper *Millî Gazete* plays a key role in maintaining cohesion within the Millî Görüş movement and in disseminating its basic ideology. A European edition of the paper is also sold in Germany.

Along with reports from Turkey (which focus on the activities of and statements by the SP), the newspaper contains in-depth reports on, for example, IGMG events which columnists from the paper frequently attend and at which they also give important speeches. The IGMG itself uses the paper to publish the texts of its Friday sermons, among other things. The former IGMG functionary Ibrahim GÜMÜSOĞLU recently took over *Millî Gazete*'s PR work. The newspaper often has information stands at IGMG events and tries to encourage IGMG members to take out subscriptions. The IGMG not only tolerates but encourages this. For example, at one IGMG meeting the "historic role" of *Millî Gazete* was highlighted and it was emphasised that readers of *Millî Gazete* were able to subject world events to a "healthy analysis".¹⁵⁸

In view of this close network, statements published in *Millî Gazete* can be viewed as representative of the IGMG's understanding of Islam and of its ideology.

¹⁵⁶ *Millî Gazete*, 5 January 2004, p. 2 and 3 May 2004, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ *Millî Gazete*, 28 May 2004.

¹⁵⁸ *Millî Gazete*, 25 March 2004, p. 3.

Islam as a political and social system

The Millî Görüş movement believes that Islam as it understands it should serve as a model not only for each individual but also for society and for political life:

“But all the presidents, kings and oriental rulers of this world have no right to protest against one single verse in the book of God. Anyone wanting a different system in social, political and individual life than God’s system will cause an earth-shaking upheaval in social structures.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 27 July 2004, p. 12)

Articles by Mehmet Sevket EYGI also express the absolutism of this claim. His regular column in *Millî Gazete* propagates an uncompromising, conservative understanding of Islam:

“God does not err. What he tells us, the rules he sent us are right. I warn all Muslims: Do not get caught in the trap of religious reform, religious renewal and historicism. ... Do not fall into the trap and be taken in by the lie of interfaith dialogue and universal brotherliness.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 8 June 2004, p. 4)

It is this understanding of Islam – with its claim to religious, social and political absolutism – which the IGMG wishes to pass on to future generations as the “true Islamic faith”. The following is an extract from a Friday sermon:

“Humanity today can only again become a model society if it turns away from the existing perversions and superstition towards this principle of monotheism and the teachings of the Prophet and firmly embraces them. There is no other means and no other way. In this materialistic world in which we live the most valuable gift we can give our children is this foundation of faith. Likewise, the biggest legacy we can leave them is the true Islamic faith.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 1 April 2004, p. 15)

The IGMG has always rejected the use of violence to push through Islam as it understands it. Rather, it tries to apply all available legal means to enable its followers to live a life according to Islam.

IGMG’s social and youth work

The IGMG continues its activities in educational and youth work, seeing it as an “investment in the future”. It claims to be the only organisation which truly looks after the interests of Muslim youth.¹⁵⁹ The IGMG organises sports events, handicraft groups, computer courses and private tutoring. However, its main focus is on providing

¹⁵⁹ *Millî Gazete*, 17 June 2004, p. 15.

religious education to children and adolescents in accordance with the IGMG's ideals.¹⁶⁰ To that end, the IGMG, for example, organises Koran courses that are taught during the school holidays, with the children split into groups according to age and sex. By its own account "experts who have travelled from Turkey especially for that reason" sometimes teach these holiday courses.¹⁶¹

Integration

The IGMG sees itself as the "driving force behind integration", but at the same time calls on its members to hold fast to their own religious and cultural identity. For example, on the occasion of a youth festival in Berlin the IGMG Secretary-General, Oguz ÜCÜNCÜ, declared that Muslims must uphold their identity and fight "efforts to assimilate" them into mainstream society. Speaking via a live video link-up, Necmettin ERBAKAN said that the event played an important role in increasing self-confidence among young people living abroad.¹⁶²

Yusuf ISIK, a former leading IGMG functionary and former managing director of *Millî Gazete*, writes a regular column in the paper. A recent article of his shows just how narrow the IGMG's definition of "integration" is:

"Since our honour and our virtue are the guarantors of our lifestyle, we must stay clear of all media organs that propagate immoral behaviour; families must be protected from them. Each individual family member must be protected from their badness. In turn we must support those media that focus on our culture and our religious values. After each looking to our own soul, we must then teach our family and our children as well as our neighbours, friends and companions who share our culture about our national and spiritual values."
(*Millî Gazete*, 28 April 2004, p. 12)

Integration – understood as social co-operation and which thus by necessity requires a certain amount of openness and exchange between social groups – cannot be achieved by those adhering to this "isolationist mentality".

Furthermore, *Millî Gazete* portrays non-Muslims, in particular Jews and Christians, in a way that precludes a trusting co-existence of religions:

¹⁶⁰ *Millî Gazete*, 17/18 April 2004, p. 2.

¹⁶¹ *Millî Gazete*, 10 January 2004, p. 3.

¹⁶² *Millî Gazete*, 3 May 2004, p. 2.

“Numerous Sures in the Koran emphasise that the Jews and the Christians, the so-called People of the Book, are unbelievers and that they will burn in Hell forever. These unbelievers are today forcing us to become unbelievers ourselves and want us to go to Hell with them. Those who do not become unbelievers and stand by their Muslim identity they kill and treat like terrorists.”
(*Millî Gazete*, 25 May 2004, p. 12)

**Anti-Semitism /
Anti-Zionism**

Although the IGMG fundamentally rejects anti-Semitism in its official statements, *Millî Gazete* supports anti-Semitic ideas: “the Zionists”, “the Jews” or the state of Israel are by turns held responsible for all the evil in the world. Often these conspiracy theories are underlined with references to the numerous verses in the Koran which warn readers against the Jews. *Millî Gazete* concurs with Necmettin ERBAKAN's position: the paper quoted ERBAKAN as having said at a conference that “the Zionists are the biggest scourge of humanity, exploiting the whole earth in order to conquer the world. They are committing mass murder in the Middle East today to achieve their goals.”¹⁶³

The following is taken from a regular column in *Millî Gazete* written by Süleyman Arif EMRE, long-time colleague of ERBAKAN's and high-ranking SP member, who holds the Zionists responsible for the worldwide terror:

“The Zionists are the global leaders of terror, non-Zionist Jews excepted. The goal of Zionism is world domination. But the world is not aware of this threat; it will be unprepared for the ensuing attack. Many are taking the matter too lightly and saying: 'How powerful can a handful of Zionist Jews be that they can pose a threat to the world?' They believe these warnings to be a conspiracy theory. In fact the matter is very different. It is different because the Jews have managed to get their hands on the United States, the biggest military, economic and political world power. Let me put it this way: they have crept into this giant's brain and begun to use it as they will. I have already said that the Zionists are the brains behind global terror. If we compare this global terror with an octopus, the Zionists are the head, the United States the body, and the freemason lodges and their global organisations are the monster's limbs. By using aeroplanes to make the Twin Towers collapse the Zionists showed they are playing the leading role in their project to stir up the American people's animosity against the entire Islamic world.”

¹⁶³ *Millî Gazete*, 24 April 2004, p. 1.

(*Millî Gazete*, 10 December 2003, p. 10)

The following is taken from a lead article:

“According to this faith, which has its roots in terrorism, humanity can be divided in two: There are a small number of first-class people, the masters. These are the Zionists. The remainder of humanity has been created merely to be the slaves of the sons of Israel. They are not afraid to set fire to the whole world in the name of their faith.”

(*Millî Gazete*, 25 May 2004, p. 1)

2.2 Left-wing extremists

Political events and developments in Turkey largely determine the agitation of Turkish left-wing extremist organisations and their supporters in Germany. The culmination in 2004 was the NATO Summit in Istanbul on 28/29 June. Turkish left-wing extremists reacted to this event by launching vehement verbal attacks; they also carried out bomb attacks during and in the vicinity of the summit. A further topic of agitation, at least for Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front), was again the ongoing hunger strike of imprisoned supporters. Other Turkish groups sidelined this topic years ago. In addition, Turkish left-wing extremist groups of every shade took an interest in international events such as the situation following the war in Iraq and the volatile political situation in the Middle East. Statements concerning both these areas of conflict are a consistent expression of an anti-imperialist ideology based on revolutionary Marxism.

2.2.1 Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party / Front)

Founded:	In 1994 in Damaskus, Syria after a split in the Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left), which was founded in Turkey in 1978 and banned in Germany in 1983
Leader:	Secretary General Dursun KARATAS
Membership/Supporters:	Around 650 (2003: 700)
Publications:	<i>Devrimci Sol</i> (Revolutionary Left), at irregular intervals; <i>Ekmek ve Adalet</i> (Bread and Justice), weekly, among others
Banned:	Since 13 August 1998

In its publications the DHKP-C continues to advocate a revolutionary destruction of the existing state and social system in Turkey and the establishing of a socialist society. Based on its Marxist–Leninist ideas, its perceived enemies include Turkey (which it maligns as an “oligarchy”), fascism and imperialism. It propagates an armed struggle led by its military wing, the Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi (DHKC, Revolutionary People's Liberation Front).

Following a military operation by Turkish security forces during which five DHKC fighters were killed, the DHKC vowed to its followers:

“Nothing can stop us from our united revolutionary struggle. The liberation of our peoples in the mountains and cities will be possible if we pursue our strategy of an armed uprising. This strategy is the only revolutionary one and we will stick to our course.”
(Statement No 342 by the DHKC, 2 October 2004)

Attacks in Turkey

In accordance with its ideological goal, the DHKP-C maintains an armed wing in Turkey, which again carried out terrorist activities in 2004. Whilst an attack on a military bus on 22 April caused only property damage, four people were killed and around 15 injured in a bomb attack in Istanbul on 24 June which did not go according to

plan. It appears that the DHKC activist carrying the bomb was travelling on a packed bus when it exploded ahead of time. The DHKC claimed responsibility for this attack the following day in a statement posted on the Internet:

“Members of the proletariat have been killed. We take responsibility for this. We accept the blame and ask our people for forgiveness.”
(Statement No 335 by the DHKC, 25 June 2004)

As had been the case following previous attacks, the organisation established a direct link between the death of their “comrade” and three other people and the hunger strike / “death fasts” of “political prisoners” in Turkish prisons. Shortly after it began in October 2000 this hunger strike was turned into an indefinite “death fast“. It is still the main topic of DHKP-C agitation.

Agitation against NATO

A further important topic of DHKP-C agitation is the struggle against imperialism, the United States and NATO. Long before the start of the NATO Summit in Istanbul on 28/29 June the DHKP-C was trying to mobilise its supporters. For example, NATO was described as a “machinery of aggression“ which represented the interests of the “imperialists”, i.e. the policies of the United States:

“After the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact ... NATO is expanding its policies to the east. It is in fact an attempt, with the help of NATO ... (in) countries beyond the reach of imperialist exploitation ... to ensure the domination of imperialist exploitation.”
(Statement by the DHKC, 5 February 2004)

In Germany followers of the DHKP-C sometimes took part in demonstrations by German left-wing extremists. However, their main focus was on party-internal indoor events with musical/folkloric programmes which had little impact outside the party.

Supporters of the Solidarity with Political Prisoners and their Families in Turkey (TAYAD) group organised several events which picked up on DHKP-C policy to draw attention to the “death fasts” of DHKP-C supporters imprisoned in Turkey. However, the numbers of people taking part in events organised by TAYAD (rallies, torchlight processions, “hunger strike tents”) dropped in comparison to previous years.

On 5 August the police searched a camp run by the Anatolischer Föderation e.V. (Anatolian Federation, reg'd society) on a campsite in Eberbach (Heidelberg District) based on a decision by Karlsruhe Local

Court. The group was under suspicion of using the camp to carry out political training courses for the banned DHKP-C. At the same time the offices of the Anatolian Federation in Cologne were also searched. Numerous editions of the publication *Ekmek ve Adale* (Bread and Justice) and other documents were confiscated, among other things.

An article published in *Ekmek ve Adale* in response to the police measures reviled the system of the rule of law applied in Germany:

“Germany is sticking to its policy of opposing those with different opinions ... Particularly when they are foreigners and particularly when they are resistance fighters from Turkey. Then they show that they are not bound by any legislation.”

(*Ekmek ve Adalet*, No 118, 8 August 2004)

TAYAD reacted in a similar vein in a statement posted on the Internet on 9 August:

“We followed the events of 5 and 6 August 2004 with regret. ... The German police attacked a camp for families and young people, claiming that members of the DHKP-C were staying there. ... We can only find one word to describe the methods used by the German police: terrorising!”

On 16 February Koblenz Regional Court sentenced a 36-year-old member of the DHKP-C to a total of two years' imprisonment for extortion in conjunction with previous offences.

On 5 July Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced a DHKP-C activist to a suspended prison sentence of one year and nine months for membership of a terrorist organisation.

On 30 March the police arrested a 29-year-old DHKP-C functionary in Greece who was wanted by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office for membership of a terrorist organisation, arson attacks (on Turkish banks in Germany) and conspiracy to commit murder. The request for extradition was rejected.

On 29 June a further DHKP-C functionary was arrested in Rotterdam on an arrest warrant issued by an examining judge at the Federal Court of Justice. The functionary is accused of membership of a terrorist organisation within the meaning of Section 129a of the Criminal Code and arson in the period 1996 to 1997, among other things. He is also accused of being responsible for passing on donated money.

2.2.2 Türkiye Komünist Partisi Marksist Leninist (TKP/ML, Turkish Communist Party / Marxists–Leninists)

Founded:	In 1972 in Turkey
Membership/Supporters:	Around 1,300 (2003: around 1,400)
The organisation is split into the	
Partizan group	
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 800 (2003: around 850)
Publications:	<i>Özgür Gelecek Yolunda Isci Köylü</i> (Workers and Farmers on the Road to a New Democratic State), fortnightly; <i>Komünist</i> (The Communist), monthly
and the	
Maoist Communist Party (MCP) (until December 2002 called the East Anatolian Area Committee)	
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 500 (2003: around 550)
Publications:	<i>Halk İcin Devrimci Demokrasi</i> (Revolutionary Democracy for the People), fortnightly; <i>Halk Savası</i> (People's War), monthly

Since 1994 the TKP/ML has been split into two rival factions, the Partizan group and the MCP.

As they each see themselves as the successor to the original parent organisation, both factions have adopted its ideology and goals, which are based on the teachings of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. Based on this they propagate a violent, revolutionary coup in Turkey led by

the party (consisting of professional cadres), after which a communist social order is to be established.

The Partizan group described its core ideology in a flyer dated May 2004 as follows:

“Even 31 years after the death of Ibrahim Kaypakkaya, the founder of our party, we are continuing our struggle for communism. ...The ideology of Marxism–Leninism–Maoism (MLM) which Comrade Ibrahim shaped was without doubt pathbreaking in our party and will continue to be so. ... Long live the people’s struggle!”

To achieve its objectives by violent means both factions of the TKP/ML maintain guerrilla units in Turkey which, by their own accounts, were again involved in armed clashes with the Turkish security forces in 2004. The MCP’s guerrilla unit is called the People’s Liberation Army (HKO); the Partizan group maintains an armed unit called the Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (TİKKO, Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army).

Both factions draw on local associations and committees to promote their activities in Germany. Both the Partizan group and the MCP endeavour to ensure that no links are evident between them and these associations and committees. In Germany they are mainly involved in distributing flyers. Both the Partizan group and the MCP held indoor events in memory of the death in 1973 of the founder of the TKP/ML, Ibrahim KAYPAKKAYA. For example, on 22 May the Partizan group organised a central event attended by around 2,500 people from Germany and Western Europe and held in the main hall of Wuppertal University. In May the MCP held several decentralised events in Cologne, Hamburg, Frankfurt (Main) and Stuttgart, among others, each attended by several hundred people.

**Agitation against
NATO and the
United States**

One focus of agitation is directed against the United States and NATO. The MCP and the Partizan group both claim that these are attempting to push through political and economic interests with military means.

In a flyer printed on the occasion of the NATO Summit in Istanbul on 28/29 June, the Partizan group polemicised as follows:

“NATO is an organisation of war which, under the leadership of the United States, includes various imperialists and their collaborators and servants. ... We must stop the imperialists and the fascists. More than that, we must force them to retreat, to collapse and to be defeated. ...

A summit at which imperialists are discussing how to turn the Middle East into a blood-bath can only be prevented by means of military resistance. ...

Down with NATO, the murderer of the world's population!"

Such topics of agitation are also taken up by groups closely affiliated with the Partizan group, namely Almanya Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (ATİF, Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany) and Avrupa Türkiyeli İşçiler Federasyonu (ATİK, Confederation of Workers from Turkey in Germany). The Avrupa Demokratik Halklar Konfederasyonu (ADHK, Confederation for Democratic Rights in Europe) and the Föderation für demokratische Rechte in Deutschland e. V. (ADHF, Federation for Democratic Rights in Germany) act as the MCP's mouthpieces.

For example, the following is taken from a flyer signed by ATİK and the ADHK and issued during the NATO Summit:

"No to the imperialist NATO Summit. ... The imperialist NATO criminals led by the United States will be holding a summit in Turkey on 28 and 29 June. The murderers of the peoples, including the Hitler of today, G.W. Bush, will be coming to Istanbul. ... NATO is an international terrorist organisation whose goal is to suppress the people's struggle. NATO is a ... dirty war organisation ... a blood-thirsty gang of war ... a criminal organisation ... the armed wing of imperialist financial and trade organisations, ... guarantor for monopolitical exploitation... .

Dismantle the NATO war machine.

Close all US and NATO bases."

2.2.3 Marksist Leninist Komünist Partisi (MLKP, Marxist-Leninist Communist Party)

Founded:	In 1994 in Turkey through the merger of the TKP/ML-Hareketi (TKP/ML Movement) and the Türkiye Komünist İşçi Hareketi (TKİH, Turkish Communist Workers' Movement)
Leader:	Group of functionaries
Membership/Supporters:	Around 600 (2003: around 600)
Publications:	<i>Yeni Atilim</i> (The New Venture) and <i>Atilim</i> (The Venture), weekly; <i>Internationales Bulletin der MLKP</i> , (International Bulletin of the MLKP), monthly; <i>Partinin Sesi</i> (The Voice of the Party), bi-monthly

The MLKP's objective is to abolish the Turkish system of government and constitutional system by a revolutionary act and to replace it with a dictatorship of the proletariat. Its ideology is founded on the theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

The MLKP's only noteworthy public activity in Germany in 2004 was an open air festival held in Gelsenkirchen on 18 September. Approximately 1,800 people attended the event, comprised largely of cultural acts to mark the tenth anniversary of the organisation's foundation.

Reactions to the NATO Summit in Istanbul

The following is taken from a statement made on the occasion of the MLKP's anniversary and in response to the NATO Summit in Istanbul on 28/29 June. It fully conforms to its fundamentally anti-imperialist stance:

"The MLKP's fight against NATO in Istanbul is an indication that the party has reached a point at which all policies and features of its entire political practice before its time have been internalised and, building upon that, progress has been made. This means that it has developed and moved forward. The MLKP proved this by rousing the revolutionary and progressive forces opposed to NATO to join the anti-imperialist struggle, applying all forms of combat – including

revolutionary acts of violence – and by focusing all forces together, worked towards the same goal under a central political leadership." (*Internationales Bulletin*, No 24, August 2004)

The Armed Forces of the Poor and Oppressed (FESK) – a militant organisation acting only in Turkey and believed by the Turkish security services to be aligned with the MLKP – carried out several bomb attacks during the NATO Summit:

1. On the night of 13 June on several bank buildings, including in Ankara,
2. On 24 June on the Hilton Hotel in Ankara, where US President George W. Bush was to stay before the NATO Summit, and
3. On 29 June on a NATO building in Ankara and an aeroplane owned by Turkish Airlines which had landed at Istanbul airport.

Property was damaged and a few people injured in the attacks.

The FESK claimed responsibility for these attacks in a statement:

"The FESK ... bombed the companies of NATO sponsors, Istanbul airport, which had been declared the 'Zone of Zero Risk Factor', the hotel in which Bush was to stay and NATO facilities. ... You who bomb the houses and weddings in Iraq and Palestine, who try to strangle Cuba and Venezuela, who have brought terrible suffering on the people of this world and are enslaving humanity; you who are responsible for Abu Ghraib, Guantánamo and the F-type prisons with solitary confinement,¹⁶⁴ you must all know that you will pay for everything and not you, but the peoples of the world will be victorious! You will be overcome!" (*Internationales Bulletin*, No 23, July 2004)

The Almanya Göçmen İşçiler Federasyonunu (AGİF, Federation of Immigrant Workers from Turkey in Germany, reg'd society), an organisation with close links to the MLKP, propagated resistance against the NATO Summit by participating in the anti-NATO platform RESISTANBUL 2004.

The following is taken from a flyer issued by RESISTANBUL 2004:

"NATO is an international terrorist organisation whose objective is to suppress the struggle of the proletariat. ... Resistance is the only means against imperialist, capitalist exploitation and pillaging led by

¹⁶⁴ Turkish prisons with small cells and single-occupancy cells.

the United States, against NATO and the EU army, which serve as the instruments of aggression and of war and the summit during which decisions will be taken concerning attacks and wars against progressives, revolutionaries and the people.

That is why more than 120 organisations and institutions in Turkey have founded the Alliance Against NATO and Bush, which is waging an efficient campaign. RESISTANBUL 2004 was founded to support this alliance abroad and to organise similar campaigns.”

3. Kurds

3.1 Overview

The activities of extremist Kurdish organisations in Germany are greatly influenced by the situation in Turkey and in other Kurdish settlements. Of the approximately 500,000 Kurds living in Germany, around 12,000 are believed to be members of an extremist organisation. Kongra Gel (The People’s Congress of Kurdistan) was founded as the successor to the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and to the Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan). It still has the largest membership. The shared objective of all these groups is to demand more political and cultural independence for Kurds in their countries of origin.

3.2 Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) / Kongreya Azadi û Democراسiya (KADEK, Congress for Freedom and Democracy for Kurdistan) / Kongra Gel (The People's Congress of Kurdistan)

Founded:	In 1978 as the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey
Leader:	Zübeyir AYDAR (subordinate to the “Leader of the People of Kurdistan” Abdullah ÖCALAN, and the General Presidential Council)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 11,500 (2003: around 11,500)
Publications:	<i>Serxwebûn</i> (Independence), monthly, among others
Banned:	Since 26 November 1993 (the ban on the PKK includes a ban on KADEK and Kongra Gel)

3.2.1 General situation

In 1984 the PKK began a guerrilla war against the Turkish military, primarily in south-eastern Turkey, with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish state. For many years it had strong militant tendencies in Germany too. Following terrorist attacks and numerous violent demonstrations, this led to the banning of the PKK in 1993. The ban includes those organisations, like Kongra Gel, which have taken over and continue to maintain the organisational structure and activities of the PKK only under a different name.

In 1999 the PKK Chairman, Abdullah ÖCALAN, who was in prison in Turkey, declared an end to the armed struggle. The PKK's guerrilla groups thereupon retreated to northern Iraq. According to ÖCALAN, this was to herald the start of a new phase in which the PKK would only use peaceful and political means to push for their demands to be met. He said that the objective was no longer to fight for an independent Kurdish state, but to achieve cultural autonomy for the Kurds within the borders of a democratic Turkish state.

The peaceful strategy officially continued even after the founding of KADEK in the spring of 2002. Despite this, KADEK on several occasions issued ultimatums to the Turkish government, and also threatened to rethink its previous strategy and possibly to return to terrorist activity in Turkey if no progress were made on the Kurdish issue. In November 2003 KADEK was disbanded and Kongra Gel was formed. According to official statements, the organisation had been restructured in line with democratic and ecological principles and the previous cadre party influenced by Leninist theories was to be replaced by a democratic, large-scale organisation of a civil, political nature. Nevertheless, Kongra Gel is an unmodified continuation of PKK and KADEK both in terms of personnel and strategy. The PKK, KADEK and Kongra Gel have therefore been included in the EU's list of terrorist organisations.

End to ceasefire

After a further ultimatum issued to Turkey had elapsed, the PKK's guerrilla groups, which have since 2000 gone by the name Hezen Parastina Gel (HPG, People's Defence Forces), on 1 June declared that their "unilateral ceasefire" was over. The Kongra Gel Chairman, Zübeyir AYDAR, said that his organisation supported this step. In the second half of the year there were thus increased clashes between the Turkish Army and the HPG. The guerrilla units believed they were engaging in "legitimate self-defence", although they also showed an increasingly aggressive attitude in their "retaliatory measures" against the Turkish security forces and in attacks on civilian targets. In August a previously unknown group appeared in Turkey calling itself Teyrebaze Azadiya Kurdistan (TAK, Kurdistan's Freedom Falcons). The group's objective is to assert Kurdish interests using terrorist means. The group claimed responsibility for several attacks and announced further actions if that "attacks against the oppressed Kurdish people" did not cease.

Power struggles within the organisation

Kongra Gel had to grapple with internal power struggles and disagreements. In February a group of functionaries loyal to Abdullah ÖCALAN's brother, Osman ÖCALAN, split from Kongra Gel but returned to the operational area shortly afterwards following negotiations. The final split came after Kongra Gel's 2nd Extraordinary Conference in May. In October the "splinter group" declared it was founding a new organisation called Partiya Welatpareze Demokratik (PWD, Patriotic/Democratic Party). This new group intends to strive for a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue, aiming in particular for closer co-operation with the United States and the Iraqi Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Democratic

Party of Kurdistan–Iraq (DPK/I).

3.2.2 Organisation

Even following the transition from KADEK to Kongra Gel, illegal and, in essence, conspiratorial organisational structures continue to exist in Germany without any obvious changes. The so-called northern, central and southern *serits* still constitute the top level of the hierarchy, with each *serit* comprising seven to nine out of a total of 26 “districts”. Orders and guidelines issued by the party leadership are passed along to the organisation's grassroots via the various hierarchical levels. They are generally implemented by the local clubs of which most Kongra Gel supporters are members. The umbrella organisation of these clubs is still the Föderation kurdischer Vereine in Deutschland e. V. (YEK-KOM, Federation of Kurdish Associations in Germany, reg'd society). Large-scale associations of Kurds from various occupational, religious and interest groups maintained by Kongra Gel are also working to achieve the organisation's objectives. The Youth Movement of Kurdistan (TECAK), the Free Women's Union (YJA) and the Association of Students from Kurdistan (YXK) are most frequently involved in public activities; the other groups are the Union of Kurdish Teachers (YMK), the Union of Kurdish Journalists (YRK), the Union of Kurdish Lawyers (YHK), the Union of Kurdish Writers (YNK), the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (HIK), the Union of Yezides from Kurdistan (YEK), the Union of Kurdish Families (YEK-MAL) and the Union of Alevites from Kurdistan (KAB).

Kongra Gel also has units whose activities are shrouded in uncommon secrecy. These include, in particular, the so-called Homeland Office (ÜLKE Office), which supports the organisation's activities in the Middle East from its vantage point in Europe, smuggling in functionaries and forging passports to that end.

In June the Yekitiya Demokratik a Gêlê Kurd (YDK, Kurdish Democratic People's Union), the political wing of Kongra Gel which was born out of the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) following its banning in 1993, decided at its 5th Ordinary Conference to disband and reconstitute itself. It is now called the Co-ordination of Democratic Kurdish Society in Europe (CDK). The intention behind giving the organisation a new name was to create a “grassroots/democratic” structure which all strata of society would be involved in. During Kongra Gel's 2nd Extraordinary Conference, which ended on 26 May, it had been decided to focus more on its “national

character". Nevertheless, the hierarchical structures and the largely centrally controlled system of functionaries has undergone practically no fundamental changes.

3.2.3 Kongra Gel propaganda

In 2004 Kongra Gel again engaged in numerous propaganda activities in Germany that were aimed at making the organisation's concerns more widely known to the public. The main topics continued to be the prison conditions of the "Kurdish national leader", Abdullah ÖCALAN, as well as demands for recognition of the political and cultural identity of the Kurds in Turkey and increased inclusion of the Kurdish issue in discussions regarding Turkey's accession to the EU.

Ability to mobilise followers

The large number of Kongra Gel supporters and sympathisers taking part in numerous events is proof of the organisation's continued ability to mobilise its followers.

On the fifth anniversary of Abdullah ÖCALAN's arrest in Kenya (on 15 February 1999), Kongra Gel supporters organised a large-scale demonstration on 14 February in Strasbourg, the motto of which was "Freedom for Öcalan – Peace for Kurdistan". Approximately 12,000 participants from several European countries took part.

A central demonstration in Hanover on 20 March and smaller rallies in several German cities were staged to mark the Kurdish new year (Newroz, on 21 March). The motto of the event, which was organised by YEK-KOM and the Kurdistan Zentrum Hannover e.V. (Kurdistan Centre Hanover, reg'd society), was "Peace, freedom and democracy". The event called for a democratic and peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey, as well as improved prison conditions for Abdullah ÖCALAN.

On 2 April the Council of the European Union decided to include KADEK and Kongra Gel as aliases of the PKK in the EU's list of terrorist organisations. In response to this, supporters and sympathisers of the organisation held protests across Europe; diverse campaigns were also carried out in numerous German cities.

A Europe-wide campaign was launched in May to prevent the possible extradition of Nuriye KESBIR, a leading member of the former PKK, from the Netherlands to Turkey. Diverse – peaceful – events were held in numerous German cities, in particular in front of Dutch diplomatic missions. The high points of the campaign were two

demonstrations in The Hague on 22 May and 30 October organised by the Umbrella Organisation of Kurdish Associations in the Netherlands (FEDKOM). Between 3,000 and 4,000 people – mainly from Germany and neighbouring countries – took part in each of these events. On 8 November the Supreme Court in the Netherlands decided not to extradite KESBIR to Turkey.

On 9 June the Federation of Kurdish Associations in France (FEYKA KURDISTAN) held a large-scale demonstration in Strasbourg. The motto of the event was “Freedom for Öcalan and a free Kurdistan”; 7,500 Kurds from several European countries – mainly Germany – took part. The demonstration was held to mark the start of renewed proceedings before the European Court of Human Right in the case against Abdullah ÖCALAN.

On 30 and 31 July YEK-KOM organised the 7th Mazlum Dogan Youth, Culture and Sports Festival in Cologne, the second time the event had been held in Germany. Around 6,000 young Kurds travelled from all over Germany and neighbouring European countries to take part. Welcome addresses from Kurdish organisations called on the young people to step up the political fight as outlined by Abdullah ÖCALAN.

On 25 September YEK-KOM organised the 12th International Kurdistan Cultural Festival in Gelsenkirchen. The motto of the event was “Kurdish prospects – Showing the way for partnership in Europe and the Middle East”. The main emphasis of the event, which around 35,000 people from various countries attended, was on cultural and folkloristic performances as well as political speeches, mostly calling for a peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish issue. A message of greeting from Abdullah ÖCALAN was also read out in which he called on supporters not to give the opposition group led by his brother Osman ÖCALAN any opportunity to engage in political agitation.

**Campaign on
Turkey’s possible
accession to the EU**

Kongra Gel carried out numerous propaganda activities in an attempt to exploit debate concerning Turkey’s accession to the EU for its own ends. The aim of the numerous events, including demonstrations, the distribution of flyers and rallies, was to highlight the organisation’s demand that greater attention be paid to the Kurdish issue. The highlight was a large-scale demonstration in Brussels on 11 December, attended by around 10,000 people. The motto of the demonstration was “Kurds want dialogue and a solution”.

The MEDYA-TV TV station broadcasts under a French licence and was used by Kongra Gel, as it had been by the PKK and KADEK before that, to disseminate political ideas. Following a decision by the French Conseil d'État (Council of State¹⁶⁵) the channel was taken off the air on 12 February. It was replaced on 1 March by ROJ TV, which broadcast under a Danish licence. Like MEDYA-TV before it, ROJ TV is available in Germany via satellite. The new station also regularly reported on the activities of Kongra Gel and its followers, for example on the occasion of various Kurdish large-scale events. The programme also included discussions in which leading Kongra Gel functionaries discussed topical political issues.

The Turkish-language daily *Özgür Politika* (Free Politics) also provides Kongra Gel with a forum in which to publish interviews or statements by the organisation's leading functionaries. The paper also regularly advertises or reports on Kongra Gel events.

3.2.4 Financial and business activities

Kongra Gel finances its activities in Europe from membership subscriptions, the sale of publications and profits from events. However, the majority of the organisation's financing comes from its annual fund-raising campaigns. The result was comparable to that of previous years, albeit slightly lower.

Kongra Gel used the majority of its income to maintain its extensive propaganda apparatus and to support its cadre structures.

With the help of the Association of Kurdish Employers (KARSAZ), which has its headquarters in Frankfurt (Main), Kongra Gel is still endeavouring to bring the economic power of Kurdish companies and entrepreneurs in line with European developments. KARSAZ wants to orient itself on economic and democratic values in Europe and to transfer modern developments to "Kurdistan".

On 3/4 April KARSAZ held its 4th Ordinary Congress in Raunheim, Hesse with around 100 attending delegates. A representative from the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), which is dominated by Kongra Gel, also took part. The KNK's headquarters are in Belgium; the organisation represents the political interests of Kurds abroad.

¹⁶⁵ Highest French administrative organ with both administrative and judicial competency (including as a supreme court of appeal).

KARSAZ focuses on PR activities. It regularly publishes *Denge KARSAZ* (The Voice of KARSAZ), provides information on its activities on its homepage and carries out events to recruit new members.

3.2.5 Criminal proceedings against former PKK / KADEK / Kongra Gel functionaries

A high-ranking KADEK/Kongra Gel functionary was arrested on suspicion of membership of a criminal organisation and participation in an incident involving dangerous bodily injury. The arrest was made in Unna, North-Rhine/Westphalia on 25 May based on an arrest warrant issued by the Federal Court of Justice. Among other things the functionary is being accused of being the organisation's Bremen area representative. He was still in custody at the end of 2004.

On 29 June Düsseldorf Regional Court fined a member of the Kongra Gel Executive Council and a member of the YEK-KOM leadership for violation of the Act Governing Private Associations.

On 30 June Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court sentenced a leading PKK functionary to a suspended prison sentence of one year and nine months plus a three-year probationary period for membership of a criminal organisation. The Court found that he had, among other things, played a key role in organising the PKK's "identity campaign".

Based on an arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice on 28 April, a Turkish national of Kurdish descent was arrested on 2 May in Düsseldorf. He is accused of having for several years been a leading PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel functionary in Germany and thus of committing the offence of leadership of a criminal gang. The accused was still in custody at the end of 2004.

In October 2004 the Federal Court of Justice confirmed Celle Higher Regional Court's guilty verdict of 20 October 2003 against a leading PKK/KADEK functionary in an appeal on points of law (*Revision*). He was accused, among other things, of being the Frankfurt (Main) and Mainz area representative. In its judgement the Federal Court of Justice found further justification to categorise the PKK leadership as a criminal organisation within the meaning of Section 129 of the Criminal Code even though the organisation has since 2000 been following a largely peaceful policy in Europe.

On 12 November a Turkish national of Kurdish descent was arrested in Rüsselsheim, Rhineland-Palatinate on suspicion of membership of a criminal organisation and based on an arrest warrant issued by the investigating judge at the Federal Court of Justice. The man, who remains in custody, is accused of having been a Kongra Gel functionary since November 2003.

4. Iranians

In 2004 Iranian opposition groups in Germany used diverse protest rallies to try to draw the public's attention to their concerns. Supporters of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), the political wing of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran), focused their efforts on having the MEK struck off international lists of terrorist organisations. The NCRI welcomed developments in Iraq, where the United States accorded members of the MEK and its former military wing, the National Liberation Army (NLA), the right to remain in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The NCRI saw this as a victory in its resistance fight.

Other groups, for example the Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI), focused their agitation and demonstrations on denouncing human rights violations in Iran and calling for women's rights in Iran.

4.1 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iran)

Founded:	In 1965 in Iran
Headquarters:	Formerly in Baghdad
Leader:	Massoud RADJAVI
Publications:	<i>Modjahed</i> (Religious Fighter), weekly, among others
Outside the home region represented by the:	
National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)	
Founded:	In 1981 in Paris (represented in Germany since 1994)
Headquarters:	Berlin
Leader:	Spokesperson for Germany: Dr Massoumeh BOLOURCHI
Membership:	Around 900 (2003: around 900)

Until Saddam HUSSEIN's regime was toppled, the revolutionary Marxist MEK, along with its military wing the NLA in Iraq, was considered to be the most powerful and most militant Iranian opposition group. It was responsible for carrying out terrorist attacks in Iran, some of them serious. The new situation in Iraq marked a turning point for the organisation: the approximately 3,800 supporters of the NLA left in Iraq after the US armed forces disarmed the organisation in May 2003 were called on by the Iraqi interim government to leave the country by the end of 2003. As a result, peaceful demonstrations by NCRI supporters took place practically on a daily basis in late 2003/early 2004 in front of US diplomatic missions in Berlin, Frankfurt (Main), Düsseldorf and Hamburg. The largest of these was a demonstration by around 500 NCRI sympathisers in front of the US Embassy in Berlin on 2 January.

The Iraqi interim government's ultimatum calling on MEK/NLA supporters to leave the country passed without noticeable results. In the meantime the United States has granted MEK supporters the

status of “protected persons” within the meaning of the 4th Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of civilians during times of war. The MEK interpreted this step as proof that the organisation was still wrongly being categorised as a terrorist organisation. Maryam RADJAVI, whom the NCRI has elected as the “Future President of Iran”, described the application of the Geneva Convention as a “victory for resistance and the people of Iran”. This status “more than ever [highlights] the distinction between the justified and legitimate resistance of the Iranian nation for freedom and democracy and terrorism, fundamentalism and violence”.¹⁶⁶

Protests against inclusion in the list of terrorist organisations

The remainder of the NCRI’s activities continued to be directed at representing the organisation as a political one. For example, the organisation endeavoured to present itself as a freedom-loving and “democratic” movement in exile. Its aim was thereby to have the MEK struck off international lists of terrorist organisations and thus to create the freedom to engage in political activity against the Iranian government in the West. As a result, the NCRI focused its agitation on the inclusion of the MEK in the EU’s list of terrorist organisations. On 13 September around 5,000 NCRI supporters demonstrated in front of the EU Parliament in Brussels calling for the MEK to be struck off this list.

To finance its activities the NCRI resumed the street collections it had called off in 2002. These fund-raising activities were carried out by, in particular, the Hilfswerk for iranische Frauen e.V. (Relief Organisation for Iranian Women, reg'd society) in Hanover and the Menschenrechtsverein für iranische Migranten (MIM, Human Rights Association for Iranian Migrants) in Düsseldorf. Former donors to the Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V. (FHI, Aid Project for Iranian Refugees, reg'd society), which was dissolved in October 2003, were contacted on behalf of a Menschenrechtsverein für Migranten (Human Rights Association for Migrants) registered in Aachen. In late December the MIM decided to change its name to Menschenrechtszentrum für ExiliranerInnen e. V. (MEI, Human Rights Centre for Exiled Iranians, reg'd society). The association’s headquarters are still in Düsseldorf.

¹⁶⁶ Press statement by the NCRI secretariat, 25 July 2004.

4.2 Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)

Founded:	In 1991 as a splinter group of the Communist Party of Iran (CPI)
Membership/Supporters:	Around 250 (2003: 300 in total in Germany prior to the split)
The organisation is split into the:	
Worker-Communist Party of Iran (WPI)	
Leader:	Hamid TAGHWAI
and	
Hekmatist (The Worker-Communist Party of Iran)	
Leader:	Koroush MODARESI

Since August 2004 the WPI has been split into two competing factions. Both the WPI and Hekmatist make reference to the ideology of Manour HEKMAT, the founder of the WPI who died in 2002. Both call for the Iranian government to be dissolved and replaced by a socialist system of councils.

The only ideological differences between the two factions have to do with the question of the practical implementation of their political objectives:

According to Hekmatist, the change in power in Iran could also be prepared in a pragmatic manner by forming political alliances with other oppositional movements. A strategy paper adopted at the organisation's inaugural conference in August 2004 stated:

"The party's immediate and direct goal is to take over political power, to found a socialist republic and to organise the social revolution of the working class in Iran. In a first step the Islamic government must be overthrown. ... This will only be possible if the party takes over political power. The working class will only gain power by having its own party."

Given its orthodox standpoint, the WPI backs a working class revolution to overthrow the government in order then to bring about a

new system of rule and social order. It distances itself from the Hekmatist faction:

“Delaying the socialist revolution until after seizing political power ... is based on the out-dated bourgeois, left-wing theory which says that ‘socialism will spread via the people’ and that a socialist revolution is ‘currently not possible’. Although they [Hekmatists] maintain that the method of seizing political power is their strongpoint, it is in fact utopian and impossible.”

(WPI communiqué on the split in a section of the Central Committee, posted on the Internet, October 2004)

Due to party-internal quarrels before and after the split, both factions were only occasionally able to carry out small-scale rallies. These usually dealt with the human rights situation in Iran and women's rights in Iran. Such events were organised by the Internationale Föderation der iranischen Flüchtlings- und Immigrantenräte (IFIR, International Federation of Iranian Refugee and Immigration Councils) and the Internationale Kampagne zur Verteidigung von Frauenrechten im Iran e. V. (International Campaign to Defend Women's Rights in Iran, reg'd society).

4.3 Iranian influence on Shiites living in Germany

Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (IZH, Islamic Centre in Hamburg)

The Islamische Zentrum Hamburg (IZH, Islamic Centre in Hamburg) is still the most important official Iranian Islamic centre for Shiite Muslims in Germany. It is the most active propaganda centre in Europe, providing a high-level point of contact to the highest spiritual revolutionary leader in Iran, Ayatollah KHAMENEI. The Iranian constitution envisages the world-wide spread of the so-called Iranian-style Islamic system as founded by Ayatollah KHOMEINI in 1979. It was KHOMEINI's will that this goal be achieved by means of an Islamic revolution.

The IZH is also the point of contact for Shiites from other countries, for example Turkey and Lebanon. Its best-known publication is the monthly *Al Fadschr* (The Light of Dawn), which publishes articles on Koran-related themes, reports on regularly scheduled events, excerpts from Friday sermons and “news from the Islamic world”. After Dr Seyyid Reza HOSSEINI-NASSAB stepped down as head of the IZH in September 2003, Seyyed Abbas GHAEM-MAGHAMI took on the post in January 2004. There are further Iranian facilities affiliated to the IZH in Berlin, Frankfurt (Main) and Munich.

- Al-Quds day** The annual demonstration to mark al-Quds day (Jerusalem Day) was held in Berlin on 13 November. The IZH regularly co-organises this large-scale event. Since 1996 al-Quds day has been organised by members of the Iranian community in Berlin and marked by Shiites of various origins (including Lebanese, Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Germans). In 1979 Ayatollah KHOMEINI introduced this day of commemoration to mark the occupation of Jerusalem (Arabic: *al-quds*, the holy (city)). In 2004 around 800 people took part in the event, including Iranian, Lebanese and Turkish nationals from across Germany. As in 2003 it met with considerably less response than anticipated (around 2,000 participants had been expected). This was, above all, due to strict conditions imposed by the police. An alternative event like the one held in Bottrop in 2003, did not take place.
- Muslim-Markt (MM, Muslim Market)** The Internet portal Muslim-Markt (MM, Muslim Market) is operated by Dr Yavuz ÖZOGUZ, a Shiite of Turkish descent. In connection with this activity he was given a three-month suspended prison sentence for incitement to hatred. The public prosecutor's office and the accused lodged an appeal on points of fact and law (*Berufung*).¹⁶⁷ The proceedings hinged on two articles posted on the "Palestine Special" website which were available via a link on the MM site. The article contained images from the Nazi era which had been combined without comment with recent photographs from the Israeli-occupied West Bank. The Court saw this as "hostile agitation" against the Jews. ÖZOGUZ was also charged with publishing part of a speech by an Iranian spiritual leader, Ali KHAMENEI, on the authenticity of the Holocaust. ÖZOGUZ has on numerous occasions drawn attention to himself on account of his Islamist statements. The MM portal has for quite some time been directly or indirectly spreading anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli propaganda. For example, the "Palestine Special" site has the following introduction: "The work is solely directed against those responsible for Zionism and the pseudo-state of Israel, which is built upon injustice." Yavuz and Gürhan ÖZOGUZ, two brothers, revealed their close links to the Iranian Islamist government system in an interview in June, when they said that "only a theocracy has a true constitution" and "Imam KHAMENEI instructs us". Yavuz ÖZOGUZ's activities in the MM portal must also be regarded in this context.

5. Kosovo Albanians

¹⁶⁷ After initially suspending proceedings and imposing certain conditions, Oldenburg Regional Court dropped the case on 18 March 2005 following payment of € 1,000 to a charity.

Albanian National Army (AKSH) / Front for Albanian National Unification (FBKSH)

Founded: In 1999 in Kosovo

Leadership: Chairman: Gafurr ADILI
Political Secretary: Idajet BEQIRI

Membership/Supporters: Around 50

The security situation in the former Yugoslavia has steadily improved over the past few years thanks to the international military and administrative presence and treaties. Nevertheless, extremist forces are still active in the region. In view of the unstable situation, particularly in Kosovo and Macedonia, these groups could pose a long-term threat to the peace process. The AKSH and its political wing, the FBKSH, are two such extremist forces. Their goal is to create a “Greater Albania” that goes beyond current national boundaries – if need be by force. Even after the National Liberation Army (UCK) ceased hostilities in September 2001 following the signing of the so-called Ohrid Agreement¹⁶⁸ and disbanded, the AKSH propagated a continuation of the “struggle for liberation” in all regions inhabited by Albanians – in Kosovo and Macedonia, as well as in Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. It also attempted to establish structures in these regions. It was the FBKSH’s task to set up a network of supporters abroad – for example also in Germany. From 2001 to 2003 the AKSH carried out a number of militant and terrorist activities in the region and was thus declared a terrorist organisation by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and subsequently banned. The FBKSH, for its part, propagated its objectives in Western Europe in various publications and at events attended by compatriots. It also attempted to create a multi-country network of forces.

The number of attacks and other militant activities carried out by the AKSH dropped dramatically in 2004. The FBKSH’s propaganda activities in Western Europe also declined. The prevailing state of uncertainty within the organisation was further heightened by the fact that two alleged leaders of the FBKSH in Albania (who had been living in Switzerland and Belgium) were handed down prison sentences for

¹⁶⁸ An agreement reached on 1 August 2001 between the Macedonian central government and the insurgent Albanians which was aimed at improving the legal situation of Albanians.

incitement to hatred, among other things. One of the two was arrested in Germany in December 2003 on an international arrest warrant and extradited to Albania in June 2004.

In view of the unstable security situation in Kosovo, as indicated by the unrest in March,¹⁶⁹ and the continued risk of destabilisation in Macedonia, tensions could very quickly rise again, for example if the Albanians' expectations regarding an independent Kosovo are not fulfilled. In turn, groups like the AKSH and the FBKSH could exploit such a situation to their own ends, by spearheading the "struggle for liberation" with militant means.

¹⁶⁹ After the Albanian-language media reported a rumour that two Albanian children had drowned in a river in Mitrovica after being chased by a Serb with a fierce dog, pogrom-like clashes broke out on two successive days in Kosovo in mid-March 2004. The rioters allegedly attacked houses and churches belonging to the Serbian population, but they also targeted the minority Romany and Ashkali population, as well as vehicles belonging to the UNMIK administration.

6. Tamils

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Founded:	In 1972 in Sri Lanka
Leader:	Cadre for the German section
Membership/Supporters:	Around 750 (2003: around 750)
Publications:	<i>Viduthalai Puligal</i> (Liberation Tigers), fortnightly

Although the ceasefire between the Tamil LTTE separatists and the Sri Lankan government was essentially observed by both sides, the situation is no less tense than before. Uncertainty remains as to whether progress will be made in peace negotiations or whether battles will flare up again.

Peace process in jeopardy

The new political situation in the government of Sri Lanka is jeopardising the faltering peace process. In early 2004 the president of Sri Lanka called an election; the government, which had appeared willing to make concessions to the LTTE, lost its majority. Although the president expressed her readiness to continue with peace negotiations, the new governing coalition's tougher stance may make this more difficult (as some are sceptical about resuming talks). On the other hand, there is also controversy within the LTTE itself. The organisation claims that the government of Sri Lanka had at the very least encouraged the conflict in order to drive a wedge into the LTTE and thus to weaken it.

In the spring the commander of the supposedly 6,000-strong LTTE units in eastern Sri Lanka rebelled against the organisation's leadership based in the north of the country. When LTTE units from the north took military action against him and his supporters, he fled to the government-controlled south of the country. Since then the clashes within the LTTE have also led to political assassinations. Although the LTTE maintains that it is ready to talk to the government if it accepts the basis for negotiation put forward by the LTTE in October 2003, negotiations have not yet resumed. Despite the LTTE-internal arguments in Sri Lanka causing irritation within the LTTE in Germany, this did not give rise to comparable conflicts among Tamils

living here. The organisation engaged in propaganda in an attempt to stop any splinter groups forming and also used the crisis in Sri Lanka to try to persuade compatriots in Germany to donate more money. The LTTE and its aid and cover organisations justified this with the increased need for funding to fulfil administrative and development policy tasks in LTTE-governed regions of Sri Lanka. However, since it left no doubt as to its readiness to resume armed combat if the peace process failed, there is much evidence to suggest that at least a proportion of these donations is being used to procure weapons.

7. Pakistanis

Tablighi Jama'at (TJ, Muslim Faith)

Founded: Around 1926 in (British) India

Membership/Supporters: Around 450

The TJ was founded by Maulawi Muhammad ILYAS around 1926 as a pietist movement for the reawakening of faith. ILYAS was a supporter of the Indian Dar al-Ulum, or Deoband School. The doctrine of the Deoband School seeks to defend Islam and to set it apart from other religions, in particular Hinduism. Furthermore, it aims to teach the “classical culture”, i.e. how to live a life based on the Koran and Sunna.

The TJ is an international mass movement without any fixed structures. Its European “headquarters” are in Dewsbury, UK. Followers living in Germany attend mosques in Munich, Nuremberg, Erfurt and Cologne, among others.

TJ followers are obligated to undertake regular, voluntary and unpaid missionary activity, the objective being to Islamise society. Each individual is to live a convincing, exemplary lifestyle according to the Islamic faith. The ultimate goal is to change society based on Western values into an Islamic society.

Followers interpret the Koran literally, which leads to discrimination against women, strict observance of Muslim family law and strict separation from non-Muslims. In addition, this verbatim interpretation of the Koran invariably leads to a rejection of Western values.

The TJ describes itself as apolitical and rejects violence on principle. However, due to its strict understanding of Islam and worldwide dissemination, there is the danger that Islamist groups and networks prepared to use violence will instrumentalise the movement for their own purposes.

Followers of the TJ in Germany attempt to recruit economically and socially disadvantaged young Muslims by engaging them in intense, personal dialogue. For many this is often the first time they have reflected on their own faith. "New recruits" frequently register for courses in Pakistani Koran schools which last several months. Such intensive courses can serve religious indoctrination and make participants receptive to Islamist ideas.

A meeting of the TJ attended by around 800 participants took place in Hamburg in April. Other large-scale meetings were held in southern France, in the Netherlands and Belgium.

In addition, the TJ organises an annual, global meeting in Raiwind, Pakistan which is attended by millions of people.

8. Chechens

Chechen Separatist Movement

Founded:	In the early 1990s in the Caucasus
Leaders:	Šamil BASSAJEV and Aslan MASHADOV ¹⁷⁰
Membership/Supporters:	Around 500

The conflict in the Russian Republic of Chechnya again became the focus of public attention following various attacks on facilities in the Russian Federation and after several hundred people were killed in the hostage-taking in a school in Beslan in northern Ossetia at the beginning of September.

Influenced by military conflicts which have been ongoing since 1994 (with a three-year interruption), sections of the Chechen population have become radicalised. The conflict increasingly served to draw people in to join the international jihad. Chechen separatist leaders who had already fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s exploited the situation to establish Wahhabitic Islam in northern Caucasus with the help of mujahidin structures. Their ultimate aim is to found an Islamic state on Chechen territory.

The Chechen separatist movement is mainly organised around military structures and aims by violent means to force the Russian Army to withdraw from Chechnya and to seize power itself.

The movement has a variety of supporters in Germany. Along with followers of the Chechen underground government led by the late MASHADOV (a movement which Moscow does not recognise) and supporters of BASSAJEV, a rebel leader, there are also alliances working towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Caucasus region. All in all, there has been an increase in activities and increased membership of groups providing support.

These supporters have been active across Germany (with regional focuses on Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, Mannheim and Munich). Activities range from engaging in propaganda for the Chechen

¹⁷⁰ MASHADOV was killed by Russian special units in Chechnya on 8 March 2005. His successor Abdul Khalim SADULAJEV is the former chairman of the Islamic Court in Chechnya.

separatist movement to collecting donations for mainly humanitarian projects.

There was no indication that Chechen separatists were responsible for any acts of violence in Germany.

IV. Means of agitation and communication

1. Periodical publications

In 2004, groups of extremist foreigners put out a total of 73 publications on a regular basis (2003: 71). Of these, 23 promoted Islamist views (2003: 21), 48 left-wing extremist views (2003: 47) and two nationalist views (2003: three). As in previous years, most of these publications, namely 25 (2003: 24), were produced by left-wing extremist Turkish groups.

***Anadoluda Vakit* (Anatolian Times)**

The Turkish daily newspaper *Anadoluda Vakit* (Anatolian Times) stood out among the Islamist publications in 2004 on account of its particularly aggressive anti-Semitism. The European edition, which had been available since December 2001, by its own account had a print run of 10,000 copies. The paper was published by Yeni Akit GmbH, with headquarters in Mörfelden-Walldorf, Hesse, and was available both by subscription and in shops. The Federal Ministry of the Interior banned Yeni Akit GmbH by order dated 25 February 2005.

No direct link could be established between the Turkish-language newspaper and any specific organisation, but its Islamist leanings were obvious from the anti-Semitic and anti-American nature of the articles. The paper agitated openly against Jews and against the state of Israel. For example, one columnist described the Holocaust as a lie which had served to move Jews living in Germany to emigrate to Palestine:

“There is no such thing as genocide. Gas chambers are a lie. It’s all just Zionist jazz. When the Jews didn’t want to leave Germany and emigrate to Palestine, they were scared into going. A mountain was made out of a molehill. It is thanks to this that the foundations were laid for the state of Israel.”

(*Anadoluda Vakit*, 1 December 2004, p. 11)

The newspaper had also set its sights on the United States long before the military intervention began in Iraq. It compared the US president’s politics with Adolf Hitler’s:

“Bush’s attitude shows that he has completely fallen in line with Hitler, that he is challenging the whole world and is trying to convince the world that only violence can rule the world and that the United States

does in fact have that power. But we must not forget that Hitler's approach leads to disaster and destruction."
(*Anadoluda Vakit*, 18 November 2004, p. 6)

2. The Internet

Foreign extremist organisations now use the Internet as a matter of course – and not just for communication purposes. Organisations outline their goals on professional homepages; party pamphlets and propaganda are available online.

The overwhelming majority of Islamist organisations represented in Germany maintain websites on which they post topical and ideological articles. Islamists primarily use the Net for propaganda purposes. But it is also particularly important as a means for undercover communication.

Mujahidin groups mainly use well-known Arabic- and English-language Internet sites to publish messages from their leaders or to post propaganda.

The mujahidin followers of the Jordanian national Ahmed Nazzal Fadhil AL-KHALALIYAH, alias Abu Mosab AL-ZARQAWI, who is actively involved in terrorist activities in Iraq, released a video of the beheading of a US hostage in early May. By broadcasting these shocking images on the Internet the terrorists succeeded in capturing the world's attention. The video also showed a masked man (presumably AL-ZARQAWI himself) reading out a statement written by the terrorist group. It called on the United States to leave Iraq, otherwise more hostages would be taken and murdered.

Two Internet publications which can be attributed to al-Qaeda/mujahidin have been available since late 2003/early 2004.

Sawt al Jihad (The Voice of Jihad) was published biweekly up until November 2004. A further issue was published in April 2005. The Internet magazine promulgates Islamist views: Islamist ideologists as well as leaders of Islamist groups write articles for the magazine, mainly on the war in Iraq, but also on the Middle East conflict and the war in Chechnya.

The second publication, *Mu'askar al-Battar* (Al-Battar Training Camp), dealt exclusively with the military aspect of the jihad and was likewise published every two weeks until November. It contained descriptions

of weapons and of training for jihad, and called on readers to take part in the jihad.

Mujahidin and al-Qaeda groups use the Internet, as well as the *Al Jazeera* TV station, to broadcast their statements. On 9 September, for example, a speech by BIN LADEN's deputy, Dr Ayman AL-ZAWAHIRI, was published on the Internet to mark the anniversary of the 11 September 2001 attacks. BIN LADEN himself issued a statement on *Al Jazeera* on 29 October shortly before the US presidential elections on 2 November. The speech, in which al-Qaeda for the first time claimed responsibility for the 11 September attacks, was later posted on the Internet.

An Internet magazine called *Al-Khansaa* (the name of one of Mohammed's female companions) was launched in August as the first publication aimed explicitly at Islamist women. It deals with clothing regulations for women and how they are to bring up their children, in particular their sons, to be good jihadi fighters. By its own accounts, the publication was to appear monthly, but only one issue has been published so far.

In 2004 the Palestinian Information Centre (PIC) again provided topical analysis of the Middle East conflict. The PIC's website was dominated by the Israeli Army's actions in the Palestinian territory. The killing of Hamas leaders in March and April (cf. Section III, 1.4.1) gave occasion for massive anti-Israeli propaganda on the Internet.

Supporters of the banned Turkish Hilafet Devleti (Caliphate State) group also made use of the Internet. For example, their new publication *Barika-i Hakikat* (The Light of Truth; cf. Section III, 2.1.1) was available on the Internet until December.

All in all it is apparent that the Internet has gained in importance for Islamist groups. Numerous new websites appear every day in a variety of languages. The number of Arabic-language websites in particular has increased considerably.

Kongra Gel (The People's Congress of Kurdistan) has had its own multi-lingual website since early 2004. The website publishes political statements and sets out the organisation's demands; it also announces activities and campaigns.

The Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C, Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front) uses numerous multi-lingual websites to disseminate declarations of solidarity and information on the "death

fasts” of “political prisoners” in Turkish prisons, as well as criticism of NATO, of “imperialism” and of the Turkish government.

The regularly updated website of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) – the political wing of the Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK, People's Mujahidin of Iraq) – contains information on those members of the MEK still living in Iraq. The site advertises events and demonstrations and calls on supporters to protest against the Iranian government. In that respect it is like numerous other sites, which on the surface appear neutral or to exclusively promote cultural activities or to provide information and have no obvious link to the MEK.

V. Overview of other noteworthy organisations and their most important publications

Organisation	Membership / Supporters (partly estimated)		Publications (including frequency)
	2004	2003	
<p>Turks (excluding Kurds)</p> <p>Avrupa Demokratik Ülkücü Türk Dernekleri Federasyonu (ADÜTDF, Federation of Turkish Democratic Idealist Hearths in Europe, reg'd society)</p> <p>Demokratik İşçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (DİDF, Federation of Democratic Clubs of Workers from Turkey in the FRG, reg'd society)</p>	7,500	ca. 8,000	<i>Tatsachen</i> (Facts), bi-monthly
	600	ca. 650	
<p>Kurds</p> <p>Iraqi organisations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Democratic Party of Kurdistan–Iraq (DPK-I) – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 	Total of 450	Total of 350	
<p>Arabs</p> <p>Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (AMAL, Lebanese Resistance Detachments)</p>	150	200	<i>Al Awassef</i> (The Storms), weekly
<p>Egyptians</p> <p>Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GI, Islamic Group)</p> <p>Jihad Islami (JI, Islamic Holy War)</p>	Only a few individuals	Only a few individuals	
	Only a few individuals	Only a few individuals	

Organisation	Membership / Supporters (partly estimated)		Publications (including frequency)
	2004	2003	
Iranians			
Union of Islamic Students' Associations (UISA)	50	50	<i>Quds</i> (Jerusalem), at irregular intervals, among others
Sikhs			
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF)	600	600	
Babbar Khalsa International (BK)	200	200	
Kamagata Maru Dal International (KMDI)	40	40	

Espionage and Other Intelligence Activities

I. Overview

Germany continues to be a preferred intelligence target	The threat scenario as regards counterintelligence tasks remained unchanged in 2004. Germany continues to be a preferred target of the intelligence services of a number of foreign nations. In addition to the services of a number of republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ¹⁷¹ mainly those of the Russian Federation, these include services of countries in the Middle and Far East and in North Africa.
Presence of foreign intelligence service staff	Varying numbers of intelligence staff are assigned to the official or semi-official missions of these countries in Germany. From their cover posts at so-called legal residencies in Germany, these "diplomats" or "journalists" engage in - overt or clandestine - information-gathering activities or support intelligence operations directed by the central headquarters of these services. If, for example, such "diplomats" are shown to have engaged in activities incompatible with their alleged status, they may be expelled from Germany.
"Classic" espionage; spying on opposition groups	The intelligence targets of foreign services range from "classic" espionage - i.e. information-gathering activities in the fields of politics, trade and industry, the military, etc. - to the investigation and infiltration of organisations and individuals in Germany that are opposed to the current regime in their countries of origin ("spying on opposition groups"). The aim is to approach selected persons in order to recruit them for intelligence activities. If the persons concerned refuse such recruitment, they or their relatives living in their home countries will often be threatened with repressive measures.
Proliferation	Finally, a number of countries are continuing their efforts to gain possession of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and of the related delivery systems, and to acquire the material and the know-how required for producing such weapons and systems ("proliferation"). The question of proliferation is still high up on the agenda, as is shown by the judgement delivered by the Stutt-

¹⁷¹ The CIS consists of: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

gart Landgericht (Regional Court) on 28 May (cf. Chapter VI below).

II. The intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation

1. Structural developments, and current situation and tasks of the services in the Russian Federation

FSB - organisational and staffing changes

The restructuring, initiated in 2003, of the Russian intelligence and security services continued in 2004 to have an impact on the set-up of the domestic service FSB.¹⁷² By a presidential decree of July 2004, the Russian President ordered additional changes to the FSB's organisation and staffing.

The FSB Director's status was raised to the rank of a Cabinet minister. As stated by the head of the FSB's Organisational and Personnel Service, Yevgeny LOVYREV, the presidential decree was intended to widen the FSB Director's powers. The Director would in future be authorised to decide, at his discretion, on the personnel strength and the membership of high-level consultative bodies within the FSB.

The former FSB "departments" are now defined as independent units, and their future - upgraded - designation will be "SERVICE for ... [the respective functional area]". The aim is to increase operational effectiveness of the special services and to strengthen their autonomy.

This reform of the FSB has further consolidated the service's status as a main pillar of the state's security structure. The FSB played an active role in drafting the presidential decree, which took account of all the suggestions made by the FSB leadership, which is headed by army general Nikolai PATRUSHEV, a long-time associate and close confidant of the Russian President.

As provided by the presidential decree, the FSB Director was expected to submit proposals to the President for additional structural changes within the domestic intelligence service. These reports fuelled rumours in the Russian media that the civilian foreign-intelligence service SVR¹⁷³ might also be a candidate for an FSB takeover. Press reports also mentioned the planned creation of a new, uniform security system which was aimed at establishing a State Security Ministry or an overarching power agency.

¹⁷² FSB: Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti ("Federal Security Service" - the Russian domestic intelligence service)

¹⁷³ SVR: Sluzhba Vnyeshney Razvedki (civilian Russian "External Intelligence Service")

Responsibilities of the FSB

The domestic intelligence service FSB is responsible for civilian and military counterintelligence, monitoring political extremism, and fighting terrorism and organised crime. The FSB is involved in the "counterterrorism operations" in the North Caucasus; in addition, it is responsible for protecting Russian industry against industrial espionage and organised crime and for protecting foreign investors against economic crime. For purposes of combating terrorism, organised crime and proliferation, the FSB may also carry out transborder operations.

Claiming to carry out counterintelligence measures, the FSB further tries to pursue external intelligence activities with the help of foreign nationals who are recruited during their stays in Russia. There are, for example, indications that the service does not confine its activities regarding Germany to Russian territory but also seeks to procure information within Germany itself. The FSB's counterintelligence activities involve intensive monitoring of the Internet in Russia. Therefore, also foreign nationals using the Internet in Russia inevitably come to the FSB's attention and can be placed under specific surveillance.

The FSB now also is responsible for protecting the Russian national borders and controlling persons entering or leaving the country. In addition, this service was assigned a number of responsibilities to ensure communications security in the telecommunications field. At present, the FSB has a personnel strength of 350,000.

Russia's foreign-intelligence services

The organisational structure and the tasks of the Russian foreign-intelligence services remained unchanged in 2004. By gathering information on a wide range of subjects, they have a supporting role, especially in view of asserting Russian interests.

Although political relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Russian Federation have improved in recent years, the Russian intelligence services continue to regard Germany as an important intelligence target and give it high priority.

- SVR** The SVR is responsible for gathering foreign intelligence in civilian sectors and helping to contain proliferation and to fight international terrorism.
- It may be assumed that, as a result of the 2003 restructuring of the Russian services, the SVR has also been assigned important tasks in the field of electronic communications intelligence. At present, it has a staff of over 13,000.
- GRU** The GRU ¹⁷⁴ is the military foreign-intelligence service of the Russian Federation. It is a subordinate agency of the Russian Ministry of Defence, and has an estimated staff of around 12,000.

2. Intelligence targets and priorities

- Objectives** The core activities of the Russian intelligence services concern procuring information in the classic fields of politics, trade and industry, science, and technology, and the military spectrum. The Russian government's current information requirements dictate the priority given to specific intelligence-gathering activities.
- The current demand for specific intelligence focused on the following target areas:
- Politics** In the political field, procurement of information on economic and security policies and information referring to the Russian Federation's national security situation was of particular interest. The Chechnya conflict, in particular, is of great importance to the Russian secret services. In this regard, intelligence collection was directed, for example, at Germany's political views on the Russian position and Russia's activities concerning the conflict in Chechnya. Further, the Russian services' information-gathering activities are permanently focused on the EU and NATO.
- The military** In the military field, the Russian services' information-gathering activities focused on the technical equipment of the Federal Armed Forces (Bundeswehr) and on their plans for operations at home and abroad. Also, efforts were made to gain information on the German armaments industry.

¹⁷⁴ GRU: **G**lavnoye **R**azvedyvatelnoye **U**pravlenie ("General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate" = Russian military foreign-intelligence service)

The economic field In the target area 'trade and industry', intelligence collection focused on issues of fiscal policy and the production, supply and distribution of energy. The economic impact of the war in Iraq was of particular interest to these services.

Science and technology In the field of science and technology, the services' efforts were directed at gathering information on security, information and communications technologies. The services were also interested in products that can be used for both civilian and military purposes ("dual use").

3. Methods of gathering intelligence

These intelligence methods include, in particular, overt information collection through conversations with contacts and use of publicly accessible information sources such as the Internet.

However, the Russian services continue to use methods of clandestine intelligence gathering, e.g. employment of undercover agents.

3.1 Legal residencies of Russian intelligence services

The diplomatic and consular missions of the Russian Federation and the foreign offices of Russian news agencies play an important role in the Russian services' intelligence-gathering activities in Germany.

Large number of intelligence personnel In almost all of these establishments, a large number of posts are available to the intelligence services for the placement of staff members in diplomatic or journalistic cover positions. Within these establishments, the intelligence staff constitute the so-called legal residency. This provides the Russian services in Germany with permanent bases for all types of on-site intelligence operations.

Members of the intelligence services also in 2004 had a large share in the overall number of the staff of Russian missions in Germany. Compared with other European countries, the Russian intelligence services are clearly overrepresented in Germany. This massive presence of intelligence staff underlines the Federal Republic's importance as an intelligence target. The cover positions for staff of the intelligence services are filled mainly by the SVR and the GRU.

Berlin as the largest base The largest intelligence base operated by the Russian services in Germany is the Russian Federation's Embassy in Berlin.

Overt information gathering	<p>For overt information gathering, residency officers maintain a network of contact persons in all intelligence areas and from various groups of society. Such contacts are established during the performance of official functions. Occasionally, it is simply by applying subtle eliciting techniques during talks that members of the secret services manage to obtain sensitive information.</p> <p>In addition, they collect openly accessible material at political or military discussions or lectures and at industrial fairs.</p>
"Semi-overt" information gathering	<p>The intelligence activities of Russian legal residencies also include clandestine techniques. "Semi-overt" information gathering includes a number of elements of covert agent handling. Residency members will, from the start, lay down the modalities for further meetings with their contact partners and thus obviate the need for openly arranging later meetings. The meetings will be held on "neutral ground", e.g. in restaurants. The long-term aim of these contacts - which are seen as "confidential contacts" by the Russian services - is to obtain a supply of information in exchange for money or other rewards. However, the residency officers avoid talking openly about the intelligence nature of their contact. This more restrained approach continues to be applied mainly by the SVR.</p>
Covert agent handling	<p>Covert agent handling employing "classic" methods is practised mainly by the residency staffers of the GRU. In this regard, priority is given to protecting the contact against exposure. To this end, considerably increased security arrangements are made in order to ensure safe clandestine meetings. The agent handler and the contact agree on various specific options for safe communication, giving the meeting/s the unmistakable - also for the contact person - character of a classic secret agent operation.</p>

3.2 Activities under central control

Central control by the services' headquarters	<p>In addition, the SVR and GRU continue their undiminished efforts to monitor the various target countries directly from their headquarters in Moscow. While it is difficult, on account of the geographical distance, to maintain intelligence communications with agents in Germany, activities carried out without relying on the legal residencies in the target country actually involve a comparably small risk of detection.</p>
Target persons	<p>Especially those persons who, for professional or family reasons, frequently travel to Russia or stay there for longer periods, e.g. businessmen or staff of diplomatic missions, are liable to become involved in intelligence activities or to be recruited as agents. The Russian secret services focus their interest mainly on these persons, who can therefore expect to be approached by these services.</p> <p>Another group of potential target persons is late repatriates from Russia (ethnic Germans) who visit their former home country or who, on account of their knowledge of the languages and countries concerned, are involved in business transactions between Germany and Russia. The FSB has extensive information on this group of persons because it places them under intensive observation and, in some cases, assigns secret agents to infiltrate their communities. During visits of such persons in Russia, it is quite possible that recruitment approaches will be made or meetings be held.</p>
Communications	<p>A complex communication system is provided for agents who are handled directly by the services' headquarters and travel to Russia only infrequently. As before, the means employed include secret writing (s/w) methods and radio communications, combined with encryption techniques. Money and documents will be exchanged via "dead letter boxes" (DLBs)¹⁷⁵. Members of legal residencies in the target country will help with such operations.</p>
Trainees	<p>The Russian services obtain valuable information about Germany also by interviewing Russian nationals who temporarily stayed in Germany for professional reasons. Thus, in a number of cases, Russian trainees holding a grant for an internship or on-the-job training in Germany were, upon their return, intensively questioned by the FSB about their activities and contacts in Germany.</p>

¹⁷⁵ Caches (in the ground or elsewhere) for the exchange of information and material or making payments to secret operatives.

III. Intelligence and security services of other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

All CIS member re- publics have intelli- gence services	Apart from Russia, all of the other eleven member republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have intelligence and security services. These were established on the basis of still existing regional structures of the former USSR intelligence services.
Different structures	Most of the intelligence services of the other CIS countries combine "civilian" intelligence collection and domestic counterintelligence activities in one service, as was the case with the former KGB (Committee for State Security). A number of CIS republics also have a military intelligence service in addition to the civilian services. Further, the security structures of these countries include presidential security guard services and border control services which, in part, are integrated into the "civilian" intelligence services.
Legal bases	The activities of these intelligence services are governed by legal provisions. In 2004, the Republic of Moldova enacted new legislation to expand the powers of Moldova's information and security service. The Belarusian intelligence service KDB ¹⁷⁶ is to be given greater scope for action under legal provisions. The planned expansion of powers - e.g. unlimited authorisation to enter the premises of third parties, and extension of Internet monitoring - might also affect German nationals in the Republic of Belarus.
Tasks of the services	As a general rule, the task of these intelligence services is to gather information for their respective government on political, economic, scientific and technological matters and the military spectrum. Also, topical events and issues are additional targets of the services' activities. Restrictions, especially as regards information gathering in foreign countries, are encountered as a result of financial difficulties. The Ukrainian and Belarusian services employ their own staff in Germany, but also rely on their countries' official missions there.
A new service estab- lished in the Ukraine	Under a decree issued by the Ukrainian President on 14 October 2004, an independent foreign-intelligence service - "Sluzhba Zovnishnioyi Rozvidky" [*] (SZR) - was established in the Ukraine. Pre-

¹⁷⁶ KDB = **K**amitet **D**zyazauny **B**yaspeki (Committee for State Security)

^{*} The German text gives the transliteration (and abbreviation of the **Russian** term: "Sluzhba Vneshnei Razvedki Ukrainy" (SVRU) [translator's note]

viously, foreign-intelligence collection had been a responsibility of the civilian security service SBU¹⁷⁷. As provided under the decree, the tasks of this new service are to gather information on political, economic, scientific/technological and military-technological subjects and to fight organised crime and international terrorism.

Ukrainian activities

In early 2004, a high-ranking officer of the Ukrainian intelligence service SBU refused to comply with the order to leave his post at the Ukrainian Embassy in Germany and to return to his home country. Before the press, he severely reproached his country's government and the leadership of the SBU Intelligence Directorate for their methods of dealing with the Ukrainian opposition. The officer said that the Ukrainian government had ordered the SBU to shadow opposition parliamentarians during their travels abroad. He further stated that such surveillance had also extended to German politicians and to parts of the German press. He said he had been requested by the SBU leadership to prevent the transmission of a TV report about certain abusive practices in the Ukraine. In connection with this broadcast, he said, he had also been requested to submit reports on additional persons who had attracted the SBU's attention.

Ethnic German repatriates

Generally, all CIS intelligence services take an interest in the lives and activities of former nationals of their countries who emigrated to Germany. In view of their continuing contacts with people in their former home countries, these persons are often involved in economic relations between the CIS member republics and Germany. This is another reason why visits by these persons to CIS countries are monitored by the CIS intelligence services.

Ethnic Germans staying on the territory of the CIS republics must, as before, expect surveillance and recruitment approaches by the intelligence services. Company representatives and staff members of the German diplomatic missions are preferred targets of intelligence activities.

¹⁷⁷ SBU = Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrayiny (civilian "Security Service of Ukraine")

IV. Activities of intelligence services of countries in the Middle East and North Africa

The primary objective: spying on opposition groups

Also in 2004, the services of a number of countries in the Middle East and North Africa pursued intelligence activities in Germany. The focus of these activities was on observing, and spying on, compatriots who have their permanent or temporary residence in Germany and, among these, particularly those persons who are in opposition to their country's government. Specific targets are the structures, functionaries, membership and objectives of anti-regime organisations operating in Germany. In view of the threat posed by international Islamist terrorism, these services increasingly gather information on Islamist groups. Also, intelligence activities are pursued in the classic areas of espionage, i.e. politics, the military, science, research, and technology.

1. Iranian intelligence services

The attention of the Iranian intelligence service VEVAK¹⁷⁸ continued to be centred on the Iranian opposition in foreign countries, which is split up into a large number of organisations and small groups.

The anti-regime spectrum ranges from monarchists and democrats to left-wing liberals and Communists. The VEVAK is particularly interested in the revolutionary-Marxist organisation People's Mujahidin of Iran (Mujahedeen-e-Khalq, MEK) which is also prepared to use violence, and in its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

For its spying activities, the Iranian intelligence service relies on a network of secret agents who are recruited from among the supporters of the organisations and groups under VEVAK surveillance. In most cases, recruitment pitches are made when target persons are on a visit to Iran. During such approaches, the service puts pressure on the targeted persons, e.g. by threatening them with reprisals on their relatives living in Iran. Persons who do not travel to Iran are contacted over the telephone from Iran.

¹⁷⁸ **Vezeerat-e Ettela'at Va Amniat-e Keshvar** (Ministry of Intelligence and National Security: Iran's civilian domestic and external intelligence service)

2. Syrian intelligence services

A major network of covert informants

In Germany, the members of several Syrian intelligence services, who are assigned as "diplomats" to cover posts at the Syrian Embassy in Berlin, operate a large network of covert informants and agents. Their systematic intelligence activities are aimed at the large number of anti-regime political parties and associations, especially those of Syrian Kurds, of Lebanese critics and of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In their efforts to recruit new agents and to intimidate opponents of the regime, they do not stop at repressive measures against the prospective agents or targeted opponents or their relatives living in Syria. When target persons living in Germany visit Syria, they must expect to be detained, questioned and maltreated.

The intelligence activities of Syrian services in Germany are patterned on Syria's domestic surveillance of practically all sectors of society and community life. Any direct opposition to the regime, e.g. in the form of independent political parties, is suppressed. Supporters of dissident movements must expect massive repressive measures. Hoping to escape the reach of the many omnipotent security services, dissidents flee the country to live abroad. But even there, they are not safe from the long arm of the Syrian security services.

3. Libyan intelligence services

Integration efforts

Libya re-oriented its foreign policy in 2004. In response to this, the embargoes imposed by the UN, EU and U.S. were lifted; the heads of government of many Western nations visited the country and established new political and economic relations. It seems that, after many years, the country's isolation is coming to an end.

No changes in the domestic situation

The internal power structures, however, are unchanged. The country continues to be under dictatorial rule. Anti-regime activities of Libyan nationals living abroad are kept under surveillance by the security apparatus. This also applies to Libyans in Germany.

V. Far East intelligence services

The intelligence services of a number of Far East nations also are developing activities affecting German interests. Primarily these include the services of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea).

1. Chinese intelligence services

Intelligence targets

The People's Republic of China is becoming an increasingly significant factor in international politics. Accordingly, the Chinese government is stepping up its efforts to obtain information worldwide in the fields of politics, the military, science and research. In addition, there is systematic surveillance of opposition movements abroad, covering supporters of the pro-democracy movement, ethnic minorities - among others, the Uygurs of Turkic origin - or activities of the Falun Gong movement which has been banned as an anti-government group. In Germany, the Chinese intelligence services employ intelligence staff at their country's official missions for establishing contacts with unwitting informants. As part of their - mostly overt - information-gathering activities, intelligence staffers working under diplomatic cover establish friendly relations with persons who possess important information.

Their activities - for example, frequent invitations to lunch or dinner - are aimed at building a relationship of mutual commitment based on the idea of friendship, in order to obtain, in this unobtrusive way, information which could not be procured otherwise. In most cases, such relations are kept up over a number of years. The undercover staffers strictly stick to their cover and do not reveal their actual intelligence-oriented intentions to their vis-à-vis.

2. North Korean intelligence services

The North Korean regime operates six intelligence and security services which directly report to the head of state and party leader. In addition, there are a number of organisations that are organised and operated like intelligence services and use similar working methods. Of the six North Korean services, the "State Security Directorate", the "United Front Directorate" and the "Intelligence Bureau of the Armed

Forces Directorate" maintain legal residencies at the North Korean Embassy in Berlin.

Activities

In addition to ensuring personnel and physical security at North Korean establishments in Germany and other European countries, the priority activities of the "State Security Directorate" in 2004 included guidance, with regard to security aspects, for North Korean trainees and students living in Germany.

Sensitive exports

North Korea showed an undiminished interest in procuring sensitive goods, i.e. items intended for the North Korean armaments and proliferation programme. In response to effectively tightened export regulations and controls preventing such deliveries from Germany, North Korean procurement organisations and intelligence services try to channel their purchases via third countries (e.g. China, Singapore). In this way, the German business partners are to be kept in the dark about the actual end use of their products in a sensitive sector.

As before, the country's permanent shortage of foreign currency greatly inhibits the North Korean procurement efforts.

VI. Proliferation

Proliferation refers to the efforts made by a number of countries to gain possession of nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC) weapons and of the related delivery systems, and to acquire the material and the know-how required for producing such weapons and systems. A distinction is made between "primary, or vertical, proliferation" (transfer of products and know-how from industrialised nations to proliferation-relevant countries) and "secondary, or horizontal proliferation" (transfer of products and know-how among the proliferation-relevant countries).

General situation

The unresolved questions regarding the possible existence and the extent of Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programmes and reports about the increasing proliferation of missile technology continue to give cause for concern.

So-called proliferation-relevant countries - e.g. Iran, North Korea, Syria and Pakistan - already possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the related delivery systems, or seek to expand their existing programmes. In view of the continuing - and sometimes very intensive - efforts made by these countries to procure proliferation-relevant products or related know-how in Germany, it is expected that the risk of proliferation will persist unabatedly at a high level worldwide.

In December 2003, the Libyan head of state announced that he would discontinue his country's WMD programmes. On account of the subsequent developments, it is generally considered unlikely that Libya will continue to be a source of proliferation-relevant threats.

Procurement efforts

Some of the aforementioned countries already have the domestic capabilities to meet their demand for the pertinent products and know-how for developing and/or expanding a WMD programme. Countries lacking such capabilities must resort to procurement activities on the international market.

Over the past few years, the phenomenon of "secondary, or horizontal, proliferation" has gained in importance. A number of proliferation-relevant countries themselves act as sellers, offering machinery, equipment or even complete and operational missile systems. Un-suspicious newly industrialising countries¹⁷⁹, which are not part of the

¹⁷⁹ The term "newly industrialising countries" (NIC) refers to advanced developing countries which, on account of a high level of internal economic dynamics, have made considerable progress with industrial-

existing [multilateral] export control regimes, are used as intermediaries for establishing production plants in support of WMD programmes or for buying relevant products.

However, this development does not warrant the assumption that the proliferation-relevant countries could generally refrain from procurement activities in the industrialised countries. Current intelligence confirms the continuing interest of proliferation-relevant countries in business relations with German manufacturers or with intermediary suppliers in Germany in order to obtain this type of (special) products.

Methods

The stringent export controls enforced in Germany and elsewhere in Europe for preventing deliveries of proliferation-relevant items to foreign countries have had an influence on the procurement patterns of proliferation-relevant countries. The latter have had to develop various methods to evade the existing legal provisions. For example, they make use of clandestine procurement networks, conceal the actual end use of purchased goods from the German manufacturers or suppliers, or make their transactions through companies in third countries.

Similar methods are employed by proliferation-relevant countries when seeking information from the fields of science and education. Existing contacts with universities, institutes or research departments of companies are used for obtaining basic or specialised knowledge which might also be used for further developing weapons of mass destruction. Possible sources of information are co-operation programmes, research projects, international specialist conferences, Internet forums, etc.

Awareness-raising

The Offices for the Protection of the Constitution inform companies, institutes and academic establishments about the threats and risks posed by proliferation. An essential part of this education and awareness-raising programme is information about the current situation in the proliferation-relevant countries and their methods of procuring products and know-how in Germany. In June 2004, the Federal and the *Land* Offices for the Protection of the Constitution published an up-dated edition of the brochure entitled *Proliferation - Das geht uns an!* ("Proliferation concerns us!"). This brochure is also available on the Internet (www.verfassungschutz.de).

Conviction

The acute topicality of proliferation issues is underlined by the follow-

isation and have clearly caught up with industrialised nations as regards their level of industrialisation (e.g. China).

ing case:

On 28 May, the Stuttgart Landgericht (Regional Court) sentenced a German engineer to a four-year prison term on charges of infringement of the War Weapons Control Act (*Kriegswaffenkontrollgesetz*, KWKG) and the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (*Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz*, AWG). In its judgement, the court stated that the engineer, as the responsible agent of a German trading company, had tried to sell special aluminium tubes to North Korea via China. According to expert opinions, the tubes could be used for building gas ultracentrifuges which may be used for enriching uranium to weapons-grade quality.

Last-minute action at sea to prevent exports

Although the company had been previously warned by the German export authorisation authority (Federal Office of Economics and Export Control - Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, BAFA) that exports of the aluminium tubes to China would not be authorised because the declared intended use of the tubes in the Chinese aircraft industry was not plausible for technical reasons and because it was more likely that the special tubes would, instead, be used for North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, the engineer in April 2003 arranged for the delivery of these tubes to China. The Federal Government immediately gave orders for stopping the cargo ship while still at sea in the Mediterranean and for returning the relevant container with the special tubes to Germany.

VII. Arrests and convictions

In 2004, the Federal Public Prosecutor General instituted 25 preliminary proceedings on suspicion of activity on behalf of a foreign intelligence service and on charges of treason, respectively. Warrants were issued for the arrest of ten persons. During the same period, courts in the Federal Republic of Germany sentenced four suspects for criminal offences constituting "treason and/or threats to external security" (Sections 93 - 101a of the Criminal Code).

The Scientology Organisation (SO)

Founded:	in the USA in 1954; first Church of Scientology of Germany founded in 1970
Headquarters:	Los Angeles (Church of Scientology International, CSI);
Membership:	Federal Republic of Germany (estimate):between 5,000 and 6,000 (2003: between 5,000 and 6,000)*
Publications:	<i>FREIHEIT</i> (freedom); <i>IMPACT SOURCE</i> , among others <i>INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS</i> ; <i>ADVANCE!</i> ; <i>THE AUDITOR</i>
Subsidiary organisations:	In Germany, ten “churches”, among them (selection) two “Celebrity Centres” and eleven “Missions” ^{*)}

^{*)} SO claims to have 12,000 members and ten “missions”.

1. Introduction

The finding of the Standing Conference of the Ministers and Senators of the Interior (IMK) of 5/6 June 1997 still holds true: there is substantial evidence that the Scientology organisation (SO) is involved in activities directed against the free democratic order, and therefore the legal prerequisites for having the SO monitored by the Offices for the Protection of the Constitution are fulfilled.

2. Bases

The founder of the organisation, L. Ron Hubbard (1911–1986), saw himself as the fulfilment of a prophesy by Gautama Siddharta (called Buddha), according to which “at a time of worldwide degeneration, a man from the West will appear with a liberating technology in order to bring about a spiritual Golden Age on Earth”.¹⁸⁰

The SO sees its doctrine,¹⁸¹ as developed by Hubbard, as a “church of redemption” in the tradition of Eastern religions – especially Buddhism – which allegedly wants to convey the status of full mental freedom from the endless cycle of birth and death to human individuals, and to free them from their bonds in the physical universe.¹⁸² In the SO's view, anybody's “person” or “identity” is, for instance, not his/her body or name, but the “thetan”, which has no mass, no wavelength, that is to say nothing concrete.¹⁸³ In its ideal state as an “operating thetan”, it is entirely the “being at cause over matter, energy, space, time and thought”, and not in a body.¹⁸⁴ In order to reach this state, the first objective of Scientologists is to become “clear”, i.e. “as a result of Dianetic therapy, free of any actively or potentially existing psychosomatic illnesses or *aberrations*”.¹⁸⁵ According to the definition used by Scientologists, an “aberration” is a departure from rational thought or behaviour.¹⁸⁶ Such departure from rationality can be caused by what they call “engrams”. Scientologists define the term “engram” as a “mental image picture which is a complete recording of every perception present in a moment of partial or full 'unconsciousness'”.¹⁸⁷ “Auditing”¹⁸⁸ is designed to discover these “engrams” and to eliminate their effect.

¹⁸⁰ See *ADVANCE!*, 140/2000, p. 9:

¹⁸¹ For the technical terms refer to the SO website, Glossary (as at 12 November 2004).

¹⁸² See Section 3 of the Statute of the Scientology Kirche Deutschland e.V. (SKD, Church of Scientology of Germany, reg'd society) of 21 March 2002 (Local Court Munich, VR 6322); Section 3 of the model statute of an SO Mission.

¹⁸³ For the term “thetan”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung für Dianetics und Scientology* (Glossary of Dianetics and Scientology Terms), 4th edition, Copenhagen 1985 (in the following quoted as HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*), p. 98; HUBBARD, *Scientology - Die Grundlagen des Denkens* (Scientology: The Fundamentals of Thought), 2nd edition, Copenhagen 1973, p. 37.

¹⁸⁴ For the term “operating thetan”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung* (Glossary of Scientology & Dianetics Terms), p. 67.

¹⁸⁵ For the term “Clear”, cf. Hubbard, *Dianetik – Die moderne Wissenschaft der geistigen Gesundheit* (Dianetics - The Modern Science of Mental Health), 8th edition, Copenhagen 1984 (in the following quoted as HUBBARD, *Dianetik*), p. 215.

¹⁸⁶ For the term “aberration”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 1.

¹⁸⁷ For the term “engram”, cf. HUBBARD, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 27.

Under this procedure, the *auditor* (“one who listens”) – a minister of the “Church of Scientology” thus designated or someone trained as such¹⁸⁹ – helps the so-called *preclear* (PC – “some-one who is not yet Clear”)¹⁹⁰ to detect areas of grief or pain through a fixed sequence of questions or instructions.¹⁹¹ The auditor uses what Scientologists call an e-meter, or electropsychometer, for this. The device is used to measure “the body's resistance and its variations due to spiritual interaction” against an electric current while the preclear being questioned by the auditor holds both electrodes of the device in his/her hands.¹⁹² The movements of the e-meter needle are caused by the flow of current and are supposed to help “the auditor and preclear locate areas of spiritual distress and travail”.¹⁹³

In addition to “auditing”, the organisation offers a number of other seminars in Germany giving instructions for a successful way of life as understood by Scientology. The seminars and accompanying publications are offered for sale in a profit-oriented manner. This sales activity is the main task of the “churches” and “missions” in Germany.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁸ For the term “auditing”, cf. HUBBARD, *Das Scientology-Handbuch* (The Scientology Handbook), Copenhagen 1995, p. XX.

¹⁸⁹ For the term “auditor”, cf. *Was ist Scientology?* (What is Scientology?), Copenhagen 1998, pp. 164 ff.

¹⁹⁰ For the term “preclear”, cf. *ibid.* p. 164 ff.

¹⁹¹ For more information on the “auditing procedure”, cf. *ibid.* p.164 ff.

¹⁹² For the term “e-meter”, cf. *ibid.* p. 165 ff.

¹⁹³ Cf. *ibid.* p. 164 ff.

¹⁹⁴ The brochure *Die Scientology Organisation – Gefahren, Ziele und Praktiken* (The Scientology organisation – risks, aims and practices) (November 1998), published by the Federal Office of Administration on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, warns people of the possible risks which attending courses or applying Scientologist methods may pose to the individual.

3. Objectives

The court dismissed an action by the SO against observation by the BfV

In 2003, the Scientology Kirche Deutschland e.V. (SKD, Scientology Church of Germany reg'd society) and the Scientology Kirche Berlin e.V. (SKB, Scientology Church of Berlin reg'd society) filed an action before the Cologne administrative court against monitoring by the Federal Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). As a reason for their action, the plaintiffs claimed that they belonged to an allegedly globally recognised religious community and as such did not pursue any political aims.

On 11 November 2004 the court dismissed the action against the BfV (file reference 20 K 1882/03); however, referring to the fundamental importance of the matter, the court allowed an appeal against the decision.¹⁹⁵

Hard intelligence of anti-constitutional efforts

The court found that the observation operations carried out by the BfV which were directed against the SKD and SKB with both open and covert intelligence means were legal. The court said there was hard intelligence that the plaintiffs were working to undermine the free democratic order. According to the court, there existed a great number of sources, some of which were not available to the public, from which it could be derived that intentions were aimed at abrogating or restricting fundamental basic and human rights, such as human dignity, the right to free development of personality, and the right to equality. In addition, the court said that Scientology aspired to a society without general and equal elections. Therefore, the court ruled, observation of the plaintiffs by the BfV was necessary and appropriate and hence reasonable overall. The court said that this held true even if it was assumed that the plaintiffs were right in claiming that they were a religious community.

In its decision the court noted that the Scientology organisation continued to influence the political opinion of its members in a way that makes them oppose the constitution. The organisation publishes one edition after the other¹⁹⁶ of the writings of its founder L. Ron Hubbard, which are regarded as immutable, and sells them without qualifying their content in any way.

With regard to the unalterability of Hubbard's writings, the Statute of the SKB says: "The Church of Scientology should present, spread and

¹⁹⁵ <http://www.justiz.nrw.de>

¹⁹⁶ Cf. one of the websites run by the SO designed especially for selling books via the Internet, catalogue 2004.

practice the Scientology religion, make it popular and preserve and protect its purity and virginity, to enable every person ... to follow the path of redemption shown by L. Ron Hubbard, as he describes it in his writings about the Scientology religion or the Churches of Scientology – generally known as ‘the writings’ ...”¹⁹⁷

Exact implementation of Hubbard’s instructions is considered to be so important that SO magazines regularly call upon readers to write so-called “knowledge reports” to the Religious Technology Center (RTC) and report misapplications of the “technology” as set out in “the books, bulletins, guidelines and writings of LRH.”¹⁹⁸

These writings contain passages which call for abolishing the main principles of a free democratic order and creating a “new OT civilization”¹⁹⁹ instead. In addition, the SO trains its functionaries and members in German institutions in seminars where participants learn how to think and act in an anti-democratic way, based on the writings of the SO's founder.

For example, in the HCO policy letter with the title “Keeping Scientology Working” (published in *International Scientology News* and circulated in Germany), L. Ron Hubbard disparages the democratic state:

“And I don't see that popular measures, self-abnegation and democracy have done anything for Man but push him further into the mud. Currently, popularity endorses degraded novels, self-abnegation has filled the Southeast Asian jungles with stone idols and corpses, and democracy has given us inflation and income tax.”
(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*; vol. 29, 2004, p. 47 f.)

¹⁹⁷ See Section 2 para. 3 of the Statute of the SKD (Church of Scientology of Germany) as at 21 March 2002 (Local Court Munich, register VR 6322). See also Section 5 para. 3 of the Statute and the membership application form of the International Association of Scientologists (IAS) in *IMPACT*, 109/2004; In this publication, the IAS says that the main purpose of its organisation is “to unite, support and protect the Scientology religion and Scientologists around the world to ensure that the aims of Scientology as defined by L. Ron Hubbard be achieved.” In their application for membership, applicants must “vow” to “respect the rules, codes and guidelines of Scientology”.

¹⁹⁸ Cf. *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, vol. 28, 2004, p. 54 f.

¹⁹⁹ For the term “new OT civilization”, see *Freewinds – FSM Newsletter*, 38/2003, title page.

Restricted validity of basic rights and no equality before the law

In one of his other publications, Hubbard described the system he envisaged as a legal order under which the existence of the individual is subject to the SO's arbitrary discretion. Correspondingly, basic rights can be enjoyed only by those people who, after selection under the auditing procedure, are considered "honest" in the SO's view:

"In order to obtain help, you must be honest with your auditor. This is the path to mental health and true freedom. A person's right to survival is directly linked to his honesty. Freedom is for honest people."
(See *Einführung in die Ethik der Scientology* (Hubbard, Introduction to the Ethics of Scientology), Copenhagen 1998, p.36 f, p. 46)

In its decision, the Cologne administrative court noted that according to the writing quoted above, only Scientologists can be "honest" people and that, in Hubbard's view, only those people should be granted civic rights in a Scientologist society.²⁰⁰

The training materials for a course that was advertised on the Internet in the section "Introductory lectures on Dianetics and Scientology" indicate that in an SO-dominated society fundamental civic and human rights would be withheld from those people whom the organisation considers to be its enemies.

"It is a mistake to use 'individual rights' and 'freedom' as arguments to protect those who would only destroy. Individual rights were not originated to protect criminals but to bring freedom to honest men. ... Freedom is for honest people. No man who is not himself honest can be free. Freedom must be earned before any freedom is possible. ... By seeking to invoke his 'individual rights' to protect himself from an examination of his deeds, he reduces, just that much, the future of individual liberty – for he himself is not free. ... The right of a person to survive is directly related to his honesty. ... Freedom is for honest people. There is personal freedom only for those who have the ability to be free."
(*Persönliche Werte und Integrität - Gegründet auf die Werke von L. Ron Hubbard* (Personal values and integrity – Based on the writings of L. Ron Hubbard), Copenhagen 1991, p.201 f, p. 208)

²⁰⁰ See footnote 195.

**No rights for
“suppressive
persons”**

In another course²⁰¹ that was heavily advertised in Germany in 2004, quotations from L. Ron Hubbard’s writings are used to teach participants that alleged enemies of the SO should be deprived of all rights. This course seems to be particularly important to the SO. Large-format advertisements state:

“Shatter suppression! If you live on planet earth, this course is a must. Attend the “PTS/SP - How To Confront And Shatter Suppression” course in your Church of Scientology.”
(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*; vol. 28, 2004, p. 53)

In the course materials it says:

“Suppressive Acts are clearly those covert or overt acts knowingly calculated to reduce or destroy the influence or activities of Scientology. As persons or groups that would do such a thing act out of self interest only to the detriment of all others, they cannot be granted the rights ordinarily accorded rational beings.”
(Hubbard, *Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP Course), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 138 f.)

According to the SO, such suppressive acts include:

“Public disavowal of Scientology...
Public statements against Scientology or Scientologists...
Writing anti-Scientology letters to the press or giving anti- Scientology or anti-Scientologist evidence to the press...
Continued adherence to a person or group pronounced a Suppressive Person or Group. ... It’s a high crime to publicly depart Scientology.”
(Hubbard, *Wie man Unterdrückung konfrontiert und zerschlägt* (How to Confront and Shatter Suppression, PTS/SP Course), Copenhagen, 2001, p. 126 ff.)

This demonstrates very clearly that every opponent of the SO who merely tries to reduce the influence of the organisation is disqualified by it as a “suppressive person” who for that reason should “not be granted the rights ordinarily accorded rational beings”.

The Cologne administrative court expressly notes that Scientology’s inhuman ideology is reflected in the fact that “suppressive persons” or “oppressors”, i.e. “enemies of Scientology”, should be removed by

²⁰¹ Cf. *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, vol. 26, 2004, p. 20; vol. 27, p. 45; vol. 28., p. 53. In a supplement to vol. 26 participants in Germany are asked to “donate” the sum of € 1,482.75 to pay for the course.

coercive means or, ideally, ruined; SO considers such “enemies” to be “fair game” which should be “deprived of their property, injured by any means ..., tricked, sued or lied to”.²⁰²

Intelligence service which has absolute rule

According to Hubbard, a Scientologist is “someone who controls persons, circumstances and situations”.²⁰³ Accordingly, an intelligence service run by the organisation that is not bound by laws and legislation, should investigate potential wrongdoing and take preventive and repressive measures considered necessary by the SO, while the person concerned has no protection from independent courts:

”We know our enemies before they strike. We are keeping them from important positions. If we happen to get somebody in a key position and he then starts making mistakes, we will shoot quickly and administer justice afterwards...”

(Hubbard, *Handbuch des Rechts* (Handbook of Law), Copenhagen, 1979, p. 2 f.)

In a 2004 SO magazine circulated in Germany, a leading Scientologist describes one of the means SO intends to use against “suppressive persons” and institutions as follows:

“Just as we treat any other person, if government agencies act in a suppressive or unreasonable manner we will ‘pull their withholds’.”
(*IMPACT*, vol. 106, 2003, p. 24)

The SO defines a “withhold” as “an unspoken, unannounced transgression against a moral code by which a person was bound.”²⁰⁴

Long-term changes in the political system to be achieved by SO's “expansion”

According to Hubbard, the SO is to achieve its long-term political aims not by participating in the process of developing policies, but rather by continuing to expand and increasing its income.

SO's aspirations to expand and develop a different society are expressed clearly in several recent publications:

“At the end of the his speech at the New Year's Event, David Miscavige, the head of RTC, called upon all Scientologists to unite

²⁰² See footnote 195.

²⁰³ See *IMPACT*, vol. 106, 2003, p. 4.

²⁰⁴ See Hubbard, *Fachwortsammlung*, p. 111.

and jointly take the next giant steps towards the goal of clearing the planet.”

(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*; vol. 26, 2004, p. 22)

“Our programmes literally affect whole nations – not piece by piece, but straight to the top, in a vertical direction – and change the future of whole regions and nations.” ...

How to achieve planetary clearing ... “Creating these ideal orgs is not just an objective in its own right. Rather it is aimed at creating islands of sanity, stable points, in order to bring the whole Tech into society, thus creating a new culture.”

(*INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*; vol. 28, 2004, p. 9; translated from the German)

“Overcoming barriers to expansion

‘In the many wars in which we were victorious over those who tried to enslave man, and in the few ongoing battles we have fought and still fight with the same aim akin to any other ethics measure: to enable the Tech to penetrate [society] and stay there.’”

(*IMPACT*, vol. 106, 2003, p. 24, translated from the German)

4. Publicity

Brochures and public advertising campaigns

The organisation continues to behave mostly in the same way in public as in the past. It has continued to distribute publications, brochures and flyers in the pedestrian precincts of German cities which were also sent to numerous private households and public authorities. Direct mail SO advertising was also received by the Federal Border Police and several other police offices. These advertising campaigns focused on social issues, such as drug and alcohol abuse, or on what the SO considers the deplorable state of psychiatry. Moreover, the organisation organised publicity events, such as the Crusade of Honorary Priests (a presentation of the “auditing” procedure in yellow tents) in several German cities in order to gain the public’s attention and recruit new participants for its courses.²⁰⁵

A new, large-scale propaganda action of SO is directed at the “opinion leaders and elected representatives of the peoples of Europe” as well as to the “highest government levels”. With the help of this campaign,

²⁰⁵ Cf. *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, vol. 26, 2004, p. 25 f; *Neue Zivilisation* (New Civilization), special edition, vol. 3, 2004, p. 9.

the organization hopes to spread its ideology and arouse an interest in their “solutions” for various societal problems. The organization claims to have circulated 550,000 copies of advertising material accompanying the campaign since its start in Europe. In addition, a new exhibition is designed to present “solutions of L. Ron Hubbard for improving society”.²⁰⁶

The SO on the Internet

As in 2004, the SO presented comprehensive and technically sophisticated sites on the Internet containing information on its aims, subsidiary organisations and current publications. In addition, Scientologists, including several hundred German members, have continued to promote the organisation on their own Internet sites professing their faith in the SO.

Little response among the general public

As in previous years, the SO's publicity campaigns were generally not very successful. The SO had very little success in recruiting and retaining new members for any length of time. The majority of new members usually cancel their membership within a short time. Public advertising events were attended by very few people and attracted little media attention.

Geographical distribution of membership and activities remains uneven

In Germany, the most important regions in terms of membership and activities are the greater Hamburg area and the *Länder* of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria. In addition, significant numbers of members can be found in the *Länder* of Hesse, Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia and Rhineland-Palatinate.

²⁰⁶ Cf. *INTERNATIONAL SCIENTOLOGY NEWS*, vol. 29, 2004, p. 30 ff.

Security and Counter-Sabotage

Security tasks	Security is absolutely essential to a democratic state governed by the rule of law. Security ensures that information and procedures remain secret and protected against unauthorised disclosure when their publication could threaten the existence, vital interests or security of the Federal Government and its agencies (<i>Bund</i>) or of any of the states (<i>Länder</i>).
Classified material	Irrespective of their form, sensitive facts, objects or intelligence to be kept secret are classified material and must be marked with one of the following classifications: <i>STRENG GEHEIM</i> (Top Secret), <i>GEHEIM</i> (Secret), <i>VS-VERTRAULICH</i> (Confidential) or <i>VS-NUR FÜR DEN DIENSTGEBRAUCH</i> (Restricted).
Physical security	Physical security provides the organisational and technical prerequisites for the protection of classified material. The Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has primary responsibility for this task. The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) must cooperate, pursuant to Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 3, of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution (<i>Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetz</i>), by providing intelligence of possible relevance to the physical security of classified material.
Personnel security	<p>The central task is to protect classified material. The instrument used for the purpose is security screening of persons to be entrusted with tasks of a sensitive nature.</p> <p>The security screening procedure is regulated in the Security Clearance Check Act (<i>Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz</i>, SÜG). The BfV's participation in this procedure is based on Section 3 (2), first sentence, no. 1, of the Federal Act on the Protection of the Constitution in conjunction with Section 3 (2) of the Security Clearance Check Act.</p>
Jurisdiction	<p>The fact that personnel security is assigned to the BfV as a "participatory task" means that the BfV does not have primary jurisdiction; responsibility for security measures lies with the competent authorities. In the federal public service, this is generally the employing authority.</p> <p>Classified government material requiring protection is handled not only by public institutions but also by private-sector enterprises, among others. In this case, the Federal Ministry of Economics and</p>

	<p>Labour (BMWA) assumes responsibility for ensuring the security of such material.</p>
Personnel-related counter-sabotage	<p>Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage was introduced in the Security Clearance Check Act, in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, on the basis of the Counter-Terrorism Act (<i>Terrorismusbekämpfungsgesetz</i>) of 9 January 2002.</p>
Security clearance checks	<p>Security clearance checks, which have proved an effective instrument in personnel security, are now being used to ensure that persons presenting a risk to security are not employed in key positions in sensitive areas. Current and prospective employees in vital or defence establishments are subject to security vetting.</p>
Vital establishments	<p>Establishments are considered vital if their disruption could seriously threaten the health or lives of large segments of the population, due to the risk inherent in the nature of their operations. 'Risk inherent in the nature of operations' refers to risk inherent in the work process itself or in the materials used in production or work (e.g. danger of fire, explosion or contamination).</p> <p>Vital establishments also include those that are essential to the functioning of the community and whose disruption would cause panic or distress among large segments of the population, thus threatening public order or security. This includes public provision of postal and telecommunications services.</p>
Defence establishments	<p>Preventive personnel-related counter-sabotage also applies to important defence establishments beyond the remit of the Federal Ministry of Defence. These include establishments involved in creating or maintaining defence preparedness and whose disruption could seriously jeopardise the functioning of the Bundeswehr, allied forces or civil defence. Such establishments also include key manufacturers in the defence industry and supplies industry as well as central transport and telecommunications facilities.</p>
Security-sensitive positions	<p>For reasons of proportionality, measures to prevent personnel-related sabotage apply only to security-sensitive positions within vital and defence establishments, i.e. the smallest organisational units working independently and protected against unauthorised access. Only persons employed in such positions must undergo security vetting. For counter-sabotage purposes, a 'simple security check' is required, i.e. a form of vetting that causes as little inconvenience as possible to the person being vetted.</p>
Statutory ordinance and guide	<p>The Ordinance Establishing Security Vetting Requirements for Vital and Defence Establishments</p>

(*Sicherheitsüberprüfungsfestellungsverordnung, SÜFV*) of 30 July 2003 (Federal Law Gazette I, p. 1553) gives a legally binding list of vital and defence establishments.

The Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour has drafted a guide to personnel-related counter-sabotage in industry. It can be accessed on the Internet at www.bmwa-sicherheitsforum.de.

Consent

It should be emphasised that security clearance checks may only be carried out with the express consent of the persons affected.
